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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to analyse the regime on defence 
procurement together with the dynamics and the shape of coordination 
achieved among European states. 
Defence procurement regards the acquisition and management of 
military programmes by governments or ad hoc agencies. Weapons 
procurement has historically been a domain of national states. Its 
apparent linkage with security affairs has hampered or rendered 
difficult cooperation among states. Nevertheless, pressured by internal 
and external factors, European countries are partly reconsidering their 
procurement policies. The last decade of the 20th century has been 
characterized by significant turning points that have increased  states’ 
willingness to coordinate their actions. 
In the first part of the research the nature of the regime is discussed: 
coordination in weapons procurement among European states reflects 
a security regime. Then, a depiction of the difficulties and challenges 
that a security regime presents is provided, deriving mainly from the 
available literature on this realm. Having defined the nature of the 
regime, the research highlights the basis for cooperation by considering 
the theoretical approaches that seem more likely to explain it: power 
based theories. In the second part of the research the findings 
emphasized in the theoretical part are employed to analyse the regime 
on defence procurement. Evidence of the features composing the 
regime and explanations of the difficulties of formalizing it and 
rendering it binding for all European states are made available.  
It is emphasized that while there exists a willingness to coordinate 
actions among states, tangible results have been achieved outside of the 
EU context and between the most powerful European states, mainly 
through OCCAR(Organization Conjointe de Coopération en Matière 
d’Armement). OCCAR, an International Organization for the joint 
management of European military programmes, does not constitute the 
regime itself, but contributes to its existence in a significant way. The 
degree and the shape of coordination reached within this organization 
amid ‘distributional’ issues provides informed insights for future 
cooperative efforts. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this research will be to discuss the regime on defence 
procurement within the European context. The existence of a regime 
mirrors a pattern of cooperation among states and therefore this work 
will attempt at motivating states’ willingness to cooperate and the 
likely shape cooperation will take. 
Defence procurement concerns the acquisition and management of 
weapon systems by national states or by agencies appositely created for 
that purpose. Always considered as a matter of national concern, 
defence procurement has progressively shifted toward a problem of 
collective action: given industrial, economic and strategic pressures 
states are searching for forms of coordination among themselves. State-
of-the-art degree of cooperation within the European landscape should 
therefore inform about the features a cooperation in this subject matter 
does present as well as the challenges encountered and possibly 
hampering a thorough coordination path among states. 
The first two chapters of the research will be mainly theoretical so as to 
provide intellectual tools for the analysis of the second and more 
empirical part and to contribute to fill a poor International Relations 
literature treatment of the matter. The second part will analyse 
coordination paths taking place within the European scenario, showing 
and validating the findings summed up in the theoretical part. Also, 
the empirical part should report to the reader about the challenges 
likely to come about in cooperative settings characterized by security 
matters, so as to encourage realistic and reasoned cooperation 
proposals. 
In order to analyse cooperation on defence procurement it is 
paramount to provide and operationalize some concepts that will be 
used through the research: the first chapter will therefore specify what 
has traditionally been  intended with ‘regime’ and what with ‘security’. 
It will show that three schools of thought have dealt with ‘regimes’ and 
have tried to provide their own assessment about the likelihood of 
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cooperation and the effectiveness and impact of regimes on state’ 
actions. In particular, regimes have been mainly studied under the 
paradigm of the functionalist school of thought, eager to depict 
cooperation challenges in international affairs as Prisoner’s Dilemma 
situations, stressing therefore how ‘cheating’ and the lack of sound and 
appropriate information did impinge on cooperative endeavours. It 
will be argued, though, that cooperation problems can assume different 
shapes according to the context of the game at play. Coordination 
games, for example are particularly relevant for the subject of our 
interest: not only they highlight the collective action challenge existing 
among actors but also underline the shape of the cooperative bargain, 
giving a peculiar role in this sense to power. 
The other concept chapter one focuses on is ‘security’, as it will be 
assumed that the defence procurement will characterize a security 
regime. Security today does not remind only to the mere survival of a 
nation state but to the pursuit and protection of other paramount 
interests: this paves the way for a more promising approach to the 
study of cooperative arrangements on security issues out of pure 
alliance dynamics. In fact, defence procurement will be considered as a 
security regime, exhibiting all the challenges this issue area is likely to 
bring about added and combined with those to be faced in a 
coordination game posing ‘distributional’ concerns. 
After having clarified the theoretical concepts to be employed in the 
empirical part chapter two will become familiar with defence 
procurement meaning and practices, specifying the reasons why it was 
considered as a paramount ‘national’ affair and clarifying how defence 
economics may impinge on a state’ s security. Defence procurement 
regards not only the acquisition of a weapon system, but also all the 
phases of its life-cycle: this will remark the arduous bargaining game 
likely to arise and the differences existing between a traditional market 
and a defence one. As previous cooperative experiences show, 
cooperation did mainly exclude competition: it was instead a strategy 
to boost the national industry and achieve strategic aims. Past 
cooperative experiences do highlight the limits but also the 
potentialities of defence cooperative endeavours. 
The remainder of chapter two will be dedicated to the presentation of 
economic, industrial and strategic pressures strongly pushing states 
towards cooperative arrangements: unilateral actions (procuring alone 
the weapons needed) are neither rewarding nor efficient even if states 
can potentially decide to pursue this path: this mainly happens when 
they are not of the same opinion about a specific arrangements agreed 
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upon. It goes without saying that the more powerful a state the more 
likely it is to influence a particular compromise or achieve better 
returns by threatening defection. 
At this point of the research the defence procurement regime will be 
analysed in its actual and real shape. This should ask for the 
identification of principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures within the European context suggesting the existence of a 
patterned cooperation among states, and eventually evaluate the 
impact these have on states’ actions. This preliminary analysis will 
highlight the existence of a double track on defence procurement, 
within and outside of the European institutional framework: within it 
the European Defence Agency deserves a particular attention because 
of its broad partnership and its attempt at favouring a thorough 
European defence stance. Outside of the European context OCCAR 
(Organization Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement) emerges as 
the highest accomplishment in defence procurement cooperation albeit 
with a small and powerful membership (as for defence capabilities) and 
an inter-governmental approach.  Therefore, the entire fourth chapter 
will be dedicated to the analysis of this organization, searching to 
envision the reasons of its success and underlining the ever-persisting 
limitations on cooperation in defence matters.  
The fear of loosing political control over a programme, of loosing jobs 
and of loosing relative competitiveness are among the most common 
concerns that did hamper institutionalized and enduring structures for 
the acquisition and management of weapon systems: from this point of 
view OCCAR scores a relevant goal in fostering a more lasting 
cooperation among states. Created by the most important defence 
producers and consumers within the European landscape (France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy), OCCAR is managing some 
fundamental European programmes. Notwithstanding huge 
‘distributional issues’ that did delay and put in danger cooperative 
arrangements, it is fair to assume that without OCCAR the 
management of those programmes would have been difficult if not 
impossible. The analysis of the A400M military transport aircraft will 
show how the willingness of some European states to cooperate met 
with an agency able to bring about concrete results amid strong 
national pressures.  
Thus, cooperation on defence procurement will be analysed in all its 
facets: as an achievement, if compared to past cooperative efforts and 
as a stumbling block, plagued by ‘distributional issues’. 
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Chapter 1 
The regime on defence 
procurement: theoretical 
background 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this theoretical part of the research is that of providing a 
basic understanding of the subject-matter we are dealing with. Defence 
procurement regards the acquisition and management of defence 
systems: what is at stake is the production of military and destructive 
means that no doubt suggests the security nature of the issue at hands, 
albeit with some important economic features. Because of the issue-
area it would not be ordinary to observe states’ willingness to 
cooperate aside from traditional alliances dynamics against a well-
defined enemy. Instead, what is worth noticing today are various 
attempts by European states to coordinate their actions so as to jointly 
manage defence procurement and progressively standardize their 
national procurement practices. This is particularly determined by 
economic, industrial and strategic pressures and incentives that all 
European states experience. These attempts at cooperation without a 
clear-cut threat on the forefront seem to suggest the existence of a 
regime, conceived this latter as a form of coordination and 
accommodation among actors. If this is true the first step of the 
research on defence procurement should be to present and clarify the 
theoretical tools that will be employed during the work.  
Assessing the existence of a regime on defence procurement is subject 
to two preliminary and consequential steps: defining what a regime is 
for different International Relations schools of thought and choosing a 
theoretical approach that seems to fit the research purposes. The first 
section will therefore highlight the way in which different schools of 
thought have approached the ‘regime’ debate, so as to underline the 
questions they do focus on when explaining cooperation, their 
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interpretation of regimes with regard to states’ interests, preferences 
and social environment, their evaluation of the impact regimes do have 
on states’ actions and relationships. The theoretical approaches that 
will be considered in the research are the ‘rationalist’ ones as they seem 
keener to answer the question ‘why do states cooperate on defence 
procurement’. The cognitivist approach, that will not be considered in 
the remainder of the research, will be broadly discussed and the 
reasons of its weakness for our subject matter explained.  
As for the rationalist schools of thought, encompassing two 
substantially different theories, it will be shown how the hegemonic 
stability theory first and the functionalist theory afterwards have 
dominated the regime literature sometimes overlooking other relevant 
insights. In particular, the functionalist approach to regimes has 
conceived the Prisoner’s dilemma as the best game representing 
cooperation challenges in international affairs and has derived from it 
recipes for cooperation. What will be stressed, though, is that 
international affairs produce multiple cooperation challenges according 
mainly to the context, the structural situation in which actors find 
themselves to play: this consideration will inevitably shed a new light 
on cooperation dynamics and perspectives.  
After having introduced the theoretical debate about regimes the 
following step will be to narrow the scope of the analysis and focus on 
security regimes, which interest us the most. It will be argued that poor 
studies have been conducted on security regimes because few of them 
did ever appear: the security dilemma on the forefront has opened 
opportunities for cooperation only on some particular occasions such 
as in the Concert of Europe or in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime. 
If security issues have been studied most of the time as zero-sum gains 
situations some scholars recognize that security does not overlap with 
military force, but instead comprises the protection of much more 
encompassing interests. For these reasons the security dilemma is 
mitigated on some situations and hope for cooperation does arise even 
if concerns about relative gains and distributional issues still persist. 
It will be shown, then, that notwithstanding its security nature, 
cooperation on defence procurement does not mirror a security 
dilemma scenario but rather an attempt at coordinating states’ actions 
acknowledging the sub-optimality of a going-it-alone strategy. This is 
the first reason why states do coordinate on defence procurement. If 
coordination is deemed paramount states would then struggle to make 
their preferred outcome count, and therefore  a ‘distributional’ conflict 
is likely to come about. The achievement of a particular coordination 
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point is utmost for states: in the section dedicated to the relative gains 
concerns emphasis will be put on the impact of cooperation on the 
position of states and the relevance this latter achieves for the pursuit 
of significant interests. A valuable way to assess the impact and 
relevance of a regime would be to question whether states are able to 
achieve the same objectives obtainable through it with other tools or 
other strategies: the last two sections search to demonstrate how 
cooperation can be one but useful strategy adoptable by states in order 
to achieve their interests and conserve their position within the system. 
If it is true that powerful actors are able to guide and influence the 
distributional process within a regime it is likely that the final 
coordination point will be a ‘compromise’ solution among different 
options, especially if, as in the case of defence procurement, the actors 
bargaining for their preferred positions share similar structural 
capabilities and if coordination is that compelling to force conciliation. 
1.2 International regimes: sociological vs. rationalist 
approach 
‘International regimes’ as a topic of International Relations has caught a 
broad academic interest during the middle ‘80s and ’90s. Partly, this 
was determined by the presence of forms of ‘durable collaborations’ 
between states that invited scholars of different schools of thought to 
offer explanations of these phenomena.1 Moreover, in those years, a 
great contribute to the literature about regimes was provided by a 
book, edited by Stephen Krasner, “International Regimes”,2  aimed at 
starting a fruitful debate about regimes, their meaning, their scope, and 
the likelihood of their creation, durability and demise. Within the book 
was an article written by Robert Keohane, “The Demand for International 
Regimes”, that became afterwards the base of the most important 
volume about regimes, After Hegemony,3 a book that has fostered huge 
attention and criticisms, both from the realist school and the cognitivist 
one. 
                                                           
1 Among the most studied regimes were those build around the GATT, OPEC 
and the international regime on Nuclear Proliferation. 
2 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 
London, 1983. 
3 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, Princeton University Press, 1984. 
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From the ‘80s, regimes have proliferated and their relevance has 
somehow been highlighted by the demise of the Cold War, in which 
cooperation between states was explained as another form of 
confrontation between the poles. Nevertheless, poor studies have been 
conducted on regimes and all the schools of thought who did pay 
attention to these cooperation phenomena have hampered a thorough 
and productive analysis of them by remaining too entrenched to their 
own paradigms and assumptions. Also, part of the explanation of the 
lack of substantial researches can result from the consideration that the 
broadness of ‘regimes’ as a concept and the disagreement about their 
meaning has rendered them an hard topic to handle. The following 
section will therefore take into consideration the insights provided by 
various schools of thought and will highlight their limits as well as 
their linchpins in dealing with regimes. 
The generally cited definition of regimes is the one provided by 
Stephen Krasner in his book; namely regimes are “implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area of international 
relations”.4 In particular it can be said that principles state the basic 
beliefs upon which a regime is formed, norms should direct the 
behaviour of the regime partners in a way consistent with the 
principles, rules convert the norms in prescriptions or proscriptions 
and finally a bunch of procedures are provided to help organizing 
collective decision-making between states. From the very beginning of 
its formulation this kind of definition has brought about a huge debate 
between pundits. As correctly Strange points out, the concept of 
regimes is misleading,5 and the main reason is that, because different 
schools of thought have different beliefs about the formation, the 
emergence and the function of principles and norms they have also 
different assessments about regimes.  
                                                           
4 Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for actions. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective actions. See, 
Stephen Krasner, 1983, p. 2. 
5 Susan Strange finds that ‘regime’ is a misleading concept that obscures basic 
economic and power relationships. Her contribute to Krasner’s book is in fact 
very critical and stands apart from other more purposeful contributes. See 
Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis”, in 
Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983, pp. 337-355. 
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From the debate around regimes three main approaches have emerged: 
a cognitivist, a realist and a neo-institutionalist one. While the realist 
school and the neo-institutionalist one interpret the definition of 
regimes mostly in the same way, the cognitivist school confers to their 
definition a particular meaning. Below cognitivists’ conception of 
regimes will be investigated: notwithstanding its positive contribution 
to the literature it will be clarified why this research will not base its 
assumptions on this approach.  
1.2.1 The Sociological approach 
First of all it is necessary to underline that there is not a unanimous 
consensus on whether it is possible to speak about a “theory” in the 
sense in which we refer to the realist or the neo-istitutionalist ones. If 
some scholars from the cognitivist strand oppose strongly the 
fundamentals of the traditional theories less fruitful has been the 
attempt at formulating a well consistent approach and providing it 
with solid empirical tests. Part of the reason is of course that the 
‘sociological’ approach undertaken difficultly matches with the attempt 
at operationalizing concepts or observing and measuring events. 
Within the cognitive landscape a differentiation must be made among 
the scholars who retain that the traditional or rationalist approach is 
incomplete and those who retain that the basic underpinnings of this 
latter are flawed.  
According to utilitarian theories (realist and neo-istitutionalist) states 
are able to individuate and adopt the soundest strategy to maximize 
their utility: states are therefore rational goal seeking. Thus, 
cooperation is interpreted as one of the available strategy to solve 
collective actions problem that would impede the achievement of a 
likely interest. Preferences, for these approaches, are taken as given and 
enter the cooperative game meeting those of the other states. ‘Weak’ 
cognitivists argue that rather than given, actors’ interests are moulded 
by states’ interpretation of the world: “before states can agree on 
whether and how to deal collectively with a specific problem, they 
must reach some consensus about the nature and the scope of the 
problem and also about the manner in which the problem relates to 
other concerns in the same and additional issue-areas”.6  Hence, weak 
                                                           
6  Peter Haas, cited in Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, 
Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 
p. 141. 
 10 
cognitivists point at explaining the ways in which interests are shaped 
and created and help cooperation, emphasizing the role that ‘emerging 
and shared ideas’ may have in preferences formation or change 
through accommodations and learning processes. Cooperation can be 
learned because interests may be re-shaped and not because states 
adjust to structural changes.7 As an example, according to this 
interpretation the Non-Proliferation regime has come about because 
both the superpowers realised the dangerousness of nuclear arms and 
therefore the necessity to cooperate to have their safety guaranteed, 
“the rules and institutions not only constrained short-range self-
interest, but they helped to reshape long-range self-interest so that non-
proliferation has become a major interest for both states”.8   
The creation of institutions and regimes produced by shared belief 
drives actors’ expectations and may re-define their interests, while for 
rationalist theories their actual impact would be appreciated when 
considering the new strategies at hand for the pursuit of fixed interests 
provided by the alteration of their costs and benefits. The idea of 
knowledge as a driving force towards change does conflict with the 
main underpinnings of the traditional theories, but it has gained 
moment in particular turning points such as the implosion of the Soviet 
Union, supposed to be caused by the emergence of a ‘new thinking’. As 
seen, this approach is not incompatible with the rationalist theories, 
and instead it could provide a more informed setting when explaining 
specific events. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess when a particular 
idea is going to emerge and whether it is going to prevail on other 
ideas: it is difficult to assess if  a demand for cooperation will arise. 
What if cooperation or change do arise without a change in basic ideas? 
The way in which change may occur creates one of the most apparent 
weaknesses of this approach: while there is a certain consent on what 
causes change this school lacks a causation pattern as the one 
highlighted by the liberal one. To correct this flaw theorists propose 
‘shocks’ as one of the explanatory variable of change or slow process of 
alteration that occur in International Relations or mutation in states’ 
interactions (proposition of a signal of change, interpretation of this 
latter by the other parties and consequent answer).  
In fairness the added-value of this approach has been appreciated and 
recognized if we consider that both some realist and neo-institutionalist 
                                                           
7  Joseph S. Nye, “Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes”, 
International Organization, 41, 3, Summer 1987, p. 372. 
8 Ibid., p. 397. 
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pundits have, on some occasions, flirted with ‘cognitive’ insights, cases 
in point being John Ikenberry in his explanation of the persistence of 
the American power, Stephen Krasner in his book about Sovereignty, 
Stephen Walt in his “balance of threat” theory, or Robert Jervis in his 
argument about perceptions and misperceptions.9 The ability of this 
approach to fit traditional theories is especially due to a persistence of a 
‘state-centered’ focus: in this way speculation about the behaviours of 
states in particular circumstances may explain shifts from mainstream 
guidelines foreseen by the classic and sometimes too parsimonious 
theories. 
Of a totally different emphasis are the ‘strong’ cognitivism approaches: 
these ones question the rationalist approach assumed by the utilitarian 
theories by saying that every rational choice is not conceivable if not 
derived from the identities and social institutions in which it is 
embedded. From this point of view it is this basic social context that 
guides states’ actions according to their position within it: states are 
‘role players’ and not ‘goal-seeking’, and would not choose the most 
rewarding strategy but the most appropriate one. International regimes 
are therefore inserted in a broader frame of social institutions and 
shared identities and will exhibit both a regulative and constitutive 
dimension, “on the one hand, they operate as imperatives requiring 
states to behave in accordance with certain principles, norms and rules; 
on the other hand, they help create a common social world by fixing 
the meaning of behaviour”.10  
Various cognitivist approaches put an emphasis on peculiar elements 
for the creation and essence of regimes: the importance of the 
‘international society’ (English school) to motivate an ‘obligation’ for 
the respect of norms and rules; the importance of communication 
among members to forge or preserve a shared vision on norms of 
conduct or to consider their likely interpretation and application in 
specific contexts through ‘persuasion’, “behaviour is thus not 
coordinated by external incentives but by common understanding of 
what a given situation requires social actors to do”;11 the importance of 
                                                           
9 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1976, ch. 6, John G. Ikenberry, After Victory: 
Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, 2000, Stephen M. Walt, The 
Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 1987. 
10 Andreas Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 163. 
11 Ibid., p. 177. 
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the social intersubjective process of collective identity formation when 
relating with other actors that pushes towards new interests in favour 
of cooperation. From this point of view these approaches diverge 
significantly from the neo-institutionalist one which also stresses the 
positive role of regimes and institutions on states: according to this 
school, even if regimes do help states cooperate they are not likely to 
change states’ interests but to advance their achievement. This is why 
they are considered as ‘intervening’ variables rather than ‘independent’ 
ones. The emphasis of the strong cognitivism scholars on 
communication, persuasion and interpretation gains a particular 
relevance in the light of our research: most of the studies conducted by 
these pundits refer to the European Union as a quasi- ‘pluralistic 
security community’ according to Deutsch terminology: even if 
motivated by egoistic reasons and aimed in particular to avoid the 
horrors of the past, European states, through institutions, have come to 
downplay their previous ‘national’ identity in favour of a ‘we-feeling’ 
awareness, to the point that a war among them is now unthinkable. The 
‘de-securitization’ of their practices has reinforced and has been 
reinforced by their common identity.12 In analysing the case of defence 
procurement it will be clear how this approach is far from reality at 
least in security issues: in fact, it is difficult for these pundits to explain 
why cooperation on some matters is still seen as troublesome for 
                                                           
12 Constructivism states basically that there is not an objective reality out there 
but that this latter depends on actors’ perception and interpretation of it. Karl 
Deutsch’ s pioneering work dating back to the end of the ‘50s has been 
considered an inspiring masterpiece for most of the constructivist theorists. The 
author emphasized how among the security community (North-Atlantic) the 
settlement of disputes among actors would have been resolved pacifically and 
diplomacy would have replaced coercion if divergences were likely to arise, so 
that in the region, the fear of war disappeared and the security dilemma was 
resolved. De-securitization means in this context that security disappear from 
the political agenda of the states of the region. In his studies Deutsch referred 
prominently to the North-Atlantic region as the one where a sort of’ ‘we-
feeling’ process did progressively take shape. He, together with other pundits, 
emphasized the importance of institutions in downplaying tensions among 
states and forging new and common interests through meetings and 
communication. In this sense he started his analysis not by denying the real 
uncertainties and threats perception among states but went on by emphasizing 
the positive role of institutions in mitigating them, a process well considered 
also by Adler and Barnett, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds.  
Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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European states and why they do still try to preserve their national 
prerogatives as much as possible. 
Krasner points out that if for the realist and institutionalist schools 
regimes are phenomena to be explained for cognitivists they are data to 
be described.13 Hopkins and Puchala say that regimes exist in all areas 
of international relations, because statesmen always perceive 
themselves as constrained by principles, norms and rules that proscribe 
and prescribe varieties of behaviours. Issue areas in this case do not 
circumscribe the frontier of a regime because regimes represent shared 
perception among states and therefore a patterned behaviour.14 
According to some other scholars a regime is an attitudinal 
phenomenon: behaviour follows from adherence to principles, norms 
and rules that legal codes sometimes reflect. Young stresses that 
patterned behaviour inevitably generates convergent expectations that 
lead to conventionalized behaviours. If there exists a pattern of 
connected activities there must be some form of norms or procedures.15  
Nevertheless, as Stein correctly points out, such an interpretation of 
regimes risks being too encompassing, and risks associating regimes 
with behaviour and blurring causes with effects.16 Ruggie says that it is 
possible to discover the existence of regimes by their principled and 
shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social 
behaviour.17 Therefore, regimes seem like cognitive entities because 
they give birth to mutual expectations and agreement about 
appropriate behaviours.  
According to these authors, then, the study of regimes must be faced in 
“sociological terms”. There is nothing to explain about regimes, but 
they can only be described. But how powerful and developed is the 
degree of ‘institutionalization’ from which all strong-cognitivists 
approaches derive their main arguments and what the influence on 
states and practices? Indeed, most of the times schools of thought are 
                                                           
13 Stephen Krasner, 1983, p. 10. 
14 Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala,  “International Regimes: 
Lessons from Inductive Analysis”, International Organization, 36, 2 Spring 1982, 
pp. 245-275.  
15 Oran R. Young, “Regimes Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International 
Regimes”, in Stephen Krasner, ed., 1983,  pp. 93-113. 
16 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: regimes in an Anarchic 
World”, in Stephen Krasner, ed. 1983,  p. 115. 
17 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order”, in Stephen Krasner, 
1983, pp. 195-232. 
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prone to answer different questions and this make them less useful 
when a research attempt does not find satisfying for its own ends their 
assumptions or starting points. The main problem with the cognitivists’ 
arguments is that most of the time principles and norms that 
characterize a regime do not represent ‘socially constructed agreement’. 
As Hasenclever points out, “rules written down on a piece of paper do 
not constitute social institutions, nor do promises or contracts”.18 
Agreed principles and norms are time and again the fruit of 
compromises between states’ interests and the product of most 
powerful states’ influence, “sorting out the autonomous influence of 
knowledge and ideology can prove extremely difficult in practice, 
particularly where there is a congruence between ideology and 
structural position. If structural theories are weak on cognitive 
variables, most cognitive theories cannot describe clearly how power 
and ideas interact. The same set of objections may even extend to 
knowledge-oriented ‘cognitivism’.”19  
Regimes do represent forms of coordination between different states 
that need to be explained and not described; the cognitive approach 
does not answer the question “why do states cooperate”, which is the 
first question that motivates this research.  
1.2.2 The rationalist schools of thought: broadening the 
scope for cooperation 
In this section a brief presentation of the neo-institutionalist and the 
realist schools approaches to regimes is provided. Most of the literature 
about regimes has been written during the Cold War where the 
systemic configuration characterizing this latter has for sure 
constrained and in a certain way helped states pursue their objectives 
by narrowing their scope. Under these constraints cooperation has been 
achieved between states thanks to the most powerful leader of the pole. 
The realist  Hegemonic Stability Theory20 was the best explanation for 
the accounting of cooperation between states and for the provision of 
regimes.  
                                                           
18  Andreas Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 19. 
19 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes”, 
International Organization, 41, 3, 1987, p. 512.  
20 For a review of the hegemonic stability theory see Robert Gilpin, The Political 
Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, 1987. 
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With the demise of the Cold War the realist school found itself puzzled 
by seeing that forms of cooperation between states did resist the 
decline of the hegemonic power. Cooperation between actors had then 
to be explained anew and risked damaging the very underpinnings of 
the realist thought that explained it in terms of power and related 
interests. If the hegemon was the supplier and the guarantor of a 
regime its demise would have signified a decrease of cooperation 
perspectives: contrary to this forecast, cooperative settings seemed to 
mushroom and this shifted the emphasis of the regime debate from the 
“supply side” to the “demand-side” of regimes, focussing on the 
reasons spurring states to create regimes. The neo-institutionalist 
school, with Keohane on the forefront, seemed able to provide a sound 
explanation for the persistence of regimes in the absence of a 
hegemon.21 His contractualist theory of regimes, discussed below, 
seemed to reduce the leverage of the realist theory by demonstrating 
that rational egoistic actors in an anarchic world were able to cooperate 
thanks to the creation of institutions. Summing up, the realist school 
seemed to be on the defensive as for the explanation of international 
regimes as forms of cooperation out of  traditional alliances patterns- 
even if some pundits did assert that the presence of regimes was totally 
consistent with the realist assumptions of  sovereignty and self-reliance 
that allowed states to build up regimes when tackling ‘dilemmas’-22 
while, the neo-institutionalist school seemed to be able to provide a 
powerful theory of “regime demand”, even if this approach did not 
face the ‘supply-side’ issue of regimes provision.  
The neo-institutionalist theory of regimes aims at answering the 
question “why are states likely to ask for regimes”. Robert Keohane’s 
theory is a ‘functionalist’ one, since he explains regimes in terms of 
their results. Precisely, he states that regimes are demanded because 
they will help states achieve cooperation and cooperation may assure 
the achievement of common interests. This narrow focus leaves out 
other fundamental issues in international bargaining: will everybody 
win? Will states always pursue cooperative outcomes? What if states 
are not able to create regimes? Will cooperation be pursued in other 
ways and with other tools? These questions cannot be answered 
                                                           
21 See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984, and Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of 
the Hegemonic Stability Theory”, International Organization, 39, 1985, pp. 579-
614. 
22 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic 
World”, International Organization, 36, 2, 1982, p. 324.  
 16 
essentially because of the basic assumptions delineated by the author. 
In fact, Keohane asserts that most of the situations in international 
relations can be considered as a Prisoner’s Dilemma games,23 in which 
states share some common interests but fail to reach them because 
cooperation, while Pareto-optimal, is neither individually achievable 
nor a stable strategy. There is always an incentive to cheat for states, 
because by cheating they will gain the higher pay-off on the matrix. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games have always been used to explain ‘economic 
problems’, such as market failures situations, collective goods sub-
optimal provision and externalities effects. In all these situations actors 
prefer to cheat because they lack information about the behaviour of 
other actors. What Keohane does, in fact, is to rely broadly on the 
economic field in stressing cooperative dilemmas; this operation, 
though, poses two problems: first, it seems implicitly to fit only 
economic cooperation settings and second it neglects the much more 
stringent (distributional) dynamics occurring among states. This has 
given both a misleading depiction of cooperative problems and posed a 
too optimistic confidence on the effectiveness of regimes. As it will be 
seen below, criticisms have not only arisen from realist pundits but also 
from neo-istitutionalist ones.24 
The main assumption of his theory is that states have a common 
interest but fail to achieve it because they fear of being cheated by other 
actors. They lack information about other states’ behaviours, they do 
not know what to expect from them: uncertainty, therefore, stems the 
                                                           
23 The prisoner’s dilemma is an asymmetrical game where each player prefers 
mutual cooperation to mutual defection, but where an actor is still better off if 
he does not cooperate when the other player does it. The least preferable result 
is when the player cooperates while the other one cheats. In an isolated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma cooperation is very unlikely, since each player will find it 
not rational to cooperate; the dominant strategy is in fact not to cooperate, no 
matter what the other actor does. At the end, both of the players are worse off 
than if they had cooperated and behaved irrationally. The two players have a 
common interest in achieving a position in which both of them cooperate but 
they are not able to realize this result. 
24 In particular Coase affirmed that if a legal framework setting liability for 
action does exist together with perfect information and without transactions 
costs then cooperation among two actors could arise out of the existence of 
negative externalities. Following this consideration, argues Keohane, it is 
possible to say that if regimes do exhibit at least one of these conditions they 
will be able to favour agreements among states, see Robert O. Keohane, “The 
Demand for International Regimes”, International Organization,  36, 2, 1982, p. 
338.  
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pursuit of cooperative solutions. Nevertheless, if a system would be 
created to assure the spread of information and the perspective of  
future encounters, then cooperation will be assured.  
This is the reason why regimes are created: states want to cooperate to 
achieve their mutual interests but lack the incentives to do so. Regimes, 
by providing information, create an environment sound for 
cooperation: “international regimes perform the functions of 
establishing patterns of legal liability, providing relatively symmetrical 
information, and  arranging the costs of bargaining so that specific 
agreements can more easily be made…like oligopolistic quasi-
agreements, international regimes alter the relative costs of 
transactions…by elevating injunctions to the level of principles and 
rules regimes construct linkages between issues…in market failures 
terms the costs of some transaction are increased while those of others 
are decreased…international regimes allow government to take 
advantage of potential economies of scale. Once a regime has been 
established, the marginal cost of dealing with each additional issue will 
be lower than it would be without a regime”.25 
A Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a “dilemma of common interests” as 
Stein puts it,26 and is commonly used in the economic field to illustrate 
situations such as market failures, problems of collective goods 
provision and of externalities in which government intervention is 
necessary to insure that the Pareto-efficient solution is achieved. The 
creation of regimes, from this perspective, is not intended to substitute 
the role of the state, because regimes lack a real enforcement 
mechanism, but to provide a framework conducive to cooperation. 
Once arrived at this threshold cooperation follows almost 
automatically from the correction of the cheating problem and from the 
expectation of future meetings (that regimes should promote): all 
states, while achieving the Pareto-efficient result, are inevitably better 
off. The ranking of preferences for this game is DC, CC,DD, CD.27  
Aside from pure economic problems the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
configuration has been used to depict zero-sum security issues, in 
particular the ‘security dilemma’ condition arising in an anarchical 
                                                           
25 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984, pp. 88-90. 
26 Arthur Stein, in Stephen Krasner, ed., 1983, p. 120. Optimal Pareto results are 
defined as those situations in which at least one actor can achieve a better result 
while not worsening the utility of the other player. 
27 Since in this game the dominant strategy is to defect and since mutual 
defection leads to sub-optimal results states should avoid to pursue their 
dominant strategy. 
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system where all actors pile up arms even if all of them would rather 
disarm: this slippery slope will end in the worst possible scenario of 
mutual insecurity.28 It should be emphasized that while the PD gloomy 
expectations are apparently mitigated by the neo-istitutionalist school 
through the building of regimes or institutions it has been more 
difficult to relate this configuration with the prospect for regimes 
building in security issues. Thus, if the game depicts the states’ 
dilemma, regimes and institutions are in no way a palliative. The direct 
problem in these cases stems from a systemic feature, that is, the 
anarchic nature of the system rather than from the lack of information: 
this latter would not modify the nature of the system and therefore 
there will be no incentive for regimes formation as in economic issues.  
As Haggard and Simmons maintain, regimes can be assumed as forms 
of cooperative actions and they may themselves foster cooperation: but 
if cooperation can arise even apart from regimes or defined institutions 
is cheating the most relevant problem characterizing cooperative 
issues?.29 States do not decide to act together and to coordinate their 
actions only or mainly to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes and 
therefore to insure a particular result, but sometimes they act more 
likely to avoid a particular outcome.  
This consideration sheds a new light on the argument aforementioned: 
while the PD has been employed to address particular economic and 
security issues other cooperative situations and problems may 
characterize bargaining among states. For example, Stein argues that 
the “dilemma of common aversion” may arise when “actors with 
contingent strategies do not most prefer the same outcome but do agree 
that there is at least one outcome that all want to avoid”.30 The dilemma 
of common aversion is represented with another game, the 
                                                           
28 The conditions that make the security dilemma arise, though, are quiet 
restrictive for Jervis: either offensive weapons are present and should overcome 
defensive ones or a clear distinction among weapon systems is not possible, see 
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics 30, 
1978, pp. 167-214. As apparent, relevant is in Jervis the role of perceptions in 
international affairs. In a situation when the dilemma does not come about, 
argues Stein, the dominant strategy of actors would not be to arm themselves 
since by doing that they could not gain advantage towards those who do not 
arm, and to pile up arms would not serve as a defence against others’ defensive 
weapons, see Arthur Stein,  1982, p. 320.  
29 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, 1987, p. 495. 
30 Ibid., p. 125. 
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coordination game,31 as a situation in which two equilibria are present 
that can be achieved if the players just eschew to act independently and 
simultaneously: instead, they should coordinate their actions. Here the 
problem is not one of cooperation, but a problem of coordination: 
players should coordinate themselves to avoid ending up in one of the 
two results that neither of them wants. States that agree on avoiding 
mutual unilateralism would not have particular problems to concur on 
the creation of a regime, but problems do arise when states try to 
achieve their preferred outcomes. Coordination games depicts 
therefore different situations from those envisioned by the PD, and this 
changes completely the opportunity for cooperation, the difficulties to 
be faced to reach agreed arrangements and the robustness of the 
regimes achieved.  
The objective of broadening the neo-istitutionalist agenda by 
emphasizing the different potential situations characterizing collective 
actions problems is a fruitful attempt of the ‘situation-structural’ 
approach. The positive contribution of this approach is to strengthen 
the explanatory capability of the neo-liberal regime theory by 
expanding the scope of collective problem situations: according to this 
reasoning, coordination, assurance and suasion games provide new 
insights for the probability of regimes formation and for their features. 
By inserting itself between the system and the actual behaviour  and by 
emphasizing the context in which actors do find themselves to play,  
this approach assures a sounder depiction of the reality. By the same 
token, the ‘problem structural’ approach which claims to be part and to 
complement the neo-liberal tradition contributes to the regime research 
upgrading the issue-areas and the different ‘conflicts’ each of these 
latter is likely to spur as the main elements influencing the likelihood 
and features of cooperation.32 
                                                           
31 The illustration of the coordination game is mostly exemplified by a couple 
who would like to spend an evening together but that has different preferences 
about what to do: this is the Battle of the Sexes in which two Pareto-optimal 
outcomes exist and are preferred by both actors to a situation in which 
coordination is not achieved. Both coordination points are equilibrium points, 
and therefore if coordination is achieved the outcome will be stable. 
Nevertheless, the two actors could differ in their preferred point: which point 
will be chosen? When divergent options do appear a distributional problem is 
likely to emerge. 
32 ‘Assurance’ games reflect those situations in which two equilibrium outcomes 
do exist only one of which being Pareto-efficient (mutual cooperation): the 
achievement of sub-optimal results can emerge if misperceptions on the 
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If situations in which states find themselves to act may vary and may 
pose different cooperative challenges the literature on regimes should 
be broadened so as to open the way for new research investigations. 
Therefore, as in the case of defence procurement, it is paramount to 
underline the game that best reflects the cooperative challenge at hand 
and the context in which actors attempt mutual arrangements. While 
this will be done in the next sections it is first of all necessary to 
pinpoint  the issue- area we are dealing with, security, in order to grasp 
all the potential tensions and pitfalls it may spur. Only after this step it 
will be possible to mitigate traditional security concerns while taking 
into account the importance of ‘distributional’ or ‘positional’ challenges 
that this issue-area inevitably endorses and examine the likelihood of 
cooperation. 
1.3 The likelihood of cooperation in security matters 
While economic regimes have been broadly studied and analysed, 
security ones have posed more challenges, the reason being that 
cooperation processes between states have not been recognized as 
security regimes but have been explained either as defence alliance 
mechanisms or strategies for the pursuit of short-term interests. If we 
consider the definition of regimes as ‘formal and informal principles, 
norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given issue area of international relations’33 
it is easy to see the problems that security regimes may encounter: first 
of all, because of security implications it is unlikely that states bind 
themselves giving birth to institutionalized forms of cooperation and 
rely on common principles, norms and rules. Second, because of the 
issue-area at question, actors’ expectations can only hardly converge 
when the security dilemma is on the forefront. Cooperation is more 
difficult because the stakes are higher, the calculus of interests more 
complex and the mistrust among actors more relevant. According to 
                                                                                                                               
ranking of preferences exists or because of the supposed irrationality of one of 
the players. Regimes, in these cases, can promote communication among 
members. ‘Suasion’ or ‘Rambo’ games reflect situations where only one 
equilibrium possibility does exist and where this latter is rewarding only for 
one actor which should therefore be compelled to cooperate through promises 
or threats. See Hasenclever, 1997, pp. 45-68. 
33 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., 1983, p. 2. 
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Lipson, “security issues are inherently more conflictual than economic 
ones, and their equilibria less stable”.34 
Nevertheless, it is probably because of the security dilemma that actors 
at a certain point agree to release their short-term interests. As Jervis 
points out, “both the incentives for establishing such regimes and the 
obstacle to so doing are especially great in the security arena because of 
the security dilemma”35 . Moreover, not all security concerns are strictly 
related to security dilemma situations and take therefore the form of a 
zero-sum game.36 Relations that enter the sphere of security are 
particularly relevant because this latter is valued, aside for stability, for 
the achievement of other fundamental states’ concerns, such as prestige 
and independence. Jervis emphasizes that security regimes can be 
defined as “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be 
restrained in their behaviour in the belief that other will reciprocate”37 
and that they are especially valuable for states pursuing them but 
particularly difficult to create, because they imply something more than 
the pursuit of  short-term interests and require some forms of restraint 
that are expected to be reciprocated by other states. There should be 
therefore a common interest among states in avoiding a particular 
result, to eschew undesirable actions resulting from a non-coordinated 
path. Lipson points out that it is misleading to believe that, because of 
their conflictual nature, security regimes do not present the 
opportunity  for joint gains or at least the prevention of joint losses”.38 
In his considerations about security regimes Jervis lists a number of 
conditions that should be met in order to achieve a security regime: he 
emphasizes that the great powers must want to establish it, “they must 
prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave 
individualistically”39. Also, the actors must believe that the other states 
have an interest in the persistence of mutual cooperation and security. 
Comparing the Concert of Europe and the balance of power between 
                                                           
34 Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security 
Affairs”, World Politics 37, 1984, p. 13.  
35 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes”, World Politics 30, 1978, p. 358.  
36 See on this point Joanne Gowa, “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The 
Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations”, International 
Organization, 40, 1, 1986, pp. 167-186 and Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell and 
Duncan Snidal, “The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation”, 
The American Political Science Review, 87, 3, 1993, pp. 733-734.  
37 Robert Jervis, 1978, p. 357. 
38 Charles Lipson, 1984, p. 13.  
39 Robert Jervis, 1978, p. 360. 
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the United States and the Soviet Union, Jervis provides a useful 
understanding of what a security regime is. The Concert of Europe was 
a security regime supported by major powers and their interests to 
avoid war; the self interest followed was longer-run than usual, while 
in normally competitive international politics direct and immediate 
gains are searched in an agreement. Moreover, because of their power, 
the states constituting the Concert did not fear destruction in case of 
defection. Consequently, a state’s gains through defection would have 
been limited in scope.40  
According to Paul Schroeder, the Concert of Europe, and in particular 
the institutional arrangements and diplomatic conferences designed, 
did assure the existence, the security, the status and the pursuit of 
fundamental interests of all the powerful European actors but 
compelled also to respect treaties, the non-interference principle and  to 
preserve moderation.41 Also, aside from the norms foreseeing self-
restraint, consultation, rejection of unilateral actions and engagement in 
favour of stability, there were some detailed rules of conduct, among 
which: diplomatic meetings and conferences aimed at tackling crises; 
no unilateral territorial change; protection of the members of the 
system and respect of the interests and reputation of  big states.42   
The balance of power situation was not a security regime according to 
Jervis, because in this case short-term calculations of self-interest 
accounted for restraint, “that each side has more or less respected the 
other’s sphere of influence does not mean that each side has developed 
the stake in the other’s security or the expectation of reciprocity that 
was found in the Concert”.43  In this situation states were constrained 
                                                           
40 Ibid., pp. 364-365. See also Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of 
International Security Cooperation”, in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under 
Anarchy, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 58-79. 
41 Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the 
Structure”, World Politics, 39, 1, 1986, pp. 1-26. The author emphasises that 
peace and stability were structurally-determined: therefore they depended not 
on statesmen intentions or choices but rather on “what the prevailing system 
constrained them from doing or permitted them to do”, p. 2.  
42 Louise Richardson, “The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the 
Nineteenth Century”, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. 
Wallander, ed., Imperfect Unions, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 52. Aside 
from norms and rules specific procedures were agreed upon in order to 
prevent crisis outbreakings. 
43 Ibid., 367. This interpretation is not shared by other pundits such as, for 
example, Joseph Nye who instead affirms that the United States and the Soviet 
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only by ‘external’ restraints  or by the consideration of others’ reaction 
to one attempt at damaging others’ interests. It goes without saying 
that different authors share different opinions about the likelihood of 
the ‘balance-of-power’ condition as a security regime, according to the 
interpretation of this latter either as a systemic outcome or as an active 
strategy deployed by states. 
The Non-proliferation regime is often cited as an example of a security 
regime even if discordance exists on whether it mirrors a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation or an assurance one.44 Its creation was mainly 
decided by the two superpowers which had an interest in avoiding the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among other non-nuclear 
states. The regime has been shaped according to the interests and 
power of the superpowers and has been characterized by loopholes, 
éscamotages and double standards. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding 
this ‘deficient bargain’, it has persisted because of the recognition by all 
states of the importance of a reciprocally restrained behaviour. The 
norms leading cooperation emphasize the necessity to prevent the 
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time to help 
developing states in conducing peaceful nuclear programmes.45 Also, 
aside from the nuclear proliferation ‘focal point’ there was the 
‘disarmament’ one which forecasted an engagement to progressively 
reduce nuclear weapons by yet nuclear states: it is here that a strong 
imbalance on focal points came about among two categories of states. 
As Roger Smith points out, these norms derive from the awareness that 
nuclear weapons do not cause direct conflict but are able instead to 
                                                                                                                               
Union did assume joint positions within some sub-issues of their security 
relationship, therefore confirming the existence of regimes in these settings. See 
Joseph S. Nye, 1987, p. 391. 
44 In the first case rationality would lead to defect while in the second defection 
would be determined by irrationality. 
45 Trevor Mc Morris Tate, “Regime-Building in the Non-Proliferation System”, 
Journal of Peace Research, 27, 4, 1990, pp. 399-414. The author provides a detailed 
lists of agreements and institutions which would form the Non-Proliferation 
Regime, and stresses the importance of the IAEA(International Atomic Energy 
Agency) as the Institution charged to monitor the peaceful benefits arising from 
nuclear activities through inspections. Important also is this latter Institution’ s 
duty to provide information and knowledge thanks to regular meetings. The 
birth and the working of the IAEA has been jointly spurred by the USA and 
USSR efforts. While the IAEA is the most important safeguard organism it has 
not an enforcement mechanism. 
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embitter relations among states and open up rooms for strains.46 
Coordination of actions was necessary and was the basic element of the 
regime, even if it ended up reflecting the interests of the strongest 
powers. Cooperation on this gloomy issue seems to endanger the basic 
assumptions of the realist school which nevertheless recognizes that the 
‘nature’ of this particular weapon can somehow impinge on systemic 
pressures by impacting directly on differences in states’ capabilities. 
That said it is possible to sum up some important features of security 
regimes, namely the fundamental role of power and especially of the 
strongest states (which are those that could potentially pursue 
unilateral actions) in order to create them in the first hand, the common 
interest in avoiding a particular outcome and coordinating actions so as 
to mitigate the probability of unilateral actions, a shared stake in the 
persistence of the regime. According to these findings it is possible to 
speculate about the reasons of the demise of a security regime. It could 
happen that at a certain point states do not share any longer the desire 
to avoid a particular result and coordinate their policies for that 
objective. In these cases the context in which actors cooperate should 
change in a significant way: this can happen, for example, when an 
actor has become much more powerful than others, so that it is possible 
for him to achieve its objectives through unilateral actions. The context, 
therefore, assumes a particular relevance when facing security issues: 
Jervis conferred to the post-hegemonic specific configuration, interests 
and capabilities part of the explanation for the mitigation of the 
security dilemma among states. The mutation of that context impacted 
negatively on the perspective of cooperation.  
As Cirincione et al. points out, one of the potential challenges to the 
Non-Proliferation regime is the current administration’s linkage of 
rogue states with terrorism: because of the challenges that the United 
States may face, it expressed an interest in testing new weapons, de facto 
undermining the main underpinnings of the regime.47 Conflicts among 
major powers may arise, as in the case of the Concert of Vienna, 
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 25 
because actors’ short and long-term interests end up differing in a 
significant way: when the bulk of the Concert resided on preventing 
France from becoming anew a threat to Europe the Concert did not 
pose particular challenges. In fairness the geometry of the Congress 
was aiming at maintaining a stable balance within Europe: Russia 
gained a lot but Austria and Prussia did it to, so as to create strong 
buffer zones within Europe. France was, after some years, re-admitted 
to the European power-game, the idea being that her presence was 
strategically paramount to keep stability. Britain did not gain anything 
in the Continent aside from an overall balance that did match with her 
broader interests off-shore, assured and strengthened with important 
commercial spots. When the initial aim motivating the Concert 
disappeared, and instead stability was conceived as the preservation of 
conservative and traditional regimes through interventions to calm 
down uprisings, Britain started to progressively detach from the 
Concert while remaining loyal to the initial aim of gathering with the 
other powers when peace was threatened: she started to perceive that 
the Concert was now employed to satisfy unilateral interests. This 
shows how each state’ s relations with actors involved in the 
cooperative setting are of the paramount importance in order to explain 
regimes formation, persistence and demise.  
1.4 Coordination to achieve security objectives: the role of 
power 
What done in the previous sections had the objective to frame the issue-
area of defence procurement, namely to present the problems that 
security as an issue is likely to pose on cooperation attempts. If the 
classic representation of security issues has been the Prisoner’s 
dilemma game because of its zero-sum nature, there are reasons to 
believe that this configuration does not fit with the regime of our 
concern for a series of reasons. Needless to say, defence procurement 
regards the acquisition and management of destructive means, which 
no doubt collocates it within security matters. Nevertheless, the regime 
exists within the framework of the European Union and within the 
European strand of the Atlantic Alliance: as was the case in the Concert 
of Europe, “important here is the expectation that peace could be 
maintained. For if wars were seen as likely, states would have to 
concentrate on building up their short-run power to prepare for the 
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coming conflict”;48 the fact of being within an alliance and within a kind 
of ‘security community’ should somehow mitigate the zero-sum 
perspective.  
More in general, not all security issues involve a security dilemma 
situation; instead, some of them present different challenges from those 
proposed by PD game. This is even more apparent if we have a quick 
look at the same ‘security’ concept and the way it has been reshaped 
and broadened after the end of the Cold War. The fact that previous 
analysed security regimes have taken place among adversary parties 
weighted on the gloomy opportunity for cooperation, “this recurrent 
image of competitive struggle, and the anarchic condition in which it is 
rooted, naturally limits the scope and durability of security agreements 
between potential adversaries. In spite of the risks, however, 
agreements are still possible if each side has reasonable grounds for 
confidence and if defection does not threat devastation”. 49 Cold War’s 
conception of security, argues Baldwin, was associated with ‘military 
force’, so that if the latter characterized an issue then the challenge 
became a security one and if the use of military force was not at stake 
the situation was regarded as a ‘low politics’ matter. After the End of 
the Cold War “the dimensions of security have not changed …but the 
substantive specifications of these dimensions that were appropriate 
during the Cold War are likely to differ from those appropriate for the 
1990s. Economic security, environmental security, identity security, 
social security and military security are different forms of security, not 
fundamentally different concepts”.50 In many cases the challenge 
regards possible “risks” brought about by failure to arrive at a mutual 
satisfying result rather than a “threat” menacing the same survival of a 
state.51 The focus of the discussion needs therefore to be put on the 
internal dynamics of the cooperative setting.  
As it will be highlighted within the research, defence procurement 
regime is perceived to be essential by all states: it encompasses both 
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relative and absolute gains concerns and is required by economic and 
strategic reasons. Against this background traditional security tensions 
are diluted “although competitive status concerns are important, they 
are typically combined with welfare goals, leaving some room for joint 
maximization”.52 Security within this regime is not so much linked with 
survival but rather with the possibility to freely pursuit prestige, 
independence or protect basic internal interests, “genuine security 
requires not only the absence of or protection against a military threat, 
but also the management of a multitude of risks concerning the 
political economic, and social well-being of states and their peoples”.53 
The definition of security as ‘a low probability of damage to acquired 
values’ broaden its realist minimal and problematic identification with 
survival by specifying the values meant to be protected when this latter 
is assured.54 Even if a threat to survival is not at stake, security still 
encompasses some paramount values that states will strive to protect: 
for example, and as it will be clarified later on, in defence procurement 
states agree on harmonizing and jointly managing armaments but they 
share different opinions on how to do that because each arrangement 
will impinge directly on  their interests or indirectly on their ability to 
achieve them. Situations described by these strategic features are 
represented by coordination games: when security matters are on the 
forefront, as it happens with defence procurement, these game are 
likely  to exhibit  burdensome ‘distributional’ concerns.  
1.4.1 Coordination and distributional concerns 
That coordination games in general do soundly depict cooperation 
challenges has been broadly stressed out in International Relations 
Theory and in Political Science too. Pundits sustain that because states 
differ in size and in structural power and therefore in interests they 
inevitably end up struggling with each other. If cooperation is agreed 
upon and unilateral actions ruled out, as it is often the case in 
international politics, then states will bargain searching to enforce their 
preferred outcome. It is unlikely that states share a common view on 
how such cooperation should be moulded, especially if the issue-area 
in which cooperation is taking place is security. At a more careful 
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glance, though, even economic cooperation will be characterized by 
strong bargaining among actors: in fact, if the concept of security is so 
broad as to encompass, among others, economic objectives, then actors 
are likely to advance their views as much as possible. As Fritz Sharpf 
points out, “while the benefits of cooperation are more attractive than 
the outcomes expected in the case of non-agreement, cooperation is 
seriously threatened by distributive conflicts over the choice among 
cooperative solutions. It is probably fair to say that in the great majority 
of ongoing relationships that is the major obstacle to cooperative 
solutions”.55 Also, Joanne Gowa highlights that Axelrod’ s emphasis on 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as the game representing a lot of 
situations in international situations fails to consider that world affairs 
are better represented by other games, in which distributional concerns 
have much more weight.56 In the same vein, James Morrow asserts that 
the Prisoner’s dilemma model emphasizes compliance and sanctioning 
and leaves out distributional issues, while in international situations 
alternative coordination options do exist, “to produce cooperation 
when distributional problem exist, actors must agree on how they will 
cooperate”.57 For the case of our concern, a lot of pundits do affirm that 
problems of weaponry standardization reflect coordination games 
because the real issue at hands regards how to tailor this cooperation: 
which capabilities to choose and which requirements to meet, for which 
goals and what to renounce to. 
Robert Jervis asserts that the Prisoner’s dilemma game is often 
employed not because it grasps the most relevant processes in the 
international political landscape but because it is stimulating and 
fosters appealing manoeuvrings; also, “the model is congruent with the 
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Anglo-American bias of seeing world politics as tragedy rather than as 
evil, of believing that most conflicts can be ameliorated for the good of 
all concerned”.58 A further consideration is the one made by James 
Fearon that maintains that trying to classify strategic interactions as 
Prisoner’s dilemma or coordination games is misleading: problems of 
international cooperation involve first of all coordination challenges 
(bargaining) and then prisoner’s dilemma-like situations (enforcement 
problem).59 
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation regimes are fundamental to bringing 
about cooperation and solve the cheating problem. It follows that they 
require a huge collaboration between states: the regimes that should 
result to solve the cheating problem and provide states with the 
information necessary to establish cooperation is one that must specify 
a strict patterns of behaviour that discourages cheating, and therefore 
that has a high degree of formalization. There are some problems with 
this statement: first of all, for however strong a regime may be it cannot 
substitute a state, and therefore the problem of cheating is always 
present; moreover, in some issues such as in security, reputation or 
reiteration are not a compelling and necessary motivation for 
cooperation. It follows that if the problem of cheating is not completely 
resolved, regimes are in fact not necessarily able neither to help achieve 
a Pareto-efficient result nor to provide incentives for states to comply 
with its rules. Therefore, there seems to be something flawed at the 
basis of PD’s assumptions for cooperation: as said before, in this game 
cooperation is supposed to be either very difficult or regimes much 
stronger than how they appear  to be in reality.  
A regime determined to solving problems of ‘common aversion’ 
requires less from states for its creation:  a shared consent to coordinate 
actions exists in the first hand because all states agree that their 
common aversion is ‘mutual unilateralism’. Second, the regime is not 
created to solve problems of market failures or problems of collective 
goods, therefore enforcement is not an issue. Cheating is not a problem 
because states encompassed in a regime do not have an incentive to 
defeat and if they defeat it is not for reaping immediate gains but for 
complaining about the coordination point reached.60 Then, it is more 
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probable that states form regimes to avoid acting unilaterally and to 
coordinate their actions for that objective. Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
coordination games pose two different collective action problems, “the 
problem in PD is that in pursuing its own self-interest, each state 
imposes costs on the other independent of the other state’s policy 
choice, whereas in the coordination game each imposes costs or 
benefits on the other contingent upon the other’s policy. The collective 
action problem is that neither state can choose its best policy without 
knowing what the other intends to do, but there is no obvious point at 
which to coordinate”.61 
As said before, states differ in power and therefore in interests: all 
bargaining situations, independently from the issue-area, will witness a 
“sequence of offers and counteroffers with one or both parties ‘holding 
out’ in hope that the other will make concessions.”62 Then, “the basic 
issue in the politics of regime formation is where states will end up on 
the Pareto’s Frontier, not how to reach the frontier in the first place”.63 
Accordingly, states’ satisfaction will be based on the distance between 
their preferred outcome and the coordination point reached. In the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game there is only a single cooperative outcome, 
but in coordination games more cooperative arrangements are possible 
because players have conflicting preferences lingering on the frontier. 
This implies both that achieving a minimum consent on cooperation is 
easier, and also that at the end the regime will represent only one of 
this cooperative outcomes: coordination between states will be decided 
mainly by power and when this is equally shared by actors distribution 
of rewards poses more challenges.  
As Krasner points out, regime formation becomes a “distributional” 
problem. The real game, then, starts at the Pareto-Frontier, in which 
states that possess more power (in terms of military and economic 
resources) are able to set the conditions of the game and  compel other 
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states to coordinate their preferences to the ones set by them.64 
Therefore, if for the neo-institutionalism regimes represent the Pareto-
Frontier, for Krasner it is a particular point of the Pareto-Frontier that 
represents a specific regime. The introduction of power as a tool to be 
employed in the “distributional conflict” arising within states 
inevitably poses a series of problems not considered in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situation. For example, Krasner points out that in the context 
of market failures issues concerning power do not come up, because 
once the game is defined all actors are treated equally with regard to 
their capabilities. Moreover, he argues, power is not considered both 
because states seem not to care about relative gains and because it is 
not apparent how this can be employed in order to solve market-
failures problems.65 Krasner explains that power enters the game 
because: 
1. it can be used to determine who can play the game in the first 
place,  
2. it can be used to dictate the rules of the game, 
3. it can be used to change the payoff matrix. 
Powerful actors can decide who is likely to participate in the game, that 
is, to invite actors able to foster their interests. Less powerful actors are 
not always likely to provide the most powerful actors with valuable 
assets. An important question to answer when addressing regime is in 
fact “who is in and who is out” an issue, argues Michael Brzoska, a 
question that the functional theory of regime seems to ignore.66 Also, 
because powerful states can dispose of huge resources in economic and 
military terms they can dictate the rules of the game, for example by 
exploiting their possibility to threat or promise particular outcomes. 
Finally, because a powerful state is less likely to need cooperation it can 
impose his position by threatening to abandon the negotiating table 
and leaving all the other actors still worse off.67  
Some neo-institutionalist pundits seem to overlook states’ power as 
influencing the bargaining game within a negotiation and instead 
explain it by referring to the degree of interdependence among great 
powers; thus Snidal asserts that “the policy choices of some states will 
                                                           
64 Ibid., p.  6. 
65 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
66 Michael Brzoska, “Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A 
Comment on Trevor McMorris Tate”, Journal of Peace Research, 29, 2, 1992, p. 
216.  
67 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger , 1997, p. 106. 
 32 
be inherently more significant than those of others and thus provide a 
relatively greater need for coordination. In general, the need for 
coordination between any two states will vary directly with their levels 
of interdependence upon one another. For example, the typical 
advanced industrial country will find coordination with the largest 
industrial powers (United States, West Germany, Japan) more 
important than coordination with the smaller economies (Denmark, 
Canada, Netherlands). This is likely to give larger countries an 
advantage in negotiations over international coordination”.68 
Power then, which was partly put aside by the neo-institutionalist 
school returns to play an important role in the shaping and supplying 
of international regimes, as it was with the Hegemonic Stability Theory. 
It is apparent from previous considerations, that weak states find 
themselves in a worse position than powerful states on the Pareto-
Frontier. This means that on the one hand they find it profitable to 
coordinate their actions with other states; on the other hand, though,  
they are likely to be embedded in the decisions of the most powerful 
states. For weaker states coordination is often the best strategy to 
pursue because the gains they will receive by cooperating with stronger 
powers are always greater than a ‘going it alone’ strategy. 
Nevertheless, they ability to structure the cooperation setting according 
to their interests is downgraded by their lower power. This is not as to 
say that regimes will be composed of strong states, will be decided by 
powerful states and will leave nothing to less powerful ones.  
The emphasis on power next to cooperation is to remark that states 
pursue different interest, will struggle for them and will have different 
capabilities to make them value. The regimes that will be created will 
not be static ones, but instead very dynamic, and this will be so because 
coordination games are likely to characterize much less formalized and 
therefore malleable regimes. The “distributional problem” will be 
always present and it will show some states gaining importance and 
advancing their interests as well as other states losing their relative 
power. It follows that aside from stable ‘principles’ regimes are likely to 
be very flexible as for their rules and decision-making procedures. It is 
also likely that if it is impossible to achieve a coordination point 
because the struggle is intense, regimes will end up being minimal 
agreements on coordination within an issue-area, losing all their 
robustness and value as intervening variable between states and 
outcomes. 
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1.5 The basis of security regimes: avoiding undesirable 
outcomes 
The aim of the previous section was that of highlighting the peculiar 
features characterizing a coordination game and its challenges and 
limitations. In this section the rationale for cooperation will be 
emphasized, the coordination game specified and the relevance of 
power in the creation of security regimes underlined. This passage will 
be useful in order to frame the context characterizing a weapons 
procurement regime. 
As shown before, in security issues cooperation arises because states 
agree on avoiding particular outcomes, namely unilateral actions: 
actors coordinate their actions in order to eliminate this possibility. 
These states of affairs are labelled as ‘dilemmas of common aversion’: 
these kinds of situations involve coordination but also distributional 
questions.69 This is so in security issues, because the problem of “who 
gets what” is of particular relevance. Krasner points out that, in this 
kind of game, while actors may recognize that all would be worse off 
without some agreements they may disagree about what the term of 
the agreement ought to be.70 Therefore, power, and not only interests 
are relevant in coordination games and in security issues in particular. 
As anticipated before, the common representation of  these games is a 
couple who agrees, but who exhibits different preferences on what 
precisely to do together. In these games the cooperation dilemma 
regards not how to reach the Pareto’s frontier in the first hand, because 
for both actors to do something jointly provides a more satisfying 
solution than to remain alone: therefore two Pareto-efficient and Nash 
equilibria exist. 
 
 Actor A 
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Figure 1: Battle of the Sexes, Source: Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and 
Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997, p. 47. According to this game, non coordinated actions give 
the lowest payoff: if actors individually cooperate it means that they both let 
the other decide where to go and no coordination is achieved. If each actor 
defect by advancing its own preferred outcome no coordination would arise.  
Coordination, instead award the highest pay-offs, even if of different degrees 
among the actors. 
 
 
 The true dilemma rests on the Pareto’s Frontier, in which different 
arrangements produce different degrees of satisfaction for the actors 
engaged.71 In security issues, the points along the Pareto’s Frontier 
exhibit different trade-offs for the players, and therefore states will 
deploy their power in order to attain the preferred outcome. Thus, in 
the first years of the Concert of Europe, “while there was great power 
agreement on the fundamentals of the post-war system, there were 
significant differences between the powers on how to interpret some of 
these fundamentals”.72 Similarly, as for the concept of a European 
security and defence identity (ESDI), France, Germany and Great 
Britain, while agreeing on out-of-area intervention “advocate 
institutional mechanisms that solve problems related to functions in 
which that state is most interested”.73  
The stronger the perspective of the future (reiteration) or the likelihood 
of a highly formalized regime, the harder the bargain for achieving 
preferred results. Delays and harsh negotiations can therefore 
complicate an effective cooperative setting.74  
All that said, it should be remarked that even if privileged in a 
cooperative setting powerful states are somehow restrained in their 
actions. In the case of the Concert of Europe and in the Non-
proliferation regime, none of the states was able to achieve the 
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preferred outcome through unilateral actions: in the first case, states 
could not have achieved more security by maximizing their power 
positions. Instead they agreed that security (intended as the possibility 
of avoiding war) was better achievable through reciprocity. Rather than 
a Prisoner’s dilemma game some pundits believe the Concert to mirror 
an ‘assurance game’, were notwithstanding a consent to cooperate, a 
basic lack of trust among members required transparency as well as 
incentives towards cooperation and against defection.75 Similarly, in the 
case of the Non-Proliferation issue, none of the superpowers was able 
unilaterally to prevent other actors from going nuclear or developing 
the capabilities to produce nuclear arms: if they were able to do so, no 
regime that would have tied their hands would have been created. Of 
course, the regime was shaped according to their interests and because 
of their power, but its principles and norms were fulfilled through 
coordination among states.  
The number of actors involved within the regimes has differed 
according to the international context: in the case of the Concert of 
Europe the regime was established among the few but dominant 
European powers of 1815 and assured by their coordinated actions(i.e., 
persistence of the anti-Napoleonic alliance and periodic consultations). 
In the Non-proliferation case, the regime was spurred by the two 
superpowers but requested the coordination of all states: the regime 
was therefore open in character and invited participation. Because of 
the broadness of the regime and the different nature of the actors 
participating in it, the Non-proliferation regime was formalized in a 
series of treaties, documents and organizations, while the Concert of 
Europe assumed a looser  and informal shape, “formal machinery was 
lacking, no supranational secretariat was formed, and all decisions and 
their implementation remained in the hands of national leaders. But 
coordination was facilitated and information and expectations were 
fairly quickly and effectively shared”.76 The number of actors 
composing a regime is therefore of the paramount importance in order 
to assess how power is distributed within a defined context, the 
openness or exclusiveness of a regime, and the implication of a broader 
partnership on its effectiveness. 
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1.6 Coordination as bargaining: distributional gains 
impact on relative gains and interests  
The problem remains to assess which are the features of the 
equilibrium that will be achieved. In other words, who gains what from 
the distributional conflict? Will weak states be invited to participate at 
negotiations? And are they able to exert some influence? The 
distributional game becomes complex because power puts under the 
spotlight the never-ending problems of cooperation: 
- the impact on relative gains 
- the impact on short  and long-term interests. 
These two features acquire a new relevance in coordination games, and 
therefore it is important to analyse the way in which they impinge on 
regimes formation and shape.  
As said before we are considering a security regime, cooperation in 
defence procurement, that does not reflect a fundamental ‘security 
dilemma’ scenario: instead, cooperation is agreed upon among actors 
and is intended by states to achieve both short and long-term interests. 
Nevertheless, especially  because of the issue-area, distributional 
conflicts may give rise to relative gains concerns. At a first glance one is 
tempted to say that cooperation is more difficult because of these two 
problems (cooperation impact on relative gains and on short and long-
term interests). However, this section will explain not only how these 
two concerns can ‘combine’ with regime, but also that regimes can help 
reduce the problem arising from them. The analysis of ‘relative gains’ is 
undertaken only considering relationships among powerful states that 
are likely to struggle within the regime, since states that have similar 
capabilities are more likely to be concerned with relative gains issues. 
The analysis of short and long term interests will state that while 
regimes are likely to advance powerful states’ interests in the short 
term they are likely to advance long-term interests both for powerful 
and less powerful states if these latter do participate into the regime. 
The following considerations, therefore, will show how the allocation 
of benefits and costs of cooperation can be internalized in a regime. 
1.6.1 The issue of relative gains 
How do relative gains concerns impinge on the distributional game? 
This seems to be a very important issue among powerful states. 
Distributional concerns arise whenever actors propose different 
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arrangement settings: these, of course, will depend on the interests a 
state searches to pursue. Nevertheless, given that a certain coordination 
point will impact on a state’s relative power position and this latter on 
the possibility to pursue further interests it is fair to state that 
distributional struggles arise also because states attempt, especially in 
security issues, at maintaining or increasing their relative power 
regarding other cooperating states. 
Relative gains have always been a main concern of the realist pundits 
not because states try to pursue them,77 but because, by pursuing first of 
all security, states may be concerned on how other states’ security and 
power may impinge on their own. Joseph Grieco’s critique of the neo-
institutionalist theory of regimes has been almost entirely based on the 
relative gains issue.78 Grieco’s assessment about relative gains is 
calibrated on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: as in this latter, a state may 
avoid cooperating because it fears that by doing that the other state 
may achieve a higher payoff. Instead, relative gains concerns is a much 
broader and encompassing issue that involves all cooperative 
situations in different issue areas, “these concerns are likely to be 
greater in the security area than in international economics, but they 
are present in the latter as well, especially because military and 
economic strengths are closely linked…even among allies, concern for 
relative gains is rarely completely absent”,79 and Duncan Snidal adds 
                                                           
77 Most of the misperceptions about the issue of relative-gains among the neo-
institutionalist school of thought arise from the fact that this latter assumes that  
realism underlines the quest for relative gains; instead states do not seek 
relative advantages but they care about them when evaluating their security, 
intended this one either as the minimal condition of survival or as the 
possibility to pursue broader but related interests. Grieco argues that states are 
‘defensive’ from this point of view, meaning that they try to preserve their 
position and not to maximize it relatively to other states, see Grieco, 1988, p. 
499-500. It is worth noticing, though, that also some realist pundits incur in this 
flaw: when Gowa states that “the more players seek relative advantage, the 
more difficult cooperation becomes” she highlights a different understanding 
of the argument Grieco is clarifying, see Joanne Gowa, 1986, p. 178. 
78 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, International Organization, 42, pp. 485-
507. 
79 Robert Jervis, 1988, p. 335. In the same vein Joanne Gowa maintains that even 
in economic deals security externalities may enter the game and render 
cooperation more difficult to achieve, see Joanne Gowa, “Bipolarity, 
Multipolarity and Free Trade”, The American Political Science Review”, 83, 4, 
1989, pp. 1245-1256. 
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that “whenever individuals seek status or victory, whenever they 
engage in contests or tournaments, and whenever goods are 
‘positional’ in nature, relative gains are at stake”.80 In accordance with 
these arguments the great powers of the Concert of Europe did agree 
not to increase the territory under their control, to gain commercial 
advantages or to have exclusive leverage that would have not been 
equally achieved by the other actors, so as to preserve their power 
positions.   
In coordination games, for example, relative gains may not enter the 
stage once the decision to coordinate action is taken, but surely they 
take ground whenever the exact arrangement point should be decided: 
in this case the distributional impact of an agreement may impinge on a 
state relative position within the cooperative framework. Even neo-
istitutionalists would not deny that in coordination games with 
different preferred results relative gains assume a clear and apparent 
importance, a fact that was not apparent in the Prisoner’s dilemma. Of 
course, relative gains are another reason of the looseness of some 
coordination regimes: coordination situations require constant and 
recurrent bargaining processes to achieve determined setting, and 
relative gains inevitably play an important role on that.  
When engaging in cooperation, therefore, states do question about the 
likely allocation of their gains; even in situations where both actors 
achieve huge absolute gains and where there is not the spectre of a war 
there is always the fear that the gain of the other can be used to increase 
this latter capabilities, “realists would argue that there are at least two 
additional sources of states concerns about relative gains: uncertainties 
about one’s partners and the efficacy of force, and fears about the non-
military consequences of gaps in gains…. Realists would argue that 
international anarchy leads states to be concerned about gaps in gains 
from cooperation not just because they seek security and survival but 
also because they value their autonomy and independence”.81 From this 
point of view, for Grieco a privileged partner could use its 
‘nonmilitary’ augmented leverage to force more rewarding 
arrangements both in the issue area in which the gap arose as well as in 
others, “trough a cumulative process of converting gaps in gains in one 
period into progressively better deals in later periods (but in which all 
would still gain in absolute terms) the advantaged partner might in 
                                                           
80 Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International 
Cooperation”, The American Political Science Review, 85, 3, 1991, p. 701.  
81 Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell and Duncan Snidal, 1993, pp. 733-734. 
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time also become powerful enough to restrict (again through the 
application of non-military forms of influence) the capacity of the 
disadvantaged partners for independent choice and action in the 
domain in which cooperation is occurring and on other domains to 
which that domain is related”.82 Since anarchy is a permanent 
condition, every state is uncertain about the other future intentions and 
actions; therefore, a cooperation that assure greater gains to a state than 
those assured to another one should be carefully assessed.  
John Matthews III specifies this argument by indicating precisely when 
relative gains are likely to be fundamental and may hinder cooperation 
both in economic and security field.83 From this point of view he 
disconfirms that relative gains do matter only in security issues or in 
economic issues which can exhibit security externalities, but he does 
assumes that even in pure economic issues relative gains deserve a 
paramount importance. The argument is that independently from the 
issue-area in question cooperation may be hindered when relative 
gains produce cumulative effects, that is, when they produce an initial 
advantage that permits to act more efficiently in future situations 
through an increase in the bargaining power. This point is relevant for 
                                                           
82 Ibid., p. 734. These risks will impinge, according to Grieco, on their long-term 
independence and on their ‘relative bargaining power’ not only in military 
issues. This specification is addressed to Robert Powell analysis of the 
relevance of relative-gains on states’ decision to cooperate. For Powell absolute 
gains are negatively affected when there is a potential threat of the use of force 
among partners that will therefore impact on states’ military security: in this 
case relative gains will become of states’ concern, “relative gains are significant 
not because a state’s utility is a function of them-the states are still trying to 
maximize their absolute gains-but because the constraints imposed by the 
underlying technology of war makes it possible for a state to use its relative 
gains to its advantage and to the disadvantage of the other state”(the cost of 
war is low), p. 1312. Powell’s attempt was at considering issues usually 
discussed in the structural realist realm: the possibility of the use of force while 
keeping the absolute-gain maximization assumption, so as to explain shifts in 
behaviour with different ‘constraints’ facing actors. See Robert Powell, 
“Absolute and Relative gains in International relations Theory”, The American 
Political Science Review, 85, 4, 1991, pp. 1303-1320. Duncan Snidal states that 
relative gains concerns apply both to economy and security issues because 
economic gains can be muted in security ones in the long-run, see Duncan 
Snidal, 1991, p. 703. 
83 John C. Matthews III, “Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When 
Cumulative Relative Gains Matter”, International Security 21, 1, 1996, pp. 112-
146. 
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regime analysis since the possible benefits achievable out of a 
cooperative setting in one round of negotiations are likely to increase 
the structural power and therefore the bargaining stance in future 
contexts.  
Of particular interest on this matter is the study conducted by Jonathan 
Tucker who shows how relative gains and the size of powers impinge 
on the likelihood of cooperation in high-technology industries. The 
author proposes a model where short-term welfare payoffs and longer-
term positional payoffs are investigated in cooperative settings: the 
more the difference in capabilities between firms the lower the 
satisfaction of the stronger firms. Even if a certain amount of 
technology transfer does come about towards weaker firms no 
significant shifts in state’s positional payoff arise, “the limiting factor is 
the stronger player, which will only collaborate voluntarily when its 
expected welfare benefits exceed its positional costs”.84 By contrast, 
when actors are more approximate as for capabilities, then welfare 
gains are amplified but the ‘positional’ cost increases endangering their 
relative stance. Accordingly, two opposite trends appear: welfare 
benefits from cooperation are really substantial when each of the actor 
has something to give and get back, that is, when all cooperating actors 
have substantial power; at the same time, a fruitful exchange among 
similar powers makes soar ‘positional’ concerns and this inevitably 
renders the bargaining struggle much more harsh. This middle-ground 
position among absolute and relative gains concerns provides useful 
insights by contextualizing the scenario according to the ‘relative 
position’ of the actors engaged in cooperative ventures. 
Grieco’s position about relative gains is relevant for the purpose of this 
research, and in fact states care about relative gains in coordination 
games because of the ‘distributional conflict’ at play, “if distribution is 
the primary relative gains problem, states can alter the terms of a 
cooperative agreement or offer side payments until the distribution of 
                                                           
84 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Partners and Rivals: A Model of International 
Collaboration in Advanced Technology”, International Organization, 45, 1, 1991, 
p. 89. While Tucker’s model rules out cooperation among equal partners (firms) 
the author specifies that as for states things are partly different for two reasons: 
first, defence or aerospace industries are somehow protected by national states 
and therefore never completely at bay of free market forces. Second, states may 
foster transnational cooperation even in keys strategic industries when this is 
conducive to the accomplishment of other foreign policy or domestic needs, see 
pp. 103-104. More to that, cooperation among equal is possible because of side-
payments or opting-out provisions. 
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gains is sufficiently proportionate”.85 The idea of a distribution of gain 
calibrated on states’ power suggests that if cooperation emerges it 
should be balanced: gains have not to impair states’ relative positions 
as it was before the cooperating venture, “to attain this balanced 
relative achievement of gains, according to Hans Morgenthau, states 
offer their partners ‘concessions’; in exchange, they expect to receive 
approximately equal ‘compensations’.86  
The introduction of relative gains within the utility function of states 
seems to be especially revealing, according to Grieco, when absolute 
gains derived from cooperation are not able to overshadow relative 
gains concerns. In the case of zero-sum games cooperation is pointless, 
but if both relative and absolute gains possibilities coexist, coordination 
depends  on the context in which actors find themselves to play. Grieco 
explains how states’ sensitivities to relative losses do vary with this 
formula: 
                                 U = V – K (W-V)  • with K • 0 
 
Where U is a state’s utility, V is its absolute gains, W its partner’s 
absolute gains and K a sensitivity coefficient to differences in pay-offs. 
This equation clearly states that the utility function is given by both 
absolute and relative gains. Grieco argues that even if a state cares 
about relative gains, the way in which K (that for the author is always 
positive) varies can limit relative gains concerns and therefore improve 
the possibilities for cooperation. The sensitivity coefficient is likely to 
decrease, according to Grieco, when: a cooperation partner is a long-
term ally; partners share a common adversary; the gap in their power 
position is so huge that relative gain are not relevant; the state’s relative 
power has not been on the decline; economic and not security issues 
are considered; payoff cannot be converted in capabilities that can be 
transferred to other issue areas.   In practical terms, all the conditions 
stated by Grieco should somehow mitigate the ‘security dilemma’ 
among states.87 The point to be remarked is, however, that cooperation 
is likely to arise even when relative gains concerns are stringent. As it 
                                                           
85 Duncan Snidal, 1991, p. 703. 
86 Joseph M. Grieco, 1988, p. 502. 
87 The fact that states can be engaged in an alliance or in what, Grieco pinpoints, 
is a pluralistic security community do assume a particular relevance in the K 
factor. A case in point is Gowa’s analysis of security externalities that arise as a 
result of trade and that can be positively internalized within a military alliance, 
see Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International 
Trade”, The American Political Science Review, 87, 2, 1993, pp. 408-420. 
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will be demonstrated in this research, coordination does arise among 
actors even in a complicate issue such as security, and relative gains 
still account for the shape of the arrangements agreed.  
When a mixture of relative and absolute gains are involved, a regime 
may help to downplay relative gains issues so as to reap the benefits of 
absolute ones: in most instances, the ‘flexibility’ of regime rules, 
especially in one characterized as a coordination game, permits to 
encompass the provision of side-payments to otherwise dissatisfied 
actors, practices of opting-out that allow actors not to participate in 
certain forms of cooperation if they do not want to, and voice-
opportunities for the smallest ones. On this point of view Tucker, 
speaking of weapon systems production, emphasizes that a more 
powerful actor will request huge side-payments if the difference in 
capabilities is large (because it will achieve less advantageous economic 
returns), or if the difference in capabilities is small (because it should 
compensate for losses in positional terms): “a side-payment may 
consist of the following: the project leadership; a disproportionate share 
of the contract either in terms of development and production work or 
in terms of work on the high value-added components; a 
disproportionate share of the financial and technological benefits; or a 
combination of these”.88 In the same vein Keohane underlines that 
“international regimes therefore seem often to facilitate side-payments 
among actors within issue-areas covered by comprehensive regimes, 
since they bring together negotiators to consider a whole complex of 
issues” an important achievement this latter given that in normal 
politics side-payments are likely to increase transaction costs and 
therefore to hamper cooperation.89 Indeed the fact that arrangements to 
partially correct ‘relative gains’ concerns are at hands does not mean 
that these are eliminated, “saying that relative-gains problems do not 
inhibit cooperation because states can ameliorate them through reforms 
or side-payments is equivalent to saying that cheating problems do not 
inhibit cooperation because states can resolve them by establishing 
verification and sanctioning arrangements”;90 what is apparent, though, 
is that cooperation is still possible when relative concerns do matter, a 
fact this latter that even Grieco’ s  was lately ready to recognize.  
                                                           
88 Jonathan B Tucker, 1991, p. 100. A side-payment results, in this case, when 
there is a different allocation of work-share compared to the one that should 
have arisen out of the financial contribution to the cooperative project. 
89 Robert O. Keohane, 1982, p. 340. 
90 Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell and Duncan Snidal, 1993, p. 731. 
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As seen, side-payments can partially correct relative gains concerns and 
therefore cooperation may lead to the achievement of gains. Another 
scenario where relative gains concerns may arise is when keeping 
outside of a cooperative setting: in this case ‘relative losses’ may 
appear. As Snidal correctly points out following Grieco’s statements, 
states are ‘defensive positionalist’, that  is, states are worried first of all 
to preserve their relative position within the system. In the case in 
which a state decides not to cooperate while other and maybe powerful 
actors decide instead to coordinate their actions, then the relative gains 
achieved by the others will impinge negatively on the first state’ s 
relative position: in this case relative gains concerns may well invite 
cooperation in order to preserve one’s position, a ‘defensive 
cooperation’.91 That states are not ‘rational egoists’ means also that they 
should monitor others’ potential alternatives for cooperation, especially 
if an actor decides not to coordinate its actions. This argument will 
assume a paramount importance in the empirical analysis of defence 
procurement where it will be shown how ‘defensive cooperation’ as a 
strategy entered time and again in states’ utility calculus.  
1.6.2 Short term and long term interests 
 In our consideration of “who gains what” the issue of short term and 
long term interests deserves a special attention. The reason for this is 
quite simple: states that engage in international regimes struggle for 
achieving their interests conceived only at a minimum extent in the 
short and most likely in the long run. It is possible to say that each state 
has what Glenn Snyder refers to as ‘general’ interests that “stem from 
the anarchic structure of the system and the geographic position of the 
state”: because these interests embody power and security substance 
states will not compromise them. Instead ‘particular’ interests are those 
which spur disputes or underline commonalities among states.92 While 
coordination regimes help directly achieve these latter they also 
contribute in a significant way to the attainment of the formers by 
preserving or increasing states’ relative position.  
                                                           
91 Duncan Snidal, 1991, p. 85. Grieco explains that “states seek to prevent 
increases in others’ relative capabilities. As a result, states always assess their 
performance in any relationship in terms of the performance of others”, see 
Joseph M. Grieco, 1988, p. 499. 
92 Glenn H. Snyder, 1984, p. 464. 
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That states have different interests is apparent and that these interests 
are determined by their power is also assessed. Nevertheless, as 
Krasner explains, regimes can be a source of power themselves, both 
for powerful and for less powerful states.93 This is so because regimes 
can be considered useful in managing ‘distributional problems’. In 
accordance with Fearon’ s argument, regimes are ‘forums’ much more 
than entities monitoring enforcement and compliance: “focal points 
and principles can be decisive in the resolution of distributional conflict 
in bargaining”.94 The idea of regimes as ‘forum of communication’ is 
particularly relevant in coordination-like situations because, given the 
fact that more equilibrium points can exist communication assures that 
Pareto-optimal outcomes are going to be achieved.95 
For a powerful state a regime often helps pursue own interests because 
of its capacity to mould its structure: this can be proven by the fact that 
most of the regimes have been created by powerful states. This 
consideration is also assessed by the neo-institutionalist school of 
thought, that pacifically asserts that the creation (but not the 
maintenance) of regimes has been determined either by snapshot and 
substantial structural mutations or by the incipit of an hegemonic 
power.96 In his powerful critic to the “public” nature of the goods 
provided by the Hegemonic Actor, Duncan Snidal underlines the 
possible emergence of a regime out of the collective action of similarly 
powerful states, “while the hegemonic role of the United States may 
have been instrumental to the success of NATO, numerous historical 
examples illustrate the possibility of collective actions among more 
equal-sized states”.97  This is so because these are supposed to provide a 
significant but balanced contribution to the regime. Against this 
background, a regime helps maintain a position of power. This 
argument has been sustained also by John Ikenberry, who in his book 
                                                           
93 Stephen Krasner, 1991, p. 25 . 
94 Thomas Schelling, cited in James D. Fearon, 1998, p. 298. 
95 See on this point Charles Lipson, 1984, pp. 11-12. 
96 This reasoning partly confirms the basic assumptions of the hegemonic 
stability theory as for the “supply” of regimes. As seen, in fact, while neo-
institutionalists can say why a regime will be created thanks to their functional 
approach, they are not able to forecast when or how a regime will be provided: 
to answer these questions they rely on power as explanatory variable. 
97 Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”, International 
Organization, 39, 4, 1985, p. 596.  
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“After Victory”98 explains how the United States has been able to 
maintain his position of power through the use of institutions. The idea 
is that a powerful state has incentives to create institutions when it 
finds itself in a position of force because it is able to shape the way in 
which the institutions are established. It will search to tailor the 
institution so as to represent and promote its main interests. A state is 
keen to freeze his position of power by proactively participate in the 
formulation of principles, norms rules and the decision-making 
procedures composing a regime. 
Second, a regime helps a powerful state to control and limit the power 
of other states, another long term interest deeply treated in alliance 
literature.99 Regimes have often been created among strong states or 
with states on the ascendance of their power. Coordination with them 
helps avoid the pursuit of autonomous decisions that could impinge on 
the first state’s position (economic or military). Engaging powerful 
states in distributional conflicts means limiting the achievement of their 
preferred outcomes: accordingly, the Concert of Europe, “served as an 
arena for the exercise of influence, constrained bargaining strategies, 
facilitated side-payments, enabled signalling, enhanced predictability, 
and specified obligations guiding state action.”100 Thus, even alliances, 
which are seen as coordination games, should sometimes be 
interpreted as way to gain “conformity” and influence of an ally’s 
action, “among equals we will finally observe a latent but constant 
struggle among the two parts, each one attempting to convince the 
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99 See James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: an Alternative to the 
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other to support it in those judged the most important objectives”.101  
Each state is likely to struggle for his own position: especially among 
great powers the likely end result is a compromise position that allows 
to control the gains of the other and limit his influence as well as to get 
something valuable back. In this case the role of a regime is that of a 
mediator between the power and the concomitant interests of the states 
on the outcome in the issue-area.102 
Third, powerful states can advance their interests through a regime by 
the power of “agenda setting”, and by deciding the number of state 
that can play, the rules for those who want to enter and the issues to 
confer priority to: in the congresses making part of the Concert of 
Europe weaker actors were also included but “there was never any 
doubt as to where power resided”.103 Ultimately, the most important 
interest is the aversion shared by all states to uncoordinated actions. 
All this said about powerful states what is left of the pie for weak 
states? What are less powerful states likely to gain? When considering 
Krasner’ s argument it has been said that powerful states are likely to 
gain more, but also that regimes are a dynamic “distributional 
conflict”, in which states engage in continuous struggles to advance 
their interests. Therefore, a regime seems to be a potential opportunity 
to gain power and advance interests for all states. First of all, less 
powerful states while having low probabilities to provide a regime are 
likely to struggle to participate in it. They gain a position inside of the 
regime, they gain a vote, a seat, an opportunity to make their presence 
count.  The regime is not likely to reflect their interests at the very 
beginning, but if their presence is increased within it, then it is 
impossible for powerful states to avoid listening to their concerns.  
Lots of scholars have pointed out that less-powerful states gain a 
“voice-opportunity” within a regime, a possibility that they could not 
have achieved from the outside. Deriving from Hirschman’ s 
observations, Grieco points out the importance of the ‘voice’ as a factor 
spurring cooperation among actors, “effective ‘voice opportunities’ 
may be defined as institutional characteristics whereby the views of 
partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed 
but reliably have a material impact on the operations of the 
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collaborative arrangement”.104 Obviously, for this to happen it is 
necessary that a regime provides a free-entry for all states, and this 
depends strongly on the issue area concerned and on the necessity of 
weak states participation into the cooperative game to bring about 
concrete results. In particular fields, the participation of less powerful 
states is more likely, since the coordination of a lot of states is necessary 
to avoid particular outcomes: this happens, for example, in the Non-
Proliferation regime, where the nuclear component is somehow able to 
downgrade significant differences in capabilities among states. In other 
issue-areas, such as in security matters, it is difficult to hazard any 
forecast.  Second, less powerful states can profit from disagreements 
among powerful states and advance their positions, by supporting one 
of them or by mediating between them. While a powerful state is not 
likely to bandwagon with another powerful state, weak states can use 
this tool to achieve rewards. Finally, in the same vein as powerful 
states, less powerful ones achieve the benefit of avoiding unilateral 
actions in the issue-area.  
1.7 Theoretical tools for the empirical research 
The aim of this section is to provide the reader with a synthesis of the 
observations emerged in the theoretical debate above and that will be 
recuperated and employed for the structuring and the development of 
the research.  
In analysing the debate about regimes among different schools of 
thought the cognitivist approach resulted as the one more prone to 
envision cooperation among European states: for the sake of our 
research it will be therefore interesting to see how difficult it has been 
or still is to create a pattern conducive to cooperation in defence 
procurement among European states, and which are the main reasons 
for cooperation. If forms of coordination among states have been 
reached it will be paramount to consider the degree of 
institutionalization of these latter and the steps forward undertaken in 
harmonizing European states’ national procurement practices.  
As abovementioned, while the ‘security dilemma’ condition is to date 
mitigated and re-moulded through the lenses of the post Cold War 
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scenario, security matters still pose challenges to states’ attempts at 
cooperation: states are reluctant to bind themselves and rely on 
common norms and practices if this rules out their freedom of action or 
downplays their power position. Nevertheless, it has also been 
emphasized that coordination games, as defence procurement is 
supposed to be, require less from states for their creation, the only basic 
condition being to avoid unilateral actions. Also, while participation 
within a regime may limit a state’s action the institutional framework is 
likely to constrain also other participating states’ behaviours: if this is 
true we should find out in states’ decision to participate within the 
regime the willingness to monitor other states’ behaviours. 
The representation of defence procurement as a coordination game is 
not a novelty: weaponry standardization has traditionally been 
conceived in this vein, as a problem of how to choose the capabilities 
required and then how to procure them. Cooperation on defence 
procurement among European states means that these latter recognize 
the need for a more coordinated path in acquisition and management 
of weapon systems because of economic, industrial and strategic 
pressures. However, agreement on avoiding unilateral paths overlooks 
all the possible and alternatives cooperation arrangements each of the 
actors is going to advance: the research should therefore consider if 
‘distributional’ issues have emerged and the impact they have had on 
the working of cooperation. Also, the research should focus on whether 
‘defection’ has resulted and whether the cause of this latter was the 
willingness to achieve higher benefits or dissatisfaction with the 
cooperative point agreed upon. 
As we have seen in the case of the Concert of Europe and in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the coordinated actions of the most powerful 
states were paramount to create the regime; this should not come as a 
surprise because in both security cases the structural power of the 
actors were the basic conditions for a credible arrangement. If this is 
true, we should expect that in the case of defence procurement essential 
have been the actions undertaken by the most powerful European 
states to give birth to the regime and to mould it: coordination among 
them should be relevant because of the possibility of a significant 
exchange, while their reduced number should ease the bargaining 
process and lower transaction costs. In fact, as Stein points out, “unlike 
PD where asymmetries sometimes favour smaller and less influential 
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states, in coordination asymmetries favour larger and more influential 
states”.105  
Nonetheless, and as recalled, because of a similar amount of structural 
power these states are likely to strive hard to achieve their preferred 
position so as to maintain or increase their relative power and pursue 
their long-term interests. Given their similar power the result coming 
out of the bargaining process should be a compromise about states’ 
positions:  the idea of a distribution of gains calibrated on states’ power 
suggests that if cooperation emerges it should be balanced so as to 
maintain each states’ position. We have seen that this is possible 
whenever a mix of absolute and relative concerns are involved in 
coordination games: regimes in fact, through side-payments and opting 
out options, allows the degree of flexibility necessary not to impair 
cooperation and to increase the benefits of joint actions. It will be 
important to examine, therefore, if the regime on defence procurement 
attempts at keeping a balanced cooperation among states and an high 
degree of flexibility through side-payments and opting-out clauses.  
By assessing the power structure of the states, the strategic options at 
hands and the result of the bargaining process we should be able to 
weigh up whether relative gains did matter in cooperation and if the 
strategy of coordination was sound to the achievement of their 
interests.  
Cooperation has been said to be not only a strategy to achieve more 
gains but also a strategy to monitor other states’ actions: in this sense, 
to participate avoids the potential drawbacks of keeping outside of a 
cooperative setting. In the case in which an actor is not deemed as 
paramount to the achievement of cooperation and where therefore 
coordination goes ahead without that state’s participation, this latter is 
likely to loose relative power and gains. ‘Defensive cooperation’ is 
therefore but another strategy to preserve the own power position: this 
is much more important in the field of defence procurement where 
security and economic objectives mingle together. In order to 
substantiate this reasoning it should be investigated whether ‘defensive 
cooperation’ was one of the strategies adopted by states in the defence 
procurement regime to keep their power position and bargain with 
other actors on an  equal footing .  
Issues such as the ‘reiteration’ of the game, often promoted by the neo-
institutionalist school of thought, should only deepen the struggle for 
the better outcome, creating delays and postponements as the 
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distribution of gain in one cooperative round (improvement of the 
industrial base, technological and know-how expertise, etc.) will 
impinge on future state’s bargaining power. By the same token, 
‘reputation’ should loose some of its normative power: of course it 
should account for a state’s reliability. Reputation, though, increases its 
monitoring power proportionally to the alternative strategies  available: 
in Europe only a small number of states have the amount of military 
might and industrial potential sufficient to be a credible partner. A look 
should be paid, therefore, on the weight of ‘reputation’ on cooperation 
choices; it should be assessed whether this parameter or instead the 
structural power of a state was decisive for cooperative decisions.  
Structural power on security issues determines relationships also with 
weaker states: if, with Krasner, power can be used to determine who 
can play the game in the first place, to dictate the rules of the game and 
to change the payoff matrix, the defence procurement regime could 
result as an ‘exclusive club’. Accordingly, it will necessary to see the 
role weaker European states do play in this context and whether they 
participate in the regime and benefit of votes and voices opportunities. 
It goes without saying that in the case of a broad and mixed regime 
either the powerful states drive the game or the regime is just a 
minimal and general consent among different-sized and endowed 
states, with no binding rules and no actual intervening power. 
1.8 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to provide a theoretical background for the 
analysis of the defence procurement regime among European states. 
The main issue this research projects attempts at answering is the 
reason driving states to cooperate on the acquisition and management 
of weapon systems, and the main thesis is that states try to coordinate 
their actions because unilateral actions are neither possible nor 
rewarding for them. The challenge that this statement poses on  
traditional studies on regimes is twofold: the first one is mainly 
addressed to the realist school of thought, since coordination on 
defence procurement represents a case of cooperation on security 
matters that rules out alliance dynamics. The second one is to the 
functionalist theory of regimes, since cooperation in this subject matter 
cannot be explained by Prisoner’s dilemma-like situations. This 
theoretical part has therefore tried to clarify the concepts to be used in 
the empirical one and, together with the next chapter, will explain the 
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rationale for cooperation and the challenges this latter is likely to bring 
about. 
The very first step of this chapter has been to present the literature on 
international regimes, emphasizing the sociological and the rationalist 
approaches: the sociological approach, or cognitivism, has presented 
regimes not as effective efforts undertaken by states to achieve defined 
interests, but rather as the product and the result of social institutions 
and shared identities. It has stressed the role and the power of ideas, 
communication, persuasion and discourse in changing states interests 
towards more cooperative behaviours. Notwithstanding some positive 
insights, this approach falls short of explaining the rationale for 
cooperation and poorly matches with empirical studies that time and 
again show that regimes do not mirror social institutions but  
compromises and bargaining among different interests. Instead, 
rationalist approaches emphasize the relevance of regimes -and 
therefore of cooperation- as ‘strategies’ to attain defined interests. 
While during the Cold War  the Hegemonic Stability Theory was 
appropriate to explain cooperative dynamics, the decline of the 
hegemon (the United States) and the demise of the Soviet Union have 
called attention to the neo-institutionalist school of thought: this latter 
underlined regimes importance in fostering  cooperation among states 
because of their ability to mitigate double-crossing temptations. The 
Prisoner’s dilemma game was able to show, according to this theory, 
the real problem of cooperation among states: cheating. Contrary to 
this statement, various pundits from different schools of thought have 
underlined that cooperation dynamics change according to the 
structural situation in which actors find themselves to play, and this 
opens the way to new and more realistic cooperation dilemmas.  
Security as an issue area has always been interpreted as hostile to 
cooperative attempts: this has been motivated by the structural 
configuration of the international system (anarchy) and the 
consequential ‘security dilemma’ arising from it. Notwithstanding this 
permanent condition, regimes have emerged even among rival powers, 
such as in the case of the Concert of Europe and the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation regime, as a demonstration of the fact that states can 
mitigate their security concerns when coordinated actions are likely to 
bring about fundamental benefits. While the defence procurement 
regime regards a security matter it does not question the very ‘survival’ 
of the actors involved: instead, security is correctly intended more in 
general as the possibility to pursue basic interests: prestige, 
independence, economic well-being. Moreover the regime of our 
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concern exists within the frame of the European Union and of the 
Atlantic Alliance, so that fundamental threats are somehow ruled out.  
The chapter has shown that what should be kept of traditional security 
matters is the fundamental role that power can have in situations when 
different interests are brought to the negotiating table. This is the case 
of regimes that, as in our case, reflect coordination games dynamics: 
while actors do agree to avoid unilateral actions they propose different 
arrangements points. If ‘coordination’ as a game is conceived by all 
schools of thought, different have been the tools proposed to face 
distributional conflict: for some authors the role of ideas and focal 
points are paramount on this account, but which ideas are going to 
prevail? Also, the role of persuasion and communication are said to 
foster agreements, but on some situations effective communication is 
not an option and coercive moves seem to force determined settings: all 
these considerations explain the importance of power in bargaining 
and structuring the regime. 
One of the traditional concerns of security issues, relative gains, 
maintains its importance for our purposes. Relative gains were not a 
problem for the neo-institutionalist school, since the main impediment 
towards cooperation was cheating. In coordination games relative 
gains concerns do not hamper directly cooperation but do arise when 
distributional conflicts come about: defection, or more likely, the threat 
of it, should not be interpreted as an attempt at double-crossing the 
other actor but at showing dissatisfaction with the arrangement point 
achieved.  
What this chapter wants to stress is that a regime, and in our case a 
coordination one, is but another strategy that states can use to pursue 
their fundamental interests when they are not able to do that otherwise: 
a security coordination regime can help preserve or increase own 
power position and control and limit the power of other actors. Also, it 
can confer some purposeful role for weaker states if they are ‘invited’ to 
participate in it. The next chapter will focus on the consequences of 
unilateral actions on defence procurement matters given the actual 
pressures (economic, industrial and strategic) facing all European 
states. It will then investigate the outcome that all actors agree to 
eschew and the rationale for coordination.
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Chapter 2 
Defence procurement: 
setting the stage 
2.1 Introduction 
After having considered the ‘security’ nature of the defence 
procurement practice and outlined all the challenges this issue area is 
likely to bring about among actors searching coordination, this chapter 
will provide an in-depth outlook of the defence procurement process. 
Before considering the reasons driving states to coordinate their 
actions, it is paramount to understand the working as well as the 
implications of the process under analysis: therefore, the first three 
sections will deal with the peculiarities of acquisition and management 
of defence systems.  
One of the main blunders made by scholars in the International 
Relations field is to label ‘security concerns’ only those situations where 
the survival of a state is at risk; instead, and as seen in the theoretical 
part, the meaning of security is so broad as to encompass various 
concerns, from a state’s prestige and influence to its economic well-
being. This permits to consider other various scenarios as ‘security 
contexts’ and at the same to perceive the challenges that this latter is 
likely to display. According to this argument defence procurement 
represents a ‘security’ issue and this is underlined in the first section of 
this chapter, that tries to explain why this process has been interpreted 
historically as a ‘national domain’ concern and has seen an active role 
by national states in directing or ignoring economic forces. The analysis 
of the phases constituting the life-cycle of the procurement process will 
highlight the differences existing between a traditional market and a 
defence one: there seems to be space only for militarily powerful actors  
in this process and this will apparently impinge on cooperative 
dynamics. The third section of this chapter will address directly the 
issue of cooperation in defence procurement. The aim is not to provide 
an all-encompassing historical background of past cooperation efforts, 
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but to underline how powerful actors have maintained the key of 
defence procurement by force of their relative power; how different 
procurement modalities were chosen with allies to keep a certain 
amount of power; how cooperation was searched to pursue other 
interests; how distributional issues rendered inefficient cooperative 
dynamics. 
If cooperative attempts in the past led to inefficient arrangements it is 
to be seen if, to-date, different and more compelling incentives are 
limiting states’ options on defence procurement and making 
coordination the best outcome to pursue. To evaluate this possibility 
economic, industrial and political-strategic pressures will be taken into 
account. Because of reduced budgets for defence but increased costs for 
weapons systems, states should optimise the resources to work with: in 
this sense, cooperation can substitute a yet impossible unilateral 
management of defence procurement by dividing costs among 
participant states.  
Also, defence industries have been protagonists of consolidation (at the 
national level) and horizontal integration (with other European actors) 
processes: in fact, due to increased unit production costs and to 
sophisticated technological systems, defence industries felt compelled 
to join their activities to augment their productive capacity and reduce 
costs. Therefore, from the supply-side of defence procurement the 
context is ripe for more fruitful and efficient cooperative processes. 
Finally, political and strategic interests are pushing toward coordinated 
actions. The changed international context has inevitably requested a 
deep re-thing of each state’ s position within the new scenario and the 
strategies more likely to preserve or strengthen that position. In 
particular, the demise of the Soviet Union has unleashed divergent 
interests and priorities within the Atlantic Alliance, among which the 
quest for  an independent European defence stance. In order to absolve 
this task two problems need to be faced, the first one referring to the 
huge military gap and therefore dependence from the Atlantic Ally, 
and the second one requesting a political willingness to harmonize 
requirements and procure jointly armaments so as to develop a truly 
autonomous military-might and a consistent defence policy. 
All these economic, industrial and political-strategic pressures are 
inducing states to coordinate their actions. Because of these incentives, 
states believe that a purely national procurement is neither convenient 
nor possible. If states were able to manage defence programmes by 
themselves, then the need to coordinate their actions or to do that 
continuously would not have existed. That said, states are still able to 
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pursue the strategies they deem appropriate for them, especially if they 
are powerful enough to have more strategic options at hands. The way 
in which cooperation has been effectively handled in defence 
procurement will be the argument of the next chapter. 
2.2 Security priorities and economic peculiarities: the 
importance of a dialogue among issue-areas 
Issues concerning security have always constituted a paramount 
national interest for states. In the case of our concern, acquisition and 
management of weapons systems, states have been reluctant to engage 
in patterns of cooperation with other actors and have searched, as 
much as possible, to keep procurement outside of other cooperation 
processes, “arms procurement is a subject of particular interest to 
students of European integration since in the Treaty of Rome it was 
specified as an area of government activity exempt from Community 
competence”.106 In this particular area the ‘spill-over’ effect that often 
accompanied European cooperation efforts seemed not to apply. A 
profit maximizing reasoning would say that there is no difference 
between civil and defence markets: the incentives operating in  the first 
one would do the same in the defence market. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to this issue, it is apparent that the utility curve of a state does 
not consider ‘efficiency’ as the utmost objective to be pursued, but  it 
comprises also other important elements: sovereignty, power, prestige, 
independence and economic well-being. 
Security should not be conceived as the likelihood of survival, which in 
our case is not in question, but as the probability of being able to 
pledge and protect other fundamental interests, “national security 
concerns arise when vital national values (i.e. core values) are 
perceived as being threatened by adverse foreign actions or events. 
What is regarded as ‘vital’ is a matter of subjective judgment 
depending on a nation’s hierarchy of values”.107 As Sandler and Hartley 
                                                           
106 Trevor Taylor, “Arms Procurement” in Anand Menon and Joylon Howorth, 
ed., The European Union and National Defence Policy, Routledge, London and 
New York, 1997, p. 121. 
107 Klaus Knorr, “Economic Interdependence and National Security”, in Klaus 
Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security, 
University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 1977, p. 8.  
 56 
point out, the maintenance of a defence and industrial base (DIB)108 
produces benefits such as the preservation of national independence; 
the security of supply and responsiveness in emergencies and war; the 
maintenance of a capability which a nation can use in the future; the 
possibility to avoid monopoly prices from the foreign supply; the  
option to avoid being equipped with weapon systems not tailored on 
the nation’s exigencies; the opportunity to increase influence by rising 
bargaining power when considering buying from abroad and the 
possibility to provide national economic benefits.109 According to these 
arguments, the ability to preserve a sound and efficient defence 
industrial base is an asset a nation should be endowed with if it aspires 
at meeting its interests and driving its policies in a way conducive to its 
strategic priorities: “the more a nation’s procurement policies ignore 
the connection between national security policy and the DIB, the more 
it risks destroying long-term value derived from the programmes it has 
funded in the past and the more it limits its ability to develop a truly 
independent security policy in the future”.110  
In the long-run, the end-objective of the strengthening of the own 
industrial base, and therefore of the capability to meet own operational 
requirements is, among others, to achieve a degree of independence apt 
to freed the state from external pressures, “depending upon foreign 
sources for military products has always been perceived as a greater 
threat to the national security than parochial legislation, gold plated 
military specification, revolving doors, or contract irregularities”.111 
Also, aside from outer interference, the preservation of a national 
capability helps the overall development of the country and the pursuit 
of foreign policy objectives, “the defence industrial base is commonly 
thought to contribute to national security in two ways. The first is in 
the area of high technology…and the second is by supplying the 
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weapons, ammunition, equipment and other supplies that our military 
forces need to function in peace and war”.112 High technology 
development is paramount not only for the military field but for the 
civil industry as well: improvements on this sector would therefore 
positively impinge on the country’s overall competitiveness. The 
capability of supplying arms provides not only the opportunity to face 
war but also to gain influence in peace. 
This stated, it is apparent that diverse states have worked out different 
strategies to manage the procurement of defence systems according to 
their power and related interests: more powerful states, better 
endowed with technological and productive capacity, have searched to 
preserve as much as possible their independence in the procurement 
process, to monitor the different phases of collaboration projects or to 
transfer arms as a way to obtain diplomatic leverage on other states. 
Notwithstanding that, it should be noticed that even the strongest 
states, such as the United States, which are able to produce by 
themselves the bulk of the national defence requirements, are subject to 
forms of dependence from other weaker actors that cause vulnerability. 
This is for example the case of military sales or foreign subcontracting 
practices where a state can be hurt by the decision of a potential 
importer not to purchase its system and therefore to spoil a potential 
long-term relation. By the same token, some level of technological 
transfer embodied in a subcontract process may increase the 
capabilities of a weaker state. As Murdock explains, the 
effective(actual) vulnerability of the importing country will depend not 
only on its level of foreign dependence, but also on the dependence of 
the supplier state towards its exports.113  
As aforementioned, the acquisition and management of weapon 
systems is a security concern because of two reasons: first of all the 
practice regards the production of destructive resources and second, 
defence procurement is likely to touch interests deemed fundamental 
aside from survival. Notwithstanding its security nature, the issue area 
we are dealing with does exhibit some important economic insights 
that help characterize its peculiarities. More to that, economic and 
security aspects do often relate in this subject-matter, so that a joint 
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study of their implications would clarify their impact and mutual 
influence.  
While some authors do recognize the connections existing between 
security and economics in this field some others do reject this 
possibility or simply do not see the way in which these connections can 
foster a complete and consistent study of the topic. Indeed, according 
to some pundits, economic and security issues should be kept separate 
because respond to different dynamics and questions. Security issues 
are the realm of power and are determined by it, while economic issues 
are fostered by market logics and power does not enter the game. 
Because of these considerations, as Moran points out, “the dialogue 
between economist and national security analysts has tended to be 
limited, unproductive, and highly unsatisfactory to both sides”.114 The 
author states that aside from industrial policy advocates and strategic 
trade theorists, economists think that the nationality of producers is not 
important and that competition should be the only criterion leading 
industrial strategies. Also, they maintain that the protection of the 
industrial base and a closure towards outer influences lead to 
inefficiencies. What should be remembered, though, is that the 
armament market, is political by its very nature; free-market answers 
are important but thus ultimately unsatisfying.115  
The relations existing between security and economics are especially 
recognized by those who confer to the national state a remarkable 
control over capabilities,   “political realism sees a powerful role for the 
state in the national and international economics. States’ intervention in 
the domestic economy is required in order to achieve autonomy and 
superiority in defence, and in the international economy a hegemon is 
required to achieve cooperative commercial relations”.116 For these 
reasons defence capabilities do inevitably fall within a state’s domain, 
since “the world’s defence industries sit on the cusp of economic and 
national security”.117 For the mercantilist school of thought, economy 
and security were linked in two ways: first of all because of the 
potential use of the economic power to influence the behaviour of an 
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actor lacking and needing a particular resource. Second, as the 
economic base of  military power. For both reasons economic matters 
are far too an important determinant of national security not to be 
geared by governments.118  
The relevance of the economic power for a state’s stance is even more 
highlighted in the case of defence procurement, where industrial and 
technological capabilities impinge positively and substantially on 
states’ pursuit of interests, “there is no reason why economic values 
and particular patterns of economic life cannot be regarded as vital. 
Once these values are perceived as being vulnerable to external events, 
they naturally inspire security concerns and the desire to minimize 
these concerns”.119 By converse, an exclusive economic-centered 
analysis of weapons procurement is likely to overshadow deep and 
significant security consequences: as William Walker and Philip 
Gummet point out, the challenges which are now present are too deep 
and menacing to think about procurement only in economic terms.120 
The authors emphasize that notwithstanding its strong pressures, 
globalization can determine both integration and fragmentation of 
defence procurement practices, “economic and technological forces are 
driving it towards greater internationalisation, but it is simultaneously 
being constrained by demands that it should serve local interests and 
sentiments, and that the international diffusion of its product and 
technologies should be more tightly constrained”.121 Some kind of 
economic protection is therefore a shield not only against foreign 
industries but also against foreign strategic dominance: the most 
relevant European concern is that the United States can prevail in a 
potentially free transatlantic defence market thanks to its technological 
leadership.  
For all these reasons new study approaches have searched to handle 
this multi-faceted topic. Among these prevail those that starting from 
an economic emphasis recognize the peculiarities of the issue-area, and 
those that point more directly to the basic security and power 
implications subsumed within it. In the first case a discipline called 
‘defence economics’ stresses that every process of cooperation or failed 
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coordination in this field entails inevitably a cost-benefit analysis. Keith 
Hartley says that defence economics implies difficult choices in an 
uncertain world: because of declining budgets for defence and because 
of rising unit costs, a state should think the better way through which 
to combine economic with security imperatives.122  
In the second case, strategic trade scholars123 and security analysts focus 
on the fears of foreign dependence and influence and on the 
importance of monitoring and driving the weapons procurement 
“dependence on foreign corporations whose key operations take place 
outside national borders opens up a real threat of interference on the 
part of their home country governments…the dangers to sovereignty 
and national security may come suddenly and without warning, even 
when firms are controlled by allies”.124 One of the strategies to thwart a 
complete foreign dependence is to diversify the degree of dependence, 
an operation, Moran stresses, that is not always the product of a free 
market strategy.  
According to the pundits who underpin the strategic trade argument, 
high-tech sectors of industries, characterized by economies of scale, 
should be protected so as to gain a big share of the marketplace: “doing 
well requires staying at the forefront of developing and 
commercializing new technologies and maintaining a capacity to 
manufacture and market the products of scientific progress”.125 It 
should not be forgotten that one of the first arguments in favour of 
strategic trade protection was made thinking about the aircraft 
industry, where barriers to entry exist because of huge capital and R&D 
investments needed to get a substantial return. The subsidization of 
this industry (Airbus) by the French and German Governments was to 
be interpreted through a defined European lens: competition in this 
case was with the United States, while within the European context no 
other contender existed in this kind of production. Although it is clear 
                                                           
122 Keith Hartley, “Defence Economics and the Industrial Base”, Centre for 
Defence Economics, University of York, England. 
 www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/documents/research/pauwels.pdf 
123 For Libicki an industry is strategic whenever it fosters the systematic 
application of knowledge to generate more and better output out of  inputs, see 
Martin C. Libicki, “What Makes Industry Strategic”, Mc Nair Papers 5, The 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 
Washington DC, October 1990. 
124 Theodore  H. Moran, 1990, p. 61. 
125 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Changing Relationship between Economic and 
National Security”, Political Science Quarterly,  106, 2, Summer 1991, p. 275.  
 61 
that subsidization of an industry does protect fundamental internal 
interests (jobs, the own industry, development of technologies) even 
Barbara Spencer, one of the most firm supporter of the argument, 
admits that it is not clear whether final economic success will make up 
for the initial subsidization.126 To-date, these arguments have 
theoretically lost some ground because of the difficulties emerged in 
finding these ‘strategic’ sectors and defining the appropriate level of 
protection necessary to gain a substantial share of the marketplace.127 
Empirically, though, defence industries protection is alive and well. 
This section has shown that weapons procurement processes do foster 
security concerns related to the pursuit of fundamental interest that 
would keep and possibly improve a state’s position within the system. 
While a security matter, weapons acquisition and management cannot 
but invite attention to economic dynamics that characterize this issue-
area: these latter help clarify the setting in which the procurement 
process takes place, its modalities and its constraints, but highlight also 
the opportunities that economic power can confer to a state’s security. 
As Schmitt makes clear, this is an in-between issue-area and therefore 
contradictions are inevitable but particularly apparent:  “technological, 
financial and economic considerations drive companies in the direction 
of globalization defence is still a national matter”.128 The objective of the 
following section will be to present the nature of the procurement 
process before discussing cooperation dynamics. 
2.3 The procurement process and strategies 
After having seen the relation occurring between economics and 
security in the weapons procurement issue-area, the following section 
will take into consideration the procurement process and its 
importance amid a state’s overall strategy.  
Defence procurement regards the acquisition and management of 
weapon systems by statal or ad hoc agencies: in particular, “defence 
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procurement issues concern the rules and practices by which purchases 
are executed, including the purchasing agency. More broadly, 
however, defence procurement must pay attention to supply as well as 
to the demand side, that is to such questions as the structure and 
capabilities of the industry which provides the goods to be bought”.129 
For the purpose of this research project the procurement process will be 
considered from a ‘demand’ point of view, that is, by observing actors’ 
specific requirements and relative arrangements agreed upon. 
Nevertheless, time and again, attention will be paid to the actual 
industrial provisions and arrangements, constituting the supply side of 
the process. 
Analysing a deeply technical topic as that of weapons procurement 
may overshadow subtle political and economic implications hidden in 
this issue; instead, “the underlying questions are highly political and 
(potentially) have considerable financial implications”.130 Therefore, 
while the different phases of the acquisition process will be presented, 
an in-depth consideration of its security implications will be provided, 
“in building weapons, defence officials in every country are pursuing 
multiple economic and security objectives. These include the support of 
domestic industries and firms, employment of scientists and engineers, 
funding for research and development, and, of course, the fielding of 
equipment that meets perceived national security requirements. 
Weapons procurement is really about how these various objectives get 
reconciled”.131 
2.3.1 Power and strategic options 
The ways in which arms can be procured are many and each of them 
depends on the power of the state, on its technological might, on its 
economic and industrial clout and last, but overriding, on its pursued 
political aim and available strategies. More in general, a state can 
import weapons from abroad, produce weapons under a foreign 
licence (co-production, that reflects the technological superiority of one 
of the partners),132 design and produce weapons in co-operation with 
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foreign nations (co-development, which imply cooperation from the 
R&D phase) and design and produce weapons domestically.133 
According to the abovementioned options, only some of these solutions 
will be chosen by a state, “what type of response a nation may choose 
will depend largely on its effective power capabilities (that is, its power 
capabilities and its ability to use them). A state with little power and 
vulnerable economy will undoubtedly choose a relatively passive 
nationalistic response and a cooperative international strategy”.134 By 
converse, a powerful state will search to produce as much weapons as 
possible, notwithstanding the costs this might imply.  
The emphasis on independence and security of supply, explains 
Hartley, “has resulted in a variety of separate national defence 
industries each capable of producing either a complete or a limited 
range of modern weapons. Inevitably, member states have purchased 
defence equipment from their national suppliers resulting in wasteful 
duplication of costly R&D, with each government buying relatively 
small quantities”.135 While self-reliance would be the preferred option 
for a state to keep independence and buttress the national industrial 
base, it is apparent that, especially in the European case, forms of 
cooperation between states should be pursued as none of the actors is 
able to go it alone.   
The second and third solutions (co-production and co-development) 
underline the willingness of the buying nation to take part in the 
productive process through the participation of the national industry: 
in this case, jobs increase and hope for a sure technological transfer 
make these options of a greater value than the pure acquisition abroad. 
Apparently, co-development will encompass more disagreement 
among states’ positions, as each tries to pinpoint its management 
model. On the other hand, simply importing arms will put in danger a 
state autonomy, will eliminate jobs  and public spending opportunities, 
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will downplay pressures towards technological innovations and 
investments but would spare risks connected with the productive 
process. This latter, in particular, can be an option for weaker arms 
producers who can see for example in the American market, a more 
rewarding solution “if the choice facing the smaller countries is either 
to buy European defence equipment that is more expensive than 
similar equipment which they could buy from the United States, or to 
sacrifice their own industry, jobs and capabilities on the altar of 
supposedly greater European good, then their compliance cannot be 
taken for granted, even at the price of weakening Europe’s overall 
capability”.136 
The restraints posed by economic, industrial and strategic pressures 
ask for a huge degree of realism in the pursuit of foreign policy 
objectives. Given the scarce resources that each state is compelled to 
work with a tricky question is whether a state’s foreign policy could be 
properly addressed with a self-reliant procurement strategy. The cost-
benefit analysis pursued in the procurement process encompasses 
therefore not only pure economic reasons but also political and security 
ones. Hartley provides a series of parameters which should be taken 
into consideration in the procurement plan: among the costs there are 
the acquisition price and the life cycle costs, while on the benefits side 
there are military/strategic features (performance, delivery schedule 
etc.,) and national economic benefits (jobs, technology, balance of 
payment, growth).137 
2.3.2 The life-cycle of a weapon system: the limits of free-
market practices 
An important step to be undertaken, in order to provide an informed 
background for our research and to specify the setting of state’s 
procurement choices, is to frame the procurement process and shed a 
light on the characteristics of the context in which it occurs. From this 
point of view, the weapons acquisition process does not take place in 
and does not represent a perfect free-market situation: expecting that it 
will be guided by demand and supply forces through the price 
mechanism is both nonsense and misleading.  
As Gansler points out, defence markets have usually one buyer 
(monopsony); very few larger supplier; do encompass very expensive 
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items bought in small quantities; exert monopolistic or oligopolistic 
prices; present extensive barriers to entry and exit; their prices are 
proportional to total and not marginal costs, are not paid according to 
the marginal utility but to the desired military performance and rise 
with reduced demand. More to that, and because of cost-based pricing, 
large excess capacity, increasing returns to scale, long delays in 
development and production costs do arise; the government absolves 
the role of regulator, specifier and funds provider; products are 
different; demand is threat-sensitive or responsive to new technologies 
available.138 
That said, the procurement process does involve more phases that 
together define the ‘life-cycle’ of a defence system. The first step 
foresees the delineation of the military or operational requirement, 
which is a product of geo-strategic perceptions, foreign policy goals, 
budgetary plans and financial constraints, national forces doctrines, 
equipment design preferences, technological assessments and 
industrial considerations.139 States differ not only over the perception of 
threat and on the definition of their basic interests: states can also differ 
in the procedural schedule of the procurement process, meaning that 
even if a basic consensus can be traced on the requirements needed, 
operational divergences will still complicate a common European 
approach. For example, some states formulate plans for a long-run 
period, while other states work on a year to year basis; also there are 
differences in national parliaments’ capacity to monitor the executive 
power, a fact this latter that can mark a higher degree of discretion in 
the procurement process. Finally, differences in management and 
scheduling.  
The need to tailor a new military requirement can be spurred by the 
perception of new threats against which current weapons are not 
suited, or can be technologically-driven,140 meaning that the availability 
of a new technology may improve or ease the use of a given weapon 
system. While a technology driven incentive normally guides the 
procurement process of a civil-use product, in defence matters the 
procurement process requires a much more precise and detailed 
definition of the operational concept: as Gansler points out, this marks 
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a sensible difference between civilian and defence markets, “the 
defence sector equivalent of market-driven R&D is for the likely 
operational users of a weapon system to write down what they actually 
need and how they will use it”.141 The military mission, emphasizes the 
author, much more than the design characteristics of the weapon 
system, should be underlined. 
After the definition of the operational requirement, a team of experts 
tries to envision the kind of weapon system that satisfies these requests. 
Programme proposals will therefore be compared: the one that better 
meets the operational requirement set down will be chosen. The 
industrial side enters the game to propose, throughout its diverse 
potential contractors, modalities of developing and producing the 
weapon system that will satisfy the specified requirements at the lower 
cost. The non-free market nature of the defence sector is apparent in the 
R&D competition: huge efforts and expenses should be sustained by 
contenders for a long time, meaning that only few of them are in reality 
able to face this challenge. In this phase a paramount issue is firms’ 
willingness to spend huge funds for research and development costs. 
On this regard, a sound procurement process will foresee systems of 
incentives which would invite companies to face these efforts and 
therefore provide a valuable programme.142  
Going back to the previous point emphasizing the limitations on 
competition, the development phase poses constitutes a case in point:  
“development forms a total fixed cost. Where such cost are substantial, 
as in the case of complex, high technology weapons, they represent a 
significant entry cost. High development costs also raise the costs of 
small production runs: hence, in such conditions independence and self 
sufficiency for a small domestic market is costly”.143 Against this 
background, it seems that only powerful industries are able to compete 
for contract awarding, and in turn, that the contract awarding process 
ends-up benefiting and strengthening the same industries, de facto 
overshadowing other firms growth perspectives. The point is, however, 
if competition does really bring about an added value in this peculiar 
market: as Gansler stresses, it is possible that the restricted competition 
observed in defence procurement translates itself in a more intense one, 
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since “a firm will tend to put more of an effort into its proposal if the 
probability of winning appears to be very good, and to make a 
significant smaller effort (or even to drop out) if the number of bidders 
is large”.144  
The assigned (prime)-contractor would develop prototypes that, if 
successful, will advance development and production, a process which 
is usually time consuming. On its side, the contractor will deal with 
some sub-contractors charged to procure some components of the 
system. Maintaining the system and its operating phase (In-Service 
Support-ISS) requires the hugest amount of money: “to have a 
significant impact on the costs of weapon systems the support and 
production costs-not the R&D costs- must be dramatically reduced 
through a combination of improved design and improved management 
techniques.145 The In-Service Support phase is of the paramount 
importance for every weapon programme and a sound management  of 
it can improve significantly  its performances and decrease its costs. As 
it will be shown later on, this phase, that concludes the procurement 
process is one of the main impediment to states’ cooperation because of 
divergent national exigencies.  
The procurement process presented, the following section will deal 
with the more general aspect of cooperation in defence procurement 
among European states so as to provide an historical insight of the 
process and emphasize its pitfalls and backsides amid never-ending 
incentives to coordinate actions. 
2.4 Cooperation as a political strategy: past experiences 
Notwithstanding states’ self-reliant attitude towards weapons 
procurement, attempts at cooperation did arise in the past and the 
lessons derived from them have somehow informed the actual regime 
on defence procurement. As Kapstein points out, collaboration in 
weapon systems is an issue of both theoretical and political relevance 
because it has always constituted one of the main debates of the 
International Relations literature and because it has shown the actual 
policies and strategies adopted by states.146  
Why do states cooperate? States cooperate because this strategy 
provides them with a more satisfying outcome than a unilateral path. A 
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case in point in the field of defence procurement is the United Kingdom 
rapprochement to Europe, “even the British government seems finally 
to have decided that participation in the European Armament Agency 
is not only unavoidable but actually desirable”.147 What is of interest for 
the purpose of this research is to observe how cooperation has taken 
place among states, so as to grasp the reasons pushing states to partly 
abandon unilateral strategies, and consider how far this cooperation 
has been brought by the same. This will highlight what states have 
renounced to and what they have not.  
In this particular issue area cooperation has not been difficult because 
of a basic double-crossing incentive tempting states, but because 
divergent positions were often expressed: agreements were asked for 
but fell short of their potential impact because of the desire to get as 
much as possible the expected returns. The problem, then, was one of 
‘distribution’ rather than of ‘defection’. In this sense, there can be 
economic, political, industrial or strategic reasons spurring states to 
coordinate their actions. According to Lorell and Lowell, cooperation in 
weapons procurement does provide various security profits classifiable 
in economic, operational, and political ones.148  
The acquisition and management of defence systems has always been 
employed by states to promote a series of interests, among which 
prestige and influence in the international landscape, the pursuit of 
strategic independence because of a strengthened industrial base, the 
protection of national industries and the maintenance of a high 
occupational level. If these interests are no longer assured by a 
unilateral strategy cooperation starts to be seen as a useful alternative. 
On the economic and strategic side, various blueprints do motivate 
cooperation, “one reason states pursue cooperation is to obtain better 
‘value-for-money’. Governments and industry also pursue cooperation 
for strategic reasons, as a means of fostering a bilateral/multilateral 
relationship among capitals or among companies to bank support for a 
future joint venture or partnering. Still, another reason may involve an 
attempt at fence-mending, such as smoothing over strained relations in 
a situation that threatens a larger imminent interest shared mutually by 
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governments or companies”.149 Of course, every cooperative setting 
impinges negatively on a state’s freedom of action -even if this depends 
largely on a state’s relative power- and should therefore be evaluated 
on the basis of this backside. As Menon argues, “the gains of collective 
action may outweigh an individual state’s loss of decision-making 
autonomy as the collective manages to achieve goals no longer feasible 
for a single state”.150 The positive side of the matter is that even other 
actors’ freedom of action is curbed by a cooperative setting, so that 
their moves are more predictable. 
Among all the possible interests aforementioned, the preservation of 
the national defence industry has been and is one of the leading 
motivation behind cooperation, “intra-European defence cooperation 
enables governments to retain certain national defence manufacturing 
capabilities that they might otherwise lose”:151 if this was not an 
objective then states would rather procure their weapons system from 
abroad saving money. Lorell and Lowell point out that the reason 
behind cooperation in the European landscape was to prop up a wide-
ranging national industry against soaring costs for R&D and 
procurement. More to that, often the objective was not that of 
preserving and enhancing an industrial capability, but rather to 
develop it form the outset.152 It should be recognized, though, that with 
a profoundly changed international environment, and therefore with  
different threats and interests, other important incentives do compel 
states to coordinate their actions (see the following section). 
Cooperation may therefore be spurred by strategic and long-term 
objectives; in this sense European cooperation comes about when 
“European governments decide to jointly procure on the basis of a 
common requirement. Such a process entails harmonization and 
standardization of defence requirements and equipment specification 
among European countries.153   
In general, it is fair to say that the most powerful actors, as for military 
production, have been able to pilot to their own advantage cooperation 
                                                           
149 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989, p. 17. 
150 Anand Menon and Joylon Howorth, ed., 1997, p. 6. 
151 David C. Earnest and Robin Niblett, “From Shadow to Substance: An Action 
Plan for Transatlantic Defense Cooperation”, CSIS, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington DC, 1995, p. 3. 
152 Mark Lorell and Julia Lowell, 1995, p. 10, 14. 
153 Katia G. Vlachos, “Safeguarding European Competitiveness: Strategies for 
the Future European Arms Production and Procurement”, Occasional Paper 4, 
ISS-EU, January 1998, p. 18. 
 70 
projects in order to pursue interests other than the pure development of 
weapon systems. This has led to disputes among states regarding the 
nature of programmes, the definition of operational requirements, the 
work-sharing among their national industries and the transfer of 
technologies.  
Cooperation in defence procurement among European states has in 
most of the cases assumed the form of bilateral agreements, in the same 
vein as within the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, standardization at 
NATO’s level has seen the negotiation of bilateral agreements 
(Memoranda of Understanding -MoUs) among NATO’ s allies. While a 
wider and more encompassing standardization process at the entire 
alliance level was difficult to implement because of the persisting 
divergences among states, bilateral MoUs favoured a little degree of 
interoperability even if plagued by work-share concerns: “part of the 
perceived failing of transatlantic defence cooperation, therefore, has 
been the difficulty of setting up and completing balanced programs 
involving cooperative development through a production that would 
offer reciprocal benefits to US and European governments and 
companies, in terms of equitable work-sharing and technology transfer 
and development, within the program.”154 
The degree of armaments standardization achieved  within the Atlantic 
Alliance was mainly encouraged by the United States, even if, as some 
authors ironically point out, the standardization process was not based 
on a compromise solution but modelled on the basis of American 
exigencies and forced by its power position. Thus, Hayward stresses 
that America “has regularly preached the virtues of standardization 
based on European states buying its equipment”.155 The claim for a 
“two-way-street” was one of the main arguments brought about in the 
European Defence agenda and motivating a more self-reliant European 
defence posture. A project developed under the Atlantic Alliance 
inevitably supported American leadership since only the US had the 
logistic and institutional capabilities to develop widespread concepts to 
be internalized within the alliance.156 Moreover, the United States often 
opted for co-production programmes with allies, meaning that if some 
of the assembly lines of the new weaponry could be based on European 
plants they remained de facto under the US’s leadership, “as a result 
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…US dominance in the NATO weapons market was maintained even 
as the United States was sharing technology and production techniques 
with potential competitors”.157  
European states were more eager to buy American systems built up 
under a co-production agreement rather than buying a product off-the 
shelf from another country, because this permitted both to spur the 
domestic industry and to achieve important fallouts in technological 
and manufacturing capacity. In return, the United States could 
penetrate the European market, dissuade European producers from 
procuring autonomous systems and eschew the risks of co-
development projects, “in the debate over the merits of collaborating 
with foreign production, co-development agreements have generated 
greater concerns among US defence planners than co-production deals. 
Co-development, unlike co-production, requires the participants to 
work together on problems as yet unsolved. The fear has been that 
prospective competitors might derive more out of the partnership in 
the transfer of leading edge technologies than US participants”.158 The 
idea behind this argument is that partner countries learn how to create 
a weapon system and get some of the technological capabilities 
embodied in it. The risk is that either they become more powerful and 
pretend bargaining on a more equal footing or that they become less 
dependent from the partner facilities.  
It is not trivial to assess that rather than being pure commercial 
strategies the arrangements agreed upon were based on the contractual 
power of the partners and searched to preserve a defined position  
within the alliance. In fact, by proposing co-production projects, 
stresses Kapstein, the United States has pushed its critics to affirm that 
it was searching to “divide and conquer” the marketplace, therefore 
calming down potential competitors.159 Also, it comes as no surprise 
that these kinds of arrangements have been frequent among the 
countries that time and again did play the Atlantic card for political 
reasons; on this point of view Hartley stresses that the United Kingdom 
with Westland and Italy with Agusta have frequently purchased 
licences to produce American-designed helicopters.160 
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Nevertheless, as in the hegemonic stability discourse where the 
hegemon ends up loosing its competitive edge, the United States have 
somehow permitted -through co-production projects- the growth of 
European national industries and consequently the rise of collaboration 
projects among European states, “American aid (after the Second 
World War) made it possible for the European countries to develop 
their own civilian and military production capability, in particular 
enabling the French and Italian defence industries partly to catch up in 
the fields of infrastructure and technologies”.161 As Jonathan Tucker 
explains, as an American firm licensed to a European one a specific 
technology to build a weapon system it happened that this latter was 
later on able to store the know-how necessary to build a quasi-
competitive weapon system at the expenses of the original one, “thus, a 
fundamental characteristic of international collaboration in advanced 
technology is that the players have a mixture of common and 
conflicting interests: a mutual desire to combine resources 
synergistically to increase the size of the ‘pie’, yet divergent interests 
when deciding how the joint benefits from collaboration are divided 
between them”.162 The ‘distributional problem’ has been explained in 
the first theoretical part but will be particularly clear when presenting 
the defence procurement regime to-date. It is important, however, not 
to bring this stability hegemonic argument too far away: as it will be 
seen in the remainder of the chapter, the United States is and will 
remain the most important defence producer.  
The Atlantic Alliance is today a less compelling argument to force 
European standardization with American equipments and invite the 
purchase of American weapon systems. Once again it is possible to see 
how strategic reasons impinge on the procurement process, “insofar as 
most European nations are members of the European Union, these 
nations have greater economic ties to one another than to the United 
States. These additional ties may eventually result in an integrated 
defence industrial base developing in Europe that competes with that 
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of North America”.163 Today, a strengthened cooperation among 
European states poses some challenges for the Atlantic ally both in 
economic and strategic terms and these pitfalls are faced either through 
industrial consolidation strategies or through the promotion of bilateral 
arrangements. According to some pundits, this latter option has the 
objective of “introducing a factor of disorder between European 
countries, promoting a dissociation of their interests that puts in 
jeopardy the Europeanization paths”.164 According to this thesis, the 
United States are still searching to ‘divide and conquer’ by favouring 
some states, especially the United Kingdom, and conferring them 
privileged not accessible for other European states, such as a less 
though exports regime and more cooperative bargaining arrangements. 
Jean Paul Hébert sustains this point by affirming that some American 
initiatives, such as the anti-missile defence and the Joint Strike Fighter, 
can be interpreted as ‘dissociation initiatives’ aimed at endangering 
European relations and the creation of a truly and independent ‘Europe 
of defence’.165 In the same vein others affirm that “in response to the LoI 
initiative, the United States is developing counter-strategies (for 
example by dividing its adversaries and choosing a privileged partner-
the United Kingdom-or by proposing comprehensive offers with new 
cooperative arrangements).166  
On its side, the United Kingdom has been able to play its cards 
successfully, as in the case of the choice for the A400M transport 
aircraft vis-à-vis an American one or of the METEOR missile instead of 
the Raytheon one, “despite strong American pressures, London chose 
to combine the operational advantage of having an equipment that was 
in service in several armed forces in Europe, industrial considerations 
(British companies being closely involved in the consortium producing 
the equipments chosen) and the diplomatic dimension (putting into 
practice in the field of armaments the new British policy of 
involvement in European defence since the Franco-British St. Malo 
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summit of December 1998).”167  Needless to say the United Kingdom 
benefits of a room of manoeuvre and of an everlasting  relation with 
the US not available to other states. This means that less powerful states 
possess far less strategic options. 
Aside from the NATO context, European collaboration projects started, 
even if in an ad hoc shape, in the ‘50s and ‘60s (Franco-German Colomb-
Bechar Agreement) and engaged mainly France, Germany and 
sometimes the United Kingdom through co-development agreements. 
Collaboration projects have been fostered mainly by the Franco-
German engine and the ambivalent policy of the United Kingdom 
towards Europe has undoubtedly strengthened this strong continental 
pole. The decision-making phases, as well as the definition of the 
military requirements, were bargaining games and ended up most of 
the time by being compromise solutions, “ad hoc industrial 
collaboration rarely addressed the core issue of planning systematically 
for the common defence moving towards common tactical doctrines 
and operating procedures which would help to improve the continuity 
of European arms procurement”.168 In fact, to a certain extent ad hoc 
agreements do hamper a more integrationist approach and prevent a 
durable form of cooperation. While ad hoc solutions are searched to 
cooperate but not to give in fundamental interests, Taylor explains that 
if the same partners can develop follow-on projects, then it is likely that 
the collaborative arrangements can last longer and give birth to 
stronger structures, aside from getting back beneficial and concrete 
returns. 169  
Even if sometimes it was very difficult to face distributional issues, 
collaboration projects were undertaken to spur political cooperation, 
“collaborative projects can be used as foreign policy tools; it was 
noticeable for example in the 1970s and 1980s that when the Franco-
German relationship seemed to flag, often the solution was the 
proposal of a new cluster of joint weapons acquisitions projects” .170 In 
the same vein, a lot of scholars stress that Tornado was aimed at linking 
Britain to the European Community before being encompassed in it. 
Due to a willingness to preserve own facilities and prerogatives, past 
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collaborations have been interpreted also as attempts at boasting the 
national industry. This is so because a cooperation aimed at reducing 
costs requires the elimination of redundant power-plants  or assembly 
lines, common R&D investments and technology sharing. Past 
cooperative experiences have been based not on specialization and 
competitive tendering but on a work-share determined by the financial 
contribution of the country to the programme. It is probable that 
European states shared a desire to curb costs but this objective was 
overshadowed by the willingness to spur the domestic industry and, 
with it, jobs and technological improvements, “over the past twenty-
five years collaboration has emerged as the principal European 
response to the dual problem of rising weapons costs and ensuring the 
maintenance of some national defence capabilities in the face of US 
competition and technical superiority”.171 If economic incentives for 
cooperation have been substantial, it is probably fair to say that 
‘political’ motivations explain most of the attempts at cooperation, “the 
efficient use of resources is of second-order concern. For both advanced 
and less advanced economies, therefore, cost savings from 
collaborative as opposed to purely national programs may be 
insignificant”.172 
Against this background, arrangements agreed upon fell short of being 
efficient. The joint ventures created did not ease the procurement 
process because of: administrative and organizational costs derived 
from duplication of R&D and production work and cumbersome 
bureaucracies; national modification of the programmes, inefficient 
work-sharing, delays determined by the need of detailed information 
and unanimity rules and finally because of transaction costs.173 Being 
primarily spurred by national states these joint-ventures were not often 
motivated on pure industrial reasons and this counts for their poor 
performances, “joint ventures are typically industry-led, but 
established with the consent of the governments of the home countries 
of the companies involved. They may be an effective mechanism for 
combining the diverse technological capabilities of different companies, 
but they are less efficient in bringing down development and 
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production costs and in enhancing the overall operational performance 
of the products”.174   
One of the most important European collaborative projects, explains De 
Vestel, was the Tornado aircraft of the early ‘70s that saw the combined 
participation of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. These 
countries agreed on common requirements for a new aircraft and 
created an ad hoc NATO agency (NAMMO-Multirole Aircraft 
Management Organization) which awarded the contract for the 
development of the aircraft to a Consortium (Panavia) composed by the 
firms of the three states, “the demand of the three partners alone meant 
that over 800 aircraft could be built”.175 Nevertheless, as the author 
remarks, each of these countries insisted to have a final assembly line in 
its country de facto increasing the costs of the cooperative effort.  
Other examples of often cited troubled programs are, among others, the 
Eurofighter (Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy) aircraft, 
the Tiger helicopter((France and Germany-see below), the Horizon 
Frigate (Italy, France and Germany). As an example, the Eurofighter 
programme, explain Creasey and May, highlighted the typical 
problems undermining European cooperation, namely the ownership 
of design leadership and work-sharing between participating states, the 
standardisation and interoperability of common components and 
questions related to the transfer of technological knowledge from the 
United States in case of an America participation in the project.176 Also, 
the Eurofighter project has been delayed because of recurrent political 
and financial uncertainties: these latter delayed of more than one year 
the formal agreement by the partner nations. The four partners that 
were ‘supposed’ to cooperate, affirms an expert on military issues,  
were not able to agree on anything if there was not an exchange of 
favours which guaranteed the interests of all parties: this has caused 
huge delays and therefore increased costs.177  
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It is clear that cooperation among similarly powerful actors poses the 
problems just envisioned, but it is also likely that the real benefits to be 
derived from a similar configuration are huge “the nearer capabilities 
and market requirements are to equality, the more difficult it can be to 
decide the allocation of resources and design leadership, even if 
collaboration between equals can have more far-reaching consequences 
if it forces participants to rationalise their activities”.178 
Another aim of collaborative projects was to face American hegemony 
in defence and strategic issues, but in general each states had its own 
objectives. For Germany cooperation was necessary both to improve its 
defence might and to be firmly ‘re-inserted’ among the European great 
powers. For France and Italy cooperation helped strengthen the 
industrial base and the technological might; for France, in particular, 
European collaboration was seen as a way at gaining leadership within 
the European political process. The United kingdom had first to face a 
declining international position, also because of its onerous 
contribution to the Second World War, and then to keep inserted 
within the neonate European Community: this has determined a more 
pro-European stance. Thus, collaborative projects fulfil a series of 
different objectives for states: political, industrial, economic and 
strategic. Explaining cooperation looking only at one of these features 
would be both misleading and useless. In the same vein, a sound 
attempt at building an efficient institutionalized framework for 
cooperation should take into account all these factors and backsides. 
What is to be investigated is if the current pattern of cooperation is still 
reflecting these exigencies: to do that it will be paramount to assess the 
context in which cooperation takes place today and the pressures 
constraining states’ options. 
It is clear that past cooperative attempts have failed to incentive a 
‘routinization’ of collaboration: in particular, what has lacked for the 
formation of a common procurement policy was a broader 
harmonization of operative requirements as the product of a common 
foreign policy. This process would have not only paved the way for a 
truly European defence stance, but also provided fundamental 
economic savings through the joint production of the same weapons. 
As Schmitt recognizes, to imagine a completely integrated armament 
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policy is nonsense but it is also pointless to keep on going with 
traditional forms of cooperation, such as ad hoc (programme-by-
programme) agreements, “to gain full advantage from a consolidated 
industrial base, governments must change their mode of cooperation 
throughout the procurement process and redefine their role of 
customer, sponsor and regulator”.179  
It is fair to say, though, that one of the main disincentives for the 
creation of a political process has been the presence, in Europe, of very 
differently-capable countries as for arms production and purchase. This 
constitutes a problem for cooperation because more powerful states, 
thanks to their structural power, can probably both define the 
operational requirements and win the industrial battle against the 
smaller nations. As Walker and Gummet point out, economy-led 
integration will distribute capabilities giving advantages to the 
strongest, wiping out non-competitive companies: therefore, achieving 
more interdependence is only an available strategy if states trust each 
others and this is possible only if states share common political aims.180 
What has lacked in the past was a political will, which could have lead 
to institutional arrangements and public support for joint procurement 
processes, “although European weapons collaboration is more than 
thirty years old and much has been learnt about how to run such 
programmes there are still fundamental problems in reconciling 
efficiency with political factors.181  
The lessons of the past are very instructive form this point of view, 
because they can highlight all the challenges likely to occur when 
cooperating and the more recurrent limits to coordination.182 The 
emphasis of European states on the ‘lessons of the past’ to improve the 
joint procurement process has to be interpreted as a blueprint to 
optimize an inevitable tendency today “over the past years a consensus 
has developed among European governments that the past ad hoc 
approach to collaboration, in which projects were launched when there 
happened to be a happy coincidence of interest, will not do for the 
future”.183 In particular, durable forms of coordination in weapon 
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systems should be promoted. Also, a sound procurement mechanism 
should be investigated. Hartley clarifies that in order to improve the 
functioning of collaborative projects three strategies can be adopted: 
using competition to determine work-share, singling out a sole prime 
contractor which shares the risks of the projects, using compensations 
or side-payments.184 
As for this argument, de Vestel launches the tricky dilemma of whether 
the process of security and defence integration, that is taking shape in 
Europe, can succeed where the American hegemony has failed.185 In 
order to answer this question it is paramount to assess the conditions 
and incentives for this process to happen, “capitalising and managing-
in reality correspond to two opposing concepts that the European may 
have of Europe. The first motivation is more political and determined, 
it will tend to insist on the notion of capitalisation, and the aim is often 
that of a European power that has a common defence policy and 
integrated industries and markets, the classic attributes of power. The 
second concept is functional and is characterized by ‘subsidiarity’. In 
the European dimension it sees in particular the means to manage 
better certain specific aspects of industries and markets that can no 
longer be managed at the national level.”186 Coordination between 
states does not mean that one of these motivations outweighs the other, 
but it simply means that states  find one of these arguments stringent. 
More probably,  European cooperation in defence procurement reflects 
the non-conflicting aims of preserving a national dimension through 
more fluid linkages between the state and industries and a souring 
necessity to cooperate with partners.187 Both aims point to the need of 
some kind of coordination in states strategies, “the major European 
countries will have to choose in which sector of technology they whish 
to dominate at the national level, the sector they whish to develop in 
more or less institutionalized collaboration between countries or 
through agreements between companies, and lastly the sectors in 
which they will have to rely on imported technology”.188  
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2.4.1 Pros and cons of defence procurement cooperation 
States’ willingness to cooperate assessed, it is now time to sum up and 
reflect more in details over the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of cooperative 
agreements. As seen before, cooperative projects on the European field 
can be beneficial because they are likely to reduce and share costs 
through economies of scale; to pile up research and investment 
expenses; to spur technological innovation; to share in-service support 
costs which weight the most in a programme; to sustain the national 
industry and related jobs; to deepen a European concept about defence; 
to increase Europe’s competitiveness towards the United States; to 
promote some level of standardization necessary for interoperability 
and to increase export capabilities. As authors point out, “common 
equipments can help countries work together on international 
missions. Most EU member-states will only carry out military 
operations as a part of multinational coalition, and such ‘inter-
operability’ is vital for the success of military coalitions”.189 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that cooperation involves also 
some costs: the beneficial impact of coordinated actions should be 
therefore evaluated on the basis of this trade-off.  
Among the more apparent costs are transaction ones, derived from the 
negotiation process among states and the distributional issues likely to 
emerge, “international collaboration in arms development and 
procurement has not always proved to be successful. Such 
arrangements often increase the number of missions that a weapon is 
intended to accomplish, so as to please the constituent nations’ mission 
requirements. ..the end result may be a complex, expensive weapon 
that does not fulfil any mission and that takes a longer time to 
develop”.190 Economic specialization is not often achieved and 
inefficient work-sharing is not likely to bring about the wanted results; 
in this sense, an inadequate cooperative procurement process can be 
inferior to a national one given its dimensions and the costs to be faced. 
Moreover, procrastinated negotiations and national uncertainties are 
likely to delay a programme, increasing its costs: in order to partially 
correct this weakness and take the programme forward, international 
contracts foresee ‘withdrawal points’-generally these are open 
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windows set just before a major financial engagement has to be 
signed.191  
Another cost concerns a comparison between the actual arrangement 
point achieved and the initial requirement proposal submitted by 
states, given that most of the time bargaining is inevitable, “any 
international agreement will be a compromise between the maximum 
bids of each partner and the minimum terms required to persuade it to 
join and remain a member of the club”.192 Finally, there is the cost 
brought about by juste retour: this practice has been employed in the 
past to assure, to countries committed to a certain amount of 
expenditures, a fair return in terms of work-share. This practice, which 
is broadly used even today is ultimately inefficient, “ it leads to the 
creation of several production lines in the participating states, with the 
consequence that the expected scaling effect cannot be achieved in 
practice and that the co-operative programme provides no economy 
comparing with isolated works, but adds the burden of co-
operation”.193  
For these reasons, the shape coordination would take says a lot about a 
nation’s satisfaction in a cooperative setting. As Kapstein suggests, a 
sound way to assess the procurement process would be: first, to see if, 
in a long-term perspective, performances have increased while costs 
have scaled back; second, to evaluate if the costs and performances set 
as requirements have been fulfilled properly.194 Looking at European 
cooperation will request to pay a particular attention to these two 
parameters.  
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Figure 2. Collaboration in Defence Equipment Procurement. Source: European 
defence Agency, “European Defence Expenditures in 2006”, November 19, 
2007, Brussels, www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=324 
 
To the mentioned challenges, one problem not directly related to the 
functioning of defence procurement has a huge impact on cooperative 
efforts: states’ structural power. In fact, assessing the presence of a 
regime in defence procurement means inevitably marking a divide: 
while cooperation at the European level has taken ground in formal 
declarations, there seems to be a lack of willingness to promote an all 
encompassing institutionalization process in favour of coordination, 
“the development of cooperative European weapons programmes is 
inseparable from institutional evolutions and from the construction of a 
thinking and from European defence might”.195 It seems that the most 
powerful European states have eschewed cooperation with less 
powerful ones, or, at least have searched not to entangle them at a 
European level on armaments issues. If progress exists, this is outside 
of the EU context, and even in this case it is likely to engage 
distributional issues and to be particularly harsh, “despite the efforts to 
strengthen EU institutions and mechanisms, the most important 
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initiatives are taking place outside of the EU-in the OCCAR and among 
the signatories to the Letter of Intent/Framework Agreement”.196  
It is likely that an encompassing outline of coordination will require 
side-payments as a form of compensation for the strongest states. In 
fact, small states gain every benefits through coordination, by spurring 
their industrial base and by achieving technological transfers. More 
powerful states would pretend a return for their cooperative 
endeavour. This reminds to the aforementioned argument about 
French and German cooperation in weapons systems. Features such as 
project leadership and work-share will be paramount to assess the 
distributional outcome; in fact, in the European Fighter Aircraft Project, 
“Dassault insisted on the leadership role because it calculated that the 
benefits from collaboration as a coequal partner would not outweigh 
the expected position costs, including the partial loss of autonomy and 
relative technological advantage…it demanded  a large side-payment 
including not only the project leadership but also a disproportionate 
share of the development and production work”.197  
Having described the general features of the defence procurement 
process and the challenges emerged in past cooperation,  time is ripe to 
contextualize the research and show the incentives that are leading 
states towards coordinated actions in defence procurement; therefore 
economic, industrial and strategic pressures will be presented. 
2.5 The limits to states’ available options 
2.5.1 Economic motivations 
This section will clarify the ‘economic’ dimension of the cooperative 
procurement process by emphasizing two aspects: first of all, defence 
expenditures should be tailored on the objectives of the state subject to 
fiscal constraints. Second, given the reduction in defence budgets 
experienced from the end of the Cold War, states cannot but envision 
the better strategies to pursue their defence interests: among these, 
coordination with other states unleashes the most rewarding results. 
The following section will underline these two points and the related 
pressures constraining actors’ alternatives in defence procurement. 
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Each government devotes funds to defence  according to the priorities 
stated by the Minister of Defence, requested by International alliances 
and security organizations of which the country is a component, and 
deemed compatible with general public spending. Prioritizing means 
striking a balance between a government’ s objectives. Therefore, when 
deciding how to relate defence with other priorities governments do 
ask “how much can we afford to spend? That is, how does defence 
spending affect the economy? Can we reduce the cost of defence by 
changing the way we do things (e.g., by adopting different defence 
strategies, new and lower-cost technologies, and better methods of 
managing defence resources”? If these were the questions that Jacques 
Gansler presented in his book “Affording Defense”,198 written in the 
early ‘90s in order to spur a re-thinking in the American weapons 
acquisition process, there is no reason to doubt the relevance of the 
same questions for European governments facing similar challenges. 
The risks ahead impose that an efficient and sound defence strategy is 
adopted; in the same time, though, “a credible national-security 
posture cannot be developed without a realistic recognition of the fiscal 
constraints”.199  
Jealous of their defence stance European states have searched to keep 
their own defence market and industries, even if this was inefficient in 
economic terms. This means that duplications of defence 
infrastructures, programmes and investments dedicated to research 
and development have rendered more cumbersome the process 
towards rationalization of military equipments in the European 
landscape. As Hartley points out, the absence of a single market for 
defence equipments is costly and inefficient, leading to monopolies, 
barriers to entry and exit, non-competitive cost-based contracts, state 
ownership, subsidies and governments interferences.200 Are the costs 
associated with a second-best solution, from a competition standpoint, 
less than the benefits associated with the preservation and the 
consolidation of an autonomous industrial base? Is such a strategy 
sustainable? Is this kind of strategy sound in order to assure a state 
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security, power and interests? These are the questions that statesman 
answer, or should so doing, when considering their defence strategies.  
Pure competition based on specialization was not a viable option 
according to European states, but other forms of procurement could 
have been envisaged to tackle economic challenges. In a study 
promoted by the European Commission, four scenarios have been 
proposed to render more efficient the defence procurement sector in 
the European context. The study showed that a completely centralized 
procurement agency replacing defence ministers would have 
determined the most significant savings. Given that this perspective is 
politically difficult to achieve, another important but more realistic way 
to get cost savings suggested to engage in a “twin track” approach, 
where competition would characterize the purchase of small and 
medium-size equipment, while for bigger projects states would  
cooperate through joint procurement.201 The reason behind this is that 
big programmes do encompass important interests as for work-share, 
jobs and technological sharing, and competition does not take into 
consideration these elements; also, competition is a priori ruled out 
because big programmes are affordable only by big industries.  
At the beginning of the ’90s and with the end of the Cold War, the 
perception of the threat coming from the East began to evaporate: the 
implosion of the Soviet Union was highlighting the end of a long 
period of cold confrontation characterized by huge military expenses. 
With the loss of the common threat two kinds of phenomena did 
happen: a certain breaking-up of the Atlantic cohesiveness and a desire 
to spend more on social programs and focus on economic matters. In 
particular, as for the first point the Atlantic Alliance started to show 
deep internal divergences regarding defence and security matters, 
paving the way for a European-oriented approach on these topics. The 
focus on economic and social issues was apparent in Germany, 
undertaking at that period hard measures (fiscal expansion and 
monetary tightening) to confront the reunification and in Italy, France 
and the UK facing hard times inside of the European Monetary System. 
Moreover, just at the beginning of the ‘90s, pressures to comply with 
the Maastricht Criteria did compel states further to re-formulate their 
budget plans. Therefore, it was thought, a relaxed posture on the 
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defence sector would have promoted and eased other internal 
objectives.  
Against that background, pursuing an efficient and effective defence 
procurement was not an easy task to meet given the plummeting 
military budgets. With this kind of fiscal constraint national orders of 
weapon systems did  decrease, putting at risk the survival of defence 
industries and investments in R&D. In fact, Schmitt recalls that 
“paradoxically, budgetary restrictions contribute further to the rise in 
costs. They lead not only to postponements and the spreading of work 
over time but also to considerable reductions in the size of 
programmes. This in turn results in a contraction of companies’ 
activities and a consequent rise in unit production costs”.202 On the 
other hand, states had to envision new strategies to fulfil their defence 
requirements since self-reliant postures were no longer an option. At a 
certain point it became imperative, for a government wishing to 
maintain its national industry, to engage in forms of coordination with 
other states to share costs and gain costly technological innovations.  
On the strategic context, new and multifaceted threats such as ethnic 
conflicts and international terrorism posed new challenges to be faced 
by coordinated efforts. Also, technological innovations, translated from 
the civil to the military context through spill-in effects, soared the costs 
of producing weapon systems: both phenomena did require a resolute 
increase of defence expenditures just at the moment when these were at 
the lowest level ever. Since a significant extension of the defence 
budget was not achievable, the resources to work with should have 
been optimized, and cooperation did emerge as the most appropriate 
solution to this problem. 
With decreasing national orders industries can dispose of only two 
solutions: either exporting their products or decreasing the costs-per 
unit associated with the production of the weapon system. None of 
these decisions can be taken independently from a political 
consideration. Selling arms abroad can be valuable when arms remain 
within an alliance but harmful when these go to other states.203 On the 
other hand, to decrease costs, the number of weapon systems to work 
with should be broadened. Given that arms export was not a rewarding 
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deal immediately after the Cold War the most reasonable solution was 
to reduce costs for the production of military programmes and this was 
possible only through coordination with other states, “allies may have 
to consider the possibility for closer cooperation in terms of pooling 
resources; streamlined budgets may not allow nations unilaterally to 
meet all kinds of contingencies”.204  
Cooperation was and still is conceived as the best solution in time of 
scarcity, an option that would guarantee defence objectives while 
preserving other paramount interests. Ideally this process should 
involve a common definition of requirements based on a whole 
European defence strategy. Also, it should foresee cooperation among 
national ‘champions’ or even their integration so as to derive the best 
gains from collaboration “when formulating their systems 
requirements, national governments will have to consider those 
capabilities that pan-European companies will possess, thus forcing a 
deeper level of European inter-governmental coordination both on 
requirements and on the timing of programme development. In this 
manner cross-border industry consolidation will force Europe’s 
governments to collaborate more”.205 A realist procurement strategy 
should be one which is able to prioritizing among different objectives 
in order to be both economically sustainable and also strategically 
effective. The imperative of the procurement process will be to envision 
the better way to achieve these two objectives, “pressures to reduce 
defence budgets will increasingly expose the costs of independence and 
bring reality to these single market and free trade visions”.206 
The impact of economic pressures on states can be remarkable, but it 
should be remembered that only a bunch of European countries are 
effective armaments producers and purchasers: this is likely to restrict 
the setting of cooperation to these states, rendering more difficult a 
thorough European approach. The UK, France, Germany and Italy are 
said to account for the 80% of Europe’s defence production, with 
France and the UK consisting of as much as 70% among the four. On 
the basis of the juste-retour requirement, implying that work is allocated 
on the basis of equity rather than on efficiency criteria, an all 
encompassing cooperation would complicate the decision-making 
process and increase transaction costs and information asymmetries. 
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Finally, a truly efficient defence market, from an economic point of 
view, should theoretically be one where competition towards non-
European states stands as one the primary parameters for contracts 
awarding: the rising image of a ‘fortress Europe’ is somehow 
suggesting that other parameters stand above in states’ considerations.  
As seen, economic pressures are compelling states to envision new 
strategies to face defence requirements. Coordination is likely to handle 
these economic challenges if properly addressed, but a paramount 
political will should prop up this process, as it was the case with the 
industrial restructuring and consolidations presented below. 
2.5.2. Industrial motivations 
As stated before, different pressures are pushing states towards 
cooperative endeavours. One of these incentives is industry-led, “in a 
first phase, between 1998 and 2000, industry was the driving force, 
engaging in cross-border consolidation and setting up a network of 
transnational companies and groups…this development was initiated 
in the absence of the appropriate political and regulatory frameworks, 
in response to the demands of the market”.207  
The industrial sector can be considered as the supply-side of the 
procurement process, that further constrains states from pursuing 
autonomous policies. At a deeper glance it is possible to say that rather 
than pressures, those exercised by the industrial sector are better 
labelled as “incentives” or “opportunities” for governments: the 
process of horizontal and vertical consolidation taking ground in the 
European context should somehow ease a political cooperative 
approach towards defence procurement.  
Even if the industrial one is the field more prone to market-driven 
decisions, it will be underlined that governments play an important 
role in the shape of the industrial panorama: “governments are central 
to understand defence industries. Governments are major buyers and 
sometimes, the only buyers of defence equipment (monopsony). A 
government can use its buying power to determine the size and 
ownership of its national defence industry, its structure, entry and exit, 
prices efficiency and profitability…”.208 Eugene Gholz stresses the role 
of the state as the “buyer” of  defence systems as well, and therefore the 
importance conferred to its satisfaction: this makes more clear how the 
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buyer can impinge on the supplier’ policies.209 By converse, because of 
the economic difficulties that defence industries found themselves to 
face after the end of the Cold War they sometimes engaged in lobbying 
their governments in order to keep alive and search some form of 
subsidies, “in this political economy view of defence procurement, 
defence firms should not be criticized for using the political process to 
win contracts. They are simply maximizing their profits given the 
political and economic constraints of their sunk investments-exactly 
what should be doing in their shareholders’ interests”.210 While all 
defence industries have historically been supported by the help of 
national states, Ezio Bonsignore asserts that this practice is in no way 
necessarily detrimental to overall efficiency, competitiveness or sound 
management, “the interests and goals of private investors do not 
always and necessarily correspond to the policies, a responsible 
government would whish to implement”.211  
A state’s participation in defence industries shows the importance of 
this kind of industry in the broader strategic policy of a nation. In this 
sensitive field, more than in others, states’ mobilization in terms of 
funds provision for research and technology is paramount, also 
because of the spin-off fallouts in civil sectors that would benefit the 
overall economy, “the defence industry’s particular significance as the 
industry which provides countries with their ultimate means of power 
remains undiminished, and continues to add some very special 
features to international trade competition”.212 
In assessing the industrial landscape of defence procurement it is 
important, first of all, to mark a divide between large industries and 
smaller ones: large defence industries are traditionally those that 
belong to a big and powerful state and that have developed advanced 
equipment and technological capabilities. The four major European 
countries -France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy- have all  
big defence industries and will strive as much as possible to keep them 
and to increase their power. Because of a general whish to improve the 
performances of every national industry, the European landscape is 
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characterized by fragmented national markets which lead to non-useful 
and costly duplication, to uncoordinated orders that hamper the 
creation of efficient production runs and to a lack of equipment 
standardization, “national champion policies is the practice of 
awarding major military contracts almost exclusively to major national 
industries with the objective of maintaining a strong domestic defence 
industrial and technological base, even if that often means keeping 
alive relatively unprofitable national champions. Such policies lead to 
inefficiencies, overcapacity and duplication on a European level.213 As 
for small industries, a differentiation must be made among those that 
did specialize in niche production or technological skills and that are 
necessary both at the European and Transatlantic level as producers of 
subsystems, and those that do not contribute significantly to the 
defence panorama. According to the strength or the weakness of its 
defence industry, each state will adopt different strategies as for 
European cooperation and transatlantic relations: of course, the more 
powerful the defence industry the more the options at hands. 
Notwithstanding the eagerness of the national states to protect and 
strengthen the own national industry, a general restructuring process 
has come about together with a more favourable approach towards 
cooperative settings. As Sköns and Wulf correctly point out, this 
process is very important in the light of previous considerations about 
the preservation of a national industrial base; the restructuring process 
should make reflect over the nature of the industrial aspect to be 
strengthened.214 The attempt at rationalizing the European industrial 
landscape and consolidating its technological base has been spurred by 
a series of factors that together led into the direction of more 
coordinated behaviours.  
The defence industry exhibits an oligopolistic nature and is 
characterized by economies of scales, for which fixed costs could be 
spread out through huge quantities produced. While unit production 
costs have always been huge for this kind of industry, the 
sophistication of some programmes together with the technological 
innovations brought about in the last years require such huge R&D 
investments that unit costs for weapons productions are skyrocketing. 
Huge costs as for R&D are one of the leading incentives behind 
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cooperation at the European level.215This is so because of the changed 
missions that states need to face, that require more refined weapons 
systems than those available: “most of European militaries lack the 
capabilities they need to be truly expeditionary, such as deployable, 
interoperable C4ISR, strategic lift, and deployable logistic”.216  
As David Kirkpatrick recalls, an increase in weapons unit costs will 
increase fixed costs sections of following projects (research, design, 
development, testing and operational investment).217 The effect is 
twofold: on the one hand, quantity of weapons systems produced are 
inevitably decreasing given the fragmentation of defence demand in 
the European context, with the consequence that as national orders 
decrease so do the hope of the industry survival. On the other hand, 
industries need to broaden their work base in order to achieve 
economies of scales and share R&D expenses. Fixed costs do not 
depend  on the number of systems produced; in order to abate these 
costs states have two options, they can either “buy second-rate 
weapons while maintaining the scale of their forces at the same level, or 
they may choose to buy new first-rate weapons to equip smaller 
forces”.218 Since the end of the Cold War states have opted for the latter 
solution.  
On the industrial stand point, this has translated into vertical 
consolidation processes, especially within countries, and forms of 
transnational horizontal cooperation, leading in some cases to mergers 
and acquisitions dynamics (M&A). This kind of rationalization process 
was apparent in the American market which, during the late ‘80s, gave 
birth to major merger processes creating few big prime contractors 
especially in the aerospace sector: the Boeing Group(Rockwell-
McDonnell Douglas) and Lockeed Martin. In other sectors, Northrop 
Grumman and Raytheon did emerge. American consolidations created 
big defence entities that endangered the competitiveness of the 
European ones. European industries felt the same consolidation 
necessity, but their cross-border integration possibilities were somehow 
restricted, “European horizontal integration was largely limited to 
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symbolic ‘corporate alliances’-exchanges of small amounts of 
ownership or collaboration in certain production areas-rather than 
M&A.”219  
As Trevor and Derrick point out, while in the United States mergers 
and acquisitions have characterized the process of defence 
restructuring, in the European context different and more cautious 
forms of cooperative arrangements were tried: joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, ad hoc arrangements, consortia.220This should not surprise 
given the fact that the United States constitutes a unique market with 
unique rules and procedures. Jean Paul Hébert reminds that industrial 
concentration within the American industrial landscape has not borne 
out of a general encouragement to pool together activities but was 
determined by concrete actions to underpin them: the US called the 
neutrality of the antitrust authorities and supported financially the 
consolidations,221 a point this one, that is also remarked by Gordon 
Adams, “the American government played a role in this process, easing 
the enforcement of anti-trust laws and subsidizing contractors for the 
costs of consolidation in proportion to the savings that would result to 
the Governments”.222   
The American rationalization process spurred further the restructuring 
path endorsed by European states: American companies were likely to 
become more competitive and challenge European industries position 
in international markets. Therefore, pushed both by increasing costs 
and a new competitive challenge launched by the US, truly European 
companies have  been created, the most important being the European, 
Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company (EADS).223 
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Figure 3: European Consolidation processes. Source: Alenia 
Aerospazio/AECMA 2001. 
 
Alas, the managerial arrangement reached within EADS was very 
complex, with two Chief Executives (French and German) and two Co-
                                                                                                                               
provider  of electronic systems to the Pentagon. EADS is a merger of 
Aerospatiale-Matra (France), Daimler Chrysler Aerospace (DASA, Germany) 
and CASA (Spain). EADS is horizontally integrated and engaged with the 
aerospace field. 
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Chairmen as well as with equal core shareholders (the French state and 
Lagardère Group and the German Daimler). In 2007, and in order to 
improve the management process of this defence colossus, Louis 
Gallois (French) has been appointed as CEO and Rüdiger Grube 
(German) as Chairman of the Board. According to Bonsignore, this 
overhaul of the executive structure “reflects exactly the same fastidious 
balance of ‘French’ and ‘German’ positions that was said to be the bane 
of EADS under the previous arrangement”,224 but was nonetheless 
inevitable, given that at stakes were the national interests of the two 
countries. In 1998-1999, the golden years of European consolidations, 
the formation of the missile and defence firm MBDA through a merger 
of France, Italian and the UK companies should be remembered.225 
While there is a general Europe-oriented focus in industrial 
restructuring, the presence of a big defence industry has not always 
guaranteed a more pro-European stance, “the Italian aerospace 
industry, although involved in European collaborative programmes, 
still remains outside the umbrella of major European corporate 
structures”.226 
On the civil sector, argues Vlackos, a process of horizontal integration 
has resulted in the creation of the Airbus Consortium (Aérospatiale -
France, DASA -Germany, British Aerospace –United Kingdom and 
CASA -Spain): in this Company, the phases of design, procurement 
policies, production, testing and servicing are conducted centrally, so 
as to commit more decisively and more quickly to an overall package. 
Nevertheless, goes on the author, Airbus mirrors the drawbacks of a 
coordination led by diverse but equally powerful nation states, 
characterized by inefficient decision-making processes and fears of 
losing control over national companies.227  
Aside from the mentioned horizontal integration processes, the 
European scenario has witnessed the creation or strengthening of 
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‘national champions’ (see figure above) among which it is possible to 
find the most powerful industries of the most powerful European 
states. These two strategies -national concentration and 
internationalization- were and still are the typical reaction of big 
companies to similar constraints.228 This is not difficult to understand, 
given that most powerful companies, supported often by states,  search 
to amplify their position within the market, “as a result of the 
increasing dominance of fixed costs within projects, production of first-
rate weapon systems is becoming more concentrated in those richer 
nations whose governments can afford the up-front costs”.229 Such 
companies are Finmeccanica for Italy, DASA for Germany, Thomson 
and Aerospatiale Matra for France and BaE Systems for the United 
Kingdom.  
As appreciated before, because of the importance of defence industries 
for the overall state’s position in the system, it is unlikely that the 
process of rationalization can go across the national frontier without 
alarming national governments, “defence industrial collaboration can 
be industry or government driven, but states ultimately establish the 
framework for defence industrial competition, mergers and specific 
project collaboration”.230 On the other hand, the same governments will 
prop up vertical consolidations in an attempt at gaining bargaining 
power towards other European states, “the consolidation of the 
European industry began also as a government-sponsored effort, but 
government across Europe are increasingly persuaded that national 
industries cannot survive, given limited budgets…”.231    
A state will never, in principle, permit the abatement or a decrease in 
power of its national champion for competition reasons. This has led, 
even in cooperative projects, to the requirement of juste retour, a 
principle which hamper competition in assigning the work-share: 
“from the economic point of view, juste retour works like a cartel in 
which the participants divide market-shares between 
them”.232According to this requirement, states that engage in a 
cooperative project will ask for an industrial participation that fits their 
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financial contribution and the number of weapons system ordered: 
“maintaining the balance is arguably the primary, if undeclared, 
regulatory task facing the architects of the European armaments 
market”.233 The ultimate end of this practice is twofold: preserving or 
creating jobs and assuring a reasonable work for the national industry. 
It should be emphasized, though, that while inefficient, the principle of 
juste-retour has been one of the leading arrangements enabling 
cooperative projects between European states.  
While important, economic and industrial incentives alone have not 
rendered coordinated actions necessary; as it will be shown in the 
remainder of the chapter, political and strategic considerations play a 
paramount role. 
2.5.3 Strategic motivations 
Aside from economic and industrial pressures, strategic concerns made 
European states reflect on and opt for joint defence procurement 
initiatives.  
These incentives where in place but the end of the  Cold War opened 
up the opportunity to follow them. This is so because since the end of 
the Second World War, the security and defence policy of the European 
states was embedded within the Atlantic Alliance and the existence of a 
common external threat was enough stringent to require a common 
approach and to downplay strategic divergences among allies. The 
drawbacks of the demise of the Soviet Union were manifold: the 
Atlantic Alliance lost the bulk of its significance; the European 
Continent was no longer the main potential battleground but new 
trouble spots started challenging the stability of the system; the 
common enemy vanished and with him the common interests of the 
allies, that started to show divergent priorities and perceptions of the 
threats ahead.  
All these facts inevitably brought to the table a deep re-consideration of 
the role of the European Union as an economic giant and as a possible 
stabilizer and independent actor in the world scene. For this to happen 
Europe had not only to speak about a Common Security and Defence 
Policy, but also to actually create the conditions for its formulation, the 
first and necessary one being to mould together operational 
requirements and to create interoperable weapon systems. Cooperation 
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on defence procurement is therefore a paramount step on this direction. 
If this latter is not viable in the overall European landscape, a 
consensus should at least be reached among those European countries 
that possess relevant defence capabilities.234 Against this opportunity, 
all the yet presented difficulties related to the ‘security’ nature of the 
issue area and the huge discrepancy of power among European states.  
The end of the Cold War started questioning the relevance of the 
American presence on the European soil. The debate around this 
consideration took ground in the United States where ever-present 
‘isolationist’ positions came to the fore, and into the Continent where 
the reunification of Germany found more than one leader deeply 
concerned. American position on this side was controversial: while 
military troops within the European territory had to be withdrawn, the 
US wanted to avoid a ‘militarization’ of Europe outside of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The first conflicts of the ‘90s in the Balkans and in the Gulf 
made it clear that new threats overshadowed by the Cold War were 
arising: ethnic uprisings, breaking and rogue states and terrorism. 
Against these threats traditional strategies and equipments were 
pointless, “while it was anticipated that threat could be countered with 
lower levels of military force than in previous decades, the great 
variety of possible forms those threat might take implied that a wide 
range of capabilities would have to be maintained”.235 While NATO and 
the United States were slowly re-thinking their role in the new 
international context, Europe was eager to take a bigger stance on the 
security of the region and in that of other zones of its interest.  
In fact, the events of the ‘90s showed that while some threats could be 
of the same concern for the allies, some other could be interpreted 
differently, leading to different strategies and approaches, “in the new 
political and military context, often the American and the European 
governments have diverging priorities in the resolution of security 
issues. This means an extreme difficulty in achieving common 
requirements…”.236  In order to act autonomously, though, it was 
necessary to dispose of own military equipments “if we think that 
Europe should decide how, according to our perception, some 
interventions should be formulated, it is also necessary to have some 
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autonomous capabilities because if we depend completely from the 
United States this possibility cannot concretize”.237  
Before considering the step undertaken by the European Union or by 
European states to foster a defence stance, the potential consequences 
that such a move could have on the Atlantic Alliance will be discussed. 
If an actor’s leverage in the international context depends also on its 
potential ability to use force, an increased military stance could help 
Europe to be a more relevant actor in the world scene, “this approach 
would allow the EU to conduct military operations without relying on 
US assistance and it would also increase European influence over US 
decision about the use of force”.238  
European willingness to establish a true and independent defence 
might can be interpreted in two ways through the lenses of the Atlantic 
Alliance: either it can be seen as a threat to American dominance within 
it or it can be seen as a purposeful attempt at increasing the military 
contribution to the benefit of the Alliance. A realist argument, for 
example, would argue that cooperation among European states is 
mainly spurred by a desire to re-shape the imbalance against the 
United States.239 While the US has publicly asserted that an autonomous 
European stance would have spoiled the meaning of the Atlantic 
Alliance by duplicating facilities, it is reasonable to think that its first 
concern was to loose some ground on European foreign strategy. As 
William Wallace points out, “American policymakers thus continue to 
give their partners contradictory signals, calling on them to shoulder 
more global economic responsibility while refusing to trust them to 
develop an autonomous political and military capacity or to pursue 
different foreign policy priorities”.240 In this sense, argues the author, if 
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the US pretends a burden-sharing within the alliance it does not seem 
to be willing to share decision-making as well. This seems controversial 
given the fact that America has always complained about the poor 
expenses on military defence faced by European states.  
 
 

Figure 4: European Defence Expenditure	
  
	     !"#
 
 
The main argument advanced by European policy-makers was similar 
to the one proposed by  Daniel Keohane and asserting that if managed 
in a sound way, endeavours to boost cooperation within Europe and 
with the Atlantic Ally are not in contradiction, because better European 
capabilities would mean a strengthened NATO.241 The problem, 
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therefore, seemed not whether an European capability would have 
endangered the Alliance but whether this could have shifted the 
balance within it.  
Given the huge gap in military expenses compared to the United States 
actions had to be taken not only to devote more national resources to 
defence but also to pool them together so as to derive greater benefits 
out of them. As Yost explains, the US-European capabilities gap should 
be defined as an aggregate of many gaps which are sometimes 
technological, sometimes involve investment and some others 
procurement procedures. These gaps contribute to create the basis for 
US qualitative and quantitative superiority in military might.242 The 
military gap is determined by different budgets among European states 
but also by different priorities envisioned: as an example, “the old 
French concern about technology gaps is still very much alive. As a 
result, the French government places greater emphasis than its British 
counterpart on the need for substantial expenditure on cooperative 
R&D-in defence and civil field-and for creating a European presence in 
defence technology”.243 
Stanley Sloan maintains that the strategy adopted by the US towards a 
European defence inserts itself in a more encompassing understanding 
of its position in the world and those of its allies.244 In this sense, after 
the end of the Second World War the US has forged its defence policy 
so as to promote its short and long term interests. During the Cold War, 
American control of European defence posture was permitted also by 
its easily penetration within the European market, determining a 
strong source of dependence. To the contrary, European states had to 
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face the almost closed American defence market: aside for the United 
Kingdom it was impossible for European states to accede to the large 
American market. To underline further the point, Ethan Kapstein wrote 
in 1994 that the US found itself in a monopoly position as for arms 
trade: this privileged condition advanced the opportunity to mould the 
worldwide economic and security contexts.245  
Until the mid ‘90s, American defence market has been roughly locked, 
with the Pentagon awarding contracts mainly to US firms “not only are 
Boeing, Lockheed, Raytheon and Northrop-Grumman large firms…, 
they also have the advantage of serving a large protected national 
market”.246 Aside from reasons alluded to as of “national security” 
concerns, there exist technical as well as fiscal barriers in favour of a 
deeper cooperation among the US and Europe: technical regulations, 
especially those concerning foreign direct investment in the United 
States, sometimes differ from the European and international ones, 
rendering complicate to export in the US market. Also, fiscal 
requirements make it particularly difficult for European companies to 
work in and accede to the American market, “American protectionism 
is so powerful that the quantity of formalities and procedures that have 
to be gone through in attempting to form a partnership in the United 
States, given the benefits that these might bring, act as a deterrent”.247 
The MEADS project, which consists on the development of an 
antimissile system and that was established among the United States, 
Italy and Germany, has witnessed delays and difficulties due mainly to 
the release of ‘technological information’ to partners regarding the 
chosen American interceptor missile Patriot.248  American definition of 
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national security determines a strong limitation on technical release in 
cooperative projects. This program (MEADS) highlights the 
shortcomings and the challenges characterizing transatlantic defence 
cooperation, “the central problem lay not in the requirements and 
scope for cooperation, but in the work-sharing/cost-sharing 
division”.249 More generally, again, the issue of cooperation brings to 
the table ‘distributional issues’ : if an effective international cooperation 
is in principle valuable for all the actors involved, the allocation of the 
gains poses huge concerns, “there is perceived inequity in tradeoffs, for 
example, between US jobs and profits on the one hand and the desire of 
an ally for transfer of a key US technology”.250 
Against this background, transatlantic defence cooperation has 
dwindled in the last years, “increasingly, for major defence acquisition 
programs, such as air transport and missiles, European governments 
are showing an inclination to “buy European”, while the US tradition 
of “buy American” remains as hard as ever”.251 This latter element is 
strongly emphasized within the American landscape where the 
likelihood to rely on foreign suppliers is negatively perceived. Some 
scholars asserts that there exists an increasing aversion from both the 
American and European governments to engage in technological and 
industrial cooperation. Also, it seems that the increasing speed of 
globalization has determined new waves of protectionism among 
transatlantic allies so that governments create obstacles to cooperative 
endeavours.252 In particular, and as mentioned before, the greatest 
element of controversy regards technological capabilities that the US is 
scared to share, even if a cooperation on this ground would 
undoubtedly strengthen the military might of the Alliance “there are 
clearly advantages to greater flexibility in the technology transfer 
regimes between these two continents and significant downsides to 
either shutting itself off from the technologies available to the other 
side. A flexible regime across the Atlantic for such technology transfers, 
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combined with more common barriers to its dispersal elsewhere, could 
be in the interest of both”.253  
Paying attention to the way in which the United States will keep its 
technological might is very important in order to assess its proclivity 
towards cooperation with Europe: being the technology leader is 
paramount as this permits to control and dominate potential conflict 
situations as well as to force relations with concurrent producers.254 In 
fact, by maintaining its “qualitative superiority” the US is likely to 
strengthen its position as security supplier.255 Transfer of technology 
would be detrimental to US industries “American  industries have 
overwhelming competitive advantages against the European ones, 
being leaders in most high technology sectors. US contractors are keen 
on preserving this leadership, and they are assisted in achieving that 
objective by the technology export policies of the Pentagon”.256 
Cooperation, though, would not only create a problem to American 
industries, but also to American relative dominance on this sector. 
Thus, as Michele Nones observes, “the ideological explanation is the  
concern for possible technological transfers to third countries, but in 
reality parts of the US administration fear that European industry 
could improve qualitatively”.257 The emphasis posed on the 
technologically-based Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) should be 
interpreted also along these considerations. Besides, utilisation of 
American technology for projects destined to third countries is subject 
to export-regulations by the United States “the  export licence 
bureaucracy in the State Department resists any loss of control over this 
area of policy, and wants to retain the leverage that licence decisions 
can provide for broader foreign policy objectives.”258  
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The above-mentioned consolidations processes taken forward by the 
United States, and increasing its competitiveness together with its 
technological leadership, meant not only a monopoly on defence 
markets but also a strong leverage on strategic issues: with the United 
States determining the speed of technology and weapons procurement 
European states ended up being dependent on the US. This was 
another reason reinforcing European states’ willingness to advance a 
European independent defence might. Through its arms market 
monopoly and through the Atlantic Alliance, the US has tried to control 
the European defence pillar, as the proposal of the well known 
Combined Joint Strategic Force showed.  
Now European states are searching to penetrate the American market 
because of the potential returns this can bring about, but the process is 
all but easy, and this has strengthened the ‘European’ card: “had they 
not been confronted by increasing protection of US assets and markets 
by the Pentagon, they might have been less willing to give their 
backing to European initiatives”.259 Nevertheless, some scholars 
maintain that the American approach is not unidirectional and changes 
in the administration can change the level of cooperation, 
“commentators doubt that BaE acquisition of Lockeed-Martin’s 
Control&Aerospace Electronic Systems business in 2000 would have 
been sanctioned if president Bush had been in office and few observers 
feel it likely that any defence technology will be transferred out of the 
USA in the current climate”.260 
In order to compete with the American giant, to face the American 
arms monopoly and to build up an own defence might the European 
states have gone forward with industrial restructuring processes, 
propping up ‘buy European’ statements or ‘European preference’ ones, 
“this US pre-eminence is buttressed by the absence of a “two-way 
street” between Europe and the US in terms of arms purchases, partly 
due to the Pentagon’s Congress-mandated ‘buy American’ practice”.261 
For all these reasons, industrial concentration processes and 
cooperation practices have not only been spurred by economic 
imperatives, but also, and somehow more importantly, by strategic 
ones. This fact underlines once again the role states play in this issue-
area, “over the past twenty-five years collaboration has emerged as the 
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principal European response to the dual problem of rising weapons 
costs and ensuring the maintenance of some national defence 
capabilities in the face of US competition and technical superiority”.262 
Defence markets and procurement processes are for those reasons some 
of the hottest issues among transatlantic allies, “the same broad 
concerns shared by large European producers apply to the US as well—
preserving a domestic industrial base, technological superiority, export 
markets, security of supply plus a stated goal to retain a strategic 
defence technology superiority. The greatest difference between the 
two is the size…”.263  
European industrial restructuring process is not likely to transform 
Europe in a ‘fortress’ as some authors have pinpointed, both because 
this would not beneficial and because even the more self-reliant states 
are sometimes keen to cooperate with the United States. The idea of a 
fortress, explains Kehoane, is not advantageous for Europe, since that 
would mean inability to enter the American market; also, this would be 
strongly opposed by those states which are not main producers of 
armaments.264 Everything would depend on the two sides’ behaviour 
vis-à-vis defence issues, “if fortress America persists, and if Europe 
develops a common armaments policy in opposition to the United 
States, there is a risk of confrontation between two closed systems, with 
damaging consequences for relations within industry in particular, but 
also for Transatlantic Relations in general”.265 While it is important to be 
competitive against the United States it is also apparent that a certain 
link with the transatlantic ally, at least for strategic and technological 
reasons, is inevitable. On this point Gordon Adams stresses that if 
cooperation in the European context is somehow inevitable, in the same 
vein more interoperability between transatlantic allies is necessary, for 
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strategic, economic and technological reasons; nevertheless, political 
issues can develop in such a way as to harm transatlantic solidarity.266  
2.5.4 Common defence procurement to help European 
interoperability 
Should Europe be dependent on the United States? Or, what degree of 
dependence should it keep? As stated before, the possibility to develop 
a common European defence and security policy will permit to engage 
in operations in which the United States is not willing to participate, or 
will permit to enhance Europe’s leverage on the international 
chessboard.  Assessing the aims European states are going to pursue in 
defence and security issues is of the outmost importance in order to 
grasp how cooperation on defence procurement can deal with these 
objectives. This implies perceiving which challenges, among those on 
the forefront, European states decide to face in a common way.267 Of 
course, for the aim of this work, it is paramount to consider in which 
manner a coordinated procurement process can ease the path toward a 
common defence policy. 
A common European Defence and Security  Policy was envisaged both 
to promote regional cooperation with neighbour countries and, in a 
more operative sense, to engage in out-of-area military operations to 
downplay trouble spots according to the Petersberg Mission 
(“humanitarian and rescue, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and 
crisis management” operations). Among civil and military issues it  is 
obviously this second aspect that is the top concern of this research. It is 
fair to say that aside from the Petersberg missions, envisaged in the 
first years of the ‘90s, the new challenges on the forefront require a 
deep European re-thinking of its defence stance; in particular, what has 
been amplified is the urgency to concretize this latter, to shape not only 
a European defence policy but also the means to bring it about, “for too 
long Europe has been more interested in the institutional/political 
structures of defence, important though they may be, and by and large 
has ignored the threats that have been steadily increasing in the world 
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beyond”.268 A great contribution to this thinking was provided by the 
poor performances of the European states in the Balkan wars. In 
particular, in that case, divergent positions among states hampered the 
formulation of a consistent strategy, and the total incapability to 
coordinate operations on the ground showed the ineffectiveness of 
separate actions. 
As said before, the US approach to the rise of a European defence 
policy was unclear: while the United States approved the  
improvement in military expenditures, it could not accept a 
disengagement of Europe from the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, 
European states started to perceive the importance of an autonomous 
defence stance, but were aware, at the same time, that the Atlantic 
alliance was most of the time decisive in crisis resolution. Moreover, 
positions within the European context were as divergent towards the 
US so as to require a cautious approach. The compromise reached 
within the Atlantic Alliance was to foster the creation of a European 
pillar within NATO, allowing to pursue operations in autonomous 
contexts with the armaments of the Alliance. If this was an optimal 
compromise for the functioning of NATO in this post-Cold War role, 
the same created tensions among those European states more eager to 
promote a truly separable and separate military stance. In fact, while it 
was clear that the provision of military equipments did hamper 
incentives to their production, it was also apparent that the Atlantic 
Ally kept the key of European interventions by de facto authorizing or 
not the provision of armaments for military operations.  
The role played by the United Kingdom on this question cannot be 
overlooked; in this sense, even the Saint Malo agreement (1998), which 
was celebrated as a decisive shift in Britain foreign policy in favour of 
Europe, has to be looked through other lenses. For example, as 
Clementi points out, Great Britain’s backing of a European defence 
stance was animated by the consideration that European weakness was 
a danger to the overall NATO’ s mission out of area. Supporting the 
process toward a European defence would have meant strengthening 
and improving European performances in troops transportations and 
command and control activities. This would have propped up 
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European defence and security identity within NATO,269 an attempt this 
latter at developing the mounting European military might on the right 
track. In fact, the agreement stated that the principal European security 
responsibility remained a concern of the Atlantic alliance.  
The UK’s policy maintained a pro-Atlanticist stand with respect to 
France and Germany: this fact underlines once again the different 
interests European states did exhibit, “the intergovernmental decision 
making nature of CFSP was considered to have hampered progress 
because of a divergence of national interests, and in particular among 
the three main EU players: the UK, France and Germany”.270 
Nonetheless, in the European Summits of the late ‘90s, an ever-growing 
willingness to proceed autonomously in the field of armaments and 
command and control of operations was underlined, rendering more 
and more dubious the compromise reached within the Atlantic 
Alliance. In the eyes of European states, all the Summits of those years 
paved the way for an absolutely European dimension of their 
armament policies, concretized also by the mergers realized among 
their defence industries.271 In fact, the Cologne Summit(June 1999) 
restated what expressed in Saint-Malo and advanced the progressive 
integration of the WEU (Western European Union) functions within the 
EU. The turning point, on this side, has been represented by the 
Helsinki Summit (December 1999), where  a Common Rapid Reaction 
Force, deployable within 60 days through aerial and naval support, 
was envisioned in order to take forward civil as well as military 
operations. This step was surely accelerated by the shared perception 
of soaring threats and dangerous scenarios that required a rapid and 
cooperative response, “now that European armies may be called upon 
to operate in protracted missions over long distances, the penalties for 
low levels of harmonization and standardization are more severe”.272 
The idea behind this argument was that new treats required 
cooperation and this latter required pooling resources, “without NATO 
engagement that quantitative threshold had to be accompanied by 
progresses on the qualitative level, that European engaged themselves 
to realize to make the rapid reaction force deployable, sustainable, 
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interoperable and guided by an adequate command and control 
structure on the field”.273  
What was needed, therefore, was coordination among European states 
in what was intended as a completely autonomous European operation 
with a European command and total European responsibility. In order 
to follow on with European objectives it was firstly necessary to 
increase military expenses, a need this one difficultly achievable given 
the hard financial situations of European countries. It was also 
paramount to project forces, and coordinate them in a consistent and 
efficient way. A common procurement could have somehow  
marginalized, if taken forward efficiently, the problem determined by 
scarce financial resources. As seen before in the economic and 
industrial sections, if states join their procurement efforts they can 
increase production by favouring economies of scales and spreading 
out fixed costs. This would  sustain a moderate expense for defence and 
would provide an indirect effect: by being more competitive in the 
world scene there could be the possibility to partly breakdown 
American monopoly in armament sector.  
Aside from that, strategic reasons seem to play an overwhelming role 
in European states’ actions; as explained from the words of a German 
official, “there is no other way for Germany  than to intensively look for 
cooperation with partner nations. This is not only because of 
decreasing numbers in procurement orders in all nations, but also since 
now and in the future, military operations will be conducted multi-
nationally. Prerequisite for successful operations is the interoperability 
of military equipment among states. The best way to achieve this is 
through the use of commonly developed, produced and procured 
defence equipment”;274 in the same vein, “a high degree of 
interoperability, co-ordination and use of agreed standards will be vital 
to achieve a unity of effort and purpose…the best form of 
interoperability for equipments and systems is commonality, which 
also matches the defence economic imperative to consolidate the 
demand side of the European defence equipment market”.275  
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The problem to be faced amid a general consensus was how to 
reconcile states’ different exigencies, “while there is dialogue, now 
often formally structured, among European armed forces about what 
kind of weapons they want, there are still gaps or deficiencies in the 
process of formulating requirements, setting specifications and 
implementing a succession of defence programmes to guide European 
defence production and eventually build a more integrated European 
defence market”.276 While clear-cut, the aim of pooling resources so as 
to get improved results to satisfy all the economic and strategic 
objectives was difficult to reach, “the obstacles which hamper a more 
homogeneous and unified European demand are huge and need to be 
related to the differences in strategic national exigencies, to the 
underlined difference in resources and to the fact that national 
procurement policies depend for the most on political and strategic 
considerations rather than economic ones”.277 Political and strategic 
considerations are more relevant than economic ones because of the 
willingness to preserve the own sovereignty and use defence 
capabilities to fulfil a series of interests relied to the national dimension 
of the state. Against this background, opposite tendencies persist: one 
leading to pooling forces and harmonizing requirements, and the other 
leading to preserve the own separate stance and influence events 
through the own structural power.  
In general, the ideal solution for the creation of an efficient and 
sustainable common procurement would foresee: first, a common 
operational requirement definition that can result from a clear 
assessment of the means necessary to face the challenges ahead, and 
second, perfect competition on the contract awarding process. None of 
the two things are observed by most of the defence procurement 
agencies. Nonetheless, the point to be stressed is that both the 
definition and harmonization of common requirements, or the joint 
procurement of an equipment would basically ask for a willingness to 
face challenges jointly, and the creation of interoperable armaments: 
“Europe must be able to provide common responses to global threats, 
by defining harmonised operational requirements, and, down the road, 
by looking at ways of bringing together resources and implementing 
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more effective procurement policies”.278 This process would strengthen 
the cohesiveness of European states by crystallizing the idea of work-
sharing. The more national structures and armies are integrated in 
multinational structures the more the need for interoperability among 
their weapons.  
Standardization refers to common specification of products and 
services but also of contractual arrangements, legislation compatibility 
and interoperability of complex systems, “the close international 
intertwinement in combined missions, especially within the framework 
of international crisis management, is considerably facilitated by the 
availability of similar or at least compatible equipment”.279 OCCAR, 
(Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement), the 
organization that would be analysed later on, should be interpreted as 
an attempt at building an armament agency, “the effective creation of 
OCCAR…would set a stone to the European defence architecture”.280 
The idea was that OCCAR should have encompassed the procurement 
of joint European programmes necessary for out-of area operations: 
their management through OCCAR responded to the necessity of 
rationalizing arms production among European states as well as of 
giving weight to common strategic objectives. Armaments such as 
BOXER armoured vehicle, FREMM frigates or especially the A400M 
military transport aircraft –currently managed within OCCAR- 
answered this attempt.  
A common definition of operational requirements assures 
interoperability among states and therefore an improved coordination 
capacity, “the large European co-operation projects launched under the 
auspices of OCCAR will lead to a better standardization of the 
equipment and therefore to an increased interoperability… Moreover, 
it opens interesting co-operation prospects as far as logistics is 
concerned, not only for the daily management but also during 
operations”.281 General Cardinali, explains that if standardization 
represents the highest level of armaments commonality among states, 
this latter is very difficult to achieve; instead interoperability permit to 
work and act together even without identical weapons systems. This is 
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a more likely scenario, given that even in cooperative programmes 
states always adapt a basic programme to national requirements.282 
States can act together when they are able to get and keep in contact 
with each other and have a common logistic support. In the case of the  
military transport aircraft (A400M), states agreed to define common 
requirements for the building of a basic aircraft: in this case 
interoperability will enable states to act in common, to pool resources 
to work together, to reduce the costs of the logistic support and to 
permit different nations’ equipments to operate on the same vehicle. As 
Brigadier General Peter Kuhn’s points out, to take forward common 
projects, a compatible conceptual planning among participating states 
is needed together with early and timely process of harmonization 
requirements; scheduled development and production phases; funds 
guarantee from participating states; sound governmental and industrial 
cooperation process and resolute political will.283 Similarly, Peter Struck 
maintains that “the right approach is to exploit means of European 
cooperation in the armament sector too, so that national resources can 
be focussed and synergisms achieved”.284 As it will be seen later on, 
OCCAR pointed exactly in this direction.  
The aim of this section was to highlight the strategic incentives leading 
to cooperation among European states. Aside from the controversies 
existing with the Atlantic Ally there seems to be a willingness to forge a 
truly European defence capability: for this to happen states should be 
able to work together, and this depends significantly on decisions for 
joint procurement processes. In the following chapter it will be shown 
that, amid states’ declarations and commitments to coordinate weapons 
acquisition and management process, there persists a general reticence 
to engage effectively in a truly coordinated path.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided background information regarding the 
nature and the peculiarities of defence procurement. Specifying the 
features of this subject-matter is paramount both to complete and make 
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consistent the theoretical part and to set the stage for understanding the 
type of regime existing in the European context. 
The first step undertaken has been to stress the relevance of defence 
procurement for the general security of a state: the acquisition and 
management of armaments has always been conceived as a ‘national 
domain’ issue. The security nature of defence procurement is 
underlined by the fact that states have searched, as much as possible, to 
procure arms by themselves: actually this would have strengthened the 
industrial and technological base, assured a security of supply, curbed 
dependence on foreign supply, conferred prestige, power and leverage 
and provided jobs. The chain that links defence procurement with the 
structural power of a state is apparent: the more powerful a state the 
more able to pursue all these objectives. Given the relevance of defence 
procurement, states have searched to drive this latter on preferred 
directions even when these did not bring about efficient results; by 
their own characteristics defence markets are totally different from 
traditional ones and their procedural mechanisms cannot be analysed 
along a pure economic reasoning. This statement has been underlined 
in the second section, assessing both the possible procurement 
strategies and the phases through which the process is divided. From 
requirements definition to the In- Service Support phase the 
procurement process poses numerous challenges to and request strong 
commitment by national states. As an example, to face the huge 
investments in research and development needed to create prime 
contractors big enough to carry forward the programmes, states need 
to be deeply engaged in the procurement process.  
The different strategies available for procurement depend on the power 
of each state; in this sense the United States can decide to be self-reliant 
or to sign co-production or co-development arrangement with other 
states. It has been pointed out that the US has searched to choose those 
strategies better able to preserve its power position within the Alliance. 
Instead, the only alternative for weak states has been to buy weapons 
off-the-shelf, relying completely on other states’ supplies. 
The third section has analysed how cooperation has been tackled in the 
past within NATO and among European states: while the US has 
employed cooperation as but another strategy of preponderance 
European states have coordinated principally for political reasons, to 
sustain the own national industry and to promote all their security 
objectives. This has ruled out cooperation on pure economic 
motivations, since duplications in facilities and in investments have 
determined huge inefficiencies. The lack of a political will and the 
 114 
incidence of divergent positions towards the Atlantic Ally have 
hampered an ‘institutionalized’ cooperation process; anyhow, the 
lessons of the past are relevant because they can highlight the major 
challenges arising within a cooperative framework and can outline the 
pros and cons of coordinated actions. 
In particular, the lesson of the past may be of the paramount 
importance given today pressures for coordination. As the fourth 
sections has highlighted with reduced defence budgets and increased 
costs for weapons coordination can be a useful strategy to meet defence 
requirements. A brief industrial outlook has also drawn attention on 
how consolidation and restructuring processes have taken ground 
within the European landscape. Notwithstanding the emergence of 
huge national champions and limited transnational mergers and 
acquisitions, industrial cooperation, favoured by a positive 
contribution of national states, has emphasized the inevitability of more 
concerted approaches toward defence. The birth of entities such as 
EADS or Airbus within the European context does exemplify the 
willingness to abate costs as well as to compete effectively with 
American giants.  
The last section has argued that cooperation on defence procurement 
can be looked at as a matter of tension in transatlantic relations: after 
the end of the Cold War and the loss of the common threat, allies have 
exhibited divergent priorities and this has motivated a more European-
focused understanding of security and defence matters among 
European states. A militarily strengthened Europe would have more 
influence on the international landscape and a soundly equipped 
Europe would permit autonomous interventions. For this to happen 
the traditional American dominance on defence matters and 
particularly on technological might should be somehow discontinued; 
on their side European states have to engage more actively in 
coordinating operational requirements and procurement efforts so as to 
assure interoperability of their armies. This was the argument behind 
OCCAR’s creation, a multinational agency for the acquisition and 
management of joint European programmes.  
Because of the threats ahead and because of reduced defence budgets 
states can no longer aspire not to cooperate on defence procurement: 
the mutation of the international context has brought to light new 
constraints on states’ margin of manoeuvre so that states feel the 
necessity to coordinate their actions. This is not as to say that past 
divergences among states and the willingness to promote own interests 
have been eradicated. Instead, coordination is a strategy for states to 
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achieve their preferred outcomes and the divergent interests of each 
state are made apparent when struggling to choose the coordination 
point. 
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Chapter 3 
The defence procurement 
regime 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter will be that of analysing the regime on defence 
procurement existing within the European context. From the first 
chapter it should be clear what it is meant with ‘regime’ and the 
peculiarities of a likely structure on security issues. In the first part of 
this chapter more details will be provided about the principles, norms , 
rules and decision-making procedures characterizing the regime on 
defence procurement, emphasizing that these are not derived and 
determined by a superior and an objective morality but by fundamental 
interests and states’ structural power.  
In presenting the regime, the first and paramount consideration calls 
for a necessary distinction between the initiatives inserted within the 
European Union context and those that instead are out of it. This would 
permit to underline how, in fields regarding security, the role of more 
powerful actors and their interests gain a particular relevance. Within 
the European context  it is possible to cite important arrangements such 
as the Green Paper on Defence Procurement issued by the European 
Commission, and the related Interpretative Communication and 
Directive, or structures such as POLARM and EDA. This latter 
Organization is what looks more like an Armament Agency among 
European states: this does not constitute the regime on defence 
procurement, since it deals with a much broader array of issues, but it 
has among its priorities some objectives deemed paramount for the 
harmonization and rationalization of procurement practices. Its 
effectiveness, though, remains to be seen.  
Outside of the European context the main initiatives on defence 
procurement have been WEAG, that did expire in 2006, LoI and 
OCCAR. In particular, these latter arrangements have been of the 
paramount importance, one mirroring the demand and the other the 
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supply side of defence procurement. Their small membership adds to 
their efficiency but their ‘intergovernmental’ rule poses completely 
under political control the entire procurement process and therefore 
each initiative to speed up further harmonization. Moreover, these 
agreements do encompass only the most important defence producers 
within the European landscape, de facto ruling out the participation of 
minor states. This, again, has permitted the achievement of some 
important thresholds albeit eschewing the image of a truly European 
defence procurement approach. 
In the remainder of the chapter a quick overview of the four major 
defence powers in Europe will be undertaken so as to perceive their 
relational divergences, their position within the European context and 
the available options at hands on defence procurement. France and the 
United Kingdom will be compared as for power and defence 
capabilities; also, their divergent interests and the strategies pursued 
through defence procurement highlighted. Germany’s changed defence 
posture and capabilities will be underlined together with its favourable 
position within the European landscape. A less favourable position is 
that of Italy, which shows the lowest defence profile among the other 
great powers. Italy’s uncertain path towards European defence has not 
helped its image as a reliable and fundamental partner.  
These states’ framing will be the linkage point between the theoretical 
and the empirical part that will follow, and will provide this latter with 
an informed introduction about the different reasons and motivations 
leading to the creation of OCCAR.  
3.2 The regime on defence procurement: principles, 
norms and rules 
As Krasner points out, regimes are “a bunch of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
states’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations”.285 In particular, principles explain the objectives that 
members states are supposed to follow. Before enlisting the principles 
of the defence procurement regime it is important to stress that 
principles, as well as norms, should not be seen as dictated by absolute 
and morally compelling values; instead they are determined by 
common interests among actors. In the defence procurement case, 
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principles can be the value of standardization and harmonization of 
defence equipments and the value of an European defence might to 
face world challenges.  
Norms derive directly from principles and specify them. In the case 
under review, for example, states should progressively contribute to 
the creation of a political Europe by investing more on defence and on 
research and development, by jointly defining operational 
requirements and by preferring European Cooperative projects. Rules 
and decision-making procedures indicate in details states’ rights and 
obligations. As it will be shown later on, it is complicated to make 
rights and obligations weight because regimes do not create a 
supranational entity that could guarantee norms safeguard. In the case 
of security regimes it is even more difficult to verify actors’ compliance: 
agreements are often minimal and states do exhibit divergent positions 
on how to act, and are difficultly eager to give in part of their 
sovereignty. The lack of measurement and compliance instruments to 
monitor the steps undertaken will show how, at least within the context 
of the European Union, the security regime is weak even if desirable. 
Summing up, “norms tell us why states do cooperate, rules tell us 
which fields cooperation covers and procedures answer the question of 
how should cooperation been taken forward”.286 
Before considering the initiatives advanced within the European Union 
framework one point cannot be overlooked: the difficulty in 
establishing European policies in defence procurement are underlined 
by the lack of a compelling Communitarian approach in defence 
matters. The Treaty that establishes the European Community (TEC) 
states that defence market is embodied within the arrangements of the 
internal market, subject, though, to article 296 (ex 213). In fact, this 
article foresees a series of derogations to the setting of a free and 
competitive market in defence issues when reasons of “national 
security” are invoked: in these cases states are not required to follow 
the rules of the internal market. This shortcut has permitted to adapt 
and mould defence matters to the protection of particular interests and 
to the disadvantage of a more open, competitive and efficient market,  
“member states have employed that article to exclude defence almost 
completely from the European integration process and to organize their 
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defence markets on a national basis”.287 As abovementioned, article 223 
of the Treaty of Rome provides specific exemptions to competition in 
the European market: in particular, point A specifies that “no member 
shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security” and also 
“any member state may take such measures as it considers necessary 
for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are 
connected with the production or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material…”.288  
Since the beginning of the European experience it was clear that 
defence procurement was an issue to be kept out of the Communitarian 
path: the failed attempt at a Common Defence in 1954 as well as 
divergences of perceptions among European actors regarding NATO 
reinforced this understanding: states considered defence procurement 
too important an issue to leave it out of national hands. This has 
inevitably marked a deep watershed between European economic 
integration performances and political might, “some Member States 
have interpreted this Article broadly and divergently, accentuating the 
fragmentation of the European defence-market. Exemptions have been 
applied to a wider range of products without reference to the 1958 
list.”289  
3.3 Enhancing a competitive European Technological and 
Industrial Base: steps forward and limits within the EU 
framework 
Notwithstanding the limits aforementioned, within the EU context 
some steps forward to invite more coordination among states have 
been attempted: 
European Commission Green Paper on Defence Procurement.290 In 
September 2004 the European Commission has issued a Green Paper 
                                                           
287 Burkard Schmitt, “Defence Procurement in the European Union, the Current 
Debate”, Report of an EUISS Task Force, Institute for Security Studies, May 2005, 
p. 7. 
288http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ / LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:12002E296:EN :NOT 
289 Commission of the European Communities, “The Challenger Facing the 
European Defence-Related Industry, a Contribution for Action at European 
Level”, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 1996, p. 14. 
290 Green Paper on Defence Procurement, COM (2004) 608. 
 120 
on Defence Procurement, the aim of which was to render more 
transparent the defence market. If ‘arms, munitions and war material’ 
could motivate exemption from internal market procedures the 
Commission stated that this possibility was not automatic but, as the 
European Court of Justice emphasized, derogations should concern the 
safeguard of the essential security interests invoked and the possibility 
of member states to asses on a case-by-case basis if the contracts 
stipulated fulfilled the exemption requirements. The objective of the 
Green Paper was therefore to open a debate with a view to a more 
regulated and competitive European market in defence procurement 
and to promote a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), “the 
Green Paper is one of a series of initiatives launched by the 
Commission to gradually establish a real European defence market, 
with common rules applying to all Member States but adapted to the 
special nature of the sector”.291  
In particular, the misuse of Art. 296 was underlined and with that the 
necessity for a specification and explanation of the derogations from 
normal internal market procedures. The reasons that pushed towards 
these European initiatives shed a light on some of the peculiarities of 
regimes: the aim of the Commission was to render more transparent 
and competitive the defence market among European states and 
therefore to promote reciprocity and mutual trust. Once again the 
limitations of these documents were those typical  of issues related to 
security. As Schmitt points out, “the production and trade of defence 
instruments are strictly related to the sovereignty of states. The nature 
of defence markets is for this motivation extremely  political”.292 
Moreover, the author puts emphasis on the different point of views of 
each European state about the organization and the working system of 
a defence market: different cultural traditions and different policies 
drive states to privilege the own national industries as source of power 
and influence. Without a Communitarian directive that would 
coordinate norms and procedures of national procurement systems at 
the European  level states would difficultly be able to work together.293 
At the EU level not only distributional but also legal and bureaucratic 
problems do exist, “efforts to design a common system for arms 
procurement therefore face the challenge of combining several different 
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national administrative systems and patterns of procurement”.294 
According to the proposal of the Green Paper, an Interpretative 
Communication (launched on 2006) on the application and 
interpretation of Article 296 had the aim of driving states to assess 
whether a contract awarding process could have been exempted from 
Community rules or eschewed the conditions established by the Court 
of Justice. Instead, a Directive on Defence Procurement was aimed at 
opening up markets and promoting competition within the European 
industrial landscape regarding non-strategic equipments, “the 
Directive will not only help to coordinate national procurement 
procedure. At the same time, it will offer defence specific and more 
flexible rules than the existing Public Procurement Directive and thus 
make it easier for Member States to resort less to Article 296 of the 
Treaty”.295 The Directive will apply to those war materials for which 
states do not request exemption on the basis of Art. 296: agreement 
among member states should be reached on the appropriate definition 
to be conferred to these ‘war materials’. The European Commission has 
often remarked the desire to be more engaged with matters regarding 
armaments albeit constrained by the extreme importance of defence 
procurement for states “Article 296 of the Treaty on the European 
Union reflects an historical orientation of members states that, 
considering that armament was not a domain of classic economy, have 
placed it outside of the Commission sphere of work”.296  
As Schmitt underlines, from 1996 the Commission has launched 
numerous communications regarding defence industries.297 Moreover, 
it has commissioned various studies to related research centers to 
identify the achievable gains from a joint management of the armament 
sector, to incentive the creation of a European industrial base and to 
shed a light on the costs deriving from a self-reliant strategy. 
Notwithstanding that, progresses have not been substantial. The 
different defence budgets among European states, the importance of 
military production and acquisition and actors’ different interests and 
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strategies have curbed the possibilities to reach out even a minimal 
overall agreement. Thus, the work of the Commission has been quite 
limited on this sector, “the Commission has been allowed to play four 
role which have direct or indirect impact on defence procurement”,298 
asserts Trevor Taylor: “first, it administers the EU’ s framework scheme 
of research and development support, with at least some of the work 
involved having defence application”.299 Second, the Commission must 
give approval of major mergers among industries, even if they have a 
defence dimension. The Commission deals also with conversion 
problems (from military to civil production industries) and the related 
issues such as the likely unemployment. Finally, it monitors a list of 
dual-use items exports. Notwithstanding these influential roles, the 
Commission is not able to intervene directly on the procurement 
process.  
What the Commission aims at doing is to face the complexities of 
defence procurement and to envision the way in which these latter can 
be made compatible with the internal market requirements. As early as 
2003, the European Commission took an initiative for the creation of a 
European Defence Equipment Market that could have propped up a 
common foreign security and defence policy. It was a proposal that 
highlighted issues such as the standardization of operational 
requirements and consequently of military equipments, the monitoring 
of defence industry, intra-communitarian transfers, competitiveness, 
dual-use products export, rules of procurement and collaboration in the 
field of research and development. The end objective in the field of 
defence procurement was, and still is, to have a single set of rules for 
the procurement of weapon systems in Europe. 
POLARM (European Armaments Policy Council Working Group). It is 
said to be the only formal forum of discussion on armaments and is 
embodied within the European Council since 1995. Notwithstanding 
the emphasis put on standardization and restructuring no substantial 
achievement have been reached. 
European Defence Agency (EDA): thus far, this has been the most 
outstanding initiative within the European landscape. It has been 
created in 2004 under the Control of the Council. According to Schmitt, 
the creation of EDA mirrors members states’ determination to pool new 
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military capabilities with new research techniques and new approaches 
to cooperation on defence armaments and markets.300 EDA became 
operational in 2004, with the objective of dealing with defence 
capabilities development for crisis situations, with armaments 
cooperation, with the strengthening of the defence and industrial base 
and with technological research improvements. Of the outmost 
importance is the 2005 initiative regarding the adoption of a Code of 
Conduct, “an inter-governmental regime, voluntary and not binding 
from a juridical point of view that should facilitate the opening of 
defence procurement to intra-European competition for what concerns 
contracts likely to fall under Art. 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty”.301 The 
principles at the basis of the Code of Conduct state that the Code is 
voluntary, that EDA will monitor its compliance, that the Code will 
assure security of supply, that it will provide fair and equal treatment 
of suppliers and that it will establish best practice (competition). Some 
kinds of contract will remain outside of this code, such as procurement 
on research and technology, collaborative procurements projects and 
procurements of nuclear weapons and related categories.302   
EDA’ s aim is to become a European Agency for defence procurement; 
in fact it should encompass all the agreements reached and the 
organizations created even outside of the institutional context of the 
European Union. According to its overall mission, EDA could 
effectively help Europe becoming a political entity by furnishing more 
solid bases to a European foreign policy. Nonetheless, this is a very 
ambitious project and doubts persist on a potential and overwhelming 
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success especially because of divergent positions existing among 
European states, “they continue bickering among themselves, as is 
shown by the recent risible episode when Great Britain vetoed the 2009 
budget of the European Defence Agency because it wanted more 
transparency about how the agency would spend the extra one million 
euros it is due to receive two years from now”.303 In fact, 
notwithstanding the broad partnership (24 states) unanimity is 
required for decisions when motivations of national politics are arisen. 
Some authors reserve some positive comments on the power EDA may 
exercise over states, “it is not juridical relevant but it is nonetheless an 
explicit political engagement. The moral pressure power waged by the 
agency should not be overlooked because at the end of every year an 
eventual abuse or inconsistent behaviour will be overtly published in 
the Ministries’ report”.304 EDA is not the regime on defence 
procurement: as it stands, a regime deals only with a single issue-area, 
while this Agency is of a more far-reaching vision and mission.  
As seen, European states have kept going with Intents Declarations 
recognizing, with words, the importance of a more regulated European 
procurement. Coordinating procurement policies and giving birth to a 
demand that would incentive efficiency and competitiveness would be 
the solution to the pressures presented in the previous chapter. If 
binding agreements can achieve more transparency, competitiveness 
and reciprocity why is it so difficult to create them form the outset? 
Security issues are characterized much more than other matters by 
‘distributional issues’: states cooperate to pursue their interests but are 
careful to make their own power weigh in cooperative arrangements. 
As it will be shown, the most effective but ‘exclusive’ initiatives have 
been those carried forward outside of the European Union context: 
first, they have been created by states with similar structural power and 
second they have been promoted by the major armaments producers 
and consumers, confirming Krasner’ s thesis that “where the 
distribution of power has been strongly asymmetrical international 
regimes have not developed. The strongest states have simply done 
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what they preferred….where the distribution of power has been more 
symmetrical regimes have been established”.305 
3.4  Few participants, great capabilities: does effectiveness 
come with exclusion? 
This section will aim at presenting the initiatives undertaken outside of 
the European context. A preliminary conclusion can be attempted: both 
intergovernmental arrangements and a small but powerful 
membership have appeared to be the conditions for achieving concrete 
results. Among the most relevant agreements and structures created 
outside of the EU context are: 
Western European Armament Group (WEAG): before assuming the 
current acronym this agreement was known as IEPG (Independent 
European Programme Group, 1976). Inside of the IEPG initiative an 
important achievement has been the Vredling Report of 1985, aimed at 
pushing a European re-thinking about procurement, both on the 
supply and demand side. It stated that national procurement had to be 
abandoned in favour of a European-oriented armament agency by 
adopting competition–prone policies and avoiding market distortions. 
Nevertheless, states were not required to adopt such policies. WEAG 
was composed by all the European states embodied within NATO and 
the EU but Iceland. For this reason it was considered as “the largest 
pan-European framework for cooperation in the armament field”.306 Its 
objectives were: to increase transparency and competitiveness through 
a more efficient use of the resources and through a major 
harmonization of operational requirements; to open defence markets to 
outer competition; to reinforce the European industrial and 
technological base and to promote cooperation on Research and 
Development. Notwithstanding the fact that the Accord set the bases 
for productive discussions and was able to bring to the negotiating 
table all the European actors, concrete results have been scarce, 
“consensus-based decision-making has allowed only for agreements on 
the basis of the lowest common denominator”.307 States have committed 
themselves in words to modify their procurement practices, but the 
engagements undertaken were not legally binding, “WEAG has 
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individuated the exact issue but lacks of means and structures to find 
out satisfying solutions”.308 In 1996, to deepen cooperation within 
WEAG, a new Organization has been created, WEAO (Western 
European Armament Organization). Nevertheless, it represented solely 
a research cell that assisted member states with administrative and 
contractual advice for cooperation in research, leaving outside the 
fundamental processes of planning and production. The broad 
partnership base and the equal voting power of each member despite 
the huge discrepancy in production capabilities has invited more 
powerful states to opt for more flexible but also more effective 
structures. In 2005, and following the creation of EDA, WEAG and 
WEAO functions, especially those related to R&T, were overtaken by 
the Agency and the two structures closed. 
LoI (Letter of Intent) Framework Agreement: signed in 2000 by the six 
major producers of defence systems within the European landscape it 
reflects the supply-side of defence procurement. It was thought for 
facilitating the consolidation of and cooperation among defence 
industries. In particular, this agreement derived from a previous 
statement made by France, Germany and the United Kingdom to help 
the restructuring of the European aerospace and defence electronic 
industries, “France, Germany and the United Kingdom share an 
essential political and economic interest in Europe possessing an 
effective and competitive aerospace and defence electronic industry. 
This will enable Europe to improve its commercial position in the 
world, to reinforce its security and to guarantee that it can play a full 
role in its own defence”.309 The main advice behind this agreement was 
to capitalize on the yet existent inter-dependence among European 
states, brought about by previous cooperation on defence equipment, 
and to attempt, as much as possible, to promote the creation of 
transnational companies. This process, though, had to consider “the 
imperative of ensuring the Parties’ security of supply, and a fair and 
efficient distribution and maintenance of strategically important assets, 
activities and skills”.310 Aside from the challenge at restructuring the 
industrial sector, LoI objectives encompass: help achieve security of 
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supply for defence articles; ease, where appropriate, national export 
control; facilitate the exchange of classified information; promote 
coordination of research activities; set rules for the disclosure, transfer, 
use and ownership of Technical Information and foster harmonisation 
of operational requirements. It is legally binding only for the six 
countries involved (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). Aside from what said, this Agreement is an 
expression of intent by states which are in no way as compelled as they 
would be under  a Treaty.311 
OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement) : 
from 2001 this Organization, created by France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Italy has a legal status, and this means that it is an 
international structure able to hire personnel and award contracts to 
the industrial sector. By having the power of issuing contracts on behalf 
of participating states and by managing the procurement process of the 
assigned programmes, OCCAR assures the presence of a single 
Executive Director instead of as many directors as the number of 
participating states. This, inevitably, simplifies and makes more fluid 
the procurement process, saving from a lot of inefficiencies present in 
collaborative projects. As Schmitt points out, differently from more 
encompassing agreements, as for example WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR 
reflects the interests and power of the major defence producers (the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany). This inevitably poses 
some problems to the image of a widespread European defence, “few 
important arms producing countries are also those with most 
significant defence budgets, which means that the bulk of defence 
money in the EU is spent in countries where in many cases national 
preference policy can be assumed”.312 Undoubtedly, one of the most 
important issues is the embodiment of new members states: while the 
major European producers of defence equipment are keen on 
negotiations and contracting and know how to deal with the 
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bargaining process in collaboration projects “such learning benefits 
might be reduced if new partners are added to the club”.313  
The aim of the Organization is to manage the acquisition of European 
programmes in cooperation. As Schmitt points out, OCCAR, as an 
international procurement agency, is an International Organization 
which is not subject to Community Directives, and in any case it 
regards complex systems which would be inevitably covered by Article 
296 exemptions: with EDA, which is not an International Organization, 
the situation would be different.314 The repercussions that a structure 
such as OCCAR can have on transatlantic relations are manifold and 
will be evaluated later on. Here one related aspect should be 
underlined: since OCCAR foresees the participation in certain 
programmes of states which are not members of the Organization, and 
since it is probable that these states would then acquire the weapon 
systems in the production of which they are participating, it is possible 
that a smaller number of weapons would be asked in the American 
market. For example this could be the case with the A400M military 
transport aircraft where even non-European states participate.  
If OCCAR has not been able to conduce states towards an 
harmonization of operational requirements it is but the most concrete 
initiative in the field of defence procurement thus far. This is the reason 
why a thorough consideration of its working is paramount and will be 
undertaken in the following chapter. 
3.5 An outlook on major European arms producers  
The aim of this section is not to explain in detail states’ procurement 
policies since this is not the objective of the research project. Instead, 
what will be looked at in here are the ways in which available options 
in defence procurement have been exploited in the past with different 
strategic constraints and how they have changed with time passing. 
Therefore, European relationships will be taken into account together 
with those with the United States. As it will be apparent, a state that 
has struggled to improve its defence might has obtained a powerful 
position thanks mostly to a nationally-based defence procurement 
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process or through asymmetrical cooperative processes. Procurement 
policies have been used as a foreign policy tool and they should be 
considered in the same way today.  
Speaking about European production of defence equipments should 
not be misleading: in this case the Europe at 27 does not enter the 
picture. More than 90% of the defence industries and capabilities rests 
on a bunch of countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy 
and to a certain extent also Sweden Spain and Belgium. The industrial 
structure of each country is fundamentally diverse: in the UK we can 
find a mostly private and horizontally integrated defence industry, 
which has been the product of restructuring processes started in the 
Thatcher’ s period. German industry is fundamentally private but 
vertically integrated. As for France, state’s control is still important in 
the defence industry but processes of privatization are taking place. 
Italy is similar to the French case, but more vertically integrated. What 
these countries have in common, though, is the presence of big national 
industries deemed fundamental for having a say in European 
developments and for meeting own interests. The presence of big 
national champions, that contribute to the power and prestige of these 
countries, has promoted inefficiencies and duplications in the 
European landscape, “many European governments still feed most of 
their procurement budgets to home firms, not permitting foreign 
ownership of top contractors, leading to overcapacity”.315 Katia Vlachos 
goes on explaining that, for example, to fulfil the need for a multi-role 
combat aircraft, European states have produced three different 
systems, the Rafale (France), the Gripen (Sweden) and the 
EF(Eurofighter)-2000 (Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain), stressing that 
the persistence of different strategic culture as well as the effort at 
maintaining national prerogatives have downplayed a European 
common path.316 Below a snapshot overview of country’s general 
posture will be depicted. 
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3.5.1 France 
France has always been a strong promoter of a defence stance for  
Europe independently from the Atlantic context, even if, as some 
scholars point out, it has conceived the defence policy not as the 
Europeanization of the French one but as the spread of its own 
conceptions, sometimes in contrast with those of the other European 
partners. France considers its leadership in European defence matters 
as paramount, “the preservation of France position within the world 
will be at a great extent linked to her ability to influence the European 
construction and the future evolution of Europe”.317 Since the end of the 
Cold War France retained that a ‘supranational’ European structure as 
for armaments and defence could have determined an American 
hegemony; therefore, even if cooperation was needed in order to satisfy 
French interests, this should have to be determined principally in a 
intergovernmental way so as to speed up European capacities. 
Coordination is for France, as for other states, a strategy to manage its 
actual position. Of course France will prop up a coordination in defence 
matters as long as it is intergovernmentally  shaped. With its strong 
military might France hopes to take a lead on it: given the difficulty of 
going it alone France has attempted to foster a European defence pillar, 
searching therefore to define the rules of the game. Nevertheless, 
disagreements among European states, as well as systemic constraints, 
influenced states’ defence positions, underlining even more their deep 
differences. The better solution for most of them was to prefer what 
was considered a NATO hegemony over the European territory.  
It can be said that the history of European defence thinking is the 
history of France’s attempts and endeavours contrasted each time by 
other European states. It is fair to argue that France has been the main 
promoter of all European defence initiatives, starting from the Pleven 
Plan, going through the Fouchet Plan(1960-62) and the Franco-German 
Treaty: none of these attempts did go ahead and fix the transatlantic 
issue; at that point in time Europe was neither able nor willing to 
envision a detached European defence policy, while France was not 
able to go it alone with its objectives.  
That systemic constraint and that the presence of an external threat 
were paramount to stem a defence posture is underlined by the new 
defence debate inaugurated after the implosion of the Soviet block: 
structures such as the WEU (Western European Armament) which 
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were inactive for almost all the Cold War took new life. Was there any 
reason to keep being reliant on the United States given the absence of a 
common threat and the progressive diversification of states’ interests? 
France again was the main promoter of cooperative endeavours, with 
the definition of Franco-German defence Commission (1982), the 
Council (1989) and the creation of a Franco-German brigade (1989). 
Also, “it was at French insistence, with German backing, that a clause 
was inserted into the Maastricht Treaty (Title V) establishing a common 
foreign and security policy(CFSP)…”.318 There was room for a peculiar 
European policy, distinct from the American one and, because of that, 
the need was stronger to forge the basis of a security structure, “in this 
context of decreasing means and efficiency, France has tried to set up a 
European system of defence, to compensate for the shortcomings of 
national systems, notably for heavy materials, likes transport planes, 
ships, and aircraft carriers”.319 
One of the trickiest aspects of European defence is the relation existing 
between France and the United Kingdom: the leading European 
powers have very different but also similar interests and policies, “our 
two countries share an intricate history, have similar ambitions and 
defence policies, and have comparable technological and industrial 
bases as well as defence budgets”.320 Both of them have a European and 
an Atlantic aim, even if they are significantly divergent, the United 
Kingdom keeps wanting to be the link between America and Europe, 
while France prefers an autonomous European entity. The relationship 
with the United Kingdom has always been considered paramount even 
if difficult because of the similar capabilities of the two countries. While 
an important step forward was reached in 1998 with the Saint Malo 
Agreement, a lot of authors now recognize that the honeymoon of the 
two countries has lasted but a few moments, “for some time now, 
France has been facing what might be called a ‘British crisis’ in its 
defence policy-Great Britain now sets the standard within Europe for 
military efficiency and deployability and is a standard of reference 
within defence circles. As a result, Great Britain represents a model to 
be admired and emulated, an ally to cultivate, and even a competitor to 
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balance against for political-military leadership in Europe”.321 
Moreover, the emphasis put on the Franco-British rapprochement 
should be understood taking into account another parallel event, that 
is, France’s new dialogue with the Atlantic Alliance: it is probable that 
without this latter event the United Kingdom would not have shifted 
toward a more pro-European stance.322 
As we said before, France policy is one which underlines national 
independence, “the first objective of the defence policy is the defence of 
her interests”;323 from the ‘90s France is more prone to speak about 
multilateral structures maybe because now its role in forging them is 
likely to be decisive as it would not have been in the context of the Cold 
War. Also, France recognizes that while the major threat has 
vanquished cooperation with other states is necessary to face the 
challenges of this fluid historical period and of reduced budgets.  
France has always been one of the leading weapons producer, 
especially in the aerospace sector. Its priority has been the maintenance 
of autonomy on defence issues and an emphasis on technological 
lead,324 which inevitably required a close relationship between the state 
and the industry. Technological skills will be important not only for 
France defence posture within the European context and towards the 
United States but will be utmost also for the overall European security 
and defence strategy, “to renounce to be active in high technologies 
would devoid the Europeans of the ability to have a say in the crisis 
that will happen, and it would oblige them to mirror according to the 
American model the paths and means of military actions destined to 
reflect their interests”.325 
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Figure 5. R&T Expenditure in Europe (2005). Source: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx? area=Facts&id=179 
 
 
Inevitably, France decision to withdraw from the NATO’s integrated 
military command has set in motion economic and technological 
progresses through national arms production. This does not mean that 
the state has not engaged in cooperative projects, but that even in these 
latter cases France has attempted to lead the collaboration process and 
has privileged cooperation with Germany, believing it to be the 
necessary card for a European defence, “Franco-German relationship is 
essential to promote Europe as a force of stimulus and proposition. It 
places France and Germany to the heart of the European 
construction”.326 In the past, this kind of collaboration was out-balanced 
on the part of France, but with the development of a stronger German 
defence sector, issues concerning leadership and work-sharing are 
coming about.  
When not national, this state prefers European acquisitions rather than 
American ones, “French armed forces should equip themselves with 
European weapons system. France will search of course to influence its 
                                                           
326 “Le Relations Franco-Allemandes en matière de défense”, 
www.defense.gouv.fr/defense/layout/set /print/content /view/full/94097 . 
For an assessment of Franco-German relations see also David G. Haglund, 
Alliance Within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European 
Pillar of Defense”, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. 
 134 
European partners to do the same in this field” and actively promote 
the development of European weapon systems “France strongly 
favours a European armaments policy which purpose would be to 
synchronize military requirements, integrate the defence sector, and 
create an institutional mechanism for cooperation that respects the 
national interests of the member states”.327 The Franco-German Agency 
created in 1996 was interpreted by the French political spectrum as an 
attempt at facing American competitiveness.328 Nevertheless, it should 
be stressed that France relations with the United States are much more 
multi-faceted than normally thought, “due to the US-French 
cooperation on armaments, American companies are the most 
important foreign suppliers of French armaments. In order to get access 
to the French market, American firms must typically provide access to 
technology that the French need”.329 
As some authors point out, France experienced very much the limits 
coming from reduced defence budgets even if it attempted, as much as 
possible, to keep substantial defence expenditure after the end of the 
Cold War, “this may be explained by the relative lateness of defence 
policy reform and also by a political will to preserve national 
independence on defence through maintaining a high level of military 
expenditures, in spite of geopolitical changes”.330 Gradually, though, 
France procurement and industrial policy has started to change, 
adopting a more competitive stance at least within Europe.  
Notwithstanding the general reduction of defence budgets after the end 
of the Cold War, France quickly understood that the moment was 
propitious to take a lead on the European defence moulding process:  
in both the Military Programme for 2003-2008 and in the Loi de 
Programmation Militaire(2002) it was clearly stated that France had to 
commit more to defence expenditures. Both documents “reverse the 
trend of declining French defence spending so evident in recent years- 
a trend that, if it had continued, would have led to a virtual collapse of 
French defence capabilities”.331 The first clearly stated aim was to gain 
the political and military leadership in Europe, to be a ‘lead nation’: in 
the Military Programme for 2003-2008 it was asserted that for France 
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Europe was now the main political and geographical spotlight and that 
therefore the state would have contributed to the achievement of the 
stated objectives, “France has undertaken to satisfy a fifth of the global 
objective of Helsinki, whilst contributing decisively to structural 
strategic resources: especially strategic and operational headquarters, 
communications and intelligence information systems”.332  
As stated, in their procurement strategies states exhibit different 
sensitivities to pressures coming from the military and industrial side. 
From this point of view, it is possible to say that French plans have 
been more “political” : a case in point is the national Rafale 
programme, that was chosen instead of the five-nation European 
Fighter Aircraft notwithstanding its costs, “Rafale is certainly the last 
major red, white and blue weapons system likely to be developed in 
France. The 1994 Livre Blanc states bluntly that no major future 
conventional armaments programme seems able to escape the logic of 
European cooperation”.333 Nevertheless, what France was stating in its 
Livres Blancs does not always mirror what France actually does. For 
example, even if France recognizes in a clear way that from the 
industrial point of view cooperation is not only useful but inevitable, in 
many occasions it still produces complex armaments at the national 
industry level. Attempts at distancing from traditional  practices do 
always bring about huge protests, “until when military needs will exist, 
weapons equipments have to be produced by industries subject to the 
national control: armaments should not be considered as other 
ordinary commodities”.334  
Jacques Chirac’s reform process in 1966, dictated also by financial 
considerations, was of the paramount importance to adapt the French 
industrial sector to the new exigencies and to favour the emergence of 
competitive poles, “in an effort to give France some chance of 
dominating the two main sectors in which she still operated 
competitively-electronics and avionics-Chirac made two decisions. He 
ordered the rapid merger of the profit-making Dassault and the loss-
making Aérospatiale in order to produce one industrial giant around 
which-hopefully-other European partners might be forced to gravitate. 
                                                           
332 République Française, 2003-2008 Military Programme Bill of Law, Chapter 3, 
Appended Report, p. 22.  
333 Anand Menon and Joylon Howorth, ed.,1997, pp.  37-39. Livre Blanc sur la 
défense, 1994, p. 39. 
334 Citation by Claude Billard, Séance du 19 Juin 1996, French Senate, 
www.senat.fr/seances/s199606/s19960619/sc19960619020.html  
 136 
And he ordered the privatisation of Thomson CSF, gambling on 
provoking a series of mergers among French Companies in the sector 
prior to the constitution of a (French-led) European group capable of 
competing with US defence manufactures”.335 That meant inevitably 
that a merge between French companies would have had a deeper 
weight on European defence restructuring and tasks division. In fact, 
distributional concerns made it particularly difficult the creation of a 
French-German armament structure, which was continuously delayed. 
France was searching, therefore, to preserve and even to increase its 
position, a concern that was shared by all other European states. 
Howorth and Menon stress in an accurate way that what was at stake 
was so high that every European leader tried to prevail; even the 
British understood in 1996, at the constituting point of the armament 
agency, that the stakes were too high in the European context not to 
participate, and in fact the United Kingdom did participate with an 
armoured personnel carrier and with a European cruise missile.336 
State participation in defence industries has been strongly reduced: 
now the French government participate in EADS only with the 15% 
and 33% in Thales; nevertheless the position of the state in defence 
issues can never be questioned exactly because of the role it plays in 
this peculiar field, “the basic principle in European cooperation 
programs so far has been that each country has received a work-share 
proportionate to their investments and their orders. This is not seen as 
an offset policy in France, but it is unlikely that French industry would 
have participated in such programs if France had not placed orders 
within them”.337 
3.5.2 Germany 
Germany’s defence posture has changed in a significant way during the 
Cold War in correspondence with its progressive increase in power: 
this has modified its policy both with the Atlantic Ally and with its 
main partner and historical enemy, France. For this state, the 
preservation of a transatlantic link has always been much more 
compelling than for France, “Germany did not object to discussing 
questions of defence policy, for example, within the context of 
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European political community. Given its dependence on the US and 
NATO, however, its main interest was to work towards a common 
foreign and security policy, rather than any military co-operation 
within the European Community framework”.338 After the end of the 
Cold War, German approach toward the transatlantic ally has been 
ambivalent, meaning that even if emphasizing the transatlantic link it 
has followed France in its European attempts. Of course, this strategy 
was also a product of the changed American priorities.  
All the attempts made by France during the Cold War period and that 
required German cooperation were considered with prudence so as not 
to endanger relations with the United States. For France, attempts at 
cooperating with Germany were part of a strategy to increase its power 
and leadership within the European landscape. Since for Germany 
American military protection was paramount, it could not but avoid 
engaging in projects that were aimed too clearly at building a separate 
defence might. If encompassing security and defence policies within 
the European integration process was an understandably German 
desire, dependence from the United States hampered alternative 
strategies, among which laid the desire to normalize and strengthen 
relations with France, the other great continental power. This does not 
mean that the two nations did not cooperate at all: a lot of military 
programmes did start almost immediately in the first decades of the 
Cold War. Willy-nilly, because of these cooperations, Germany has 
permitted France to increase its power and leverage within the 
European context, “Germany has willingly allowed France to hold a 
leading position in Europe, thereby defusing mutual historical enmity 
and laying the foundation for European unity”.339  
In the ‘80s, German attitude towards the Atlantic ally started to change, 
first of all because of the renewed competition started from the 
American Republican President, which could difficultly match with the 
attempt to normalize relations with the East through the Ost-politik. 
More to that, though, was Germany reunification which conferred back 
sovereignty and the possibility to exploit its immense potentialities. 
Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, Germany’s strategy begun to 
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change: while reunification could re-confer a geographical strength in 
the center of Europe, a re-gained leverage and status could only have 
been achieved through a more proactive policy especially on the 
European front: in Germany “we witnessed not only a modification of 
the constitution in response to European demands, but also a cultural 
sea-change marked by the emergence of a new concept-
Europafahigkeit (Europe-compatibility)- as the central strand in 
German defence thinking”.340 German freedom of action and 
commitment to the European cause conferred the country more power, 
“ironically, the project of European integration was largely designed to 
contain the Germans, not to foster their role in world affairs. Yet 
German support for European integration has often had the effect of 
enhancing, rather than reducing, German autonomy in defence 
matters”.341  Integration and Europeanization were therefore beneficial 
to Germany  autonomy and influence: for the German defence industry 
they were “an important vehicle to promote its interests”.342 
Cooperation is therefore an apparent and broad part of the German 
defence procurement strategy; in fact cooperation has helped to 
develop the national industry and accommodate past grievances. More 
to that, international cooperation has legitimized projects that would 
not have been accepted in the national context given the internal 
reticence towards military issues. Since collaboration is of the 
paramount relevance for Germany, this latter has felt the exigency to 
strengthen its leading sectors so as to be not only a reliable and 
paramount partner in cooperation ventures but also one of the 
European leaders in military production, “as a prerequisite for this 
ability to cooperate, Germany will maintain an efficient and 
competitive industrial base in core areas of technology affording it 
some leverage in the development of key weapon systems. This will 
promote the capacity to play a constructive role in an Alliance and 
European context and is thus an element of German security policy”.343  
As said before, Germany’s stance towards France and the United States 
has changed correspondingly to its increase in power. The changed 
relationship with the United States presented, now it should be 
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appreciated how this increase in power has impinged on the Franco-
German one. While still a minor partner, Germany stands as one of the 
most important European producers, with high capabilities. Aware of 
its importance in carrying forward a European military might Germany 
has requested to participate on an equal footing within cooperative 
projects: this can be seen in the constitution of EADS as the major 
military pole and in the assessment of various weapon systems 
requirement. As for EADS, and as seen in the previous chapter, there 
exists an identical distribution of power between France and Germany 
which has sometimes overburdened the company work. Especially for 
political reasons, this merger was of the paramount importance to 
create a truly and reliable European pole, to tie and encompass 
Germany new power position and share with it the responsibility to 
develop a European defence might competitive enough to face the 
American giants. For Germany, this was an outstanding opportunity to 
underline its European role and to improve its aerospace industry 
might. As Burkard Schmitt points out, both countries (France and 
Germany) desire to coordinate was possible because of their 
commitment to important concessions, “the French side had to accept a 
merger of equals. At least for some in Paris, this was not easy since 
Germany’s aerospace industry was traditionally considered in France 
as an important albeit minor and technologically less competent 
partner. Moreover, in terms of sales and order backlog, Aérospatiale-
Matra is bigger than DASA…. On the other hand, and this was 
decisive, DASA is much more profitable than Aérospatiale-
Matra…..Moreover, there was a political motivation to tie down DASA 
before it linked up with an American partner, leaving the French 
industry isolated”.344 Discrepancies among the two countries have often 
determined substantial delays, case in point being the TIGER combat 
helicopter programme, the contract of which was signed in 1989 but 
actual orders made in 1999, “the initial timetable was wrecked by the 
different basic needs of the French and German armies, linked to 
differences in military culture and strategy. Originally, Germany 
wanted an anti-tank helicopter, whereas France preferred a support 
protection version that would be geared toward air combat as well. 
Now there will be three version of the TIGER: one for Germany and 
two for France”.345  
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Germany is also a major contributor to OCCAR’ s working, the 
Organization placed on its territory, confirming again the willingness 
of the country to proactively participate in the European scenario as a 
leading nation, “German policy-makers see a compelling political 
imperative to give precedence to European procurement”.346 According 
to Sarotte, in deciding for the Future Large Aircraft (then A400M) 
Germany did evaluate the American aircraft option as politically 
unsuitable; instead, the French(A400M) and Ukranian options were 
both, even for different reasons, politically attractive.347 Nevertheless, 
more than one problem have plagued German cooperative agreements, 
the most important of which being financial, as in the case of the 
A400M were German parliamentary approval delayed of almost two 
years the development of the system: this reflects the contradiction 
between Germany’s European aspirations and internal reticence on 
military affairs. Given the huge and unrealistic amount of orders made 
for the aircraft(73) doubts arose about the hidden motivations behind 
Germany’s commitment which in any case fell down to 60 aircraft, just 
the necessary number to start the programme. 
3.5. 3 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the ‘80s and the early ‘90s have been 
characterized by deep and radical restructuring processes of 
procurement practices and defence industries structures. A particular 
emphasis then was put on liberalization within the defence sector and 
particularly on competition. Nevertheless, what English policymakers 
referred to was not pure competition but ‘value for money’, a practice  
that underlines the importance of efficiency “whilst competition allows 
the advantage of tangible price comparison determined by market 
forces and the ability to compare competing proposals for compliance, 
it can also sometimes drive unintended behaviours and consequences 
for both us and industry. These may include unrealistic timescales, an 
over optimistic assessment of risk and hence cost, and the potential loss 
of flexibility for timely insertions of technology in the future”.348 This is 
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so, according to UK analysts, because defence is not a perfect market 
condition; therefore procurement strategies should be tailored to 
underpin key sovereign capabilities and to provide long term 
efficiency. Quality impinges on the decision as well as price, and 
evidence shows that the lowest bids have not always been satisfying. 
As for contracts, awarding procedures started to be calibrated on the 
basis of fixed-price contracts rather than cost-plus ones: it was possible, 
then, to keep down costs and enhance competitions among tenderers. 
More to that, emphasis on “smart acquisition” rather than on 
‘procurement’ is intended in the UK as an approach aimed at 
‘acquiring capabilities’ rather than at meeting the requirements of the 
armed forces: this has permitted to concentrate more on the whole 
process of a system life-cycle rather than on the pure acquisition phase, 
and to advance Projects team-working with various abilities and 
experiences.349  
Competition, as a basic principle for contract awarding, has been since 
the ‘80s one of the main parameters of English defence procurement 
process:  pressures on defence cuts have appeared slightly before the 
end of the Cold War and soared especially because of the huge defence 
spending compared to poor economic performances. Also, early in 
those years the state owned defence company British Aerospace started 
to become privatized.350  Since the Levene reform in the Thatcher’s  
period, prime contractors were given more responsibility for the 
possible risk of failure and competition had to be considered as the 
main parameter guiding industrial choices; this led to a general 
privatization of the defence companies.  
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The acquisition process is not as centralized as in the case of France, 
where the Délégation Générale pour l’Armement(DGA) is responsible both 
for the procurement and the industrial policy through the participation 
of the state in defence companies. Some practices, though, seem similar 
for all powerful states as they respond to basic interests: in the past, 
and for maintaining the United Kingdom military might, defence 
industries have somehow been protected and supported and ‘national’ 
choices have been motivated by the economic return these would have 
brought about. This has been shown by huge defence budgets in 
comparison with those of the other countries. This phenomenon has 
determined, according to some pundits, huge economic distortions, 
“there is an influential body of literature which suggests that military 
expenditures has had a negative impact on economic growth by 
variously dampening investment, diverting scarce R&D resources and 
by infusing key economic sectors with a corporate culture ambivalent 
towards innovations and competition within civil markets”.351 
Notwithstanding that, the importance to keep a powerful defence base 
is paramount for the UK given the capability of this latter to 
significantly influence political matters, “many procurement projects 
and collaborative ventures can now be so large in scale and political 
importance that they have significant implications for foreign and 
security policy interests. The nature of the UK defence industrial base 
can also affect the UK’s ability to participate in and influence 
international collaboration now and in the future”.352 
A huge portion of defence procurement goes to national contractors 
meaning that even in a country which is so ‘competition-prone’,  
broader considerations hamper the decision for a sound procurement 
process. As some authors point out, “the government would strongly 
deny industrial policy considerations formed any part of defence 
procurement but there seems evidence that industrial/technological 
issues and lobbying from UK  defence interests influenced decisions”.353 
In the last years Britain industrial policy has slightly changed to permit 
foreign-owned companies to set up and operate within the territory. 
Instead of being a cession of sovereignty, this process makes part of a 
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newly-shaped strategy aimed at keeping technological might and jobs 
within the territory and diverting more profitable affairs into the 
United States provided that benefits, especially technological and 
economic, can be brought back, “the UK defence industry should 
therefore be defined in terms of where the technology is created, where 
the skills and the intellectual property reside, where jobs are created 
and sustained, and where the investment is made”.354 
 
Figure 6. MOD’s  top 10 direct suppliers in 2004/2005 showing location of 
corporate HQ Defence Industrial Strategy. Source: Defence White Paper, 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, by Command of 
her Majesty, December 2005 http:// www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F530ED6C-
F80C-4F24-8438-0B587CC4BF4D/0/def_industrial_strategy_wp_cm6697.pdf 
(see p. 291) 
 
Both France and the United Kingdom have strived and realized to be 
two big arms producers, but the strategies they have deployed to fulfil 
this aim are different: while France stresses the European link, it is 
possible to say that the United Kingdom emphasizes the transatlantic 
chain for historical and strategic considerations, even if it is 
participating in various European programmess, among which the 
A400M, the Meteor Missile and the Eurofighter. Therefore, the United 
Kingdom argues against protectionist measures towards the United 
States and for an open-market strategy among European states.  
Speaking of a European defence policy calls inevitably into question 
the relationship occurring between France and the United Kingdom 
since both countries are the most important European producers of 
weapon systems, “without intense Franco-British security cooperation 
and even integration, there is no possibility of developing either a 
credible CFSP or a viable ESDP…the biggest single stumbling block to 
both a CFSP and an ESDP has been the inability of Britain and France 
to agree on fundamentals”.355 On this point of view, their relations have 
been characterized by a willingness to cooperate but also by mutual 
diffidence, “sensible defence procurement between Britain and France 
means that those two proud and somewhat arrogant nations have to 
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concede political, technical and manufacturing grounds to one another 
and accept some form of loss of independence, concessions on foreign 
policy, intrusions in the shaping of industry, and last but not least the 
inevitable jobs casualties, a price that fewer and fewer politicians are 
prepared to pay”.356 Even if beneficial to both countries, cooperation 
assumes for them a different meaning. If engaging with France means 
to tie the hands of the most powerful and distrustful European state 
and take a lead on European defence developments, for France, 
according to Howorth, involving the UK in the European security and 
defence path means assuring a rare and intermittent engagement thus 
far.357 
The United Kingdom is geographically a European nation but its 
interests have often conflicting with those of its European partners for 
historical and strategic motivations. For these reasons the UK has 
always put a clear emphasis on its transatlantic dimension. Britain 
defence industry is the one better able to penetrate the American 
market both in terms of exports and in terms of participation in US-led 
project teams: the United Kingdom is the main US overseas supplier. 
From the US point of view, the relation with the United Kingdom has 
served the aim of controlling continental developments, searching to 
guarantee that the initiatives undertaken to reinforce a European 
defence might were strongly inserted within the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance. In this sense, the UK has searched to drive the 
interpretation of the Western European Union as the context within 
which to match up European and American relations so as to 
strengthen the Atlantic Alliance: this consideration reaffirms the UK’ s 
image as of a ‘bridge’ among Europe and the US. At a more careful 
glance, though, the ‘bridge’ metaphor reminds to a more subtle but 
reasoned strategy: this ‘in between position’ permits to maintain 
balance in Europe without loosing sovereignty and to rely on the 
special relationship to keep a powerful status amid reduced real power 
and influence. Therefore, while American collaboration does not offer 
the possibility to take a lead in defence production, European 
collaboration give the United Kingdom a paramount position, given its 
stance as one of the most powerful arms producers in the European 
landscape.358 
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Against this background, the political debate has put a lot of emphasis 
on a new and more European defence attitude of the United Kingdom: 
its participation within the main organizations devoted to defence 
positively contributed to the formation of a European stance, “…over 
the last years the UK has moved away from its traditional partnership 
with the US in defence procurement, preferring instead to develop and 
procure technology in partnership with its EU allies”.359 Its participation 
in European institutions and defence developments was perceived of 
the paramount importance in the new post-Cold War scenario: Mr Blair 
supports this argument by saying that “if we don’t get involved in 
European defence, it will happen without Britain. Then those people 
who really have an agenda to destroy NATO will have control of it”.360 
Therefore, even if not totally happy with the new organizations, the 
United Kingdom decided to participate in them, “when the EDA was 
first suggested in 2002, the UK government tried to head off the idea, 
producing a counter-proposal for a ‘capability agency’ which would 
have focussed purely on encouraging member states to increase their 
capabilities and providing value for money audits of member states’ 
spending”.361 Even if competition among European actors would have 
been strengthened the fear was to see a kind of fortress emerging and 
damaging relations with the US, “there are significant potential benefits 
to be gained from a better functioning European market, a more 
efficient supplier base, and better prioritisation of research and 
technology budgets in Europe, providing this can be implemented 
without damaging transatlantic co-operation”.362 This explains UK’ s 
opposition to EDA budgets that invited the criticism of other European 
states, especially of France, or the reluctance towards a Directive 
proposed by the Commission Green Paper on defence procurement.  
Also in the case of the United Kingdom, cooperation is almost 
envisioned at the intergovernmental level, “intergovernmental 
coordination represents the convergence point of pragmatism and 
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principles, two concerns that we are used generally to combine in our 
defence policy”.363 
3.5.4 Italy 
Italy’s position in the European defence landscape has been 
characterized by ambiguities: on the one hand the willingness to 
remain an important player, and on the other hand poor investments 
dedicated to defence expenditures and research and investments. The 
financial law of 2007 was welcome by the President of Aerospace 
Industries Systems and Defence Giorgio Zappa as a substantial 
improvement of the percentage conferred to defence spending to GDP. 
This was of the paramount importance, stated the President, because 
“not only we do not catch up with countries that remain stable such as 
Germany and Sweden, but we are detaching from growing countries 
such as France and the Great Britain that do even increase expenses on 
the security and defence field”.364 More in general, though, Italy is 
perceived as a country that has chosen to rely on foreign protection 
rather than to pay the efforts of a more self-reliant defence strategy: this 
has determined its low-profile stance compared to other European 
countries.  
Another ambiguous issue regards the willingness to deeply collaborate 
to the creation of a truly European defence and industrial base and also 
a  flirting relationship with the United States. Relations with the United 
States have been deepened both on the industrial and political point of 
view: as for this latter aspect, 2005 has seen the strengthening of the 
Globalization Talks, followed by the Declaration of Principles 
established in 2004 by the defence ministers of the two countries (Italy 
and the US). The aim of this bilateral partnership is to ease defence 
cooperation among the two countries. On the industrial point of view, 
one of the most relevant factors has been the choice of US 101 
helicopter, proposed jointly by Agusta Westland and Lockeed Martin 
as the Presidential helicopter. Also, under the last Berlusconi’s 
government Italy has deepened relation with the United Kingdom 
thanks to the creation of some joint-ventures between Finmeccanica 
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and British companies(AMS- Alenia Marconi Systems, Agusta 
Westland) and Italian acquisitions within the United Kingdom. As 
Andrea Tani points it out, the English choice for Italy as industrial 
partner has been determined by a careful ruling out of the other 
European alternatives: Italy was, therefore, the last option available and 
the less problematic one.365 According to the author, France would have 
been the natural beneficiary of English offers both for dimension and 
mission, but because of its superior technological might and the 
political repercussion that a likely act would have meant, it was safer to 
pass the ball to another actor. Tensions with Germany, especially on 
industrial matters, have pushed this latter towards industrial 
cooperation with France so that the last option available, albeit inferior, 
remained Italy.  
As one expert on defence issues asserts, the Italian demand policy is 
fundamentally ‘reactive’, spurred more by the armed force and 
industrial pressures than by a precise and basic framework for action, 
an approach this one different from the English or the French ones 
were an active policy of exportation and R&D promotion has been 
undertaken.366 Instead, the armament policy would be of the paramount 
importance to strengthen Italy’s position and influence in cooperative 
contexts and to determine operational requirements harmonization, 
procurement rules standardization, arms exports regulations and 
markets openness.367  
The Italian approach towards European cooperation appears uncertain, 
“Rome lack of national capabilities makes the European option 
desirable, independent of its merit. Italy has favoured multilateral 
solutions since 1949. But whereas in the European Community Italy 
soon gained the confidence to promote integration, convincing itself 
that the national and the ‘communautaire’ were synonymous, in the 
area of defence it has had very little choice”.368 
On the industrial standpoint, some relevant steps forward have been 
undertaken in particular with the consolidation of Finmeccanica, which 
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has permitted to deal almost on an equal footing with the major 
transatlantic and European partners. Improvements on the 
technological sector have been determined in particular thanks to huge 
production licences contracts; of course this capability falls short of 
those of the other European states. As Burkard Schmitt puts it, Italy’s 
profile as a smaller European partner makes it opt for joint ventures 
rather than real European alliances, “as one of the smaller players, 
Finmeccanica could never become an equal partner in a global alliance 
with EADS or BAe Systems. Only partnerships limited to specific 
sectors allow real co-decision. Finmeccanica therefore prefers to 
integrate its subsidiaries into bilateral 50:50 joint ventures; if this is not 
possible, the group tries to participate in multilateral joint ventures 
where a minor shareholder can still benefit from varying majorities”.369 
Italy is both a member of OCCAR and LoI, and this of course is 
important for its position within the overall defence landscape both on 
the demand and supply side of defence procurement. In both cases, 
though, ratifications of the agreements have been characterized by 
huge parliamentary debates: Italy was in fact the last partner to ratify 
them (2001-2003). Participation in international cooperation structures 
is paramount to be engaged in the most relevant projects and to 
monitor other developments; Italy’s engagement in international forum 
is deemed as unsatisfying, “I believe that often we attempt at putting 
emphasis on the national requirement…I am firmly convinced that 
Italy has a fundamental requirement identical to that of the English, the 
Germans, the French and the Spanish and that mental reticence and the 
excuse of the peculiarities of the requirements create a resistance to a 
process change”.370 Also, Italy’s has posed some problems to the 
development of European cooperative projects: as in the cases of the 
Eurofighter or of the FREMM Frigates, the lack of a defined financial 
commitment has postponed and delayed the programmes, confirming 
a sometimes lukewarm contribution to a European defence might. 
3.5.5 Other states’ capabilities: general overview 
Aside from the big leaders in the European landscape it is possible to 
find other states which do not have a big defence industry, but which 
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have niche productions, meaning that they are specialized in the 
production of a particular but fundamental component or key 
technology: Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Switzerland. For these reasons these states do not dispose 
of prime contractors but of  subcontractors which are fundamental both 
in the United States and in Europe, “…it is a fact that most US weapons 
systems and subsystems today are dependent on offshore producers 
for numerous critical components”.371 These states import the most of 
their defence equipments or build it under licenses.  
Small states without relevant defence capabilities rely, in general, on 
the United States as a way to counter a potential hegemony by 
European states: for this reason it will be particularly difficult to 
encompass these states in a Europe-led process of common 
procurement. Moreover, abandoning the traditional juste-retour 
principle would be deleterious for these states which cannot succeed in 
competing with other European states on an equal footing. Cooperating 
with America is also a way to win a share of the US market and 
improve the technological knowledge. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this third chapter was to present the regime on defence 
procurement existing within the European landscape. After having 
mentioned the principles driving this regime, such as the value of 
standardization and harmonization and the value of a European 
independent defence might to face world challenges, derived norms 
have been pointed out. As for rules and decision-making procedures, 
the elements that specify the principles and the norms of a regime, a 
careful attention should be paid to international organizations since 
these latter are the entities more likely to provide and define 
determined practices. 
Before considering the regime, emphasis has been put on the fact that 
since their creation the European internal market procedures have seen 
the exclusion of defence items under article 223(now Article 296), 
recognizing the sensitiveness of the issue area for states’ national 
interests. This has stemmed any successful attempt at fostering a more 
competitive market in this sector. Notwithstanding that, the European 
Commission has attempted to render more transparent the defence 
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market among European states and to limit the misuse and abuse of 
Article 296, so as to improve the European defence and its industrial 
base. Its Green Paper on Defence procurement has opened up a debate 
to favour competition among European states. POLARM and EDA 
stand as other important achievements. Nevertheless, the shortfalls of 
these arrangements, inserted within the institutional context of the 
European Union, are their broad membership and their stumbling 
decision-making procedures which render almost impossible every 
step forward. 
Outside of the European Union, WEAG has searched to harmonize 
states’ requirements by pooling countries to discuss possible initiatives; 
this process fell short of success. LoI and OCCAR do represent the 
demand and supply side of defence procurement and do exhibit some 
promising provisions: nevertheless, their working base is quite 
restricted as only the most important defence producers participate as 
members in the Organizations. As seen in the first chapter, the initiative 
of powerful states is paramount to bring about concrete achievements: 
therefore a quick outlook of the four leading nations and their related 
strategic options has been attempted in this chapter. 
France, together with the United Kingdom, is the most important 
European defence producer. It has always put an emphasis on 
technological research and development as a source of power; its 
power position has made it the main promoter of European initiatives 
with a view to lead them and to make up for national shortfalls. Given 
the huge economic challenges it has to face, France is much more prone 
to cooperation today but prefers European cooperative projects where 
it can preserve a leader position. Inevitably, relations with the United 
States have been tense on some cases; on other, instead, fruitful 
cooperation has been searched and reached to the benefit of both 
countries. The United Kingdom ‘European-move’, as someone has 
called it, should be interpreted through the lenses of its special 
relationship with the United States: assuming a leading role in 
European defence creation has assured the consideration of the Atlantic 
Ally’ s exigencies. The UK’s emphasis on ‘value for money’ and smart 
procurement has paved the way for a more efficient and reasoned 
acquisition process: as a powerful state, it has protected the national 
industry and favoured national interests but its pressure on 
competitiveness has had deep impact also on other countries’ 
procedures. Germany’s reunification and improved position has 
permitted to enhance its role as contributor to European defence. By 
converse, Europeanization and integration as processes are likely to 
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increase Germany’s power position and play down internal reticence to 
military affairs. Italy’s defence stance has been fundamentally shaped 
by continuous ambiguities and uncertainties towards a European 
security and defence path: its flirting relations with the United States 
and with the United Kingdom, together with its feeble and indecisive 
stance in European collaborative projects, have arisen more than one 
doubt on its reliability as fundamental and trustworthy partner. 
Notwithstanding divergent interests, different relations and different 
strategic opportunities, all the four outstanding European defence 
producers have opted for OCCAR (Organization Conjointe de Coopération 
en Matière d’Armement) as multinational agency for the management of 
cooperative European project, deciding to coordinate their actions on 
the procurement of some complex European programmes, a decision 
this latter that will be investigated in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
States’ coordination in 
defence procurement: the 
case of OCCAR 
(Organisation Conjointe de 
Coopération en Matière 
d’Armement) 
4.1 Introduction 
Why do European States coordinate their actions in defence 
procurement? Answering this question by saying that this is the most 
efficient way to build complex weapon systems hides a series of other 
deeper motivations that go well beyond pure economic reasons. Of 
course, these latter are of the paramount importance given today’s 
reduced budgets for defence faced by all European States. 
Nevertheless, if we jump one step further and try to answer the 
questions “so why is the production of these weapon systems 
paramount?” or “what do we need these weapons for?” it is clear that a 
pure economic answer is at best incomplete. Is coordination in defence  
procurement a cause or an effect of broader processes? If we answer the 
first question posed it is apparently an effect of reduced defence 
budgets, while if we answer the other two it becomes the tool to 
achieve national or European interests. What is important to stress, 
though, is that a field of investigation such as this one that has to do 
with the production of military equipments, either for protective or for 
destructive reasons, cannot but remind to the security of a state, 
interpreted this one more broadly than simple survival. 
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During the time, different attempts have been made by European 
states, and especially allies, to cooperate in defence matters but with 
scarce results: because of the peculiarity of ‘defence procurement’, 
intended this one as the acquisition and management of weapon 
systems, states have difficultly found agreements on the arrangements 
to be achieved through cooperation. Multiple reasons can explain this 
fact: the fear of loosing political control over a programme, the fear of 
loosing jobs related to defence industries; the fear of loosing relative 
competitiveness in industrial production or technological capabilities; 
the fear of seeing the national operational requirements adapted to 
other states’ exigencies. Of course, all the aforementioned risks have 
had different impacts on states according to the relations entertained 
with other actors and especially with the Atlantic Ally and to their 
power capabilities, that in this case become ‘defence capabilities’: even 
if not always able to pursue unilateral paths, more powerful states are 
those more likely to advance and achieve their interests in cooperative 
settings. This happens because without them cooperation is not likely 
to come about or is simply pointless. Instead, less powerful states have 
basically had two alternatives: either to cooperate and being somehow 
overshadowed by more powerful states, or to buy equipments off-the-
shelf, especially from the transatlantic ally. 
As said before, powerful states are not always able to procure by 
themselves the equipments needed: weapon systems are now more 
expensive, defence budgets more inadequate and international threats 
more arduous. In particular, this latter reason seems to answer better 
the two questions posed above, because it addresses directly the 
importance of procuring weapons in cooperation. Therefore, to 
understand why states coordinate their actions in defence procurement 
it is necessary to take into account two elements: first the 
aforementioned pressures rendering unilateral path not impossible but 
apparently onerous and second the possibility to achieve own interests 
trough cooperation. Against this background, it is more likely that 
coordination takes place among similarly powerful states that can get 
effective returns from cooperation and that can make count their 
bargaining power on an equal footing. A similar coordination path is 
both an achievement and a limitation: on the one hand it is the most 
likely configuration attainable among actors. On the other hand, once 
states decide to coordinate and therefore to limit and be limited by 
other states’ positions, a never-ending process of compromises and 
negotiations start to push the agreement towards the most wanted 
outcome. 
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All these considerations apply to OCCAR (Organization Conjointe de 
Coopération en Matière d’Armement), an International Organization for 
the management of weapon systems in cooperation created by the will 
of the four most powerful producers and consumers of defence systems 
in the European context: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Italy. Assisting the stalemates present at the European level regarding 
the formulation of a common defence strategy and common defence 
structures, and pressured by the new challenges emerged, these states 
agreed to create an organization dedicated to the procurement of 
weapon systems in cooperation with own rules, regulations, values and 
procedures. The first aim of this chapter will be therefore to investigate 
the path toward the creation of this Agency, the features of the 
arrangements agreed upon and the standard procurement procedure 
adopted by  states. 
While analysing all these steps, the chapter will highlight the 
controversies arisen among states, the different interests pursued 
through the same organization and the limits these factors have caused 
on the overall organization functioning and aspirations. In particular, a 
short history of the programmes integrated in OCCAR will be provided 
with the aim of emphasizing both the delays and the added costs 
determined by states’ reluctance to give in on individual positions and 
the compromises decided in order to carry forward the programmes. 
For the economic, industrial and strategic relevance of the Aircraft 
A400M a separate analysis of this programme will be brought about. 
The aim, again, is to underline the difficulty of coordination in defence 
issues but the necessity to do so: OCCAR does represent only one 
coordination point, even if a relevant one. The intergovernmental 
character of the organization requires coordination whenever a new 
decision has to be undertaken; nevertheless, without this peculiarity 
the agency would probably have not been created at all. 
4.2 Towards OCCAR 
The first section of this research is aimed at considering the steps that 
led to OCCAR’ s creation. It will be underlined how some European 
states, pressured by economic, industrial and strategic constraints, 
decided to coordinate their actions in what can be considered the basic 
and preliminary step toward a common defence: a common weapon 
procurement system. Differently from past experiences, the states that 
founded OCCAR decided not to rely on ad hoc agencies but instead 
envisioned an institutionalized pattern of cooperation trough which to 
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achieve efficient performances and pave the way for a common defence 
posture. In fact, the idea of working together, accepting the same 
procurement procedures and adhering to the same values, principles, 
regulations and decision-making procedures was intended to help 
mitigate differences in weapon requirements definition and increase 
therefore interoperability among their Armed Forces. 
It was during the ‘90s that European States started to play more 
strongly the European card in defence matters and to delineate the 
features of a common posture: “the European Defence implies the 
definition of common interests, the setting of a common research and 
development, investment and procurement policies”.372 Early in the 
‘90s, in an attachment to the Maastricht Treaty, states pertaining to the 
Western European Union (WEU) manifested their interest in creating a 
European Armament Agency. Nevertheless the sluggish process 
toward the creation of such an agency underlined the different 
positions that existed among European actors, “Europe’s slow progress 
on improving joint procurement is not for want of ideas. Numerous 
reform proposals have been suggested, including the creation of a 
fully-fledged European Armaments Agency. A declaration attached to 
the EU’ s 1991 Maastricht Treaty is calling for the creation of such a 
European Armaments Agency. More than a decade later it still does not 
exist”.373  
While France and Germany have always backed a structure similar to 
the one envisioned in the Maastricht Treaty other states, for different 
motivations, have downplayed this initiative: the smallest ones for fear 
of becoming hostages of the most powerful actors and of finding their 
defence policy moulded according to other states’ interests; the  biggest 
ones for their willingness to shape in a precise way the structure of the 
Armament Agency in order to fulfil their strategic interests.  
The years between 1996 and 2001 have been particularly meaningful for 
the creation of a European defence might because of outstanding 
pressures arising from different contexts. Immediate causes were the 
Gulf War and the Balkan conflicts but also the more ongoing 
perception that the world scenario was slowly but irremediably 
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changing, posing new challenges and requiring new tools to speed up 
the formation of a European approach toward defence matters. It is in 
this context that the Franco-British declaration of Saint-Malo in 1998 
came about, together with other important initiatives such as the 
European Summit in Cologne of 1999, the integration of the WEU(the 
long-standing European structure of defence) in the EU -with Javier 
Solana nominated as high representative of the Foreign and Security 
European Policy, the 22nd Franco-British Summit on November 1999, 
the 74th Franco-German Summit on 30th November 1999 and, in the 
same year, the European Council in Helsinki. This latter, with the Nice 
Summit in 2000, has highlighted the willingness of fifteen states to 
create a European Rapid Reaction Force to be composed of 60000 units 
and to be provided with a surveillance system, a force projection 
system as well as an interoperable system of command; the idea behind 
this was to create a truly European independent capability able to 
intervene and operate in out-of-area missions.  
All these Declarations drove to the conclusion that, in order to work 
together, states had to provide not only a common definition of 
interests but also a common definition of requirements- a more difficult 
outcome this one-, together with a common effort in research and 
development. Standardization of armaments, in fact, constituted the 
highest probability to concretize the objectives delineated in the 
European Councils. Given the difficulty of achieving such an outcome 
‘interoperability’, intended as the possibility of being able to work with 
similar equipments and structures, seemed a more likely option. 
Nevertheless, until the end of the ‘90s this blueprint fell short of the 
expectative, “defence implies common interests and orientations in 
terms of military equipment, research and development, investments 
but also of organization defining the framework of common 
defence…thus far all the endeavours made in order to find a common 
and minimal position that would underline the specificity of armament 
sector brought to no result”.374  
Every Declaration at the European level emphasized the difficulty of 
bringing about the desired outcomes, underlining the different 
positions and therefore the compromise decisions achieved. For 
example, aside from the positive results, Nice has been interpreted also 
as a Declaration reinforcing each state’s divergent position, “aside from 
multiple positive initiatives among which the definition of roles of the 
COPS or of the Military Committee a relevant political aspect has been 
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missed, the willingness to extend also to defence activities the criterion 
of reinforced cooperation. As it is known, reinforced cooperation 
permits to go ahead in the integration phase even when a unanimous 
will does not exist”.375 This statement underlines that even if states 
agreed in principle on coordinating their actions, the implementation of 
these latter seemed to be complicated by specific interests. 
4.3 OCCAR’ s creation 
Within this gloomy context, the consideration about the creation of a 
procurement agency encompassing all the most important European 
producers and consumers of defence was twofold: on the one hand the 
power base of the entire European defence might resided in the states 
composing OCCAR, and that meant that their coordination was 
paramount to achieve concrete results and foster the European Defence 
Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB). On the other hand, the 
limited membership emphasized the idea of a Europe at two speeds 
and of an ‘exclusive club’. Below a short history of OCCAR’ s creation 
is presented, outlining how this structure can be considered as a 
successful process of coordination among states, coordination that was 
characterized by divergent positions and compromise solutions, but 
that brought about tangible steps forward while satisfying states’ 
interests.  
OCCAR is a Multinational Organization for the management of 
armament programmes in cooperation, and was established by an 
Administrative Agreement in November 1996, by the French, 
Germany, Italian and English Ministries of Defence. The arrangement 
has been signed by the four states in 1998 in Farnborough and ratified 
later on. The same nations signed a Treaty, the OCCAR’ s Convention, 
which explains the vision, the mission but also the rules and decision-
making procedures agreed among them. With national ratifications on 
January 2001, OCCAR achieved a legal status and became an 
International Organization able to define and award contracts and to 
have its own staff.  
OCCAR’ s origins are to be found in a previously-established agency 
between France and Germany, operative starting from February 1996. 
Cooperation between France and Germany on armaments procurement 
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was not new: a series of ad hoc structures existed and remarked the two 
states long-term collaboration; among them were the bureau des 
programmes franco-allemands (BPFA), le Bureau technique des programmes 
(BTP), the Deutsch-Französisch Helicopter Büro (DFHB). France and 
Germany, eager to develop a joint armament structure, but aware of the 
persistent disagreement among them concerning the structure of the 
would be Organization, decided in 1993 to form a cooperative 
armament structure to promote various programmes, rationalize 
operative requisites and speed up the production and completion of 
just existent joint weapon systems. The guiding lines of this structure 
were set in the Franco-German Summit in Baden-Baden in December 
1995376 and afterwards inserted in the precursory team created in 1996 
and established in Bonn. The principles set by France and Germany in 
Baden-Baden are still OCCAR basic principles: cost-effectiveness, 
harmonization (of requirements, methods and technology), competitive 
industrial base, renunciation of the  juste retour principle and openness 
to other European countries.  
It is clear that what pushed France and Germany to foster a joint 
rationalization of defence procurement was the amount of military 
programmes they shared.377 The way to speed up their development, to 
face decreasing budgets for defence and to reinforce a European 
Industrial Base was to advance coordination among their needs and 
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their industrial capabilities, and to go over traditional forms of 
cooperation.  
French position on this matter was underlined by Minister Charles 
Millon, which emphasized in those years that “the national defence will 
be neither independent nor autonomous if it does not take into 
consideration the European dimension. It is apparent that today it is 
necessary to build European poles if one wants to face the American 
defence market. It is in this spirit that France…has proposed the 
constitution of a European Armament Agency”.378 As apparent from the 
Minister’s words, France’ s desire to advance the case for a European 
Armament Agency was spurred also by the willingness to compete on 
an equal footing with the overwhelming American defence market, so 
as to retain and improve European strategic independence.  
Of course, all four nations had apparent reasons to prop up OCCAR, 
nevertheless it was France that more visibly supported the organization 
and conferred to it a huge strategic and economic value. France 
participates in all but one programmes in OCCAR and pays the most 
substantial financial contribution to the organization. At the political 
level, France claims the importance of OCCAR for  the creation of a 
European defence, independent from the United States. Some experts 
argue that France has conceded a lot in order to bring about this 
organization specifically for the importance attached to the creation of 
this structure. For this reason, it is easy to understand why France 
deemed the British and Italian adherence of the paramount importance 
for the efficacy of the organization: the creation of it could have 
constituted the bulk of a European Agency that without the United 
Kingdom and Italy would have lacked most of its strength given that 
Italian naval sector and British technology and aerospace activities 
were paramount for an encompassing defence scenario. Probably, 
reluctance on the part of France to these states’ participation would 
have pushed them toward the US as it has often been the case with the 
United Kingdom and Italy. 
Germany’ s historic collaboration with France on economic and 
military matters together with the need to reaffirm its European stance 
has rendered the state the obvious partner of this enterprise. Once 
created, the agency attracted the attention of the remaining “big” 
European defence producers(the UK and Italy). These latter were 
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facing the same economic and industrial challenges of France and 
Germany, but had different strategic postures and exigencies. Their 
jump up into the wagon meant that they agreed to participate in a 
structure with previously defined principles. Nevertheless, their stance 
and their potential contribution to a European Defence might conferred 
them, and especially the United Kingdom, a certain leverage in the 
moulding of the organization procedures and development. According 
to the United Kingdom and Italy, it was necessary to participate in the 
organization both because of the necessity to improve a European 
Defence Capability and also because of the importance of being within 
such a structure to control its development.379 In fact, France and 
Germany would have created the agency with or without other states’ 
participation, “the two governments stated that they could not afford to 
wait for all thirteen WEAG member countries to reach agreement and 
argued that progress on common procurement systems could best be 
achieved through a bilateral structure open to others who agreed to 
adhere to its policies on eliminating juste retour and European 
preference”.380  
Staring from this consideration is important to understand why 
cooperation between the two most powerful European continental 
states has attracted the attention of Italy and the United Kingdom in 
what was perceived as an institutionalized defence cooperation. The 
potentialities of the organization assessed, all of the four most 
important arms producers and consumers in the European context 
gave birth to this management structure, emphasizing the importance 
of coordinated action to a successful European defence stance “in the 
process of growing European integration even in the defence field, 
OCCAR represents a successful example of collaboration among states 
started in 1996 with the push of France, Germany, Italy and Great 
Britain defence Ministers…”.381  
One of the most interesting issues to investigate is the United 
Kingdom’ s adherence in a structure that strongly emphasized its 
European stance. As said before, France showed interest in the 
participation of the United Kingdom and Italy, even if the Minister of 
                                                           
379 Security coordination among states has among its paramount objectives that 
of controlling the actions of the partners. This has characterized all cooperative 
armaments  structures. 
380 Keith Hayward, “Towards a European Weapons Procurement Process”, 
Chaillot Paper 27, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1997, p. 27. 
381 OCCAR-EA “Frequently Asked Questions”, OCCAR-EA Institutional 
Aspects,  http://www.occar-ea.org / view.php?nid=141 . 
 162 
Defence Millon stated that the Franco-German agency was not the one 
proposed at the beginning from France.382 The adherence to the 
organization first and the declarations made afterwards, such as at St. 
Malo followed a consistent English policy, aimed at controlling and 
therefore participating in European initiatives together with a desire to 
pursue a double-track path on defence matters. Of course, the UK was 
able to exploit its power in this issue-area by being one of the most 
important producers of European defence systems and by making 
count its relation with the United States: inevitably linked to its 
transatlantic ally it was able to downplay the potential critics aimed at 
representing OCCAR as a contributor to the “fortress Europe” 
argument. Also, because of its power, the United Kingdom knew that 
by participating it would have been able to mould the structure of the 
Organization, “they want OCCAR to get on with proving its 
competence in its core tasks, and establishing its credibility, before it is 
transformed into something more powerful”.383  
In the discussions arisen within the English defence context, and 
regarding the adherence to the Franco-German structure, it was 
emphasized that in the case of a British engagement in the 
Organization, precise and detailed management procedures for 
cooperative programmes would have to be defined before any 
commitment, and that the United Kingdom would have not 
relinquished its control and monitor benchmarks.384 Among other 
questions arisen about the way in which the MoD would have 
guaranteed the commercial interests of the British defence equipment 
industry in the trilateral Organization (France-Germany-United 
Kingdom), were those related to the number of personnel coming from 
the European Commission, the WEU, the French Government and 
armed forces, the German Government and armed forces and NATO, 
the number of the British Procurement Executive personnel to be 
transferred in Bonn and the sharing of the agency budget among the 
three states, the EU, the WEU and NATO in the first year of existence.  
                                                           
382 Charles Millon, “Séance du 23 Octobre 1996, Débat sur une Déclaration du 
Gouvernement », Sénat Français, Octobre 23, 1996, http://www.senat.fr / 
seances /s199610/s19961023 / sc19961023015.html .  
383 Daniel Keohane, 2002, p. 31. 
384 The United Kingdom Parliament, “Franco-German Armaments Agency”, 
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for March 7, 1996. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk /pa / cm199596/ cmhansrd/ 
vo960307/index/60307-x.htm.   
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The National Audit Office reports proposed five performance 
indicators regarding programme time, programme costs, equipment 
performances, administrative efficiency and administrative overhead. 
Of these five the first three measures were set in OCCAR. The United 
Kingdom’s role in OCCAR matters had to be a very proactive one in 
accordance with English cooperation practices; in fact, as stated in a 
report for the Ministry of Defence, the United Kingdom should have a 
sound assessment of risks and benefits from cooperation and should 
play an important role in its development, “the Department should pay 
particular attention to these success factors in deciding whether to co-
operate and, if co-operation does take place, what form the co-
operation should take”.385  
The United Kingdom’s decision to join the Franco-German agency 
came about with a look at France’ s new approach toward defence 
procurement, aimed at both emphasizing the European vision and at 
facing its declining defence budget. During the ‘90s France carried out 
a process of privatisation of its industries and in particular of the GIAT 
(Groupement  Industriel des Armaments Terrestres), opening up the 
possibility for this to be controlled by foreign groups. The United 
Kingdom’ s adherence to the agency was concretized with its 
participation to the construction of an armoured vehicle (the future 
BOXER, see below), “discussions with France and Germany on 
participation in the Franco-German Armaments Agency will 
commence following completion of work on the tender documents for 
the armoured utility vehicle”.386 Given the challenges the French 
                                                           
385 Committee on Public Accounts, “Maximising the Benefits of Defence 
Equipment Cooperation”, Seventeenth Report, The United Kingdom Parliament, 
March, 2001, http://www.publications.parliament.uk /pa/ cm200001/ 
cmselect/cmpubacc/393/1032801.htm. The lessons to be taken from past 
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defence industry was facing and given the Baden-Baden principles, 
British industries could have resulted more competitive and efficient 
and easily win a contract once that juste-retour was discarded.387  
The United Kingdom pushed strongly the case for ‘competition’ within 
OCCAR and obtained that the organization established management 
procedures and especially work through ‘project teams’ according to 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition.388 That said, it is fair to underline that when 
competition is proposed by one of the biggest producers of defence 
systems this practically means that its big and advanced industry 
permits to share a huge comparative advantage over other states. This 
indicates that hidden in the UK’ s support for competitive awarding of 
contracts was the awareness of its huge industrial potentiality. 
Notwithstanding the role the UK had in OCCAR constitution, its 
participation in the organization programmes is limited to three of 
them: COBRA, A400M and PAAMS (managed by OCCAR only for the 
munitions procurement). This latter programme integration, as well as 
the A400M one, mirrors the United Kingdom’s powerful and in some 
cases decisive stance in taking forward cooperation within OCCAR, a 
point that will be explained later on when discussing the single 
programmes. 
Italy’s ratification of OCCAR’ s Convention was the latest one and 
came about without prolonged parliamentary debates with almost 
unanimous consensus, so as to underline the importance of 
participating in such a structure, especially after the UK’ s adherence. 
At a careful look, it can be said that the ratification of the Convention 
was an important step and a turning-point in Italy’s parliamentary 
debates of those years: only one year before in fact, hot issues within 
                                                           
387 Séance du 19 Juin 1996, “Programmation militaire pour les années 1997-
2002”, Discussion d’un projet de loi déclaré d’urgénce, Senat François, 1996, 
http://www.senat.fr /seances /s199606 /s19960619 /sc19960619018.html 
.During this debate strong oppositions against the privatization of the defence 
industries have been emphasized by the whole political spectrum, with an 
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388 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview,  Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 27, 2007a.  
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the Defence Commission emphasized the reasons for industrial 
compensation related to armaments contracts.  
Italy made clear that it intended to participate in OCCAR on an equal 
footing with the other states and maintained that national prerogatives 
would not have been lost after its adherence to the organization, 
“political control is always on the forefront in OCCAR’ s activities and 
Italy’s participation will be absolutely on an equal basis with that of the 
other countries”.389 According to Italian personnel in the precursory 
team, Italy’s participation in the initial stages of cooperation was huge 
and its staff was charged with paramount and prestigious institutional 
positions, confirmed later on by the nominee of  General Nazzareno 
Cardinali as Director of the Executive Administration. Moreover, under 
the Italian Presidency, Italy solved actively the mandate question 
(definition of Programme Decision arrangements) where different 
opinions existed among France and Germany, and that of the 
‘reporting’ part embodied in the Business Plan. 390  
While it is simple to understand why OCCAR has been created just by 
these actors of the European scenario it is difficult to assess whether all 
states’ were motivated by the same interests or whether OCCAR was a 
common tool through which to achieve or preserve other interests. The 
most reasonable position is in between: it is fair to say that these states 
had both common and divergent interests but that the common interest 
did not impinge or was even preliminary to the pursuit of particular 
national interests. According to General Cardinali there were of course 
common interests among the founding members that together with 
Sweden(which participates in the LoI framework) are major producers 
                                                           
389 Gianni Rivera, Former Defence Under-Secretary «Ratifica Convenzione 
Italia-Francia-Germania-Gran Bretagna-Irlanda del Nord sull’istituzione 
dell’Organizzazione congiunta per la cooperazione in materia di armamenti 
(OCCAR)», 3rd Committee, Foreign and European Affairs, Italian Senate, 
September 28, 2000. For an insight of the political debate about industrial 
compensation in Italy see Carlo Sconamiglio Pasini, Former Minister of 
Defence, “Audizione del Ministro della difesa Carlo Sconamiglio Pasini, sulle 
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390 Colonel Antonio Padula, Interview, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome, 
December 5, 2007. The first Director was a French one, while the headquarter of 
OCCAR-EA was based in Bonn. Klaus Von Sperber, German, was the second 
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and consumers of defence products.391 Common interests that, as shown 
below, were based on strategic and economic reasons. The fact that all 
these states experienced the same pressures at the same time pushed 
them together to coordinate their action and to converge on basic 
agreements. The same position is expressed by Colonel Antonio 
Padula, which participated in the precursory team and which affirms 
that all four nations intended OCCAR as a shared European project of 
the paramount importance, and adds that OCCAR came about as an 
incredible and without precedent amalgamation of different cultural 
approaches.392  
It is reasonable to emphasize, though, that the Founding Members had 
specific priorities to take forward; while common interests did exist, the 
creation of the organization in the first hand was possible because each 
state was able to preserve its political control over it. This Organization  
is therefore both an incredible achievement on the defence 
procurement sector but also the reflection of power positions within the 
European defence scenario. All four founding states preserve a de facto 
veto position on most important decisions and make their weight count 
in every cooperative setting. In fact, what makes OCCAR of the utmost 
interest as a study subject is that aside from the balanced and almost 
equal power of the states in the basic structure, coordination ‘struggles’ 
can be found  for every programme it is integrated within OCCAR and 
in every step the Organization aims at undertaking. As it will be seen 
later on when summing up the history and peculiarities of each 
programme, states agree to cooperate but differ significantly in the final 
result of cooperative arrangements. Divergent positions persist  even at 
the very last stage of the weapon life, underlining that states continue 
to advance their preferred but divergent positions.  
4.4 How the four nations reached the coordination point 
The creation of OCCAR was aimed at eliminating the duplication and 
fragmentation of national procurement processes by building a single 
permanent structure able to supervise the acquisition and management 
of weapon systems for European States. Usually, cooperative 
programmes were handled through ad hoc and expensive agencies 
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392 Colonel Antonio Padula, Interview, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome, 
December 5, 2007.   
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created every time a new programme had to be managed in 
cooperation. Instead, OCCAR’ s objective was to create a set of rules 
and procedures fit and applicable for every new programme, able to 
reduce in this way administrative and negotiation costs and to favour 
economies of scale, “as far as market exploration, development and 
testing are concerned, the fixed costs in an OCCAR programme are 
divided among the participating countries. In other words, economy of 
scale intrinsically leads to cost savings per produced unit and therefore 
to a more attractive quality-to price ratio”.393  
Cooperation among states meant to optimise procurement activities 
through the lessons learned from past experiences, given that all four 
countries had cooperated with each other in the past on some defence 
programme.394 In particular, lessons learned from traditional 
cooperation highlighted that the application of juste retour could not 
bring about the rationalization required to face plummeting budgets 
and could not strengthen a common European Industrial Base. Also, 
previous lessons taught that, most of the times, there was not a clear 
decisional authority on programme conduction; that personnel was not 
selected on competitive basis; that cooperation in a programme was a 
way to improve the national industry capabilities; that different 
national cooperation and procurement procedures did hamper and 
render burdensome coordination efforts.395 
More in general, and as affirmed in the organization official 
documents, the reasons determining the birth of OCCAR are believed 
to be the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attack to the twin 
towers in September 2001: while the first fact did require a deep re-
thinking of European position in the world chessboard as well as a 
considerable reduction in military expenditures by all nation states, the 
second event demanded for a snapshot answer, and made evident the 
necessity of working together following a unique European strategy 
through interoperable armaments.396 In fact, it is in the ‘90s that the 
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394 Colonel Antonio Padula, Interview, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome, 
December 5, 2007.  
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most important achievements in terms of a European defence policy 
have been brought about: OCCAR, LoI, ECAP (European Capability 
Action Plan) and WEAO (Western European Armaments Organization) 
were instruments aimed at promoting a thorough cooperation among 
European states on defence matters and were perceived by the Member 
States as structures within which to find and forge their position in the 
fluid international context. 
OCCAR’S Convention presents a mingle of economic and strategic 
blueprints that can be considered the common original motivations 
behind the Organization’s build-up: the economic aim asked for an 
increase in transnational cooperation with a view to improve efficiency 
and reduce life-cycle costs through optimised management tools, 
through incentives for the creation of prime contractors and through 
the achievement of more effectiveness in contract awarding. According 
to this aim, OCCAR has been thought as a management structure likely 
to foster competitiveness and face declining budgets for defence, 
“France expects that closer European defence ties, stronger industrial 
partnerships and combined procurement initiatives will boost military 
procurement spending efficiency”.397 Aside from that, was the idea that 
the promotion of competitiveness would have created poles of 
excellence reinforcing an autonomous European Defence and Industrial 
Base, “the principal motivations are basically two: the first is an 
economic one and is linked  to the need to rationalize defence industry, 
the second is strategic and regards the consolidation of the American 
predominance from an economic and security point of view (security of 
supply): the necessity is that of being independent from America and 
carry forward independent defence plans”.398  
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398 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview, Bad 
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order to be able to compete on a sounder basis with the United States. The 
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Strategically, OCCAR aimed at coordinating long-term requirements 
and technology investment programmes through complementarities 
(following the global balance principle), reciprocity and balance in order 
to foster a European security and defence identity, “the Organization 
points at downplaying a national exclusivity on defence issues to reach 
a division of the role among European states”.399 The idea was that 
OCCAR could have paved the way for a thorough defence cooperation 
among European States by mitigating the hardest national 
discrepancies related to armament procurement, “OCCAR is a first step 
towards the elaboration d’une Europe de l’armement. Its 
creation…permits the constitution of a European armament market, by 
harmonizing operative requirements and by fostering interoperability 
of military materials, by reducing national costs thanks to international 
cooperation and to the integration of the planning-production and 
acquisition processes, by coordinating research and technology 
policies…Cooperation enhances the formation of a European defence 
identity”.400 In the words of the previous OCCAR Director  Klaus von 
Sperber “it is a defined objective for OCCAR to be a major player in the 
development of a European armament acquisition capability”.401  
                                                                                                                               
Director added that of course the United States would prefer to be the leader on 
defence matters and control defence development but the strong imbalance 
existing on this issue should be imputed to the same European states and the 
dynamics arising within them.  
399 Senator Aventino Frau, « Ratifica Convenzione Italia-Francia-Germania-Gran 
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cooperazione in materia di armamenti OCCAR », 3rd Committee, Foreign and 
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l’approbation de la convention entre le Gouvernement de la République 
Française, Le gouvernement de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne, le 
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http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr /11/ pdf/rapports/r2025.pdf See also 
OCCAR, “Convention on the Establishment of the Organization for Joint 
Armament Cooperation” , Baseline Documents, September 9, 1998, 
http://www.occar-ea.org /media /raw/ OCCAR_Convention.pdf . 
401 Klaus von Sperber, “Foreword”, OCCAR-EA Business Plan 2004, Bad 
Godesberg Bonn, 2003, p. 3, http:// www.occar-ea.org/ media/raw/ 
BP_2004_issue01.pdf . 
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As just mentioned, one of the principles motivating and guiding 
OCCAR’ s initial functions was to improve the competitiveness of the 
European Defence Industrial and Technological Base and to contribute 
to the creation of a European identity in the security and defence 
field.402 An article of the Convention supporting this argument states 
that “to comply with defence and security requirements, or to improve 
the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base, competitive tendering and the award of contracts, and 
especially contracts for armament-related research and technology 
activities, may be limited to companies, institutes, agencies or 
appropriate institutions under the jurisdiction of a member State 
participating in the programme concerned”.403  This Article, therefore, 
emphasizes how important was the objective of building up a 
European Defence Base and the way in which OCCAR could have 
contributed to this fulfilment. Also, the Article highlights the 
importance of the preservation of states’ room of manoeuvre in defence 
issues. Both these objectives mirror the two contrasting  and omni-
present aims characterizing defence matters: national prerogatives and 
European ones. In the same vein, the “European preference” statement 
presented in the Convention can be interpreted accordingly: strongly 
propped up by France, the ‘European preference’ argument embodied 
in OCCAR’ s principles matches with the attempt at supporting a 
European Industrial Base but also with the attempt by France at 
leading and forging the ‘Europe of Defence’ creation exploiting its 
strong efforts and engagement in that objective and its military might. 
It is clear that the UK did not see the ‘European preference’ argument 
as paramount as France did; this was one of that peculiar interests that 
pertained to some but not all states, a by-product of the more general 
objective of enhancing a common European defence pole. For the 
United Kingdom, the realization of the latter design could have been 
achieved without a clear-cut preference for European equipments. 
While its participation in OCCAR means also the acceptance of the 
‘European Preference’ principle, its restricted involvement in the 
organization makes up for the divergent interests. Because of its 
history, its geography and of course its interests the UK has always 
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searched to be part of those European arrangements that did not 
require a cession of sovereignty-sometimes even pushed by the United 
States-, both to pursue its continental concerns and to try to control and 
forge the arrangements development. In the case of OCCAR, 
improving economic performances and avoiding that Germany and 
France could determine the rules of cooperative procurement were 
among the principal aims motivating the United Kingdom’ s 
participation. 
Therefore, aside from its pure management functions, the organization 
would have contributed significantly to an overall cooperation among 
European states: the efficiencies it could have invited would have been 
spread out to the Second Pillar, sustaining the European Union 
building through a bottom-up process, “to develop, manage 
programmes in cooperation to improve efficiency as for performances, 
costs and delivery-schedule, to guarantee interoperability among 
armed forces and to contribute to the formation of an European 
identity in the security and defence realm”.404  
For France, OCCAR was the appropriate European frame where to 
cooperate for building  l’ Europe de l’ Armement, emphasizing that 
“France’s armament policy goes in a absolute European dimension”.405 
For Italy, OCCAR was aimed at reducing costs for procurement while 
improving efficiency, at improving the competitiveness of the 
European technological and industrial base, at creating a European 
identity and at progressively coordinating procurement policies within 
the context of the European Common Security Policy.406 For Director 
General Cardinali “OCCAR wants to be a major actor in European 
demand-side reform in support of the European Defence and Security 
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Policy, able to play an agile and timely role in the delivery of military 
capability”.407  
Some authors underline that OCCAR’ s contribution to the tailoring of 
a European defence is visible in some of the programme it manages 
such as the A400M military transport aircraft, FSAF(Surface-to Air 
Anti-Missile Systems), BOXER(Multi Role Armoured Vehicle) and 
which are apparently thought for new European missions, “these 
Programmes will contribute in a significant way to improve projection 
and protection capability of European forces in the whole Petersberg 
Missions spectrum”.408  
Summing up, according to the Founding Members, OCCAR was 
envisioned as a practical step towards a European Armament Agency 
because the major European armament producers and consumers had 
an advantage in coordinating their actions, “OCCAR-EA was created in 
1998 by  a group of four like-minded Nations, sharing a commitment to 
improve on past collaborative experiences, and each involved in a 
substantive collaboration project, which they were prepared to pass to 
OCCAR management. At that time no other nations were in quite the 
same position”.409 As said before, in fact, European states had very 
different industrial structures and any attempt at promoting 
cooperation in the WEAG context was blocked by the fear of less 
powerful states of seeing defence issues driven by stronger ones. The 
group of nations was too heterogeneous to foster a common vision or at 
least to open the way for some kind of compromise or reciprocity 
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clauses, compensation and offsets arrangements. The four states 
shared, even if in different degrees, some mutually undesirable 
outcomes: non-interoperable weapon systems, costly procurement 
programmes, fragmented markets and industries and low capabilities 
with respect to the United States. Coordination was therefore necessary 
to eschew the likelihood of these events to occur or persist. 
4.5 OCCAR ’ s principles, mission and values 
As every International Organization, OCCAR has its own mission, 
values and strategic aims agreed upon by Member States. The objective 
of this section is to briefly present them so as to analyse the 
benchmarks leading its functions. As it will be seen, these yardsticks 
have been changing during time according to states’ will as well as to 
mutations occurred within the European landscape. From this point of 
view, OCCAR can be interpreted as a dynamic organization trying to 
cope with the constraints posed to its actions but also trying to get the 
best out of its assigned tasks.  
OCCAR’ s current missions- intended as the main purposes and 
functions of the organization-410 are to coordinate, control and develop 
the programmes conferred by Member States; to ameliorate the efficacy 
of programmes in terms of costs, delays and performances and to 
coordinate and promote joint actions that will favour future common 
programmes. Comparing the Business Plans delivered in the last four 
years it is possible to perceive that some modifications did take place: 
in 2003 OCCAR’ s mission was to “become the best multinational 
defence acquisition agency”, while in the following Plans the mission 
has turned to a more modest facilitation and management of 
collaborative European Armament Programmes and Technology 
Demonstration Programmes in order to satisfy customers(nation 
states).411 If the end mission has not changed, the perspective is now 
different. In fact, by emphasizing customers and their satisfaction as 
OCCAR’ s final end something seems to be lost from the organization’ s 
initial aim.  
                                                           
410 OCCAR, “Corporate Management”, OCCAR Management Procedure 3, 
Section 2, July 2006, http://www.occar-ea.org / media/ raw/ 
OMP3_Corporate_Management_issue2_010706.pdf . 
411 See OCCAR Business Plan 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, Corporate Documents,  
http:// www.occar-ea.org /view.php?nid=162  
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This organization was thought to facilitate but also to rationalize 
national procurement by integrating collaborative European 
programme in a institutionalized and permanent structure able to 
speed up and optimise programmes development. While OCCAR, as 
organization, still preserves this objective, the emphasis of its functions 
is posed more on its role as a management structure rather than on its 
potential as European armament agency. This is due to the advent of 
EDA(European Defence Agency) which has somehow reshaped 
OCCAR’ s priorities and has overtaken some of its original functions. 
Because of its enlarged participation, EDA is believed to be the truly 
and appropriate European setting for requisite harmonization among 
states. Nevertheless, OCCAR’ s functions are still of the paramount 
importance: OCCAR is an intergovernmental organization composed 
by national states aimed at resolving some of the problems that the 
same face when cooperating, namely to obtain a better cost-benefit 
trade-off of their military expenditures by avoiding duplication in 
production lines and by pooling resources, and to make up national 
divergences by favouring dialogue and applying a sole procurement 
strategy. All this should avert delays and postponements of military 
programmes and forge common positions among participating 
members. As stated in Article 7 of OCCAR Convention, this 
organization “shall coordinate, control and implement those armament 
programmes that are assigned to it by Member States, and coordinate 
and promote joint activities for the future, thereby improving the 
effectiveness of project management in collaborative projects, in terms 
of costs, schedule and performance”.412   
OCCAR vision is what the organization envisions to become in a time 
span of normally five to ten years. It represents the maximum 
achievement OCCAR aims at reaching, that is, to be a “centre of 
excellence” or the agency to whom national states refer to procure 
armaments in collaboration, “to become the best procurement agency 
in the defence realm for multinational programmes is a duty mirrored 
in the same structure  and toward which we all should confront with 
the absolute intent to reach it”.413 During  past years OCCAR vision has 
been modified significantly, and even in this occasion it is possible to 
observe a discrepancy between 2003-2004 and the following Business 
Plans. In 2004, the vision was much more encompassing and European-
oriented: “serving the multilateral defence equipment needs of the 
                                                           
412 OCCAR Convention, Article 7. 
413 OCCAR, Frequently Asked Questions. 
 175 
OCCAR Member States and assisting the collective needs of Europe”.414 
In all other Business Plans the vision was that of being a centre of 
excellence and first choice in Europe in the field of collaborative 
acquisition of defence equipment. If EDA, created in 2004, has implied 
a downscaling of the organization’ s field of activities, it has 
nevertheless to face problems related to a large membership and 
overall consent achievement so that OCCAR may remain for its 
Member States a preferential channel to speed up cooperative solutions 
whenever EDA is not able to go ahead with its functions.   
OCCAR ‘Strategic Aims’ are “statements of strategic intent addressing 
specific desired outcomes of activities deriving from the Mission 
Statement and giving clear direction and focus for such activities”.415 
Among OCCAR strategic aims are first of all those referred to the 
customer perspective, which envision the objective of optimising 
delivery schedules, performances and costs of programmes, according 
to the High Level Objectives agreed upon by Participating States. Also, 
there is the aim of being the most efficient instrument for managing 
European programmes and fostering communication and exchange of 
information among European structures(i.e., EDA) regarding defence 
acquisition issues, “we will improve and extend our networking with 
national and European security and defence actors, in accordance with 
our business development strategy, in order to increase OCCAR 
visibility and reputation in the field of collaborative programmes and 
Technological Demonstrator Programmes management”.416 As for the 
                                                           
414 The business strategy was to facilitate and manage all major future European 
collaborative armament programmes in line with European goals; to be in 2006 
a defence acquisition service provider for OCCAR Member States and non-
Member States; to be recognized as the centre of excellence in the field of co-
operative acquisition of defence material and to be joined by other participants. 
See Business Plan 2004, p. 4. 
415 OCCAR Management Procedure 3, “Corporate Management”, Section 2. 
416 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Foreword”, OCCAR Business Plan 2005, Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, 2004, p. 5. http:// www.occar-ea.org/media /raw/ 
business_plan_brochure_2005_final.pdf . The aim at improving synergies with 
EDA (European Defence Agency) is strongly underlined in OCCAR Business 
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watershed for its development; in fact the organization’ s aim is to “pursue the 
work initiated in 2006 on the definition of the interface between EDA and 
OCCAR, test this interface through its concrete application on projects initiated 
by EDA in 2007”, See Business Plan 2007, Milestones/Anticipated Progress,  p. 
21,http://www.occar-
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financial strategy, OCCAR aims at managing efficiently its 
programmes given its resources. Internal Processes Perspectives refer 
to the intention of fostering integration of programmes and Technology 
Demonstrators as well as of optimising its management capabilities. 
Finally OCCAR aims at specializing and optimizing its staff work. 
It is safe to affirm that the achievement of all blueprints OCCAR is 
driving at depends in a significant way on Member States: what 
OCCAR can do is to improve its management tools so as to be 
considered as an efficient structure and to try to provide services 
advantageous for states. 
OCCAR values are ethical standards that motivate and guide its 
activities. For OCCAR these values are the belief in Europe’s future, 
professionalism, teamwork, positive attitude towards change, cultural 
diversity and integrity.417 OCCAR mission, values and strategic aims 
are defined by the Board of Supervisors (BoS), made up of Member 
States, with the support of the Executive Administration Director. 
Aside from the aforementioned issues OCCAR Business Plan 
encompasses objectives, planned activities and the resources needed to 
achieve them. It is therefore a guide for attaining the Strategic Aims.418  
4.6 OCCAR’ s structure 
The section that follows deals with OCCAR’ s structure and will 
therefore illustrate the way in which Member States have decided to 
shape the Organization. The element that pops up immediately is its 
intergovernmental character: Member States are in full control of every 
fundamental activity and this probably has sustained its creation in the 
first hand. 
 
                                                                                                                               
ea.org/media/raw/Business_Plan_2007_issue1_Brochure_Format_single_page
s.pdf  
417 OCCAR, “OCCAR Corporate Strategy”, Strategy Paper SP14, Section 3, June 
2006,http://www.occar-ea.org /media / raw/ SP14_ OCCAR_ Corporate_ 
Strategy_ issue1_041006. pdf . 
418 OCCAR Management Procedure 3, “Corporate Management”,  Section 5. 
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Figure 7: OCCAR Organisation in 2007. Source: OCCAR Business Plan 2007. 
http://www.occar-ea.org / view.php?nid=162  
 
OCCAR is composed of a Board of Supervisors (BoS), and an Executive 
Administration(EA). As stated in capital letters in article 10 of the 
Convention, “the BOS shall be the highest decision-making level within 
OCCAR”,419 which basically means that national states are in control of 
all OCCAR most relevant decisions. Each of the Member States has a 
vote in the BoS and participate in it through his Defence Minister or a 
delegate. Therefore the BoS is the mirror of the states participating in 
OCCAR and not the structure charged of managing programmes, 
which is the Executive Administration. The BoS has a chairperson 
which is a member of the states on a rotation basis. Among the 
competences that should without exceptions be undertaken by the BoS 
are recommendations for the admission of new Member States; 
assignment of a programme to OCCAR; establishment or dissolution of 
Committees composed of Members States’ representatives and 
appointment of auditors. The Executive Administration is in charge of 
the implementation of BoS decisions. The EA is composed of a Central 
Office(CO) and Programme Divisions(PDs). The Central Office, set in 
Bonn, embodies a Directorate (a Director, its Deputy and support staff) 
and Divisions responsible for future tasks, acquisitions, contracts and 
finance matters and administration (Art 20 of the Convention, Chapter 
V). Programme Divisions, in charge of the management of the 
programmes, should have as their reference benchmarks performance, 
                                                           
419 OCCAR Convention, Chapter IV. 
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risk management, value engineering and cost containment, as stated by 
BoS regulations(Art. 20, b of the Convention, Chapter V). While being 
at the head of the Executive Administration, OCCAR-EA Director is 
also the main interface between all the management processes and 
national States: among other functions he is in charge of approving 
Management Plans before submitting them to the Programme 
Committees (PCs), reporting relevant issues to the Programme 
Committee, signing OCCAR contracts after approval of the Programme 
Decision, monitoring and assisting the work of the Programme 
Divisions.420  
Appropriate Committees- Programme Committees- can be assigned 
some of the functions of the BoS. Specific arrangements handle the 
complicate issue of the use and protection of information: on the one 
hand, and in order to conclude Programme Contracts, Member States 
should have access to information regarding suppliers through the EA, 
and on the other hand  the Executive Administration needs to consult 
the necessary information from contractors and from governments in 
order to better manage the programme. It is not possible for non-
Member States participating in an OCCAR Programme to use or 
deliver OCCAR information if not stated otherwise.421 OCCAR has to 
protect all information assigned to it by Governments or contractors 
and cannot disclose them. This highlights the function of  “interface” 
between States and industry that OCCAR plays. 
                                                           
420 OCCAR, “Principal Programme Management Procedure”, OCCAR 
Management Procedure 1, Section 4.2, July 2006, http:// www.occar-
ea.org/media/raw/OMP1_Programme_Management_issue2_010706.pdf   
421 OCCAR, « Legal Aspects »,  OCCAR Management Procedure 4, Section 4, 
July 2006, http:// www.occar-ea.org /media /raw / 
OMP_4_Legal_Issues_issue3_010706. pdf . 
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Figure 8. ‘OCCAR in Europe’. The Place of OCCAR in the European Defence 
Procurement Debate. Source: OCCAR presentation to EDA, Brussels 2006. This 
figure illustrates OCCAR ‘s relations and place within the broader European 
procurement Environment and the actors involved in it: the first stage of 
relations resides at the European Union level, with structures such as the 
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), the Environmental Technology 
Action Plan (ETAP),  the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Western 
European Union (WEU). Outside of the European level there is another 
important agreement providing measures to facilitate the restructuring of the 
European Defence Industrial landscape (LoI Framework Agreement). As said 
before OCCAR performs the tasks assigned to it by the Member States through 
their Ministries of Defence that are therefore its customers. OCCAR’ s interface 
with European industries is of the paramount importance also because of its 
objective to speed up the creation of prime contractors. Finally the 
Organization deals with other procurement agencies, such as NAMSA-NATO 
Maintenance and Supply Agency within the NATO Context. 
 
OCCAR rules and procedures for procurement, states the Convention, 
are to be approved by the BoS and can be proposed either by the 
Director of the Executive Administration or by the Member States and 
should apply to all contracts awarded by OCCAR(Art. 23,1 of the 
Convention, Chapter VI). Article 24 specifies that “contracts and sub-
contracts shall generally be awarded after competitive tendering”.422 Of 
course, “generally” refers to the special provisions agreed in Chapter II 
                                                           
422 OCCAR Convention, Art. 24. 
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and underlining the principle of global balance, and in the “transitional 
arrangements” set in Annex III (see below). 
Having a set of rules and regulations defining the way in which 
procurement has to be managed and applicable to all programme 
decisions makes this organization unique in the defence field, “the 
added value of OCCAR is a set of rules, agreements and common 
procedures and the ability to fulfil its daily tasks… the most relevant 
economies do not derive from functioning costs but from procurement 
procedures which are better and more rapid”.423 Therefore, it is its value 
as a procurement agency able to bypass the problems arising when 
trying to coordinate national divergent procedures that will encourage 
states to assign it more funds and more programmes in the future.  
Uniformity of contracting procedures, rules and regulations is of course 
a huge step forward in an heterogeneous European defence frame, 
“OCCAR is to be seen as a tangible, practical and legally constituted 
tool by which different national procurement rules and regulations are 
harmonised for the benefit of all… OCCAR can bring an added value to 
a wider European armament policy, and can be expected to become a 
significant tool for facilitating the consolidation process of the enlarged 
EU armament community through the management of joint 
multinational programmes in a better and most-effective way”.424 
General Cardinali, at the head of OCCAR-EA, affirms that by pooling 
together administrative staff and infrastructure resources it is possible 
to achieve improved and more efficient results in economic terms; also, 
the presence of  a Central Office as well as of established and not 
changing procedures spurs advantages that national or ad hoc agencies 
are not able to get.425 Collaboration, explains General Cardinali, is in 
principle more costly because a huge coordination work is required; 
nevertheless, if costs are shared, then it ends up being more convenient: 
savings obtained by integrating programmes in OCCAR compared to 
ad hoc solutions amount to 20-30%.426 While this is possible with a small 
number of and a similar power among actors doubts persist on the 
                                                           
423 Jean-Paul Béchat, 2001, p. 17. In most of the cases ad hoc agencies, created for 
a single programme, are “NATO based”, such as for example NAHEMA 
(NATO Helicopter Development and Design, Logistic Management Agency). 
424 Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, “Development of the Armament Policy in 
Europe”, Military Technology, Special Issue, 2004, p. 19.   
425 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview, Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 30, 2005a. 
426 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview,  Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 27, 2007a. 
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probability of a likely outcome among an enlarged setting. In fact, 
during the initial steps of OCCAR’ s creation, some experts attributed 
just to the small partnership its potential success, “as a four-nation 
treaty, OCCAR will arguably be able to do some serious work-while a 
pan-WEU structure, with all the usual legal trappings of compulsory 
unanimous decisions and the like, would have been but yet another 
useless Eurocratic bandwagon”.427 Therefore, analysing its success, its 
achievements and the added value it brought about compared to ad hoc 
or national procurement strategies and arrangements is paramount for 
future cooperative programmes, “OCCAR is a unique opportunity to 
improve the management of international programmes, and it is our 
intention to become the preferred choice for management of new 
armaments programmes, and to be a model example of European 
integration”.428  
For OCCAR to be chosen as procurement agency, optimal 
performances in terms of costs, timing delivery and reduction of 
management risks should be reached, “our policy objective is to 
identify correctly the risks to the achievement of our objectives and to 
ensure that control strategies are in place to manage them. The strategy 
for this will be to apply a continuous cycle of identifying, assessing, 
managing and reporting risks, while also reviewing the control 
strategies in place to deal with them”.429 In 2006, and in order to 
accomplish these tasks, a series of  Management Procedures (OMPs)--
together with precise performance indicators- have been approved by 
the BoS and established: they clarify the practices, the tools and the 
instructions to be followed and needed to render the organization work 
easier, and “to prevent from re-inventing the wheel every time a new 
programme is incorporated”.430 Moreover, the purpose of a review of 
the structures and regulations was to facilitate the administrative path, 
“to reduce the number and details of procedures that require BoS 
approval, to clarify the role of Member States and Participating States 
                                                           
427 Ezio Bonsignore, “Too Much of a Good Thing?”, Military Technology 10,  1998, 
p. 4. 
428 OCCAR Mnaagement Procedure 1, “Principal Programme Management 
Procedure”. 
429 OCCAR, “Programme Management Rules and Policies”, Addendum 1 to 
OCCAR Management Procedure 1, July 2006, p. 2. http:// www.occar-
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430 “German Army Weapon Systems Managed by OCCAR”, Military Technology, 
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in OCCAR Business and improve the effectiveness of the decision 
process within OCCAR”.431  
Year 2006 has therefore been remarkable for OCCAR’ s management 
tasks. The new procedures apply to all programmes integrated in 
OCCAR except the case in which the BoS through the Programme 
Decision decides otherwise. Every decision related to the programme 
should be taken at unanimity. A Programme Committee, composed of 
representatives of the Participating States, is created to monitor and 
take decisions on the achievement of “High Level 
Objectives”(performance, time and cost):432 Member States have a 
decision power on all OCCAR-EA decisions regarding programmes, 
“national States, often, are afraid of loosing the power to control and 
manage them in the likely direction when engaging in cooperation 
programmes; instead, OCCAR assures that state is always able to 
monitor the programme”.433  
Director Cardinali points out that even if a state is pressured by 
external factors and knows that by adhering to a similar organization 
may loose some of its control on the industrial work-share there are 
security and technology assurances it wants to keep, and OCCAR 
answers this concern. National states want to keep their prerogatives 
and cooperation depends on their willingness to coordinate actions, “if 
cooperation is rewarding then States are going to pursue  it, otherwise 
they are not”.434 This is the major difference between an inter-
governmental and a supranational process: in the latter one, state risk 
loosing the ability to exercise power in order to foster or preserve their 
interests. Instead, an inter-governmental structure receives its power 
                                                           
431 OCCAR Business Plan 2004, p. 10. 
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directly from its members. A supranational structure is both the 
aggregation of parties and something more, a cessation of a small part 
of sovereignty and with it of the power to decide freely on a specific 
field. While it is assessed that OCCAR is an intergovernmental 
structure reflecting its members positions, it is also clear that it is 
something more of that, for all the reasons abovementioned and the 
ones that will be presented below. First of all, OCCAR is structurally 
different from pure ad hoc agencies both because it has a precise 
procurement model that mirrors none of the internal procurement 
procedures of its Member States, and therefore that is equally agreed 
upon by all States. Second, every national state has conceded 
something for the sake of OCCAR’ s creation, because coordination 
always implies an accommodation among actors, and an 
institutionalized coordination among similarly powerful actors 
requires the delineation of common principles, missions, strategic aims 
and so on.  
Programmes headquarters are based in different countries according to 
requests made by states; even these decisions, therefore, represents a 
bargaining activity among them. For example FREMM-the Multi-
Mission Frigates programme among France and Italy- has its official 
headquarter in France and a detached office in Rome. One of the 
criteria to decide the programme headquarter is to locate it in the 
nearby of its production site: A400M Division is in Toulouse, near to 
Airbus production location. ROLAND and FSAF are based in Paris 
while TIGER; COBRA and BOXER in Bonn. The UK has no 
headquarter mainly because its participation in OCCAR is not that 
relevant in terms of programmes. 
 
Figure 9.  OCCAR Headquarters. Source:  OCCAR Presentation to CNAD, 
NATO HQ, Richard Burley-Commercial Editor, October 2006- (see p. 292) 
 
As for the selection of staff, recruitment is based on merit standards but 
the Director has the responsibility to assure that a certain balance exists 
among the staff of Member Nations.435  
OCCAR’ s membership status can be obtained by participating in a 
significant programme in which at least one other OCCAR’ s state takes 
part. Also, the state applying for membership has to endorse the 
                                                           
435 OCCAR, “Staff Selection”, OCCAR Management Procedure 9, July (2006): 
Art.4.7http://www.occarea.org/media/rawOMP9_Staff_Selection_issue2_010
706.pdf . 
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Convention, and therefore OCCAR principles, rules, regulations and 
policies, and most important of all, the number of votes that Member 
States decide to assign it. On the one hand it seems that a small number 
of participants has created a good environment for cooperation; for 
example, among the worse examples of cooperative settings General 
Cardinali remembers some NATO agencies, such as the AGS(air-
ground-surveillance) one, where all NATO members participated with 
70 industries and the juste retour principle was applied. On the other 
hand, it seems that sometimes coordination is difficult notwithstanding 
a limited membership because opt-out and compensation clauses, 
while facilitating cooperation, hamper important and generalized 
decisions or dampen relevant step forward while preserving national 
control over the programmes, “intergovernmental initiatives in a 
reduced form are not necessarily easier than the others. Its (OCCAR) 
creation was justified by the fact that four states the interests of which 
were similar could have rapidly created an operative structure. Certain 
issues as the way in which to envisage the global balance seem to be 
characterised by different approaches from Participant States. 
Moreover the decision to have a decentralized management of the 
programmes shows that suspicions persist among Members”.436  
Since OCCAR’ s creation, states showing an interest in the organization 
have been the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Finland. Belgium and Spain joined the organization respectively in 
2003 and 2005; the Netherlands participates in the BOXER Programme 
with Germany. OCCAR has been alleged to represent an “exclusive 
club”, encompassing the most important producers and consumers of 
weapon systems in the European context, and therefore preventing the 
access of less powerful defence producers. On this point of view 
Belgium acceptance into the Organization looked like a promising 
trend and downplayed part of the critics arisen.  
After Belgium membership, in 2003, former Director Klaus von Sperber 
stressed that this “testifies to the vitality of the organization and 
support its ambitions to be the first choice in Europe for the 
management of collaborative armaments programmes”.437 While 
Founding Members accepted Belgium’s candidacy, they pretended that 
it was conferred less votes than they had (5 voting rights instead of 10). 
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For Spain, that joined the organization in 2005,  the first proposal by 
Founding Members was for 5 votes, as for Belgium, but the nation 
pretended and obtained (tanks also to Italy’ s strong support) that it 
had more votes than Belgium (8) considering itself a more powerful 
state than Belgium was. As a counterpart to this concession the 
Founding Members required that Spain participated in two 
Programmes; for this reason Spain has waited to enter OCCAR until 
the integration of the TIGER helicopter. This fact confirmed the 
engagement of Spain in two considerable programmes (TIGER and 
A400M) which in turn justified the need for an increased amount of 
votes.  
This piece of evidence shows also that Spain, even if not at the level of 
the other states, is still an important constituent of the European 
defence scenario. The same can be said for Sweden, whose electronic 
industry is paramount for new technologies, “states able to participate 
to the programmes, which have a defence industry such as Spain and 
Sweden, are the likely candidates to a potential adhesion.”438 
Nevertheless, Sweden did not decide to apply. Also because of this, 
asserting that OCCAR is the embryonic structure of a would be 
widespread European Procurement Agency does not match with 
reality. The label of “European agency” applied to OCCAR should be 
interpreted in a very narrow sense, and should take into consideration 
not only sates’ interest to participate but also to the power to do that. It 
is difficult to envision an efficient defence structure which encompasses 
states that do not have the capability to contribute significantly or to 
compensate for other states’ shortfalls. Because of the lack of these 
capabilities, small states are always likely to buy weapon-systems off-
the-shelf, a practice that in a sense violates the ‘European preference’ 
precisely stated in OCCAR Convention. 
That said, what can explain Belgium presence in OCCAR? As stated by 
Major General Guido Andries, former Belgian National Armament 
Director (NAD), Belgium is a small country with small industries and 
limited defence budgets,439 but OCCAR helps integration among the 
most powerful states , “through the participation in OCCAR it becomes 
easier to keep in touch with the initiatives taken within the framework 
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of European integration. The membership also provides the 
opportunity to call the attention of the larger European partners to the 
sensitive issues smaller European partners are dealing with”.440 Colonel 
Antonio Padula affirms that the acceptance of Belgium is a clear proof 
of the fact that OCCAR addresses not only to powerful states(with 
industrial capabilities) but also to smaller states who, as Belgium did, 
engaged actively in cooperative programmes and in the elaboration of 
a common defence.441  
Of course, Belgium does not enjoy the same military potential as the 
Founding Members do, but it has a vibrant capacity in high-quality 
(sub)systems and components and therefore it specialises in niche 
markets at the sub-contract level. According to OCCAR rules and 
regulations, Belgium can potentially participate as a sub-contractor on 
programmes in which it is not directly involved, while OCCAR can 
take advantage of Belgium excellence in niche markets. That said, it is 
not clear whether the same history can be replied with other “small 
states”; as Brigadier General Peter Kuhn of the German Army explains, 
Germany –but the same is true for other powerful states- seeks 
cooperation also with smaller nations, but “prerequisite for balanced 
cooperation with fair work-share is that partners of common projects 
do have sufficient technical know-how on the industrial side and also 
do have development and production capabilities. At least in partial 
areas, which need not to be built up first”.442 The fact that Belgium had 
a previous capacity has been determinant for its acceptance and this 
will be the decisive card for other European nations willing to apply for 
membership.  
As said, OCCAR Member States are also the most powerful arms 
producers and purchasers of the European context and this reasonably 
implies that they want or expect to have a decisive say in defence 
matters over other less powerful States: Europe of the armament is still 
‘Europe at six’ and this fact should always be taken into consideration 
when assessing the probability of cooperation. This latter arises when it 
is rewarding, and it is rewarding when there is room for reciprocity or 
compensations bargaining among similarly powerful states for which 
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unilateral actions are not available. This may explain why, for example, 
Founding Members do not seem to be eager to accept new members. A 
small amount of Members is a sound number to work with both at the 
decision-making level and to make work some of the agreement 
reached within OCCAR. Global balance, for example, which foresees a 
calculation of industrial return spread out on more programmes in 
more years, is more easily applicable with a restricted number of actors.  
In any case, the entrance of a new Member State will have to be 
accepted by the Founding States, and these latter would set the 
conditions and ask for precise and sometimes hard decisions, “it would 
be time-consuming and complex for every member-state to join 
OCCAR, as the existing members have to set the terms for new 
members”.443 This practically indicates that Founding Members are able 
to state the rules of the game and of course to change the payoff matrix: 
for example, while cooperation would be a preferred outcomes for 
some states their cost-benefit calculus may change once they are put in 
front of a modified cooperation context. It is clear therefore, that the 
mere fact of participating in the organization adds, to the power 
conferred by the possession of the resource, the power of setting the 
cooperative stage and that of changing the actions of non-Members 
States. To date, however, no state’ s candidacy has been submitted. 
State-of-the art seems to invite states to participate in programmes 
within OCCAR and eventually ask for entry, so as to perceive the costs 
that participation may imply. Of course more Members risk 
overburdening negotiations, re-proposing all the costs that a 
cooperative structure may incur in. While states as Sweden, Poland and 
Finland are participating in ESSOR programme-a programme under 
consideration for integration in OCCAR- this latter is far too small to 
justify states’ entry within OCCAR. 
Member States provide funds to OCCAR’ s administrative and 
operational plans through an “annual budget”, prepared by the 
Executive Administration, that specifies the planned administrative 
and operational expenditures and the sources of funding. The plan 
should be approved by the BoS and should be in accordance with the 
financial rules and regulations (Art 34-35 of the Convention). By 
calculating the ratio of administrative and operational costs it is 
possible to assess that the overhead is much lower than that existing 
within national states, confirming once again OCCAR’ s good 
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performances in terms of efficiency.444 Central Office funds are 
provided by Member States according to their voting rights in the BoS. 
Programme Division costs as well as programme operational 
costs(those related to contracting)are shared by States participating in a 
Programme according to the Programme Decision.445 States’ financial 
contribution depends on the programme they participate in, on voting 
rights and on off-takes (number of systems ordered for each 
programme). France is the biggest contributor to OCCAR’ s budget. At 
the creation of the Agency Italy and the United Kingdom used to pay 
half the contribution of France and Germany for the administrative 
budget; this latter was re-balanced among Member States in 2001. 
All of the Founding Members dispose of ten votes, while, as said 
before, new Members will have less voting rights, underlining that the 
organization assures the interests of the existing members and that 
inclusion in the club implies a lower decision power: of course the four 
states want to preserve their power position. An equal amount of votes 
among them and a superior one than other Participating States could 
also be interpreted as a reasonable compensation for the work 
performed to create OCCAR in the first hand.446  
All decisions regarding the Convention, the operative and financial 
impact have to be taken unanimously. Among the BoS decision making 
processes a reinforced qualified majority(there should not be ten votes 
against) is required for admission of new Member States, approval of 
OCCAR rules and regulations, organization of OCCAR-EA and 
appointment of the Director of the Executive Administration. What this 
means, basically, is that a Founding State(but not the others) has a veto 
power on all these decisions. A simple majority is enough to create or 
dissolve Committees, while for all other issues for which a specific 
decision-making procedure does not exist, and therefore where there 
can be a dispute between states regarding the existence or the specific 
provision to consider, unanimity is required.447 As for the programmes, 
Member States recognize that unanimity goes against an effective and 
rapid decision-making process needed to respect the time-schedules 
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agreed. Since delays mean added costs it is advisable to envision 
different kind of decision-making procedures for different types of 
issues. This argument is sustained by the Member States that from time 
to time do suggest different decision-making solutions but which have 
not been able to come to a definitive agreement.448 Of course, decisions 
concerning a single programme will be taken only by the 
representatives of the Member States engaged in the 
Programme(Article 15, 2 of the Convention). The possibility to take 
some decisions on a majority base has been considered very important 
and innovative in this realm, “article 18 makes OCCAR the first 
organization competent in armaments which does not foresee only the 
unanimity procedure”.449 
The possibility to participate in OCCAR programmes without being 
Members of the organization is contemplated by Member States in 
Article 38 of the Convention, which foresees the previous approval of 
Member States of the arrangements to be reached. Of course, non-
Member States which aim at participating in a programme should 
conform with and accept all OCCAR’ s rules, regulations and 
principles.450  Non–Member States will have also the same rights in the 
decision-making process and will send representatives for the 
Programme Board, Programme Committee and the Programme 
Working Group. Instead, the participation of non-Member States is 
limited to the programmes: they cannot pretend to have seats in the 
Central Office in Bonn even if they will have to contribute to the 
Central Office budget(operational and administrative), the idea being 
that they need to make up for spared costs, “one of the benefits of 
OCCAR managed programmes is the reduction in size of the 
programme offices through the transfer of common programme 
elements (such as budgeting, accounting, contracting, human resources 
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and IT facilities) to the OCCAR-EA Central Office”.451 Therefore 
OCCAR-EA grants a service to States participating in the programme.  
The participation in programmes by non-Member States has come 
about in the BOXER Programme and in the A400M one. OCCAR 
foresees also the possibility of conceding “observer status” to non-
participating Members in programmes managed by the organization. 
In 2006, underlining the interest of non-European States towards 
OCCAR initiatives, it was stressed that Turkey wanted to join the In 
Service-phase of the COBRA Programme and that South Africa and 
Malaysia would acquire observer status in the A400M Programme.452 
The grant of “observer status” should be approved by the BoS by 
unanimity. Every request will be considered on a case-by-case basis; 
more probability does exist to ‘observe’ a programme if there is an 
intention by the same to eventually join it, “all States granted observer 
status in an OCCAR managed programme shall be required to state 
formally their clear interest in future participation in the programme or 
to purchase off-the-shelf the system developed under the programme 
and to sign a nondisclosure agreement”.453 
In case of OCCAR dissolution, Member States should previously find 
procedures to manage the dissolution without damaging third parties 
and contractual partners, and to find arrangements to share among 
them OCCAR rights and responsibilities (Art. 55 of the Convention). 
Instead, a State deciding to leave OCCAR has to consider all the 
consequences arising from its withdrawal (Art. 56,  1,2,3 of the 
Convention). Leaving a programme by a state means first of all 
consultations with all other participating states on the consequences of 
its withdrawal, eventually notification in advance of its decision to 
leave the Programme, respect of all its duties until its exit and “be 
solely responsible for any additional costs, damage, penalty or 
liability”454 produced to the programme. This applies also in the case of 
a state changing its requirements for a programme or the number of 
systems planned to purchase. In 2005 Business Plan the Director 
informed of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the BOXER 
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Programme and the necessity to arrange this latter in a bilateral way;455 
while this event has requested a deep overhaul of the programme 
OCCAR has been able to deal with it properly.  
 
Figure 10: Programme Contributions in Millions of Euros. Source: General 
Nazzareno Cardinali to the Defence Commission of the Italian Senate, Rome 29 
May 2007. (see p. 293) 
 
Figure 11: Staff Contribution. Source: General Nazzareno Cardinali to the 
Defence Commission of the Italian Senate, Rome 29 May 2007. (see p. 296) 
4.7 OCCAR procurement procedures 
After having presented the motivations behind OCCAR’s creation and  
structure it is time to analyse its procurement procedures so as to 
perceive the difference that the organization marks in comparison to 
other  procurement agencies. As it will be seen, OCCAR is inspired and 
driven by some fundamental guidelines, such as the ‘European 
preference’ or the ‘global balance’ principle: taken together they show 
the peculiar features of the organization and recall the economic and 
strategic objectives aforementioned. 
One of the most interesting ingredients in OCCAR is the so called 
“European preference” of defence systems, aimed at improving both 
the European industrial base and the European defence might. Article 6 
of Chapter II  of the Convention states that Member States should give 
preference in their procurement decisions to equipment in which they 
participated and which have been developed through OCCAR 
whenever these equipments satisfy their requirement. States who 
engage in the development and production of military equipments by 
committing huge amount of money are aimed at acquiring those 
systems: this has the objective of favouring an autonomous European 
base. On this point of view Hayward maintains that France did not 
compel to introduce a reciprocity clause in OCCAR Convention, “but 
officials maintained that weapons acquisition decisions would have to 
reflect ‘clear political choices’…there is apparently a strong feeling on 
the part of French officials that all JACS(Joint Armament Cooperation 
Structure, i.e., OCCAR) sponsored programmes should be acquired by 
the members”.456 It is clear that the United Kingdom was not perfectly 
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comfortable with the “European preference” clause, but, as 
aforementioned, it was considered wiser to participate rather than to 
keep out of this structure.  
Perhaps, the most important principle set in Baden-Baden was the 
abandonment of the juste retour practice: this principle is to-date what 
renders OCCAR different from other procurement agencies. In 
Chapters II of the Convention, Article 5 states that “to enable a 
strengthening of the competitiveness of European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base, the Member States renounce, in their 
cooperation, the analytical calculation of industrial juste retour on a 
programme-by-programme basis, and replace it by the pursuit of an 
overall multi-programme/multi-year balance”; in fact this practice was 
called ‘global balance’. ‘Global balance’ would create more freedom in 
the selection of suppliers and thus more cost/effective solutions, “it has 
not been easy, for OCCAR member nations, to give up the ‘cost-share-
work/share principle’, which has been the old traditional rule for 
multinational programmes. However, experience has shown that too 
much emphasis on strict and rigid work-share arrangements prevents 
reaping the full benefits of competition”.457   
France was the Nation that more strongly pressed for the introduction 
of the global balance principle among OCCAR rules; this principle in 
no way means pure competition among Member States: it promotes 
cooperation but assuring a return in the long run. It is not difficult to 
grasp France’s insistence behind this request: facing huge industrial 
and budget problems and participating in almost all OCCAR 
programmes, France would have the guarantee that sounder economic 
performance would be reached while not loosing its rewards. 
Moreover, by being one of the most relevant defence producers, it is 
also highly competitive; this grants the opportunity to get a substantial 
work-share in every programme it participates in. Finally, competition 
at the sub-contractor level would have promoted innovation and 
improved performances propping up the European Industrial Base. 
Clearly, global balance does not have the same attractiveness for a 
nation that does not participate so much to OCCAR programmes. What 
changes substantially is the time-span, the immediacy of the juste-retour 
practice against a longer run view: if a state is not that eager to engage 
in or to integrate programmes in OCCAR it is clear it does not put 
much emphasis on this principle.  
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Knowing that a balanced return will in any case be reached in the 
future, suppliers will focus more on proposing the best solutions given 
that the work-sharing for each country is not assigned beforehand 
rather than  “aiming to achieve work-share down to the last Euro, a 
behaviour that has bedevilled other major collaborative 
Programmes”.458 Also, global balance practice would promote 
industrial and technological complementarities necessary in the short 
and long-run to work together, sustain each other and deepen the 
European defence stance (Art. 5 of the Convention), “if juste retour 
principle permits industries to develop themselves it poses some limits 
on concurrence and determine an impressive and counter-productive 
fragmentation of work”.459 The objective, as General Cardinali points 
out, is that of pushing on the competitiveness of the European defence 
industry and hampering its fragmentation.460  
Nevertheless, Annex III of the Convention specifies some important 
limitations to the global balance principle and with this to a concrete 
step towards a more integrated defence. The first limitation to this 
principle was its not total applicability during the very beginning of the 
organization’s functioning,  “contracts shall, in principle, be awarded 
more on the basis of competitiveness rather than on the financial 
contributions made by each Member States. However…during the 
three years following entry into force of this Convention: 
• if the industry of a Member State has received a volume of 
orders smaller than 66% of its financial contribution, either 
concerning a programme, a certain phase or a certain sub-
assembly of a programme(as far as complexity of a weapon 
system justifies that this system is divided beforehand into sub-
assemblies), 
• If a global imbalance of more than 4% is identified in relation to 
all programmes, 
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“appropriate actions will be taken by the BoS in order to restore the 
balance”.461 The vagueness of this provision was probably necessary to 
speed up the creation of the Agency; the flexibility assured should have 
been enough to make states trust this organization. It is probable that 
too a narrow and specific provision would have hampered the 
achievement of an initial and fundamental consensus.  
The specification of the annex III was a compromise solution between 
the states who favoured a more competitive environment from the 
beginning and those that instead wanted to preserve their prerogatives 
and monitor the development and the likely consequences of such a 
provision. Member States wanted to be sure that global balance would 
not apply to Programmes just integrated in OCCAR or in process of 
being integrated in the first years.  
The transitional arrangements have turned in the application of the 
global balance principle, even if some exemptions exist for the 
functioning of this practice. Competition is therefore considered of the 
utmost importance within OCCAR, “the use of competition is the 
cornerstone of OCCAR Procurement Policy because it provides the 
greatest leverage on Suppliers to obtain the best value for money and 
reasonable transfer of risk. The potential for competition in each 
programme must always be given careful and early consideration by 
OCCAR-EA”.462 Therefore, contracts and sub-contracts shall in principle 
be awarded competitively. The aforementioned Art 24 of the 
Convention, stating that for defence and security requirements or to 
improve European industrial and technological base competition may 
be limited to the structures of a Member State participating in the 
programme concerned, is a constraint of the competition rule which 
should be at the basis of the Organization.463 In principle, even a 
Member State not participating in a programme can potentially take 
part in its productive process if its offer is competitive; nevertheless for 
‘security reasons’ competition may be limited to the industries of the 
Participating States. Security reasons are intended to be very broad and 
appear in all programmes; they can go from particular components 
embodied in a system to reasons of security of supply. Alas, this 
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procedure will be decided time by time in the Programme Decision by 
Participating States.  
There are also some cases in which prime contractors are not appointed 
competitively; in this case, the procurement process should be treated 
as ‘non-competitive’. In order to make up for this the maximum of 
visibility should be achieved at the sub-contractor level. 
Juste retour practice was the scapegoat through which in the past 
cooperation has been reached among states; while cooperation was 
necessary on some occasions the return received had to make up for the 
orders and the financial contribution faced by the States, otherwise the 
incentive for cooperation were lost. What today makes the difference is 
that coordination is not only seen as a practice to spur the national 
industry but also a tool for answering economic, industrial and 
strategic imperatives. As General Cardinali points out, “normally this 
principle (juste retour) has been used to increase the own industrial 
might instead of exploiting a yet existing capacity, and this has 
inevitably implied huge costs”.464 In this sense, a more competitive 
setting is needed and achievable with the global balance provision, 
even if at some point states should get what they provide for the 
development of a programme. For example, ordering a certain amount 
of weapon systems and therefore committing financial resources to that 
objective is the sine qua non condition for carrying forward a 
programme. Because of that, and because of the peculiarities of the 
weapons field, a state  need to be entitled of sound (balanced) returns 
in a defined time-span.  
The principle of global balance is therefore more promising than that of 
juste-retour, but it re-affirms that a “balance” should in any case be 
reached and should guide and lead the work allocation: as General 
Cardinali maintains, “it is a competition in a controlled 
environment”.465 According to the Director, global balance is a form of 
“compensation” thought to meet the exigencies of the Director of 
Armaments that would not tolerate a wild competition and therefore 
would put in danger cooperative efforts. The most important 
achievement on this ground has to be considered the ‘commercial 
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approach’ agreed on the A400m aircraft (discussed below), “in the 
A400M programme, even if states concerns are yet strong, the 
commercial approach determines that the balance of work-sharing 
relation to the number of orders is but an objective and in no way an 
obligation of the contractor. For new programmes  this principle will be 
for sure strongly applied”.466  
It goes without saying that new programmes should be integrated in 
OCCAR in order to guarantee competition in the application of the 
global-balance principle. In fact, a calculation based upon more 
programmes and more years means that a ‘controlled competition’ 
today is possible through the assurance of returns in the future. This is 
an issue much more for smaller states as Belgium rather than more 
powerful ones, “the abolition of the proportional participation per 
projects implies for Belgium the risk that in the short-term a global 
balance can not be achieved given that the Belgian defence industry is 
far smaller than that of the larger OCCAR countries. This risk will be 
decreased as more programmes are managed by OCCAR”.467 In fact, 
“for the smaller European states a formal policy of juste-retour 
represents a vital defence of national industries assets against the 
power and productivity of the larger states’ defence of national 
companies”.468 In order to have a truly competitive market, states 
should have similar capabilities, otherwise stronger states are likely to 
prevail. 
Currently, the global balance principle applies to the sub-contractor 
level and is foreseen among the states participating in a programme: it 
cannot be otherwise, since it is not possible to tell a state to invest 
money and to have no return at all. As General Cardinali points out, 
global balance permits to apply competition to the single programme 
by monitoring its development.469 Only if none of the participating State 
provides an appropriate system(evaluated on the basis of OCCAR 
performance tasks) can competition be broadened to other Members 
States not participating in the programme. In fact, the monitoring 
process is of the paramount importance in order to apply the global 
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balance principle: prime contractors should be compelled to inform and 
to make clear how their subcontracting procedures have been pursued. 
In the case of the A400M programme the prime contractor employs the 
“best endeavour” practice, meaning that competition is enhanced and 
promoted in a context in which an industrial return should be 
considered but not necessarily applied(as it was the case with the juste-
retour practice). If it is apparently not efficient to confer work on the 
basis of the financial contribution, then this is not being done. 
Summing up, “best endeavour” aims at balancing a return but this is 
not the principal criterion according to which sub-contracts are 
awarded; there is an effort but not a commitment to do that.  It would 
have been difficult to apply the global balance for old programmes: 
since their contracts did not require to provide data on sub-contracts 
awarding, it would have been difficult to calculate work-share and 
envision a multi-year-multi programme return.  
4.8 Integration of a programme in OCCAR 
After having explained two of the most important principles guiding 
OCCAR’ s procurement practices, it is paramount to assess how a 
programme comes to be integrated within the organization and the 
phases of the procurement process. As seen before, OCCAR can be 
interpreted as the result of states’ coordinated activities in the field of 
defence procurement. Notwithstanding its permanent rules, 
regulations and decision-making procedures OCCAR is an 
organization that can carry forward its potentialities and functions only 
by managing the programmes states decide to integrate. Therefore, 
every decision regarding integration of a programme requires a 
coordinated move by states; also, coordination is necessary to assure 
the programme passage through the various stages of its life-cycle 
within OCCAR. 
The integration phase is that fundamental step which assigns to 
OCCAR the management of a weapon system. The integration process 
is composed of three steps: a BoS Integration Decision authorizes the 
integration of a programme in OCCAR, the phase(s) to be developed 
by OCCAR and the schedule to be respected, and should be 
unanimously agreed. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
commits the participants in the Programme and assures that whenever 
the programme is yet existing it should adhere to OCCAR management 
rules, regulations and principles. Finally, the Programme Decision is a 
legally binding decision taken by the Board of the states participating 
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in the Programme and stating in a detailed way the management 
process that OCCAR should undertake (including the contractual 
process, cost forecasting and High Level Objectives).470  
In order to avoid “unnecessary duplications” the BoS has set guidelines 
for the redaction of a Memorandum of Understanding guide applicable 
to all Programmes.471. Once the programme is integrated, OCCAR 
performs its management tasks in accordance with its role and 
responsibilities and following the guidelines of the Programme 
Decision.  
First of all, according to OCCAR rules, the entire Programme, from the 
Initial concept to In-Service Support must be seen as an integrated 
process: in fact, after the identification of the better procurement 
strategy, the procurement activities within each phase should be 
pooled together in order to have a thorough view of what is needed: 
the programme management, financial, contracts and human resources 
will be grouped together so as to identify all the risks more easily and 
work in teams.472 Also, as stated by the Director, “we will endeavour to 
integrate all processes and initiatives into a single business 
management framework. Within that framework special emphasis will 
be put on the management of programme and corporate risk”.473 The 
aims towards excellence can permit OCCAR to make the difference and 
be considered as the first choice in Europe: this is why OCCAR’ s 
strategy is that of improving the performances of the Organization. 
High level Objectives (performance, time and costs), stated in the 
Programme Decision,  will stress the priorities OCCAR should focus 
on;  for their identification close team work and shared information are 
required.474  
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A Programme Manager is entitled of the monitoring of a programme 
development, while the Programme Decision embodies the 
arrangements established between Member States and OCCAR 
regarding each Programme. The Programme Manager works with 
national representatives, encompassed in the Programme Working 
Group(PWG), which helps the Manager to keep discussions open 
among OCCAR and National States. The Programme Division is a team 
in charge of the management of a specific programme and is headed by 
the Programme Manager which shall report on a regular basis to the 
Director the developments or the problems encountered and, if 
required by Member States, propose alternatives or recommendations. 
On the basis of these reports, the Director will refer to the  Programme 
Committee (4.2.4.4 OCCAR Management Procedure 1). The reporting 
work, which should provide relevant, concise and timely information475  
is paramount in order to supervise the management process as well as  
to get back to the bodies representing the Member States (BoS, 
Programmes Boards and all the subordinate bodies). The provision of 
information should help Member States to be informed and therefore 
confident of the work of the organization as well as speed up decisions 
which would otherwise linger behind divergent national procurement 
approaches and degree of information available.  
Within OCCAR, communication among customers, Member States and 
the other structures is necessary in order to pave the way for a sound 
management work.  Some of the information and documents that 
OCCAR produce and related to Programme activities are classified as 
“sensitive” and may comprise commercial details of offers, technical 
description, drawings, operational requirements and product 
descriptions.476 These issues are not strictly related to security interests 
but require monitoring; therefore a series of procedures are established 
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in order to manage their handling. These information should remain in 
the hands of the Programme Divisions and under certain circumstances 
of the Director. Moreover, a series of procedures are foreseen in order 
to protect Classified Information (secret, confidential or restricted) as 
well as handle them in a uniform way.477  
It is in OCCAR power to negotiate, award and administer all 
Programme contracts with prime contractors, the legal entities entitled 
of the contract of a Programme. According to the global balance 
procedure, which grants a multi-programme/multi-year balance, 
prime contractors as well as sub-contractors, which have to be on the 
WEAG (Western European Armament Group closed in 2004) spectrum, 
should be selected competitively following costs and capability 
criteria(but with all the exceptions aforementioned).478 OCCAR-EA is 
aimed at being the only interface with Programme Contractors; this 
means that, unless stated otherwise and in order to improve the 
effectiveness of OCCAR management capabilities, there will be no 
direct communication between Member States participating in a 
Programme and the Programme Contractor in matters regarding the 
management and contractual procedures of the Programme. The 
Executive Administration, through its reporting activity will inform 
Participating States.479  
In the placement of contracts OCCAR should “exercise impartiality and 
consistency of treatment in its dealings with potential suppliers, respect 
commercial confidentiality and uphold the integrity of a Contract 
which requires the due performance of obligations freely entered into 
by both parties”.480 The document which helps placing contracts is the 
Procurement Strategy, which defines requirements for the 
Programme(Programme Operational Requirement) such as cost 
options, timescales, risks, industrial considerations, the procurement 
method and In-Service Support strategy; the handling of this document 
is of the paramount importance since “the success of a programme in 
                                                           
477 OCCAR, “Security Regulation”, OCCAR Management Procedure 11,  June 
2007, Section 1, http:// www.occar-ea.org /media /raw/ 
OMP11_Security_Regulations_issue3_010607.pdf.  
478 OCCAR Management Procedure 2, “Participation of non-member States in 
OCCAR Managed Programmes”, Work Allocation. A sub-contractor is defined 
as  a person or a legal entity which has been assigned a work from a prime 
contractor or another sub-contractor.  
479 OCCAR Management Procedure 4, “Legal Aspects”, Section 3.3.2. 
480 OCCAR Management procedure 5, “Contract Placement Procedure”, Section 
1. 
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terms of schedule, performances and costs depends on the  quality of 
the parameters established at the beginning of the programme”.481  
It is OCCAR’ s preference to assign a contract for the whole system to a 
prime contractor which will then get in contact and manage with a 
certain autonomy (if it has been selected competitively) its commercial 
policies with subcontractors. This practice is aimed at shifting the 
balance of responsibilities in terms of time delivery, delays and 
effectiveness to the prime contractor: in this way contractors are 
pushed to optimise their performances. If products are not delivered on 
schedule as foreseen on the Programme Decision, the Contractor 
should pay to the Contracting Authority the amount envisaged for 
delays in deliver.482 OCCAR was eager to encourage the creation of 
integrated and transnational prime contractors and this willingness 
reflected a changed relationship between governments and industry, 
“whilst everyone understand that the ultimate risk-by which I mean 
the risk of success or failure on the battlefield-will always remain with 
governments, there is an increasing desire, on the part of governments, 
to make industry bear the responsibility for cost, integration and in-
service availability”.483 
In order to reduce the complexity of the tendering process OCCAR can 
issue to potential contractors a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire(PQQ) 
in order to assess suppliers ability to meet the requirements needed; in 
fact, “the selection of tenderers is a critical element of competitive 
tendering, only suppliers capable of carrying out the work and with 
which OCCAR would be prepared to place a contract should be invited 
to tender”.484 The logic that stands behind this is concretized within the 
                                                           
481 OCCAR Presentation to the Civil Defence School, 2005, 62. 
482 OCCAR, “OCCAR Standard Articles”, ANNEX A to OCCAR Management 
procedure 6, August 2007, Paragraph 3.2.1, http:// www.occar-
ea.org/media/raw/Annex_OMP6_A_Issue_1_030807.pdf. The procedure 
OCCAR has envisioned in order to optimise the satisfaction of customers is to 
adopt a more “commercial” contract approach, able to shift more 
responsibilities on suppliers. Nevertheless, it should be considered that too 
much a burden shifted on the industry can have negative effects on time and 
schedule, and therefore a sound balance should be found.  The setting of a 
commercial contracting principle and procedures will create consistency of 
approach for industrial actors.  
483 Denis Ranque, “Confronting Reality in Defence Procurement: Future Trends 
and Challenges”, RUSI Journal, April, 2004, p. 57.  
484 OCCAR Management Procedure 5, “Contract Placement Procedure”, Annex 
E. It is noteworthy that in Annex E it is underlined that “OCCAR will not 
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A400M aircraft, where OCCAR shifted the responsibilities of the 
programme to the prime contractor signing a fixed-price contract. Since 
economic risks may be strong for a Company, this latter should show 
reliability and ability to take forward the production process. This was 
not the case in the past when feeble consortia or joint-ventures where 
not a trustworthy interface able to face risks. Interesting to see is how 
Airbus Military Company (AMC) will face the delays the programme 
(A400M aircraft) is experiencing especially because of its engine: the 
contract signed should assure OCCAR and the nations states engaged 
because it shifted the burden of eventual costs adjustments to the 
Company. 
OCCAR’ s aim is that of being an efficient procurement organization, to 
achieve best value for money: therefore and as said before, its main 
target is that of promoting competition in assigning a contract, “the aim 
of competition is to promote keen pricing, to encourage the most 
efficient use of industrial resources and to stimulate innovation and 
new ideas”.485 Alas, and aside from the reasons aforementioned, 
competition may sometimes be downplayed by the fact that in most of 
the cases only a small number of countries is able to develop a system, 
and therefore competition  arises only at the sub-contractor level.486  
Anyway, the prime contractor is required, as stated before, to provide 
information about the policies through which to assure competition 
(Procurement Plan).  
                                                                                                                               
normally consider such suppliers (joint ventures/Consortium Management 
Companies) to be invited to tender or to provide a proposal unless they assist 
in the creation of a pan-European defence industry”(E.3.1.a). Is Airbus Military 
conceived in this vein? The statement is reinforced also by the Article 
explaining that joint ventures should not be created to satisfy the requirement 
needed only for a limited period of time (E.3.1.a).  
485 OCCAR Management Procedure 5, “Contract Placement Procedure”: Section 
3. 
486 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview, Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 30, 2005a. General Cardinali stresses that for 
example Airbus Military should apply the “best-endeavour” principle with 
subcontractors, according to which to assure a certain balance in work-sharing 
among national industries it is possible to allocate work on a “second-best” 
basis: if a country wins too much of tenders then the contract is awarded to the 
second-best tender. It is clear that the strongest country is able to win most of 
the tenders. This is another limitation to a pure competitive process. For this 
reason Cardinali affirms that competition rests within a “controlled 
environment”. 
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As seen, the contractual practice has never been an easy process and 
has caused more than a dispute among states. A case in point is the 
MRAV(future BOXER) Programme: at the outset of the programme 
conception France was considering to build an armoured vehicle. 
Conflicts among partners existed on different operative requirements 
but a more deep conflict existed on the way in which to award the 
contract, because this had inevitably a distributional impact. The 
United Kingdom and Germany favoured- at least at the design stage- a 
competitive contract awarding process, while France wanted a simple 
work-sharing (juste retour) that would have guaranteed its 
GIAT(Groupement Industriel des Armaments Terrestres) participation in 
the programme. Nevertheless at that time GIAT  was in severe 
economic conditions and could not freely compete with the other 
industries. The compromise that France reached with the United 
Kingdom and Germany, given its relative low power, did not meet its 
preferences: it asserted the possibility for GIAT to participated after the 
Anglo-German winners were defined. This was enough for France not 
to go on with the programme and pursue a national alternative. The 
UK, instead, took advantage of this situation and did win the struggle 
with France because of its competitive industry “it seems something of 
a paradox that the British committed themselves to a collaborative 
programme in order to join a Franco-German initiative in which the 
French partner saw its first new venture become a largely Anglo-
German affairs”.487 It is more so, if we take into account that the United 
Kingdom  finally withdrew from the programme.  
4.9 The life-cycle of a programme 
As seen before, the integration phase is that fundamental process 
through which national states confer to OCCAR the management of a 
cooperative multinational programme. OCCAR is not a traditional 
procurement agency but it is devoted to efficiency and to customer 
satisfaction: the idea is that by being free from industries’ pressures it is 
able to assure a more competitive procurement process. States that 
integrate programmes in OCCAR know that their internal procurement 
strategies are no longer applicable and this implies two things: first, 
they will face common rules and regulations that together agreed to 
establish easing cooperative efforts. Second, states can take forward 
programmes sometimes stymied by internal intricacies. 
                                                           
487 Keith Hayward , 1997, 34.  
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Notwithstanding this, states are still reluctant to confer to OCCAR 
programmes from the very beginning of the procurement process, 
exactly where it would be more profitable. In fact, the procurement 
process is made up of multiple phases, the first of which is the 
‘preparation phase’, that implies basically the definition of commercial 
arrangements and technical specificities such as capabilities needed, 
funds required, “OCCAR may potentially intervene in this phase, and 
therefore contribute to harmonize military requirements of different 
countries: if states agree to enter this phase then the organization could 
define the operative requirements, while normally, instead, this are 
developed by states and only afterwards presented to OCCAR”.488 In 
fact, if the preparation phase was geared together and states were 
required to assess the capabilities needed in order to face new 
challenges, an harmonization of requirements would inevitably come 
about, to the benefit of a common European Defence Strategy. States 
would agree together that  national systems are not enough to promise 
national defence and that new challenges require cooperation and 
interoperability among weapon systems; armaments manageable by all 
European states would pave the way for a truly integrated 
procurement process.  
In ‘Programme definition’ the feasibility of the programme is tested 
together with its potential costs and the problems likely to arise: this 
phase should end when an operative requirement has been developed. 
States are not used to cooperate in the definition phase because they 
need to define the perimeter of the programme and only after that they 
relate to each other: some of the aspects and peculiarities of the 
programme need to be defined clearly, while in OCCAR they may go 
out of their control. Notwithstanding that, OCCAR may manage all the 
other phases of a programme life-cycle: development, production and 
In-Service Support, but the preparation and definition activities, 
concerning mission analysis and feasibility studies, are prepared by 
Member States. 
The development phase, that regards the BOXER, FREMM and 
partially the TIGER HAD programmes, assists the preparation phase, 
                                                           
488 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview,  Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 27, 2007a.  The preparation phase, explains 
Cardinali, tries to answer the question: which is the capability to be satisfied? 
This answer is more likely to be faced by EDA, but what if EDA is not able to 
foster common operative requirement by states? Would not the entire defence 
process be damaged by this fallacy? 
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its certification, the fulfilment of the security standards and the meeting 
of requirements. In particular, this phase is aimed at specifying in 
details the system, developing it, testing it and finally qualifying it, 
while assets for the industrial production are ascertained. After a 
positive judgment on these aspects and after states’ approval, the 
system would pass through industrialization and production. The In-
Service phase enters the stage when Participating States decide to 
employ the weapon system; this phase can be assigned to OCCAR  and 
its Programme Division which, trough the Management Procedures, 
will implement common In-Service technical management and support 
functions.489  
OCCAR Management Procedure asserts that “in order to gain 
maximum benefit from the management of a collaborative system by 
OCCAR, a Programme should not be integrated later than the start of 
the definition phase. However the participating states may decide to 
integrate a Programme in OCCAR at any stage of its life and possibly 
after a phase has already begun”.490  
 
Figure 12. Optimum Programme Phasing. Source: OCCAR Management 
Procedure 1, http:// www.occar-ea.org /media /raw/ 
OMP1_Programme_Management_issue2_010706.pdf  
 
The previous Director of the Executive Administration Klaus Von 
Sperber affirms that, “it is important for OCCAR to continuously 
improve the effectiveness of its programmes, to be involved in 
programme preparation and planning (from the earliest stages) and to 
                                                           
489 OCCAR Management Procedure 1, “Principal Programme Management 
Procedure”: Paragraph 3.3. 
490 Ibid., Section 3. 
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position itself within the future European Defence Agency”.491 The 
same organization emphasised in its documents that to enhance its 
capabilities it was deemed paramount  to “realize and integrate new 
programmes and Technology Demonstrators from the very beginning 
of the life cycle”.492  
In line with these arguments Jean Pierre d’Hérouville maintains that 
“in order to be truly efficient at the very date when a programme is 
assigned to it, OCCAR must be involved at an earlier stage. This 
involvement does not preclude any loss of responsibility from nations 
at that stage”,493 and maintains that in the “in concept phase”, that is the 
phase in which nations are evaluating whether to cooperate or procure 
nationally a weapon system, OCCAR can participate as an observer in 
order to ease the integration phase once the decision to assign a 
programme to the organization is taken by Member States. Precisely, 
OCCAR could draft reports and recommendations clarifying its rules 
and procedures. For example, OCCAR has been an observer of the 
A400M and of the FREMM programmes. OCCAR’ s involvement in the 
initial phases of a programme can help face problems at an early stage, 
avoiding stalemates later on, “some of the old school may see OCCAR 
as an intruder or a nuisance in the discussion between nations when it 
is an observer, but this is a non economical reaction. OCCAR stands in 
reality as an adviser, reminding nations of the best practices in leading 
cooperative projects”.494  
The procurement process is thus divided in phases in order to assess 
technical, financial and schedule risks: working phase by phase permits 
to prove that each step has met its purpose before passing to another 
stage. For each phase a Programme Management Plan is  created and 
                                                           
491 Karl Von Sperber, “Foreword”, OCCAR-EA Business Plan 2004, 
Organization Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement, 2003, p.  3, 
http:// www.occar-ea.org/media/raw/BP_2004_issue01.pdf.  
492 OCCAR Presentation to the Civil Defence School, 2005, p. 62. 
493 Jean-Pierre d’Hérouville, “OCCAR Involvement in Future Programmes”, 
Military Technology, Special Issue, 2004, p. 16. The Special Issue of the Military 
Technology Journal in 2004 was entirely dedicated to OCCAR; it encompassed 
interventions from OCCAR staff, specialists in military issues as well as 
components of the industries and military forces of the Nations participating in 
the organization. Its aim was to ascertain the results OCCAR did reach from 
the achievement of the legal status in 2001. “On the way to Success” was the 
subtitle, and underlined the potentialities but also the limits encountered thus 
far by the Organization. 
494 Ibid. p. 16. 
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explains the organization and the resources needed, the methods used, 
the tasks to be undertaken to achieve the programme purposes. Each 
programme will be divided in as many phases as it is deemed efficient 
for it: given that more phases will inevitably require longer works and 
costs a sound trade-off should be devised in order to curb them.  
Delaying in programmes state-of-the art is a problem OCCAR is aiming 
at facing: while risk reduction through division in phases is a step 
toward a more efficient procurement strategy, the time extension 
implied in it could determine an increase in the costs of the process 
because of prolonged negotiations. To handle this issue OCCAR has 
foreseen a unique contract for production and development: this would 
potentially save time, while risk management procedures would 
mitigate the pitfalls encompassed in a sole phase.   
4.10 Improving performances: coordination in “In-Service 
Support”  
Looking at the state of OCCAR’ s programmes it seems that for the 
near future the main function OCCAR is going to perform is the In-
Service Support one, “as more and more OCCAR-managed 
Programmes enter the In-service Support Phase, we will ensure that 
our processes, methods, tools and organizational structure are 
optimised for the specific ISS-related requirements”.495 States can decide 
either to manage this phase by themselves or to assign its management 
to a specific agency. The reasons states may want to manage this phase 
in cooperation are the same envisioned above and remind to economies 
of scale and general savings opportunities. Nevertheless, the possibility 
to manage this phase in cooperation has also important strategic 
repercussions that will be analysed below. 
It is difficult to-date to ascertain whether and how many new 
programmes will be integrated in OCCAR; therefore, the organization 
aims at specializing in the In-Service Support phase so as to deepen its 
potentialities as a procurement agency and to provide further benefits 
to the Member States.  OCCAR wants to optimise its capabilities in 
order to be “the first choice for managing specification, contracting and 
acceptance for the engineering and logistic elements in all activities, 
                                                           
495 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Foreword by OCCAR-EA Director”, OCCAR 
Business Plan 2007, Organization Conjointe de Coopération en Matière 
d’Armement, 2006, p. 5. 
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commercial aspects and information management”.496 Starting from 
2004, OCCAR envisioned the In-Service Support as one of its main 
activities and recommended to develop systems for ascertaining and 
including life-cycle cost considerations as early as possible in the 
procurement cycle. The most visible challenges that the organization 
has to face now regard distributional tensions among Member States: 
for every state cooperation in this phase is absolutely preferable than a 
non-cooperative process for economic and strategic reasons, but each 
state is used to a particular support system and would like to see the 
arrangement that most satisfies its preferences. A cooperative 
management of this phase through OCCAR would inevitably require a 
certain standardization of practices towards a joint support, “it is clear 
that if production and development market is fragmented the one for 
In-Service Support is even more complicated. This is so because each 
armed force operative exigency and the specific conditions in which it 
works requires a more strict control that would probably be lost within 
an International Organism”.497  
The In-Service-Support (ISS) is of paramount importance for an 
organization as OCCAR, because it can potentially pave the way for 
harmonization of practices and point to the direction of rationalization 
and common work,  both remarkable aims of OCCAR. Assessing the 
problems and the challenges this phase could represent for states 
deciding to pool resources highlights once again the peculiarities of an 
organization dealing with defence issues and facing distributional 
issues. 
Every complex system has a life on its own, a life-cycle that 
encompasses the development, production and support of a weapon 
system. “Support” means that when completed a system should prove 
its performances and absolve the tasks it was created for. The In-
Service phase coincides with the operative life of a system that 
strategically and temporarily represents the most important period of 
the programme life-cycle:498 strategically because it is in this phase that 
the system is required to reach, maintain and improve its operative 
performances and temporarily because this phase has an extension of 
                                                           
496 OCCAR, “Corporate Strategy”, OCCAR Strategy Paper :  Section 6.2. 
497 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Indagine Conoscitiva sullo stato attuale e 
sulle prospettive dell’industria della difesa e sulla cooperazione in materia di 
armamenti”, 2007d, pp. 13-14, http:// www.senato.it /documenti /repository/ 
commissioni/stenografici/15/comm04/04a-20070529-IC-0431.pdf.  
498 Lieutenant Commander Carlo Aliberti, ISS expert, OCCAR-EA, Interview, 
Bad Godesberg, Bonn, Novembre 27, 2007. 
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almost 2/3 of the whole life-cycle. It is apparent that, aside from 
production costs, there are huge other costs linked to maintenance of 
the system, adaptation and adjustment: costs that could soar up to 70% 
of the entire programme, “it is like an iceberg, where the biggest part is 
hidden under the sea, while the minor part comes out and sometimes 
gives a misleading and false vision of the submerged one”.499 Given the 
huge costs this phase is likely to exhibit, the better solution would be 
that right in the preparation or definition phase logistic requirements 
for the support of the system were assessed, a process called 
“integrated logistic support”: in this way it would be possible to  have a 
clear-cut vision of the financial efforts needed for the In-Service 
Support phase from the very beginning of the programme. 
The aim of OCCAR is to provide services in eight macro-activities 
embodied in this phase: 
- configuration management: it permits to have a precise and 
timely assessment of the exact configuration of the system, its 
“work breakdown structure”, its real and authorized 
configuration. It is a complex activity which requires a complex 
organization. It is necessary, for example, to have a perfect 
interconnection among informative systems: among producers, 
suppliers, industries, states, so that various actors are engaged 
at more levels. 
- Technical event management: it supervises and assesses the 
compatibility of technical elements with those required, and 
comprises studies to prevent the rise of technical problems. 
- Supply support management: it regards the individuation and 
the release of spare materials. 
- Maintenance management: it regards the maintenance of the 
system and the correction of its shortfalls. It can range from the 
substitution of parts of the system till inspections at regular 
time-frames. 
- Post-design services: similar to development this activity enters 
the game at the middle of the programme life-cycle.  It entails a 
technical analysis of the possible updates to the  basic project, 
so as to improve its performances or to maintain them through 
time. In fact, requirements can change during the life of a 
programme and an update of the system is necessary in these 
cases, even if less significant technical adjustment may also be 
brought about. 
                                                           
499 Ibid. 
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- Obsolescence management: it regards the individuation of 
parts that can become obsolete and selection of the tools likely 
to handle this problem: stockpile material, substitution with a 
similar component, change of the entire system. This activity is 
getting more and more important in new generation systems 
where exigencies are determined by the difference in operative 
life among the complex system (20-25 years) and the elements 
composing it (such as computers, software). 
- Technical documentation management: it regards the 
management of the technical information (updating, 
corrections, adaptations, broadening). Without documentation 
it is not possible to use the system. 
- Training management: education of the technical staff charged 
of the management and servicing of the system. 
It is clear that In-Service Support does not need to encompass all of the 
phases just presented; in fact, a support activity may well cover only 
some of these activities or some other not presented here. Also, 
OCCAR’ s attempt at identifying eight macro-activities is tentative; 
some of them seem to overlap and need a clearer and detailed 
definition specifying their realm of application. In order to provide 
those services, OCCAR needs to develop a ‘process model’ so as to 
enhance, through a defined and consistent project and quantitative 
parameters of performances, states confidence in OCCAR’ s In-Service 
Support management.500 
Why should states confer the In-Service Support phase of a programme 
to OCCAR? As said before, there are advantages to let OCCAR manage 
this phase if the organization has taken part in the development and 
the production of the same: because it would possess information 
regarding the system, it would be able to manage it appropriately. If 
cooperation in the first phases of a programme is deemed beneficial 
and if the more relevant costs are for the ISS phase, it is apparent that 
greater scale economies may be reached through cost-sharing in this 
phase, “it is clear that the more synergies and commonality can be 
                                                           
500 Lieutenant Colonel Stefano Delle Chiaie,  ISS expert, OCCAR-EA, Interview, 
Novembre 27, 2007. Carlo Aliberti maintains that actually OCCAR is engaged 
in developing an innovative management process of this phase which foresees 
the possibility to provide  timely verification tools of the activities undertaken. 
This  instrument could help OCCAR provide that added value in ISS activities 
able to attract even advanced programme. 
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achieved in this phase by nations using the same equipment, the more 
savings can be achieved”.501  
That said, OCCAR aims at becoming an excellence centre for ISS 
support in absolute terms, meaning that it aims at capturing the 
attention of states even for programmes not integrated in OCCAR. 
Managing the ISS phase for multilateral programmes in cooperation 
brings about advantages for participating states when positive 
achievements overpass the loss of potential national returns.502 OCCAR 
has to act so as to underline and stress these positives achievements in 
particular by adapting the support system to different logistic 
requirements, favouring in this way interoperability.503 Of course, if 
states use exactly the same weapon systems economies of scale would 
spread out considerable effects also in the In-Service phase: all the 
logistic would benefit from that because, for example, offices can be 
kept in common and it would be possible to reduce servicing centres. 
Nevertheless, even without exactly the same armaments it is possible to 
save on and improve contractual procedures within OCCAR: 
supposing that OCCAR is not influenced by industrial pressures and 
that it has good contractual skills, it can acquire a bigger amount of 
stockpiles for a less individual cost compared to national orders. 
OCCAR would follow its management procedures which, as seen 
before, render it more free from the burdensome complications of and 
sometimes incompatibilities among national legislations and 
procedures. Given that basic weapon systems in OCCAR are similar for 
all states, the possibility arises to enhance interoperability through 
pooling ISS activities. Instead, if, because of different requirements, a 
duplication of ISS activities should emerge, no benefits would be found 
in OCCAR activities. All depends on the way in which the organization 
is able to optimize this phase and on the way in which states agree to 
coordinate the previous phases of the programme life-cycle. 
Notwithstanding all the potential beneficial achievements, states 
remain reluctant to assign OCCAR the management of this phase 
specifically for fear of loosing national prerogatives or of loosing 
control of their actions. The negotiations leading to agreements are long 
and states try to keep and advanced their preferred solutions. As an 
                                                           
501General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Armaments: Which Technologies for Which 
Defence?”, Address delivered at the Centre des Hautes études de l’Armement, 
Paris, November 19, 2007b, p. 14.  
502 Lieutenant Commander Carlo Aliberti, Interview, 2007. 
503 Ibid. 
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expert on this issue maintains, there are not technical reasons that 
motivate states’ reticence for a common management of ISS through 
OCCAR, but essentially political ones.504 Industrial interests at stake are 
much higher in this phase for the reasons abovementioned. If a state 
has a low work-share within a programme the trade-off resulting from 
conferring the management of the phase to OCCAR is not particularly 
high; instead, for big amounts of work-share, the calculus is much more 
arduous since states do not want to loose their position and their 
returns within the programme. A case in point is the A400M aircraft: 
states such as France and Germany, who have huge take-offs, exhibit 
different positions from states which participate in a less significant 
way. In this case, the states would have to weight the benefits -
economic and strategic- of a common support with the backsides -
industrial and political- of such a choice. On this latter aspect it should 
be noticed that given the economic relevance of the ISS phase, national 
states have developed through time vast structures devolved to this 
task which would resent the “externalization” of the activity and the 
inevitable linkage with and dependence from other nations.  
Aside from pure industrial motivations, which nevertheless constitute 
most of states’ reticence towards common ISS, stand other important 
factors. As Lieutenant Commander Carlo Aliberti maintains, in order to 
manage appropriately the ISS phase information flows should be 
enormous, continuous and immediate. The quantity of information that 
should be exchanged asks for the existence of  well structured, ramified 
and safe communication channels not yet available in the military field 
among nations participating in different programmes.  
Timely information is equally of the paramount importance: a late 
information is equal to a complete hampering of the whole support 
system performances. Also, information may be sensitive in some cases 
and states may be reluctant to provide them as this phase practices 
request. What is at stake in this case is not a ‘technological transfer’, 
which is embodied in previous phases of the programme, but the 
national security of states: whenever a state declares that one of its 
components or an entire system is out of order, it may potentially 
endanger its safety because such information regard the “availability” 
and not merely the possession of the system.505 Moreover, for example, 
                                                           
504 Lieutenant Commander Carlo Aliberti and Lieutenant Colonel Stefano Delle 
Chiaie, Interviews, 2007.  
505 Lieutenant Commander Carlo Aliberti affirms that notwithstanding the fact 
that rivalries are no longer characterizing relationships among European States, 
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if OCCAR would manage the “technical event” activity it would have 
potentially the authority to stop an entire fleet if the need arises: if the 
fleet in question is the one concerned with aerial defence a state would 
be reluctant to follow OCCAR devices and would rather keep control 
over every similar decision.  
For all these reasons, experts suggest that ISS phase of big and vital 
weapon systems would probably never be conferred to OCCAR, or at 
least, that the more sensitive activities of the ISS would never be 
relinquished to the organization. That said, some ISS activities do not 
constitute the big challenges aforementioned: the “obsolescence” 
activity does not reveal a strategic shortfall of a nation but rather it 
permits to locate and correct elements to the benefit of all the nations 
engaged in a programme. Inevitably, there is a critical path that should 
be respected when conferring some ISS activities to the organization: 
the configuration phase comes before every other activity because it is 
necessary to carry forward all other phases. Therefore, if a common 
management of ‘obsolescence’ is approved the ‘configuration’ activity 
has to be implicitly agreed.  
Some of OCCAR’ s programmes are in or will enter soon the ISS phase: 
this means that states have decided to confer some of the ISS activities 
to OCCAR. Configuration and supply support are foreseen for the 
TIGER, COBRA and FSAF programmes, while as for the A400M 
aircraft only a minimal core has been reached because of the problems 
illustrated above regarding different levels of work-share among states. 
Added to that, states exhibit  polar conception about the sound way to 
servicing a system. This is why it is difficult for OCCAR to go on with 
its functions and improve its potentialities: in order to accomplish these 
tasks a partial cession of sovereignty or renunciation of national 
prerogatives would be required. This does not mean that a state looses 
its political control on programmes but at least that if coordination is 
agreed upon it can not always reach its preferred outcome. This is 
especially true because of two reasons: it acts with other powerful 
states and compromise is the best strategy if weighted on the balance 
sheet.  
States do want OCCAR to perform beneficial cooperative actions up to 
the point where their interests and position are not endangered. 
Therefore, the coordination achieved for OCCAR’ s creation has to be 
constantly re-negotiated whenever a new step has to be undertaken.  
                                                                                                                               
these latter are still careful to share information related to shortfalls in their 
national security system.  
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4.11 Where does OCCAR stand? 
This section deals with the state-of-the art of the organization and 
highlights how this has grown since its creation in 2001. This analysis is 
of the paramount importance because it helps understand the limits but 
also the potentialities of such an agency.  
The figure below shows the likely evolution of OCCAR’ s programmes 
based on their current stage of development: delays or postponements 
of the expected path would therefore hide controversies among states, 
temporarily lack of funds or shortfalls in the productive process. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: OCCAR-EA projected evolution based upon the current 
Programmes. Source: OCCAR Corporate Strategy, Strategy Paper 14, 2006, p. 6. 
 
What emerges from this figure is first of all that programmes are facing 
an advanced phase of their life-cycle and that therefore the ISS phase 
will be the one that will engage OCCAR the most in the near future. 
Second, OCCAR growth potentialities cannot be appreciated only by 
optimizing the ISS phase but also by increasing the number of 
programmes to work with: this is important both for the application of 
the global-balance principle and to confirm OCCAR as a choice for 
procuring multinational  programmes in cooperation.  
The feeling that the organization does not live up to its aspirations is 
shared both by OCCAR staff and by experts outside it: the general 
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agreement is that “OCCAR has not grown in proportion to the 
ambition contained in the Convention”.506 This is gloomy, given that the 
aim of the Director for  2005 was to focus efforts in two areas: growth 
and excellence in programme management. The previous Director of 
the Executive Administration recognized in 2003 that a huge amount of 
work should have been conferred to the agency in order to create and 
forge a European armament capability able to face declining defence 
budgets and satisfy nations’ desire to cooperate on defence issues.507 
Director General Cardinali stated in 2005 that OCCAR was managing 
only 4% of the total investments for defence, while it should have 
reached 50%, that global balance was not applied and that part of the 
objectives set by OCCAR would have been achieved by EDA.508 In 2007 
OCCAR has been managing 10% of the total investments for defence 
and a budget of 4000000000 Euros, a more encouraging number.  
Among OCCAR’ s strategic objectives to be pursued in 2005 there was 
to increase the number of programmes and financial engagement 
through the management of most of the European cooperation projects 
by 2015-2020, given that the integration and common management of 
more and more programmes within OCCAR would have inevitably led 
to a certain harmonization of capabilities.509  In 2004, the French Senate 
remarked that having been assigned two big programmes such as the 
A400M and FSAF, OCCAR had considerably enlarged its dimension 
and had the opportunity to put in practice its acquisition policy.510  
In 2004 Business Plan, four programmes among which a 
TDP(Technology Demonstrator Programme) were under scrutiny for 
integration in OCCAR: FREMM(planned integration year 2004) which 
entailed a cooperation between France and Italy for the development 
and production of multi-mission frigates and with an estimated budget 
of 9000M Euros; PAAMS(planned integration year 2004) which 
                                                           
506 OCCAR, “Corporate Strategy”, OCCAR Strategy Paper, 2006,  Section 4.2. 
507 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Foreword”, OCCAR Business Plan, 2005, 
Organization Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement, 2004, p. 5 and  
Klaus von Sperber, “Foreword”, OCCAR Business Plan 2004, Organization 
Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement, 2003, p. 3. 
508 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview, Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 30, 2005a. 
509 OCCAR Presentation to Civil defence School (2005), p. 58.  
510 French Senate, « Avis présenté au nom de la Commission des Affaires 
étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le projet de loi de finance 
pour 2005, adopté par l’Assemblée Nationale », Ordinary Session 2004-2005, 
http:// cubitus.senat.fr/rap/a04-077-6/a04-077-60.html. 
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involved the development and production of a ship-to-air missile 
system between France, Italy and the UK to be incorporated into the 
existing FSAF Programme Division; integration of Spain in 2004 into 
the TIGER programme which foresaw the introduction of a new 
version of the helicopter (HAD); the PIONIERE/EGACOD, a TDP, 
(planned integration in 2003/2004), which concerned the concept 
demonstration of specific functions of an armoured engineer vehicle; it 
was promoted by Italy and France and had an estimated cost of 10 M of 
Euros.  
Of these initiatives, the FREMM programme and Spain integration in 
TIGER were postponed to 2005: in the first case because of indecisions 
showed by the Italian Government and in the second because Spain 
integration required a new trilateral agreement and refurbished work-
shares. PAAMS munitions procurement was integrated in the FSAF 
programme. PIONIERE  found the agreement of Italy and France on 
common technical requirements and on Programme Strategy but 
waited for the BoS TDP Decision, which was expected in 2005. A new 
Programme, the NH 90 was considered for integration, even if without 
a specific timeframe. This Programme concerned the development and 
production of an helicopter for tactical transport -which included also a 
naval version- among France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal.  
Of these programmes, PIONIERE and NH 90 were never developed 
within OCCAR. As explained before, among OCCAR’ s functions there 
is also the one related to the management of Technology Demonstrator 
Programmes (TDPs). These latter purpose is to assess whether a certain 
technology is appropriate or not to operationally effective systems. It is 
apparent that this activity would play an important role in OCCAR  
attempt at reducing management risk and therefore improving its 
operating procedures, “equipment or programme TDPs are an 
important component in the long term reduction of programme risk 
and the early involvement of OCCAR-EA is therefore likely to increase 
the long-term efficiency and effectiveness of OCCAR management of 
any resultant equipment programmes”.511  Moreover, sometimes TDPs 
                                                           
511 OCCAR, “TDP Management within OCCAR-EA”, Policy Paper, August 
(2003),http://www.occar-ea.org/media/raw/ OMP_1 _TDP_ Policy_ 
Paper_iss1. pdf.  A TDP may have the possibility to be managed by OCCAR in 
three ways: a transfer by Participating Nations of an existing collaborative TDP, 
a commission for it from the nations instead of nationally derived requirements 
and, under some circumstances, a proposal from the Executive Administration 
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can be useful in order to assess the main risks of  a new concept for a 
programme: in this case, a  TDP may be programme-related and 
OCCAR’ s participation will help manage this phase and promote an 
integrated approach with the rest of the programme,512 “Technological 
Demonstrators deserve a particular attention, because they are the 
precursors of future programmes where it is convenient that OCCAR is 
inserted as early as possible to reduce risks and to apply the most 
efficient management practices: from this perspective, all the 
technological demonstrators necessary to validate new concepts or new 
technologies should be assigned to OCCAR”.513   
In 2003-2004, that of including Technology Demonstrator Programmes 
within OCCAR competencies was one of the most important aims of 
the organization. In fact, this would have deepened the role of OCCAR 
as an armament agency rather than a pure management organization, 
“we will in particular strongly support the Member States in their 
attempt to develop further collaboration in defence procurement 
Programmes and TDPs”.514 While the Board of Supervisors did approve 
a Policy Paper specifying in details the management of TDPs within 
OCCAR and while OCCAR-EA has within its aims to engage with 
TDPs, no such programme currently exists and the PIONIERE had a 
short life.  In 2005 Business Plan, the Director, General Nazzareno 
Cardinali, expressed his satisfaction for the agreement reached among 
Italy and France on the common requirements and procurement 
strategy for the PIONIERE/EGACOD Technology Demonstrator 
Programme but the programme has never been integrated into 
OCCAR. In fact, a basic lack of funds stemmed the achievement of a 
final agreement  regarding the system; also, the Italian and French 
Societies cooperating in the programme did not propose a sound 
technical-economic solution since they were not able to find an 
agreement among themselves. The Societies did not want to assume the 
risks of the programme since they did not perceive a rewarding 
                                                                                                                               
to the BoS on the basis of information taken from the nations (see Paragraph 3 
of the TDP Management procedure). 
512 Jean-Pierre d’Hérouville, “OCCAR Involvement in Future Programmes”, 
2004, p. 16. 
513 Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Audition du 
Général Nazzareno Cardinali, Directeur de l’Organization Conjointe de 
Coopération en matière d’Armement, Compte Rendu n°41, July 21, 2005. http:// 
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cdef/04-05/c0405041.asp#TopOfPage.  
514 Klaus Von Sperber, «Foreword », OCCAR Business Plan 2004, Organisation 
Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement, 2003, p. 3. 
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economic return in developing the plan; the huge amount of money 
requested by them has convinced national states to go on through a 
national path.  
Programme NH90 was in the NATO frame when integration into 
OCCAR was proposed. Sometimes it is risky for the future of a 
programme to plan its passage from an organization to another given 
that the consent of all nations engaged is required. Apparently, some of 
the nations participating in the NH90 programme preferred it to 
remain in the NATO context. The way in which the programme was 
balanced and controlled in NATO could have changed significantly if 
integrated in OCCAR. It is all about a balance to be maintained on 
programme control: in OCCAR the programme would have been 
delegated to the Programme Manager while within NATO states had a 
“day by day” supervision of its development.  Following the same 
argument, even the air-to-air missile METEOR could have been 
integrated in OCCAR but “the Great Britain, in a dominant position, 
was absolutely willing to privilege its national industry”.515   
As said before, a nation, in this case the UK, wanted to keep its leader-
position over the programme and opposed therefore the integration of 
it in OCCAR. Of course, this state was the one that more strongly 
supported the programme. There is a Programme Office in the United 
Kingdom that controls English procurement: METEOR contract is 
delineated on the basis of English normative procedures and BAe 
Systems(the English Company) is the prime contractor. When states 
want to retain a particular control on a programme they will try to 
preserve their leadership position finding other cooperative setting 
rather than accepting integration in OCCAR. Programme are assigned 
whenever a substantial parity condition exists among the 
participants.516 
The tasks envisioned by OCCAR for the next years regard the 
completion of programme A400M and first deliveries to participating 
states; achievement of BOXER final  production subject to participating 
states’ decision; design and build of the first French and Italian Frigates 
(FREMM), attainment of initial operating capability for SAMP/T 
(medium range surface-to-air system for the army) and SAAM/T(anti-
missile surface-to-air system for the naval units) system and munitions 
                                                           
515 Jean-Pierre d’Hérouville, “L’OCCAR? Une construction européenne 
originale”,  Défense Nationale 2, February, 2003.   
516 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview,  Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 27, 2007a.  
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delivery for SAMP/T, SAAM/FR(for France), SAAM/IT(for Italy) and 
PAAMS(Principal Anti Air Missile Systems); completion of 
qualifications for HAP(Hélicoptère d’Appui Protection) and HUT 
(Unterstutzung Hubscrauber TIGER) for the TIGER helicopter 
Programme and 1st prototype of the HAD (Helicoptero de Apoyo y 
Destruccion) Version; delivery to nation of COBRA(Weapon Locating 
System) and In Service-Support phase with possible integration of 
Turkey; disposal of ROLAND(Short Range Surface-to-Air Defence 
System) and finally, support of the transition into the In-Service phase 
of the TIGER, FSAF/PAAMS, and A400M Programmes.517  
To date, there is one proposal for integration, ESSOR system. This is a 
small programme of 100M Euro among France, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
and Finland for a ‘European Secured Software Defined Radio 
Referential’. The Programme is  aimed at elaborating, in relation with 
the United States, the ‘normative referential’ requested for the 
development and the production of radio software in Europe, creating 
common security bases to increase interoperability among European 
forces and with the United States and stimulating balanced 
transatlantic relations based on SDR(Software Defined Radio). The 
objective is to promote a technological and industrial capability of a 
truly European strategic importance. 518 
4.12 From ‘Cold War minded’ programmes on 
Some of those labelled as “old programmes” have been of the 
paramount importance for the development of the organization. In 
general, these are programmes that existed even before the setting of 
OCCAR and that were conferred to it immediately after its creation. Of 
course, they were integrated in a late phase of their life-cycle. Below, a 
brief analysis of the programmes will be undertaken: what is of the 
utmost interest is to grasp the difficulties emerged because of different 
states’ positions regarding the agreement to be reached.  
First of all is Programme ROLAND. Its bilateral management was 
integrated in a permanent French-German office(Bureau de Programmes 
Franco-Allemand) in 1973; this represents the example of an existent 
cooperative project, in service since 1978 and used by France and 
Germany. ROLAND is a short-range optical/radar(20000 meters) with 
                                                           
517 OCCAR Business Plan 2007, “Strategic Initiatives”, Organisation Conjointe 
de Coopération en Matière d’Armement , 2006, p. 21. 
518 General Nazzareno Cardinali, 2007c.  
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guided Surface-to-Air Missile(6000 or 8000 meters) mounted on tracked 
and wheeled carrier vehicles. For this programme OCCAR managed 
only the In-Service Support (ISS) and Ammunition Surveillance, and 
therefore the Programme does not mirror OCCAR new principles and 
management capabilities, but is instead one of the examples of the 
fruitful cooperation in arms procurement among Germany and France. 
In any case,  in 2006 Germany affirmed its intention to discontinue the 
Ammunition Surveillance and bilateral In-Service Support of the 
ROLAND system and in 2007 it was joined in this decision by France. 
The Programme will be dismissed and OCCAR is envisioning a plan to 
terminate the activities.519 ROLAND was thought in the Cold War 
context to perform specific functions that can now appear in part 
outdated. 
In a similar way, COBRA(Counter Battery Radar) is a long-range 
battlefield radar programme integrated in OCCAR only in its 
production and In-Service Support phase. This weapon system is 
considered as the “world’s most advanced land based weapon locating 
system, comprising a high performance radar, advanced processing 
and an integrated, flexible command, control and communication 
system”;520 its aim is to locate mortars, rocket launchers and artillery 
batteries and to provide information necessary to nullify their 
effectiveness and potential drawbacks. It is a cooperation Programme 
between France, The United Kingdom and Germany started in 1990, 
after protracted phases of negotiations. Interesting is the fact that it is 
identical in its main design for all three nations, with only small 
differences.521 The consortium chosen in 1998 for the production was 
Euro-Art.522 Assigned to OCCAR in 2002, it has been in service since 
2005 and by 2007 all the systems have been delivered to the 
participating states(it is currently being employed by English troupes 
in Iraq). OCCAR manages the In-Service Support Phase and post 
                                                           
519 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Foreword by OCCAR-EA Director”, OCCAR 
Business Plan 2007, Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière 
d’Armement, 2006, p. 4. ROLAND was developed and produced by GIE 
EUROMISSILE. 
520 OCCAR Business Plan 2007, “COBRA- The World’s Most Advanced Weapon 
Locatine System”, p. 13. 
521 Klaus Gewehr, “COBRA”, Military Technology, Special Issue, 2004, p. 36.  
522 EA Consortium was composed by EADS Deutschland GmbH Defence 
electronics(GE), Thales Air Defence(FR), Thales defence ltd.(UK) and Lockeed 
Martin Government Electronic Systems (US). The consortium production 
consists of 12 radar for Germany, 10 for France and 7 for the UK. 
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design Services (2007) in cooperation with a NATO Agency, 
NAMSA(NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency). The In-Service 
Support phase was delayed of a huge amount of months to the 
disappointment of the UK due to disagreements among states about 
the way in which the contract should have been placed and after the 
decision of Germany to reduce the amount of radars ordered(Germany 
sold two COBRA to Turkey), that in turn required a redefinition of the 
production costs.523  
FSAF Programme stands for an entire family of surface-to-air anti-
missile systems for the navy and for the army. In particular, 
SAMP/T(medium range surface-to-air system for the army) was 
aiming at replacing the expensive Patriot System in service in Europe. 
A Memorandum of Understanding among France and Italy for a 
bilateral cooperation of these systems was signed in 1988 and a 
consortium named EUROSAM was created.524 Phase 1 of the 
Programme encompassed French DGA(Délégation Générale pour 
l’Armement) contract for feasibility studies, project definition, 
development and qualification of SAAM/FR(anti-missile surface-to-air 
system for the naval units/for France composed of short range missile 
Aster15-short range- plus 4 naval launchers plus radar ARABEL FCS), 
SAAM/IT(For-Italy, Missile Aster15 plus 4 naval launchers and radar 
EMPAR FCS) and SAMP/T systems(Missile Aster30 -medium range- 
plus 6 land launchers and radar ARABEL FCS) and was concluded in 
2003.525 The second phase, launched in 1997, encompassed the 
                                                           
523 The United Kingdom Parliament, “OCCAR Projects”, House of Commons 
Hansard Written Answers for December 1, 1997, http:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo971201/text/71
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industrialization and qualification of the three systems, and the 
delivery of pre-series systems, that is still ongoing for SAMP/T. In 
order to create a less expensive but efficient system in comparison to 
the Patriot one, deep cuts should had to be undertaken on research and 
development costs. However, this was rendered more difficult by just 
aforementioned reasons, “every participating country wanted its 
defence industry to participate, but since the industrial capabilities and 
designers’ skill and experience not always justified that, some parts 
have been duplicated, such as three types of fire-control radar used in 
the whole FSAF”.526  
The programme has been assigned to OCCAR in 2003, and 
encompasses its production and also common FSAF/PAAMS(Principal 
Anti Air Missile Systems) Aster munitions production plus initial In-
Service Support of the system. The decision to procure munitions for 
both FSAF and PAAMS was taken on economic ground and with 
strong support by the UK, “taking the needs of both programmes into 
account in one single contract enable us to negotiate better Aster 
missile production prices”.527 In fact, the peculiarity of the programme 
is that there are similar or identical equipments for naval and land 
systems which therefore decrease development, production and In- 
Service Support costs.  
PAAMS encompasses new weapon systems based on common 
elements developed in the frame of the FSAF Programme.528 It is aimed 
at “self-defence, local area and naval area defence capabilities for the 
future frigates of the navies: the FR/IT Horizon Frigate(with the Italian 
EMPAR Radar) and the UK Type 45 Destroyer(with English radar 
SAMPSON)”.529 In particular for France, out-of-area airbases protection 
is of the paramount importance, because, as experts explain, on some 
occasions France finds itself to act alone(as in Africa) and with its own 
system it can be self-sufficient. In the PAAMS munitions procurement, 
                                                                                                                               
French Air Carrier Charles De Gaulle for self-defence in 1999, while SAAM/IT 
on aircraft carrier Cavour. SAMP/T short-range land which was chosen 
together by Italy and France defends tactical important areas. The Italian Navy 
has chosen FSAF to ensure the defence of a new Italian Navy Major 
Unity(NUMM- Nuova Unità Maggiore della Marina). Differently from France, 
it employs EMPAR radar, designed and built by Alenia Marconi Systems. 
526 Michael Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczyhnski “OCCAR Chooses SAMP/T”, The 
Journal of Electronic Defense, January, 2004, www.jedonline. com.  
527 General Nazzareno Cardinali,  2005 b, p. 27.  
528 See OCCAR Business Plan 2007, p. 15. 
529 Ibid. 
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which has spurred relevant economies of scale, participates also the 
United Kingdom, “the idea has taken a little time to take ground but, 
quickly, the participant states have appreciated the possibility to pass 
to a unique contract for a huge number of missiles rather than to have 
separate acquisition procedures. The scale economies have triumphed 
on programmes rivalries”.530 As mentioned above, not all the PAAMS 
Programme is integrated in OCCAR, but only the part regarding the 
procurement of munitions. While France and Italy did not oppose, at 
the beginning, a full integration of the programme in OCCAR the 
situation was different for the UK within which different positions 
persisted about the advantages of  integration in the organization. 
Moreover, the Programme Office yet existing seemed to guarantee 
more control on the programme.  
France and German cooperation on the production of TIGER 
helicopters started in 1988, for strategic and tactic support functions. 
The helicopter had to absolve multiple fighting tasks during the day 
and the night in all weather conditions. It was developed in two 
version, the UHT (Unterstutzung Hubscrauber TIGER) for Germany 
and the HAP (Hélicoptère d’Appui Protection) for France with a 
contract with EUROCOPTER in 1999.531 The difficult period France 
faced in the ‘90s with its defence production was felt also in this 
programme, “the production of reports of TIGER and NH90 helicopters 
put in danger our European industrial cooperation. In the same 
moment where the American offensive was stronger we give the 
impression of giving in. This is alarming and the workers of 
EUROCOPTER are right to demand to you explanations”.532 In 2004 
Spain showed its intention to participate in the Programme and to 
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 224 
develop and produce a new version of the helicopter (HAD-
Helicoptero de Apoyo y Destruccion) which met also French 
requirement, so that it will be produced for both of them. This has 
entailed the signing of a trilateral Administrative Agreement and has 
seen the integration of the programme in OCCAR. Also in this case the 
procurement of the same system would have brought about huge 
savings, “for optimising the commonalities and reducing costs, all the 
version of the TIGER have been developed from a common ‘basic 
helicopter’ which corresponds to the vehicle development and to the 
basic avionics”.533 The work-sharing among states foresaw also Spain’s 
compensation of the costs encountered by the other two countries for 
the creation of the basic system: in fact its HAD version derived from 
the original system. Due to national peculiar exigencies three version 
derived from the basic model are developed for the three states. 
4.13 New threats old problems 
This section will highlight those programmes that seem perfectly 
tailored and envisaged for the new threats of the world scenario. While 
new challenges request a prompt answer, states continue to encounter 
their usual problems when trying to coordinate their actions in 
multinational programmes. From this point of view it can be said that 
the decision to confer OCCAR these programme has been of the utmost 
importance to speed up their development and production.  
Of course, the integration of the FREMM programme in 2005 has been 
paramount for OCCAR, “France and Italy have decided to entrust 
OCCAR with a new Programme, FREMM (Multi- Mission Frigates), 
which is the second largest OCCAR Programme in budgetary terms 
and the first full naval Programme to be managed by OCCAR-EA”.534 
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that integration in OCCAR 
came out of a long process of delays and disputes among France and 
Italy regarding funds and operative requirements that amended more 
times the original contract. First of all there were divergences related to 
the requirements the Frigate had to meet, with Italy preferring a bigger 
model while France opting for a lighter one. Asked about these 
controversies General Cardinali answered that none of them did 
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prevail; instead “both of them” won, given that Italy will have the most 
sophisticated version while France the simplest one.535 The contract 
awarded by OCCAR is one and envisions an Italian and a French 
version of the Frigate; the parts developed in common are produced 
according to competitive criteria (first among Italy and France and 
eventually encompassing other Member States); the parts 
distinguishing each version will be produced by the national 
industries(French and Italian).  
The participation of Italy to the Programme has been uncertain until 
May 2006, when the main contract was amended to reshape the 
development and production of the frigates given Italian decision to 
join the Programme. Italian and French Minister of Defence gave birth 
to this cooperation in 2002  proceeding with feasibility studies; in 2004 
a conjoint declaration stated that OCCAR had the vocation to assure 
the management of the Programme, being an observer from 2003. The 
FREMM programme has spurred a lot of discussions within the Italian 
political panorama: on the one hand it was said to represent a high 
level strategic and tactic programme, in line with Italian commitment 
to European development of interoperable and similar defence 
capabilities(Helsinki Headline Goals, Berlin Plus536). On the other hand, 
Italy was uncertain about the results of cooperation given its financial 
constraints. The legislative process was therefore difficult; the financing 
of the FREMM Programme was asked by the opposition party (the 
Left) in 2005 within the Competition Law Decree; a suppression of the 
financing was decided in the first part of 2006 and then it was 
reintroduced in the second half of 2006, through a harsh parliamentary 
fight. As it happens with a lot of international programmes,  
cooperation with France was strongly auspicated because a financial 
commitment to an international programme has less chances of being 
reduced or totally eliminated; international cooperation, therefore, is a 
strategy to obtain and keep assured funds for a programme.  
Italy wanted to be sure that given the huge expenses it had to face in a 
moment of meagre resources it could get an adequate return out of the 
project, meaning that the cooperation arrangement should have been 
rewarding enough to make up for the financial effort. Notwithstanding 
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all the challenges encountered, the Italian political environment 
understood that the programme was essential for the modernization of 
the navy and vital for the national naval industry. Those in favour of 
the programme asserted that “naval units foreseen in the FREMM 
Programme are characterized by  high technological components with 
positive spin-offs not only for the Italian naval industry but also for the 
development of the electronic, radar communication, armaments and 
engine systems, and with positive spin-offs also for the civil and not 
only the military industry. The orders will foster an excellence 
production assuring stability and occupational continuity for a relevant 
number of workers for a long time”.537 Therefore, the final agreement 
reached by France and Italy was one that satisfied all Italian 
requirements and that weighted the potential consequences of a lack of 
the necessary investments to start the programme: in this case the 
alternative for Italy would have been to withdraw from the programme 
and let France produce alone the Frigate, loosing in this way its relative 
competitiveness. Moreover, Italian credibility in cooperative efforts 
would have been reduced given the yet withdrawal from the A400M 
programme. Finally, Italy would have lost jobs. Instead, such a high 
technological investment would have increased Italian competitiveness 
in international markets while assuring occupation.  
FREMM programme is defined by OCCAR as “the most ambitious and 
innovative European naval defence project” and is aimed at fulfilling 
the new requirement of a changing environment for the Italian and 
French navies.538According to the BoS and to the Programme Board 
decision, OCCAR should manage the development, production and 
initial In- Service Support of this Programme, estimated 11,000M of 
euros in 2005 and 11,116M euros in 2006. The total of navies to be 
procured is 27, 17 of them for France and 10 for Italy. These ships will 
have three version: anti-submarine warfare(ASM/ASW), land 
attack(AVT) and general purpose (GP). First delivery of the ASW 
frigate is established for 2011, while all the other are envisaged for 2021. 
Programme Divisions are now set in Rome and in Paris, a way this one 
to re-affirm the balance existing in this programme. The balance is not 
                                                           
537 Lorenzo Forcieri to the Prime Minister, 14° Legislature, Session n° 964 , Act 
n° 4-10257, published the 7th March 2006. http:// 
www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/showText?tipodoc=Sindisp&leg=14&id=1
82039.  
538 OCCAR Business Plan 2007, “FREMM-The Future Multi-Mission Frigates”, 
p. 14. 
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of course in terms of take-offs, that as seen are different for the two 
countries, but suggests instead that no state has the leadership on the 
programme. This is also illustrated by the industries going to produce 
the frigates: ARMARIS(DCN, Thales -France) and ORIZZONTE S.N. 
(Finmeccanica- Italy) that in any case cooperate in the production of 
common parts. 
BOXER, a multi-role armoured vehicle, is together with the A400M and 
FREMM, a programme that better mirrors OCCAR’ s aims and vision. 
First of all, it is a flexible weapon deployable in different contexts, in 
line with new environments, “the concept of a drive module and an 
exchangeable mission module makes it a flexible military vehicle for a 
large range of assignments, providing the highest protection of his 
class”.539  Moreover, this vehicle can be transported by the A400M in 
crisis areas(out of area missions) and is fit to work both in high 
intensity conflicts and in rapid reaction peace support and 
humanitarian operations. It is provided with protection against mines 
and an adjustable modular armour that grant protection of the soldiers 
from threats. For these reasons, it is visibly superior to other available 
weapons. This conclusion is clearly stated in the programme 
presentation in 2007 Business Plan: “the programme represents a major 
collaboration between Germany and the Netherlands, which will bring 
great operational benefits including interoperability with the armies, as 
well as financial savings. Sharing of development costs, technologies 
and economies of scale in production are just three of the major 
attractions and benefits of this collaboration”.540 In the same vein, the 
programme is deemed of the paramount importance for the 
development of industrial capabilities, “the BOXER Programme 
strengthens the links between the partner nations and industries and is 
expected to provide a springboard for the development of a more 
cohesive and competitive European defence industry in this sector”.541 
OCCAR is engaged in the development and production phase of this 
Programme and has signed a contract with ARTEC GmbH(2004) -
which is a Consortium between a German and a Dutch enterprises- that 
                                                           
539 OCCAR, “BOXER-A Multi Role Armoured Vehicle”, Programmes, http:// 
www.occar-ea.org/view.php?nid=76. Different variants of BOXER will be 
developed and qualified to cover operational need: Armoured Personnel 
carrier, Command Post, Ambulance, Battle Damage Repair and Cargo vehicle. 
The Programme Division was established in the late 2000. 
540 Ibid.  
541 ARTEC,  “BOXER-The New Generation of Armoured Utility Vehicles”, 
http:// www.artec-boxer.com/ .     
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entails the production of 272 vehicles for Germany and 200 for the 
Netherlands for 2009, given that the vehicle is deemed as urgent to 
states’ needs.542 The Netherlands entered the programme in 2001 
because this latter could have satisfied the basic requirements for its 
vehicles, but also because this was an opportunity to penetrate OCCAR 
procurement agency.543 All that said, it is fair to stress that the United 
Kingdom was a participant in the Programme but, due to changes in its 
national requirements, the UK and its industry(which followed the 
decision of the MoD) withdrew from the programme. The remaining 
states had to adjust the arrangements in a bilateral way according to 
technical, practical and work-sharing criteria. In particular, agreements 
exist among the German and Dutch industry that balance the work-
share through off-sets.  
The reasons of the UK’ s withdrawal are not to be found in OCCAR’ s 
poor performances; instead the organization was performing pretty 
soundly its procurement tasks. The fact is that the UK started to 
question the significance of this vehicle. In July 2003, the UK Ministry 
of Defence stated that the MoD required a lighter and more easily 
deployable vehicle albeit able to protect the soldiers. The requisites 
called for were very ambitious and, as it was assessed later on, 
impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, for the UK BOXER was considered 
too heavy a vehicle and therefore it decided for a national path through 
the development of the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES).544 This 
decision came after that, in the 2002 presentation by ARTEC of the first 
German prototype, the UK Minister for Defence Procurement argued 
that “BOXER was a good example of European engineering excellence, 
offering a vehicle concept with which the armed forces and industry 
should be proud to be associated”.545 The Minister went on by saying 
                                                           
542 ARTEC GmbH is a consortium formed by Kraus-Maffei Wegmann (GE 36%), 
Rheinmetall Landsysteme (GE 14%) and Stork (NL 50%). The British 
participating industry was Alvis Vickers. The contract was signed in 2004 and 
the production phase started in 2006. After this date, ARTEC proposed an offer 
to OCCAR for the first production of 400 vehicles in 2005, but it was rejected 
because it did not meet requirement costs. Germany will have 272 vehicles and 
the Netherlands 200. 
543 Ted Hooton, “FRES Knocks Out Boxer: British Army Reviews AFV 
Programmes”, Military Technology  8-9, 2003, p. 59.  
544 “BOXER MRAV Wheeled Multi-Role armoured Vehicle”, www. army- 
technology. com / projects/ mrav. MRAV (Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle) was 
the name of the programme in the United Kingdom. 
545 “BOXER Prototype Presented”, Military Technology 12, 2002, p. 62.  
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that European cooperation was important in order to meet UK’ s needs 
and the BOXER Programme represented one of these cooperations.  
English withdrawal has inevitably implied delays as well as huge costs 
for the nation, that, according to OCCAR’ s rules, had to uphold the 
burden of adjustments and termination expenditures. These provisions 
have permitted to carry forward the programme even without a 
fundamental partner by making it support the total costs of adaptation, 
“it is worth emphasizing that, prior to the advent of OCCAR, a 
withdrawal of this type (the UK had a share of the 33% of the 
Programme) would have normally led to the collapse of the 
programme or, if not, to much greater levels of disruption than will 
now be the case for BOXER”.546 This is another proof of OCCAR’ s 
support for cooperation through mechanisms to disincentive defection. 
In particular, states’ decision to insert in OCCAR provisions for 
mitigating the shortfalls produced by an abrupt withdrawal or a likely 
event is another example of their willingness to go on with cooperation 
and punish detrimental behaviours. Nevertheless, this rules seems not 
to impede states to pursue their interests if their power capabilities 
permits it, as it happened with the United Kingdom. According to 
some pundits, the English decision went against the interest of  
common European equipments and needs, “though European Defence 
Agency(EDA) head Nick Witney has made ‘reducing the number of 
national infantry fighting vehicles from 22 to 12’ one of the EU 's Top 5 
                                                           
546 General Nazzareno Cardinali, 2005 b, p. 27. General Cardinali maintains that 
the UK has paid huge adjustment costs for its withdrawal decision. On the 
same vein is the argument put forward by Laurent Giovachini, which states 
that even for the A400M programme special arrangements are taken in order to 
correct potential disruptions, delays and burdensome adjustment costs, “not 
only do the customers commit in one step to both the development and their 
full production batch, but if one of them wants to reduce its order, an explicit 
financial mechanism is in place to make sure that there will be no adverse 
impact for industry or for the other customers”, see Laurent Giovachini, “Can 
European Co-operation Deliver Competitive, Cutting-edge defence 
Equipment?”, RUSI Defence Systems, June, 2007, p. 44. It is noteworthy to 
observe that BOXER was borne as a cooperative programme among the UK 
and Germany in 1999 and assigned to OCCAR in 2000, and therefore the UK 
was one of the two states needing a new vehicle with specific capabilities. The 
Netherlands joined the Programme in 2001, and together the nations did 
managed a trilateral contract. The UK developed even four prototypes which 
were nevertheless used by the other states for the qualification process. 
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defence priorities, his own government initially followed a very 
different script”.547  
Nowadays the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has made clear the 
necessity for a revision of the English vehicle (FRES). Iraq war has 
stressed the importance that protection has on the ground, a protection 
that is guaranteed only by an heavy vehicle. In fact, the MoD seems to 
reveal its interest for the BOXER programme and to evaluate its 
acquisition off-the-shelf for its infantry among two other alternative 
systems. This has spurred strong criticisms and accusations to the MoD 
for having used a lot of money on the FRES programme, but the 
Defence Department was ready to reply that, "the Boxer was a 
programme the MoD pulled out of when it was known as the MRAV 
programme. We took that decision in 2002 in light of the requirement at 
the time. We have since reviewed the FRES requirement in light of 
recent operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Force protection 
in theatre now has a higher priority than strategic deployability – I 
don't think anyone would argue with that view. When the situation 
changes our procurement process must be capable of responding to 
that change….. I’m not going to go into the details of the protection 
FRES will have in a public forum…. But to suggest that ignoring the 
threats we face in Iraq and Afghanistan today when we set the 
requirement for our future vehicles is wrong. 548  
The UK’ s exit from the BOXER Programme shows how difficult it is 
for states to pursue a cooperative pattern when a national one would 
protect fundamental interests: this means neither that the national path 
is the best strategy nor that defection is more rewarding. Indeed the 
planned order of 3500 vehicles would have provided important 
economic, technological and industrial returns in addition to an added 
interoperability among participating states. Given all the adjustment 
costs that the UK has incurred, it is hard to appraise whether the 
national programme has brought about a better ‘value for money’ 
trade-off, especially if the UK will end up acquiring the BOXER off-the-
shelf. Moreover, the redefinition of British requirements aside from a 
cooperative European path does not fit the objective of coordinating a 
common European defence policy;  as an expert affirms “there are 
many reasons for setbacks: national conceptional plannings changed 
                                                           
547 “The UK’s FRES Transformational Armoured Vehicles”, Defense Industry 
Daily, October 11, 2007. http:// www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uk-issues-
several-fres-transformational-armored-vehicle-contracts-01130/ .   
548 Ibid. 
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over time and finance-plans changed after years caused by budget-
restrictions, and resulted in shiftings which could no longer be 
harmonized or in cutting of projects in one or more nations. There are 
even examples for intentionally changed military requirements in order 
to bail out of a cooperation-program for the benefit of a national 
development and production projects, just to save national capacities 
and jobs”.549  
It has always been English approach to participate in structures with 
‘opting-out possibilities’:550 because of them a state can still coordinate 
actions with other States when it deems it to be in its interest, and 
decide not to be engaged in other situations. Nevertheless, when a state 
commits with a huge amount of orders so that other states become 
dependent on its participation the risk of an eventual disruption are 
high: a state that because of its power cannot be prevented from 
behaving in a damaging way should at least be punished accordingly. 
For the importance of the A400M aircraft Programme a more detailed  
and separate analysis will be undergone later on in this research. 
 
 PARTICIPAT
ING STATES 
PROGRA
MME 
COST 
TOTAL 
PRODUCTI
ON 
DELIVE
RY 
A400M Belgium, France 
Germany, 
Luxembourg 
Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom 
PLUS: 
South Africa, 
Malaysia 
20,330M•  - 
Development, 
Production 
and Initial 
Support 
180 + 12 - 
(7+50+60+1+27+
10+25) 
+ 
(8+4) 
First 
delivery: 
end of 
2009 
Last 
delivery: 
2021 
BOXER The Netherlands, 
Germany 
1,419M• - 
Development 
         
472 – 
First 
delivery to 
                                                           
549 Brigadier General Peter Kuhn, “Germany’s International Cooperation for 
Army Equipment and technology”, Military Technology, Special Issue, 2002, p. 
38.  
550 Cooperation may arise also in some of the trickiest occasions if specific 
‘guarantees’ exist. The coordination game is said to be the less demanding 
game in the “game theory” literature, in terms of commitments given that there 
is not an incentive to defection. Once achieved the Pareto-frontier, which in our 
case can be represented by OCCAR a state can use its power for opting out  
(possibility to go it alone), producing the twofold consequence of delaying the 
programme and compelling a rearrangement of the coordination point 
(rearrangement of the point between Germany and the Netherlands).  
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and 
Production 
(200+272) Germany: 
2009 
First 
delivery to 
the 
Netherlan
ds: 2011 
COBRA France, 
Germany, United 
Kingdom 
623M• -
Industrializati
on& 
Production, In 
Service (IS 
phase under 
review, 
possible 
changes) 
            
29 – 
(10+10(+2)+7) 
Delivered 
to France: 
10 
Delivered 
to 
Germany: 
10 +2 for 
Turkey 
Delivered 
to the UK: 
7 
Last 
delivery: 
2007 
FREMM France, Italy 11,116M• - 
Development 
& Production 
27 – 
(17+10) 
First 
delivery: 
2010 
Last 
delivery: 
2022 
FSAF 
 
PAAMS 
France, Italy 
 
 
France, Italy, UK 
2,646M• 
(Phase 3)- 
Development 
& Production 
540M• – 
Development  
& Production 
1 SAAM/FR 
1 SAAM/IT 
18 SAMP/T– 
(12+6) 
SAAM/FR 
and 
SAAM/IT: 
Delivered 
SAMP/T: 
in 
productio
n 
ROLAN
D 
Germany, France 21M• - 
Bilateral In-
Service 
Support, 
French 
ROLAND 
Operation Life 
Extension. 
NOW: 
discontinued 
 
 
Outside OCCAR 
 
Disposal 
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TIGER France, 
Germany, Spain 
4,522M• - 
Development, 
production, 
initial In-
Service 
Support 
(possible 
changes) 
184 – 
Fr: 40 HAP+40 
HAD 
Ge: 80 UHT 
Sp: 24 HAD 
HAP 
delivery: 
2005-2010 
UHT 
delivery: 
2005-2011 
HAD 
delivery: 
2010-2015 
 
Table 1: State-of-the Art of OCCAR’ s Programmes: Participating States, 
Programme Costs, Total Production, Delivery. Source: OCCAR Business Plan 
2007 and OCCAR Presentation to the Defence Commission of the Italian Senate 
by General Nazzareno Cardinali, Rome, 29th May 2007. 
4.14 OCCAR’ s relations with EDA (European Defence 
Agency) 
As stated in Article 8 of the Convention, among OCCAR’ s aspirations 
there is that of absolving ulterior functions to those yet put in practice. 
Member states could, potentially, assign to OCCAR the task of 
“preparing common technical specifications for the development and 
procurement of jointly defined equipment or of coordinating and 
planning joint research activities and studies of technical solutions to 
meet future operational requirements”.551  What this sentence reminds 
to is the contribution that OCCAR could give to the harmonization of 
operational requirements so as to pave the way for a common 
European defence approach and an improved European Defence Base, 
“the litmus test of OCCAR, and of its members’ willingness and 
preparedness to pool their defence procurement activities, would come 
with a conceivable future move to bring under it not only programme 
management but also what arguably is the most sensitive part of any 
project for the development and acquisition of defence material-
namely, the formulation of the operational requirements”.552 In this 
sense, the possibility to harmonize requirements within OCCAR would 
depend on the trust and interests of Member States in creating a 
concrete step to a real common defence might through an 
institutionalized pattern, “it is of course possible that through OCCAR, 
                                                           
551 OCCAR Convention, Chapter II. 
552 Ezio Bonsignore, « Too Much of a Good Thing ? », Military Technology 10, 
1998, p. 4. 
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Member States, may change the way they look at opportunities for 
collaboration”.553 
OCCAR’ s existence out of a European scheme of cooperation is 
therefore dependent on the political will of the actors. The eagerness to 
speed up decisions and agree on further cooperative steeps can 
therefore wax and vane according to states’ interest. The structure the 
states have conferred to the organization permits for this reason to 
hamper and block a more thorough coordination path. Within these 
limits, the agency has a very proactive role to play: by improving its 
procurement strategy it can catch the interest of the actors willing to 
face declining budgets and aiming at improving European defence 
cooperation. Also, it is apparent that the participation in an 
organization is likely to bring about a sharing of information and 
increase channels of communications among Member States: this does 
not imply that states will change their mind regarding their own 
preferences but that they come at least to know each other’ s positions 
and open up possible rooms for fine-tuning. Common procurement 
procedures are finally known to bring about significant results and ease 
otherwise complex processes:  on this point of view OCCAR is a huge 
move forward in respect of other ad hoc agencies. Its restricted 
partnership eases the negotiation and decision-making processes.  
It is fair to say that some expected OCCAR to play more encompassing 
functions than those played to-date. Of course, the first programmes 
integrated did not permit to demonstrate the organization’s 
potentialities given that they existed yet outside of the OCCAR 
framework, were in an advanced stage of their life-cycles and did work 
according to the juste retour  principle. Nevertheless, as General 
Cardinali points out, those programmes conferred reliability to a 
neonate organization and permitted it to survive the first difficult 
phases of its settlement.554 Its future development could have been 
therefore paramount in order to see the direction OCCAR was driving 
at.  
On this aspect General Cardinali stresses that sadly not all the 
objectives of the Convention have been met. In fact, the organization 
has developed especially the “management” side of its initial 
ambitions, while it has not made enough steps forward in the 
promotion of prime contractors or in the harmonization of operational 
                                                           
553 OCCAR, Frequently Asked Questions. 
554 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview,  Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 27, 2007a.  
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requirements among states.555  Likewise, Denis Ranque points out that 
“these elements of OCCAR’ s original remit have not yet been fully 
implemented, perhaps because of a whish on the part of the member 
countries to concentrate in the first instance on building up the 
organization’s skills and success record in acquisition. Whatever the 
reason, this approach has had the effect of restricting what should have 
been the organization’s normal growth and influence”.556   
What said cannot be fully understood without introducing in the 
debate another actor emerged in the European context: the European 
Defence Agency (EDA). While the creation of EDA in 2004 was 
welcome by OCCAR, it inevitably imposed a rethinking of the 
organization’ s perspective, activities, and relevance. Before EDA’ s 
creation and as appreciated above, lots of articles stressed the 
“harmonization” role that OCCAR could have achieved on states’ 
definition of operational requirements as one of its fundamental 
objectives to go ahead with a sound cooperation process, “as for future 
planning it is foreseen that it engages essentially to harmonize 
medium-term operational requirements, including common investment 
policy in the technological research sector”.557  
Thus far, the ‘harmonization’ process has been defined as a task to be 
accomplished by EDA at the European level: some overlapping 
therefore does exist among the two organizations, “OCCAR 
Convention and Joint Action of EDA are formulated in a similar or 
sometimes identical shape; therefore some functions seem similar or 
identical”.558 The debate around OCCAR’ s nature and future showed 
all the concerns of those, as the French, who strongly pushed the case 
for this organization “we can see that there is a lot of overlapping and 
therefore, when EDA was established, many people wondered whether 
OCCAR still had a role in the European defence landscape. I can tell 
you that I firmly believe that OCCAR has a very important 
role…’improving efficiency and reducing costs of armaments 
cooperation’, ‘developing new programme management methods’ and 
‘making procedures for the granting of contracts more effective’. As a 
                                                           
555 Ibid. The Director specifies that the creation of prime contractors depends in 
the first instance on states and industrial incentives, while for the 
harmonization of requirements states have the command and EDA the duty to 
pursue it. 
556 Denis Ranque, “OCCAR’s Role in European Armaments Cooperation”, 
Military Technology 28, 2004, p. 50. 
557 Michele Nones, Stefania Di Paola and Sandro Ruggeri,  2003, p. 16. 
558 OCCAR presentation to the Civil School of Defence, 2005, p. 57. 
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consequence, the original scope of OCCAR was narrowed down and 
the more ‘political’ aims were left to the initiative of the Nations and of 
EDA”.559 
As appreciated, EDA is an intergovernmental organization within the 
European Second Pillar of the Common Security and Defence Policy, 
and comprises a much broader base and much broader aims than 
OCCAR does, encompassing states with different capabilities and 
therefore interests and sometimes different views about the exigencies 
of a common European defence. The need arises therefore to find 
synergies among the two organizations but also to define the border of 
each other’s activities.  
More precisely, given that OCCAR aims at contributing positively to 
the delineation of a common defence it should find its place within 
EDA, by improving its procurement performances and most 
importantly by managing more and more programmes.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Place of OCCAR in the European capability development process. 
Source: OCCAR Strategic Paper, OCCAR Corporate Strategy, p. 5. 
 
Analysing the relationship that could exist among OCCAR and EDA is 
paramount in order to assess the possibility for them to contribute to 
each other’ s works and development.  
OCCAR can provide EDA with an operative and proved procurement 
agency with efficient management performances; with a set of 
                                                           
559 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Armament: Which Technologies for which 
Defence?”, 2007b, p.  12. 
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contractual procedures, a flexible geometry for participation in and 
integration of the programmes, and an ability to establish new projects 
and team-works in a short time-span.560 EDA should lead all the process 
getting toward common procurement by identifying and harmonising 
capabilities needs and by assessing current capabilities systems, 
promoting a unified armament market and consolidating the European 
Defence Technological Base. Once having defined the demand for 
capabilities and their available supply, EDA should discover existing 
gaps. The next step would be to establishing priorities and proving and 
assessing technologies in order to promote cooperative programmes.561 
According to General Cardinali, EDA should engage in defining 
operational requirements and ease the creation of programmes in 
cooperation while encompassing all European Nations (except from 
Denmark): it should drive toward the definition of a European 
“exigency” and even a small European state recognizes a “European 
defence” need: even a small state therefore should take part in the 
process of requirement definition and contribute financially to support 
the capability EDA is aiming at creating: this is the reason why the 
‘harmonization’ aim should be performed within EDA. Therefore, 
while OCCAR should carry out the management work, EDA should 
create the basis for cooperation in the first hand by helping to 
harmonise operational requirements among states.  
Members of OCCAR have never gone ahead with these objectives and 
this can be interpreted as a missed opportunity given the restricted 
membership. More far away seems to be the “coordination of national 
decisions concerning the common industrial base and common 
technologies”.562 Notwithstanding that, the probability of these 
blueprints to be reached within EDA looks gloomy. The process is not 
likely to be that straightforward, since the broad and significantly 
disparate base EDA is made of risks re-proposing all the shortfalls that 
have characterized precedent Defence Institutions, “now that most of 
                                                           
560 OCCAR Presentation to the Civil School of Defence 2005, p. 61. OCCAR 
recognizes the necessity to establish a clear and fruitful dialogue with EDA, 
ESA(European Space Agency) and NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Agency(NAMSA- which can carry forward In Service-Support functions).  It is 
clear that more coordination with all these structures will improve the whole 
procurement process, but seems difficult to be obtained. 
561 OCCAR Strategy Paper, “OCCAR Corporate Strategy”,  Section 4. 
562 OCCAR Convention, Chapter II. 
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the WEU’ s functions have been transferred to the EU, the armaments 
group is even less likely to achieve anything”.563  
 
Figure 15. EU Defence Budgets 2004. Source: House of Lords, “European 
Defence Agency. Report with Evidence”, 9th Report of Session 2004-2005, 
European Union Committee, 16 March 2005, http:// www. 
publications.parliament.uk /pa /ld200405 /ldselect/ldeucom/76/76.pdf . The 
figure shows the great discrepancy that exists in defence expenditures ( in 
Dollars terms) among European States. 
 
This of course does not mean that in the case of an EDA impasse 
OCCAR would fall down on a stalemate, since it can go it alone with 
the activities that Members States would confer it outside of a 
European path.564 From this point of view, OCCAR can even represent a 
faster-track through which cooperation is eased whenever consent is 
not achievable in a broader context; in fact this is the reason it was 
envisaged in the first hand by France and Germany. 
According to General Cardinali, there is no discrepancy between a 
broad definition of a capability (by EDA) and its eventual actuation by 
few states (through OCCAR). Nevertheless, it is probable that the states 
with major military capabilities are those likely to influence more the 
definition of European capabilities within EDA. Moreover, the 
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participation of new and essentially Eastern States in the European 
context is seen, according to some pundits, to hamper the deepening of 
the European Defence Industrial Base: some of them have strong 
relationships with the Atlantic Ally and in most of the occasions search 
protection under the NATO umbrella. For this reason, they end up 
buying American off-the-shelf weapon systems.  
As for the possibility that OCCAR be integrated into EDA, it is 
noteworthy to observe that a certain discretion exists among OCCAR’ s 
states: given the small number of participants it is obvious that 
coordination is more straightforward, “a quick integration between 
OCCAR and EDA is of course welcome but the OCCAR members 
conserve a certain prudence on this issue, because it is much more 
easier to take decision and assume common position now than if 
members are 24”.565  If OCCAR does not want to be eclipsed by EDA it 
should result as the best choice in the field of cooperative procurement: 
in fact, one of OCCAR’ s actual work is that of arranging its position 
towards EDA and of finding fruitful complementarities among the two 
organizations. But it seems clear that every achievement in this 
direction depends on national states and the way they would like to 
mould it, “it is an agency for armaments procurement, once these have 
been showed as the needs of the states. It does anything else but 
manage their willingness”.566 
4.15 A400M 
The section below will deal with the most important Programme 
managed by OCCAR: the A400M transport military aircraft. Some of 
the procurement procedures applied to it, its broad partnership as well 
as its relevance for the Common European Defence make necessary an 
in-depth scrutiny of the Programme. Analysing the reasons spurring its 
birth, the stages of its development and the final integration into 
OCCAR will shed a light on a continuous pattern of coordination but 
also on setbacks, where states have searched to arrange their common 
and partly divergent positions. 
 A400M aircraft has been thought principally to enhance Europe’s 
airlift capabilities. This military aircraft is able to perform strategic 
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operations (because of a long-range, a large capacity and a  high cruise 
speed), tactical missions(soft-field performances, autonomous ground 
operations, low speed/low level operations, aerial delivery) and “in-
theatre” tanking operations(get and provide fuel).567 Being able to 
perform different tasks it is deemed of the paramount importance in 
order to provide a military substance to the broader European 
Declarations delivered in these years. Given the complexity of future 
scenarios and given the willingness expressed by European states to 
play an active role in risks reduction and stabilization of trouble-spots, 
this aircraft permits to reach out-of-area contexts and carry the future 
‘European Reaction Force’ together with other important weapon 
systems on hostile grounds.  
The independence in airlift, transport and projection this aircraft would 
bring about from the Atlantic ally adds to the significance of the 
programme, “the geostrategic evolution with a multiplication of 
regional crises, the priority conferred to the need to project forces and 
the role our state wants to play in the international context are 
arguments in favour of a strong transport aircraft”.568 Notwithstanding 
American weapons, “Europeans may be willing to take the 
technological risk and accept delay or a higher price for capabilities 
that are manifestly European, thereby sustaining their own industrial 
and technological base and serving political goals that are shared more 
evenly within Europe than across the Atlantic”.569 It is for all these 
reasons that this programme strikes a remarkable turning-point in 
European but also Transatlantic Relations, and States’ decision to 
participate in it will be analysed also within this interpretative 
category. 
                                                           
567 For a detailed illustration of the functions and the features of the aircraft see 
http:// www.eads.com/1024/en/businet/miltrair/miltrair.html.  
568 Francois Beck, Général de division aérienne, « Disposer de la capacité de 
projection des forces » Défense Nationale, Avril 18, 2001, p.  64. 
569 CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security, “The Future of the Transatlantic 
Defence Community”, CSIS Panel Report, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington DC, January, 2003, p.  49. 
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Figure 16. Rapid Reaction Force 
Deployment Scenario. Source: EADS, 
“Typical Missions”,  
http://www.eads.net/1024/en/b
usinet/miltrair/a400m/typical_m
issions.html  
Figure 17. Humanitarian Aid 
Scenario. Source, EADS, “Typical 
Missions”, 
http://www.eads.net/1024/en/b
usinet/miltrair/a400m/typical_m
issions.html  
 
 
As it often happens in cooperative issues, while the need to coordinate 
actions is indispensable to obviate non attainable unilateral paths, 
concrete deeds are taken only when the decision to collaborate cannot 
be postponed any longer. In the case under study, the need to refurbish 
an aging defence system was there from the ‘80s, but only real and 
pressing contingencies speeded up agreements regarding the 
programme. As the Defence Ministries of the seven countries involved 
have emphasized, situations as those in Kosovo, East Timor and 
Mozambique plus the Balkan and Middle East turmoils underlined the 
need for interoperability among European States and for a own long-
reach airlift, “the Persian Gulf war and operations in Bosnia as well as 
the new post-cold war emphasis on peacekeeping and humanitarian 
aid missions, have highlighted the need for long-range transports that 
can operate from short runaways at improved airfields”.570 In these out-
of-area operations a Rapid Reaction Force together with the 
equipments needed to take forward its work had to be deployed: 
therefore the need for a rapid airlift capability with a huge payload and 
accomplishing both a strategic and tactical missions. Given the limited 
budget of the European states, the aircraft had also to be affordable and 
                                                           
570 John D. Morrocco, “Europe Struggles to Fill Airlift Capability”, Aviation Week 
& Space Technology 148, 19, 1998, p. 68.  
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sustainable, “commonality of design bringing reduced operating and 
support costs would add weight to the need for air forces to reduce 
ever-expanding budgets”.571  
If Europe aims at meeting its military aspirations and at creating forces 
to reduce risks of disruptions, it has to have operative capabilities, 
“willingness is widespread, now it is necessary to concretize it”.572 The 
idea behind this statement is of course the understanding that a truly 
European defence policy with defined missions needs first of all 
coordination on armaments procurement. This aircraft strikes an 
effective point on this matter, “there is much more to the FLA(Future 
Large Aircraft, previous A400M name) Programme than airlifting 
personnel and materiel from point A to point B and the politicians have 
based their decisions on this perception, which can be shared to a quite 
significant extent”.573 All these considerations lead to affirm and 
underline the political aside from the economic rationale of this 
programme. In fact, the breakdown of the A400M would have  
immediately put in doubt European ability to live up to its aspiration, 
and in particular that of establishing an effective European Rapid 
Reaction Force as stated in the European Summits.  
Given its long life, the stalemates and the uncertainties exposed by 
national states, the final agreement on the development of the A400M 
was interpreted as the European willingness to go ahead with a 
common defence policy. Even within the NATO context the decision 
regarding the A400M was intended as a move by European states to 
balance the burden of the alliance and a possibility to intervene in out-
of-area conflicts. As for the relationship with the United States, the 
Programme was interpreted as a “test of European nations’ 
commitment to catching up with US military capability and strategic 
airlift”. 574 
                                                           
571 « Airbus A400M-Europe’s Unbuilt Freighter, Aviation News Magazine, 2002, 
www. aviation-news.co.uk / a400m.html.  
572 Jean-Paul Béchat, “L’Europe de la Défense”, 2001, p. 24. 
573 Ezio Bonsignore, “From Pork Barrels to European Worries”, Military 
Technology 7, 2000, p. 2. Future Large Aircraft was the name conferred to the 
Programme before tenders started proposing their models. When Airbus 
Military proposed the A400M aircraft, then this was the name taken by the 
programme. 
574 Philip Butterworth-Hayes, “A400M: Symbol of European Commitment”, 
Aerospace America, April, 2002. http:// www.aiaa.org/ aerospace/ 
Article.cfm?issuetocid=191&ArchiveIssueID=25   
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In 2001, speaking of the harmonisation process, experts and politicians 
maintained that A400M was a kind of exception among other weapon-
systems, “the A400M programme is highly symbolic of both European 
countries redirecting their military capabilities for out-of-area missions, 
and of efforts at establishing schemes for joint European defence 
procurement”,575 and the same feeling was expressed by the President 
of Airbus Military, which, after the Franco-German Commitment to the 
aircraft declared that “these decisions are a clear endorsement that the 
A400M fulfils precisely the requirements of the seven-nation European 
Staff Requirement (ESR). It leads the way to true European fleet 
interoperability via common procurement policy”.576 
4.15.1 A400M  history: setting the stage for cooperation 
Analysing the history behind this programme is a necessary step to 
undertake, since it fully shows the difficulties entailed in coordinating 
more states’ preferences and in making up different positions. This 
process uncovers also the potential positive benefits of cooperation in 
such a huge weapon system, both in economic and strategic terms.  
Motivated by the willingness to renovate their transport capabilities 
and to standardize the European fleet for strategic and tactic transport 
Germany, Belgium, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal 
and Turkey decided to join together and proposed a European Staff 
Requirement(ESR) trying to compose all their requirements for the 
aircraft to be procured. The aim at pooling their requests collectively 
was to explore a way to mitigate each others’ positions and find rooms 
                                                           
575 « European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs : a Long –Term Vision”, 
Military Technology, 12, 2006, p. 17.  
576 Airbus Military « French and German Governments select A400M as their 
Future Military Transport Aircraft », Airbus Military Press Releases, June 9 
(2000), www.airbusmilitary.com/pressrelease.html. The faith in the 
programme as well as the big stake that both France and Germany assigned to 
it is mirrored in today disputes around the decision of NAMSA, the NATO 
Maintenance and Supply Agency to manage a deal to acquire C-17s, for the 
alliance airlift needs. France and Germany are strongly opposed to this deal 
officially for procedural reasons, affirming that it is not  in NAMSA power to 
act as a procurement agency, but more realistically to protect their industrial 
interests as for the A400M. France and Germany have been able till now to 
block the deal because members of the NAMSA board, for more detail see 
Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie, “Herculean Labor”, Aviation Week and Space 
Technology 166, 9, 2007, p. 87.  
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for coordination in the setting of a basic common model, “the strategic 
self-sufficiency in the long-distance transport is a French concern, but 
also of our European neighbours. The search for interoperability and 
for cooperation at the European level are therefore completely relevant 
within the domain of military transport aircraft.”577  
The importance of producing a weapon-system instead of acquiring it 
off-the-shelf are self-evident: of course buying the finite product may 
decrease costs and risks linked to procurement but means also to rely 
on other industries, to depend on other countries for the supply of the 
system, to lack a logistic support, to do not have the possibility to 
modify the system or to make the national industry participate. 
Production means risks but also the development of the national 
industrial capabilities.578 
A400M was known in the past as the Future Large Aircraft (FLA) and 
encouraged the first discussions within the IEPG (Independent 
European Programme Group)  in 1984. Later on a group of industries 
called the European Future Large Aircraft Group (EUROFlag), and 
charged with the pre-feasibility studies, was set in Rome and 
comprised Aerospatiale(France), Alenia (Italy), BaE(UK), CASA(Spain) 
and Deutsche Airbus(Germany), joined afterwards by Belgium, 
Portugal and Thailand’s defence industries. From the very beginning of 
the studies prepared, these industries exposed different views on the 
management and industrial work-sharing of the programme.579 The aim 
of these discussions was to create an aircraft able to substitute from 
year 2000 the existing medium/long range transport aircrafts in the 
hands of the European states. Given the fluidity of the international 
landscape and the attempt by national states at reorienting themselves 
after the end of the Cold War toward a European-prone path, the FLA 
had a very controversial life made of big announcements and poor 
deeds. In fact, notwithstanding the importance of the programme, the 
negotiations between the parties were time-consuming and the 
distributional issues among the states were hampering a broader 
consent on programme features. 
                                                           
577 François Beck, Général de division aérienne, « Disposer de la capacité de 
projection des forces », 2001, p. 64.  
578 General Nazzareno Cardinali, Director, OCCAR-EA, Interview,  Bad 
Godesberg, Bonn, November 27, 2007a. 
579 Paul Proctor, “Industry Outlook”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 
6, 1995, p. 11. 
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The ESR(European Staff Requirement), drawn in 1996 clarified the 
main characteristics of the aircraft considering possible scenarios and 
missions: the nations were asking for an all weather, day/night tactical 
and strategic airlifter, independent from ground support. It should 
have had the capability to deploy troops or weapons systems between 
or within theatres of operations by parachute or by landing on short, 
semi-prepared landing spots. The steps made by these European states 
highlighted the commonality of exigencies: as said, it comes as no 
surprise that a speed up of the project was determined in the late ‘90s 
when the need for interoperability was more pressing given the Balkan 
failure, transatlantic rifts about the Iraqi war and given states’ limited 
defence budgets, “the scope of this initiative to specify and procure an 
aircraft of a common definition is unique and clearly points to the way 
forward in the domain of smart procurement for the armed forces of 
allied nations”;580 in the same vein, “while the A400M program spent 
many years in limbo, the requirement for this plane has been greatly 
increased by political change. The strategic rift between the US and 
Europe, worsened tensions arising from the second Iraq war, 
highlighted Europe’s need for military self-sufficiency”.581   
The setting of the aircraft was encouraged by the same pressures that 
characterized OCCAR’ s creation. After having stated their common 
needs, the seven Countries(except for Portugal that did resign from the 
programme in 1997) delivered an offer, the Request For Proposal(RFP). 
The RFP was sent to Airbus Military (European Company), to the 
United States and Ukraine, in order to stress the competitiveness 
principle behind the tender, but “sadly, for reasons which are peculiar 
to each nation, states behaviours have been different. France, Spain 
Belgium and the United Kingdom have referred to the United States, 
while France, Spain, Germany and Italy have referred to Ukraine. It is 
apparent that among seven countries France and Spain opened 
                                                           
580 EADS « The A400M Programme : a Partnership Without Precedent », http:// 
www.eads.net/1024/en/businet/miltrair/a400m/partnership.html. The tactic 
transport implies the ability to deploy men as well as military equipments 
directly to the operation theatre. It is aimed at providing logistic support to the 
forces engaged in the operations. The strategic role of the aircraft is provided 
by the ability to project rapidly huge capabilities in great distances. By 
providing tactical and strategic roles the A400M is able to deploy a military 
force in a short time. It is the only aircraft with these characteristics today. 
581 Richard Aboulafia, « Military transport Market Grows », Aviation Week & 
Space Technology, 160, 3, 2004, p. 30.  
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competition in a broader way”.582 On January 1999 Airbus Military 
proposed the ‘A400M’ programme underlining that national states 
should have been responsible for ordering a consistent number of 
aircrafts and for supporting penalties in case of retirement from the 
Programme. Airbus Military Company, AMC, which is a military 
division of EADS was built up specifically for this programme and 
comprised the industries of all the nations that moulded the European 
Staff Requirement. 
Aside from the Airbus Military Company proposal there were two 
other alternatives: an American proposal and a Russo-Ukraine one. As 
for the American proposal, there was not a unique aircraft able to 
satisfy the operative requirements delineated by the European 
countries; instead, two aircrafts were needed, namely the C130J and the 
C17. This alternative was refused on the ground of at least three 
reasons according to Jean Menu: a logistic one, which underlined that 
the C17 ability to work in difficult terrains had limits while a more 
adaptable aircraft was necessary to reach the terrestrial forces. Second, 
the economic reason emphasized that in the case of an American choice 
European countries would have been submitted to the dollar cycle and 
that an American choice could have impaired the competition on the 
civil aircraft sector, giving a great leverage to Boeing on international 
markets. Finally, strategically, “with a view to build a defence  for the 
European Union it would be disappointing to adopt American 
material”.583 In fact the project will be important both for the European 
aerospace sector and for the Airbus Company itself. 
The other alternative was the Russo-Ukraine’ s one,  proposing the 
Antonov  AN-70 model, that was better able to meet the requirements 
listed by the European states. Nevertheless, the aircraft was far away 
from the development and certification phase, and it would have 
probably requested France and German substantial contribution for all 
production costs and adaptation to European norms. All that said, it 
should be stressed that Germany’s attention to the Antonov An-70 has 
been one of the factor that has delayed the programme in its first 
phases. In fact, this latter was considered  a superior and cheaper 
                                                           
582 Jean Menu, « Les réponses industrielles aux besoins opérationnels des Forces 
Aériennes(l’A400M) », Défense Nationale, Juin, 2001, p. 67. 
583 Ibid. p. 72. 
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option by the German Ministry of Defence, but probably for political 
reasons the ‘European’ solution was adopted.584  
In 2000 France and Germany decided together in favour of the A400M 
proposal, with a common declaration in Mayence (Mainz); this joint 
declaration emphasized once again the ‘tandem’ position the two states 
often show off in military issues.585 In July 2000 in Farnborough, France, 
the UK, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Turkey and Luxemburg(in 
strict collaboration with Belgium)did agree to the programme with a 
Letter of Intent, declaring the intention to procure some 225 aircrafts 
thus divided: 
 
FRANCE 50 
UNITED KINGDOM 25 
SPAIN 27 
ITALY 16 
GERMANY 73 
TURKEY 26 
BELGIUM 7(plus one for Luxembourg) 
 
 
                                                           
584 « Airbus Military A400M », Flug Revue, 2003, http:// www.flug-
revue.rotor.com/Frtypen/FRFLA.htm.  See also, Wolfgang Gehrmann, 
« Scharpings Luftnummer, Der Eurofighter richtet ein Desaster im Haushalt 
des Verteidigungsministeriums an », Die Zeit 10, 2002, http:// 
www.zeit.de/2002/10/Scharpings_Luftnummer. For an in depth analysis of 
the internal German debate about financing see also Deutscher Bundestag, 
Stenographischer Bericht, 250 Sitzung, Berlin, July 25, 2002. 
585 75th Franco-German Summit of Mayence, Déclaration du Conseil Franco-
Allemand de défense et de sécurité, Juin 2000. www.france-allemagne.fr/ 
75eme-Sommet-franco-allemand-a.html. In the declaration the two countries 
commit themselves to the acquisition of the strategic aircraft, deeming it 
paramount in order to develop a European defence might and «creating the 
conditions for the formation of a European common and consistent transport 
fleet”. This declaration was of course reinforcing the engagement towards the 
aircraft. This previous bilateral agreement was able to bring about a defined 
policy guaranteeing a higher bargaining power on the decisions to be taken. 
Bilateral agreement are in fact sometimes searched before a multinational 
agreement, so as to grant a stronger contractual power to the states engaged 
because changes in their positions are not easy to be achieved: the position of 
one actor can be changed only with the other actor’ s consent. Because of that 
the contractual margin s are deemed to be more wide than that of single states. 
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The minimum of orders necessary to obtain a sound cost-benefit trade-
off and therefore essential for starting production was 180. Immediately 
after the agreement the intention was expressed to pass the programme 
to OCCAR, so as to optimize the procurement process “what is needed 
now is to concretize the political orientations integrating the contracts 
to Airbus through OCCAR”, said the French Military advisor of 
EADS.586 A MoU (Memorandum of Understanding)  for the 
procurement of the A400M was signed in June 2001 at Le Bourge Air 
Show and the contract negotiation between participating nations was 
assisted by OCCAR-EA. At this date the commitment for orders 
dropped to 212 aircrafts. In this phase, in fact, Italy withdrew from the 
Programme (while Portugal seemed interested to re-join it with 3 
orders). A revised MoU was signed in 2001, placed the main contract 
and assigned the programme to OCCAR-EA: it formalized the decision 
to procure 196 Aircrafts, given Turkey’s reduction of orders: 
   
FRANCE 50 
UNITED KINGDOM 25 
SPAIN 27 
PORTUGAL 3 
GERMANY 73 
TURKEY 10 
BELGIUM 7 plus 1 for Luxembourg 
 
The first aircraft flight was planned in 2006. Parliamentary ratification 
by Germany required two years to come; the final contract between 
OCCAR-EA and Airbus Military Company, chosen as prime contractor, 
was on 27 May 2003. The prime contractor, responsible for price 
proposals, performance guarantees and delivery dates, launched the 
A400M Programme, committed to produce 180 models, just the exact 
number to make up for production costs: Portugal did resign again 
from the Programme while two years of  controversial parliamentary 
debates in Germany scaled down the take-offs to 60. 
In the above-mentioned Farnborough meeting, the seven Defence 
Ministers emphasized their commitment to the Programme and to a 
European defence capability, stressing also the industrial return that 
each of the national industries would have obtained from the creation 
of the system. One of the aims of the nation states engaged in the 
Programme was to get the maximum economic benefits out of it; 
                                                           
586 Jean Menu, 2001, p. 74. 
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therefore the procurement procedures were of the paramount 
importance to absolve this task. Jean Menu sustains that it was 
absolutely conformed to the willingness of the Delegation General 
d’Armament to reduce costs: the reduction of costs, says the author, will 
face budgetary decline but will also sustain competition towards the 
United States.587  
What the states jointly decided for was to employ the ‘commercial 
approach’, deemed able to achieve the greatest savings out of the 
production process through the setting of a fixed-price contract. 
Following these directives Airbus Military exhibited an acquisition 
procedure derived from those employed within Airbus civil sector, 
which were aimed at reducing costs by pooling development and 
production activities in a single phase without need for ulterior 
approvals, “under the commercial approach A400M customers sign up 
to a set of performance and supportability guarantees leaving the 
precise technical solutions to the discretion of Airbus Military…Unlike 
traditional military programmes, this compressed ‘one-shot’ 
commitment guarantees the lowest price possible for the development 
and production of the A400M”.588  
The French Government has spent a lot of efforts for a positive 
conclusion of the project: it has required the reduction of specifications, 
the utilisation of a civil approach, the drop of costs, the creation of a 
European Consortium and the planned acquisition of the aircraft by all 
countries participating in its construction. France’ s resolve for the 
development of a sound and economically efficient programme was 
twofold: on the one hand the exigency to prop up a European 
significant programme; on the other hand, the need to use the scarce 
financial resources of its defence budget in the most rewarding way. 
France has been plagued by huge internal debates about the soundness 
of a “commercial” approach for the awarding of the Programme 
Contract. For France the problem was never whether to decide for or 
against the A400M but instead the way through which to finance its 50 
orders. While France finally backed the ‘commercial approach’ solution 
-which was anyway consistent with a broader national aim arisen in 
the late ‘90- positions inside of the country stressed that this approach 
could have spurred a competition struggle and the decline of the 
French industry among more powerful ones, “it is the first time that 
                                                           
587 Ibid. p. 68. 
588 Airbus Military, “A Single-Phase Programme”, http:// 
www.airbusmilitary.com/programme.html . 
 250 
states(France and Germany at Dijon Summit589) confer to their defence 
industries all the financial risks and demand to them to behave as the 
Civil Aircraft industry, where air companies are satisfied with buying 
‘off-the-shelf’. By acting this way you have fostered the disengagement 
of the State from its obligation to grant state defence in order to permit 
the market law to regulate the means necessary to its security”.590 
Aerospatiale, the French industry embodied in Airbus would have seen 
a deep reduction of its role in the development of the programme, 
determining an impressive cut in jobs. Other politicians maintained 
that the disengagement of the French state put in danger the same 
existence of the programme by emphasizing that industries would not 
have found the funds required to carry forward the programme. This 
potentially meant to confer to the United States the monopole of the 
military strategic transport, given that American armament 
Programmes were partly financed by public credits. The strong internal 
debate and final decision underlined how important was for France the 
development of this aircraft.   
Summing up, the A400M was an aircraft thought to meet the exigency 
of seven Countries’ Armament Delegations, namely, that of proposing 
a remedy to a persisting gap in quick and efficient troops and cargos 
projection in out-of areas operations. In fact when in the mid ‘80s it was 
chosen by WEAG (Western European Armament Group) for replacing 
Lockheed C-130 Hercules and C160 Transalls (Franco-German) aircrafts 
the Future Large Aircraft (then A400M) had to confirm and promote a 
                                                           
589 “France and Germany have agreed to propose to all European partners to 
build an aircraft by a consortium of European enterprises and to confer the 
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Programme. 
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Reins on Military Procurement”, Aviation Week and Space Technology 153, 13 
2000, p. 33.  
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European preference aimed at a European independence. For this 
reason, as above stated, a lot of experts argue that A400M is a very 
significant programme that goes beyond a pure technical-operative or 
industrial meaning.591 The work-share assigned to each European 
industry would have provided benefits but also improved and 
stimulated the European Industrial Base, given the high technological 
contents embodied in parts of the Programme. Also, given the potential 
beneficial returns, sub-contractors would have strived to propose better 
solutions to be chosen by the prime contractor. Therefore, the 
production of the aircraft answered broader European objectives: the 
survival of the European Aerospace industries, otherwise likely to be 
destroyed if divided, and the fostering of technological components 
necessary in the aerospace sector. 
4.15.2 A difficult coordination path 
The necessity of this aircraft proved, states were trying to adjust their 
different positions regarding the specific features of the Programme 
and broader contractual arrangements. Of course, all these debates and 
uncertainties delayed the Programme. 
It is fair to say that the process leading to the decision for the A400M 
has not been without problems, “after a lot of controversies and 
hesitations governments of the seven states have convinced themselves 
of the good choice and have oriented themselves towards the A400M 
solution”.592 Different positions among states keep characterizing the 
programme within OCCAR: in particular, and as it will be clarified 
below, states are trying hard to arrange the In Service-Support phase. 
Consistently with the arguments just presented, a basic agreement 
exists among states to coordinate their actions but when it comes to 
consider distributional issues they are always reticent to abandon their 
positions. In fact, the A400M history has been determined by big steps 
forward but also by huge setbacks. Notwithstanding a common 
willingness, in place from the ‘80s, to create a strategic military aircraft 
for European operations, the importance of the programme for the 
European defence future and its positive technological and industrial 
fallouts, states diverged in the preferred positions to be achieved, in the 
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agreement to be reached given the funds, in the work-share deserved, 
in the cost/benefits calculus of jobs and in the implication of such a 
programme for transatlantic relations. Each of these elements was 
perceived differently by states because different were the interests 
pursued within the cooperative setting, “major defence procurement 
decisions are by definition exceedingly complex and delicate affairs, 
involving as they do an acrobatic balancing act between many different 
and equally important considerations which more often than not are in 
direct conflict with each other”.593  
Lindley-French assessed that the A400M aircraft was an example of the 
distance between words and deeds, implying that the programme, 
even if of the utmost military and industrial significance, was plagued 
by a combination of true or false financial problems and nationalistic 
rivalries which have rendered more difficult its development.594 Thus, 
explains Ezio Bonsignore, even when operational requirements are 
matched with available resources some trickier issues have to be 
considered, such as political and strategic issues and concerns deriving 
for the preservation of a national industrial capability or of internal 
occupation.595 In fact, adds another expert, “the multi-national 
programme… has gone through what many observers feared would 
prove to be an endless series of false starts, political back-pedaling, 
industrial battles, postponed parliamentary debates, sudden 
withdrawals, reciprocal threats and blackmails…”.596 Each country was 
therefore motivated to get its preferred outcomes while this inevitably 
determined delays and postponements of the Programme, “we could 
thus perhaps expect the Paris Air Show(2001) to produce yet another 
generic and substantially meaningless Joint Declaration or MoU, 
whereby the participating countries would reaffirm their commitment, 
would signal their intention to eventually procure hundreds of 
aircrafts. But as regards firm orders being signed, and money being 
actually committed, you must be kidding”.597  
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As evidence of that, in 1996 the planned start of the FLA (Future Large 
Aircraft) was thought  to be in 1997, the first flight in 2002 while 2004 
would have seen the start of the In-Service phase. The estimated orders 
for the aircraft was 300, with the biggest ones to be shared by France, 
Germany and Great Britain. In 2000 the commitment was for 225 
aircrafts and later on dropped to 180: Germany 60 models, France 50, 
Spain 27, Turkey 10, the UK 25, Belgium 7 and Luxembourg 1.  
Of course, the more important controversies and delays were 
determined by lacking funds: France and Germany had cut 
substantially their defence budgets and their industrial partners 
wanted to have states’ commitment to a certain amount of orders 
before creating the Consortium(Airbus Military Company), given the 
employment of a ‘commercial’ awarding process.598 For example, in 
1996 discussions arose about a possible withdrawal of France from this 
programme and the likely consequences in terms of orders, given that 
France had planned to acquire more than 50 aircrafts and was one of 
the main promoter of the project. Also in this vein the German proposal 
order of 73 aircrafts, given its internal financial problems and political 
struggles, seemed unrealistic. Germany’s off-take reduction would 
have inevitably determined, and it did, a broader reorganization of the 
programme work-share and costs. In fact, in order to minimize the 
impact of cost increases determined by reduced orders and delayed 
delivery negotiated in 2001 the United Kingdom planned a 
restructured delivery schedule, “an incremental acquisition of certain 
configuration items for the tactical role was also agreed although 
subsequently provisions for the more  important of these(Defensive 
Aids Sub-System-DASS) was reinstated to the early deliveries in the 
light of operational experience”.599 
 
Figure 18. Work-share  of the A400M before Portugal withdrawal and Germany 
reduced orders. Source: Aviation News,  www.aviation-
                                                           
598 Airbus consortium should have comprised the four Airbus members-British 
Aerospace, Daimler-Benz Aerospace of Germany, Aerospatiale Matra 
Airbus(France) and CASA of Spain. The associated partners were at that 
moment Belgium with FLABEL, responsible for the wing leading edges and 
flaps, Italy’s Alenia responsible for the rear fuselage and other subsystems and 
the Turkish Aerospace Industries, engaged with structural elements. 
599 The United Kingdom Parliament, “Airlift Assets: A400M”, House of 
Commons, Defence, Written Evidence, 2002, http:// 
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news.co.uk/a400m.html. Each of the sub-assemblies will be produced by the 
members nations in different parts of Europe and then delivered to the final 
assembly-line in Seville, Spain. (see p. 294) 
 
In 2001 the development of the aircraft was less than sure, given 
specifically to the reduction of military budgets, “for the moment this 
willingness to cooperate is transferred only to bilateral, trilateral or 
more rarely more numerous partnerariats initiatives. Notwithstanding 
the efforts, divergences are still numerous”.600 Because of its initial 
order of 73 aircrafts Germany pretended and obtained a large part of 
the works-hare for its industry. The MoU (Memorandum of 
Understanding) signed by all the partner countries in December 2001 
stated that the contract to be issued to Airbus Military Company had to 
be subject to Germany obtaining full financial capability by 31st January 
2002. Germany’ s commitment in early 2002 was up to 40 orders, a 
lower number than that required for the launch of the programme 
(180). For this reason the issuing of the contract was delayed. When 
finally Germany committed  to 60 aircrafts in 2003 the contract was 
issued, with 16 months of delay.  
A non-commitment of Germany of such an amount of orders would 
have probably disappointed France given their bilateral strategy to 
commit together to the programme: because of this previous bilateral 
commitment at Mayence, Germany tied its hands in three ways: less 
than 60 orders would have had repercussions on German credibility, 
on Franco-German relations, and on the same development of the 
Programme. Germany had basically no alternatives but to commit to 
the orders required to launch the programme. Because of a reduced 
take-off, Germany’s contractual power was downgraded: it had to 
accept a different work-share as a form of compensation towards other 
states for the costs brought about. Because of the delays, the signing of 
the contract among OCCAR and Airbus occurred in 2003, and this has 
of course postponed all the phases and the first planned flight and 
delivery.  
Also, discussions among Members about industrial workload was 
questioning the survival of the FLA project, re-proposing from time to 
time the possibility to acquire the (American) Lockheed Martin C-130J 
Hercules.601 That of the work-sharing was one of the hottest issues 
                                                           
600 Jean-Paul Béchat, “L’Europe de la Défense”, 2001, p.  25. 
601 Pierre Sparaco, « Europeans Strive to Keep FLA Alive », Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, 145, 3, 1996, p. 52. 
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emerging from the programme debates; finally an agreement was 
reached to give an industrial share proportional to the orders placed by 
each of the nations, while the final assembly of the A400M would be 
undertaken by CASA in Spain (Seville) and the management of the 
development activities subcontracted to Airbus. The existence within 
Airbus of available production centres and facilities has eased the 
organization process. The national industries work-share were mainly 
the same as in Airbus Civil production: Airbus UK was responsible for 
the wings, Airbus France for cockpit management and fight controls, 
Airbus Germany for the main fuselage and airbus Spain for the 
horizontal stabilizer.602 All these states were fundamental for taking 
forward the programme; therefore, every participant was awarded a 
consistent portion of the work. The participation of Airbus (responsible 
of 70% of the total work) guaranteed a broad share to the countries 
with the highest orders (Germany, France, the UK and Spain). Even if 
competition was planned at the subcontractor level, it was clear that the 
initial work-share, and the arrangement achieved among states at the 
prime-contractor level, were paramount. For example, EADS, a joint 
venture between France and Germany, and the biggest stakeholder in 
Airbus Military Company given its 80% of participation in Airbus, 
develops the transport’s self-protection architecture and this has 
assured a leading position also within the A400M electronic warfare 
equipment, giving EADS a huge advantage in this field, “for the past 
two years, German electronic warfare technicians have been working 
with their Spanish counterparts, who would manufacture the aircraft, 
to help define the self-production suite”.603  
 
Figure 19: A400M Strategic Workshare. Source:  http:// 
www.airbusmilitary.com/programme.html  (see p. 294) 
 
Adding to work-share turmoil,  different positions among participants 
regarded standardization: for example “France uses larger expendables 
than those utilized by other A400M partners. Germany also is driving a 
requirement to have large amounts of data stored on the aircraft to 
                                                           
602 John D. Morrocco, “Europe Inches Toward A400M transport Launch”, 
Aviation Week & Space Technology 154, 25, 2001, p. 152.  
603 Robert Wall, “The Big Prize”, Aviation Week & Space Technology 159, 21, 2003, 
p.  40. Airbus is detained 80% by EADS and 20% by BaE Systems. EADS has a 
total participation of 90% in the programme. EADS estimation of jobs creation 
in Europe because of the A400M was calculated in 40000 units. 
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allow in-flight replanning”.604 While all states reached a common 
agreement on a “basic transport configuration”, every country will 
have its own aircraft adapted to national requirements with a different 
final price. Of course, the specific features of each aircraft will be 
produced by national industries: this is both an achievement and a 
limitation of the coordination process. 
The number of participants in the programme should be considered 
both a success and an impediment: on the one hand, the stating of 
common requirements by different states scores a mark on a truly 
European willingness to face the same challenges with the same 
equipment, to work together and to be interoperable. On the other 
hand, as it happens in every game, when the number of the players 
increases the pay-off matrix become more complicated -as coordination 
points multiply- and the pursuit of the preferred outcome more 
difficult, “the greater the number of partner members, the less the pace 
of progress, would appear the rule of thumb if lessons learned from 
Typhoon and A400M programmes are indicators”.605 Moreover, the 
actors find not in the same position: a state committed to a massive 
amount of take-offs has the possibility to delay a programme, cause 
additional costs, or even put in danger its same existence. The 2000 
Letter of Intent, the 2001 MoU and the one that led to the issuing of the 
contract in 2003 exhibited three different arrangement points, mirroring 
the power of the states in a precise moment to determine a defined 
setting. Each MoU is therefore a bargaining moment for states, trying to 
achieve their preferred outcome given the power they show off in a 
precise context, “in the run-up, executives are jockeying to draw 
attention to their companies’ offering”.606  
4.15.3 Assessing UK’ s participation in the A400M 
programme 
The UK’ s pronouncement for  the A400M the 16th of May 2000 caught 
all by surprise. Geoff Hoon, at that time Secretary of Defence, was the 
first leader of the European nations to firmly commit to an order of 25 
aircrafts. The United Kingdom’s order was paramount both to give 
trust to the Programme and to speed up the achievement of the 
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required number to start it. This latter was a strategic move since the 
UK left the other states decide for the survival and development of the 
Programme.  
The UK’s decision for the A400M came after a period of scrupulous 
analyses of the British needs and available options; at this phase the 
FLA (Future Large Aircraft) programme seemed not to be the favoured 
option, especially for the short-term needs, “despite wide acceptance 
that the FLA meets these criteria, the British government refuses to give 
a firm commitment to it”.607 Apparently, in 2000 it changed its mind. 
The United Kingdom posed the “commercial approach” as the 
paramount conditions for joining the programme, which in fact it 
obtained, stating, in the words of the Minister of Defence Robertson, 
that the UK believed in ‘buying European’ but not at any price.608 Given 
that the RAF(Royal Air Force) request for the kind of capability 
performed by the A400M was critical, a too delayed project 
commitment by the other states would have probably pushed the 
United Kingdom toward the Atlantic Ally and called off the A400M 
programme for good. 
The decision to join the programme has not to be interpreted as a new 
path in the United Kingdom’s foreign strategy towards a definite pro-
Europe stance, even if the almost parallel decision in favour of the 
METEOR Missile instead of the Raytheon(American) one of course 
created some tensions with the Atlantic Ally, “President Bill Clinton 
had written twice to Mr. Blair on behalf of the American bidder, 
Raytheon, while President Chirac of France and other European leaders 
had lobbied in support of the proposed METEOR Missile designed by 
Matra-Bae Dynamics, a British-French Consortium”.609  
The choice for a European weapon system was determined mainly by 
the so called “smart procurement” reason. General Cardinali stresses 
that the United Kingdom is always oriented towards the United States’ 
market, and this is perfectly confirmed in the UK Defence Industrial 
Strategy of 2005, “we recognize the attractions of the US market, given 
its scale and high levels of investment in research and technology…the 
UK defence budget has grown, but UK companies still generally are 
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Space Technology, 147, 5, 1997, p.  16.  
609 Tom Buerkle, “Blair Unswayed by Clinton Letters: Europe’s Air Industry 
racks up a Gala Day”, International Herald Tribune, Wednesday, May 11, 2000.  
 258 
seeking to secure a share of the larger and generally more profitable US 
market”.610 Moreover the UK’ s strategy has been to welcome overseas 
investment, especially from companies that create value, employment, 
technology or intellectual assets in the UK and thus become part of the 
English defence industry: “within this strategy, we aim to tell industry 
very clearly where, to maintain our national security and keep the 
sovereign ability to use our Armed Forces in the way we choose, we 
need particular industrial capabilities in the UK (which does not 
preclude them being owned or established by foreign-owned 
companies).”611 As an example of this, BaE has sold its quota on the 
Airbus Company to invest in the American market. Nevertheless, the 
United Kingdom pretends that its sold quotas be based in the English 
territory, in order to guarantee jobs and security of supply: products or 
strategic services are kept within the national territory meaning that the 
UK has always a control on foreign societies.612  
Indeed the United Kingdom had a big return from its participation in 
the programme. Airbus, presenting to the MoD the aircraft for its Joint 
Rapid Development Force, explained that the American alternatives(C-
130J and C-17) did not guarantee as much benefits as the A400M in 
terms of performances and costs; moreover, the UK would have had a 
major role in wing design and production in the same vein as it had in 
the production of civil aircraft within Airbus. Against this background, 
it is important to stress the lobbying made by British Aerospace in 
favour of the European project at the time of the decision, “without UK 
government involvement…BAE lead in European wing technology 
designed would be threatened”.613 Also, Roll Royce has been engaged in 
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the engine design and supported by the UK’ s Government (letter of 
intent to Rolls-Royce, 4 may 2003). Benefits will be guaranteed also to 
the propeller manufacture industry with the participation of Messier 
Dowty and the advanced composite industry because of the use of 
carbon-fibre structure.614 The industrial return for the British 
participation were therefore apparent.  
The final decision of the MoD was hence to lease four Boeing C-17 
aircrafts(American) until the A400M enters service, and also to buy 
Raytheon(American) missiles until the METEOR ones come into being, 
a perfect way to keep a balance between  Europe and the Atlantic ally. 
4.15.4 Italy’s decision to withdraw 
After a commitment to the programme Italy withdrew and decided for 
the acquisition of American aircrafts. As seen before, Italy planned 
take-off was of 16 aircrafts.  
Someone has interpreted this move as a precise strategic one, as a re-
statement of the transatlantic link compared to the European one. This 
argument should nevertheless take into consideration the limited 
strategic options Italy had on that occasion. Italy found itself within 
two different poles: the UK, with its special and certain relationship 
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with the United States and the Franco-German tandem that showed to 
be able to go ahead out of a broader European participation. From time 
to time Italy has perceived the exigency both to re-mark its European 
stance or its faith to the transatlantic ally.  Given that Italy had also the 
possibility to deploy the C-130J (American) aircraft which would have 
somehow overlapped with the A400M, its decision towards this latter 
should had to be interpreted as a clear European move.615 Also, Andrea 
Nativi, an expert on defence issues, argued that “Italy, having already 
acquired 22 C-130Js and with an ongoing programme for the purchase 
of a dozen C-27Js, has already done more than its call in the military air 
transport sector”,616 and therefore there was no logical reason to 
participate to the A400M programme also because Italy shortages stood 
mainly in combat aircrafts rather than transport capabilities.  
Against this background, there was not the possibility to finance three 
different projects. Moreover the C27J, a light transport helicopter, was 
produced by Alenia and Italy pointed to make it known 
internationally, given that its predecessor, the G222, was largely used 
in Africa, East Timor and Latin America. Given Italy’s 16 planned 
orders, argues Nativi,  its industrial work-share would have been of 
7,5% and therefore of no strategic significance. Italy’s industrial return 
would have consisted of only “a small slice of the A400M pie” and 
given Italy’s reduced financial resources this distribution of benefits 
was too small. According to some pundits, Italy did not participate in 
the programme since it auspicated basically the application of the juste-
retour principle.  
In an audition made to the parliament for explaining the reasons of 
Italy’s disengagement Minister Antonio Martino explained that 
European industrial and strategic considerations should not have had 
the primacy towards economic and technical reasons, and could not 
have imposed excessive costs in comparison to alternatives at disposal. 
In any case, the building of a European defence was a political action 
with few in common with the construction of a transport military 
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aircraft.617 Moreover, continued the Minister, the new scenarios and 
new terrorism threats did not require urgently  transport capabilities 
but rather other competences such as aerial defence. In accordance with 
Nativi’ s argument Martino pointed out that the Italian industry would 
have had only a secondary role in comparison to the other European 
industries; this of course meant that relative gains were taken into 
account in the final decision. Therefore the agreement that would have 
probably been reached was not satisfying Italian interests.  
While the decision to remain in the A400M programme could have not 
been explained in terms of ‘value for money’ it could have nevertheless 
driven the long-term strategy and direction of a state foreign policy. 
Because of that, Italy has experienced a strong internal political debate 
about its decision to withdraw the A400M Programme. After a first 
Commitment with the centre-left government in 1999, the centre-right 
one decided not to sign the agreement in 2001 and therefore to abandon 
the programme and its estimated orders, a political decision that 
spurred strong tensions between the Minster of Defense and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Renato Ruggiero, which was in favour of 
the Programme.  
Reactions spurred within the political landscape highlighted that the 
withdrawal decision would have endangered the role of Italy in 
Europe, determined its isolation and put it at the margin of the 
tailoring of a security and defence policy.618 It is true that with its 16 
orders Italy was not considered vital for the survival of the programme 
and had not the same bargaining positions of other participating states, 
but some authors stress that the Italian industry could have 
participated in strategic sectors, “Italian government called itself out of 
a fundamental EU programme, in which its industry could have played 
a paramount role-this time totally balanced to the amount of spent 
euros- only to please an hegemonic ally which makes no discounts and 
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which does not reciprocate at all”.619 According to these positions Italy 
should not aspire to be only a sub-contractor of the American industry, 
but instead it should endeavour to develop the ability to produce with 
higher levels of technology, to be competitive and therefore be able to 
export. Italy discarded the option to participate through a ‘defensive 
cooperation’ strategy: as seen in the theoretical part, cooperation may 
be spurred also by the desire to eschew huge discrepancies in relative 
gains arising from the non-participation to a cooperative game. Some 
pundits put the blame on the Italian Government for having put in 
danger Italy’s position at a complex and fluid European turnover, “one 
thing is to contract even hardly with European partners to enter the 
alliance at the best conditions and on a substantially equal base 
affirming the right to preserve relations with the American industry; 
other thing is to cut the alliance, to withdraw without consistent 
motivations, with a snapshot act that -if effectively made- would 
downplay our credibility in common enterprises”.620  
Italy’s decision to withdraw from the Programme still arises debates 
within the political spectrum. It is possible, as the Air Force maintains, 
that Italy did not need that aircraft but its participation in the first 
phases of the Programme planning and its withdrawal afterwards 
seems to suggest that Italy was not content with the return conferred to 
its industry. Given the impossibility to pursue a unilateral path, it had 
to rely on partners to satisfy its requirements and therefore its strategic 
options were quite restricted. As said before, a procurement decision, 
especially in this case- where the weapon systems considered is a 
watershed in the European defence context and encompasses a 
considerable number of European partners- is never a pure ‘value for 
money’ evaluation but also and prominently a strategic move. It 
remains to be seen how the A400M will impinge on the European long-
term strategy and partners interoperability. 
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4.15. 5 OCCAR management of the programme 
OCCAR management of the A400M aircraft constitutes a paramount 
step forward both for the organization and for European defence more 
in general, “the conclusion of the A400M contract last year was a major 
vote of confidence in OCCAR”;621 also, “the decision to put the new 
A400M programme under OCCAR, even though some of the project 
partners are not OCCAR members, was the clearest possible vote of 
confidence in the organization”.622 In 2004 the Director of OCCAR-EA 
affirmed that “the planned A400M milestones have been achieved on 
schedule; a marked improvement has been achieved in the field of 
exchange of information between the Programme Division, nations and 
Airbus Military.623 The A400M will promote operational cooperation 
among European states given that “aircraft configurations are about 
90%”.624 Participating states will request installations of components or 
particular systems in order to satisfy their specific requirements but the 
bulk of the programme is commonly defined and shaped: this shows 
that the participating states found cooperation the soundest way to 
follow. They agreed on coordinating their requirements towards a 
common basic aircraft to which they would add own features through 
their national industries. In this way, they found a compromise 
between the exigency to cooperate and the willingness to maintain 
national prerogatives.  
OCCAR, on its part, has searched to get the maximum benefit out of 
this programme, “since 2003 we have been continuously applying best 
management methods to the programme, with a special focus on risk 
management. Signing a Letter of Understanding with Airbus Military 
in October 2003 has significantly improved the co-ordination of 
programme activities and in particular the involvement of our 
customer in the military aspects of the design of the aircraft. This has 
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created a fruitful relationship  with industry, which has now led to the 
achievement…”.625  
 
 
 
Figure 20: Programme Organization. Airbus Military Source: http:// 
www.airbusmilitary.com/organisation.html  
 
What has to be remarked is that probably states would have reached in 
any case a coordination point. In fact, coordination has been reached 
among states in a series of international cooperative programmes. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible, as General Cardinali emphasizes, that in 
the case of the A400M coordination was reached because of the 
perspective to integrate the programme within OCCAR: this makes a 
lot of difference since states in this case did decide to ‘bind’ their 
commitment through the organization in order to get some economic 
and strategic outcomes out of their cooperative actions, to agree on a 
precise schedule, to accept OCCAR procurement procedures. Given the 
number of participating states and the complexities involved in a 
programme such as this one, OCCAR has certainly eased the 
organizational procedures and has permitted its development, “it is 
understandable that the A400M Programme, without an Organization 
such as OCCAR that encompasses needs, that harmonizes procedures 
and manages the contractual specificities in a common contract will be 
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completely unmanageable given the number of States and the 
complexity of the Programme”.626This does not mean that once 
integrated in OCCAR states do not show different preferences 
regarding the programme development; to the contrary, states do 
continue to support their preferred arrangements satisfying their own 
interests, but do this within an institutionalized framework which 
somehow poses some limitation on their actions.   
As evidence of states supporting their preferred solutions, it is 
noteworthy to consider the case of the A400M engine.  Initially there 
were two proposals for the engine, a Canadian one, proposed by Pratt 
& Whitney and a ‘European’ one, the TP-400-D6, presented by 
Europrop International-EPI-, Rolls Royce (UK 24,8%), Snecma (France, 
24,8%), MTU Aero Engines (Germany, 24,8%) Industria de Turbo 
Propulsores (ITP- Spain13,6%) FIAT AVIO (Italy, 8%),  and TechSpace 
Aero(Belgium4%). After Italy’s withdrawal from the Programme there 
was a correspondent withdrawal of the Italian industry; FIAT AVIO,627 
involved in the engine production was finally expulsed as a 
punishment to Italy for having withdrawn the programme and the 
percentage of the engine work-share redistributed among the other 
members: ITP (16%), MTU(28%), Rolls Royce (28%) and Snecma (28%). 
The two proposals came after a previous Request for Proposal(RFP) 
issued by Airbus Military in April 2002; in order to optimise the 
technical aspects and commercial practices a second RFP was issued. In 
2003 Airbus affirmed that that the Canadian offer was cheaper than the 
European one and that “it would be chosen if there was no ‘political 
dimension’ to the decision”.628 Six days later(6 may 2003), after the 
European Consortium made some price and contractual concessions 
and because of strong pressures exercised by France, Airbus Military 
decided for the European solution, “after a fierce competition (this 
being actually a bland euphemism) with the rival PW 180 proposal by 
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Pratt & Whitney (Canada), the Europrop International Consortium has 
been selected to develop the TP 400-D6 engine for the A400M”.629   
The sub-contracting part was then decided according to the ‘best-
endeavour’ practice, where “the contract requires Airbus Military to 
use ‘reasonable endeavours’ to place with industries of the 
participating nations a level of programme work in proportion to their 
off-take”.630  
Given the composition of Europrop it is easy to see how this 
exemplifies the willingness of the states to keep balance so as to 
mediate contrasts among them. Moreover, within the European 
landscape, “originally two competing designs were being considered 
by AMC (Airbus Military Company) from two engine consortia. 
Political and industrial work-share pressures, however, resulted in a 
decision to combine the two proposals into a single design”.631  In fact, 
Europrop did not exist before. At the very beginning of  the tendering 
process there was a proposal from Snecma and its partners (the M138), 
while the United Kingdom proposed its BR700: the combination and 
adaptation of these two engines requirements has inevitably delayed its 
development even if personnel says that the engine will come out 
improved from this amalgamation. The United Kingdom pressed the 
most for including Rolls Royce in the European project, and insisted 
that the aircraft had a three-shaft layout in accordance with Rolls Royce 
design tradition: Airbus Military accepted its proposal. Therefore, the 
United Kingdom’ s influence on this issue was evident. 
The choice of the European engine instead of the Canadian alternative 
has been considered by the Americans with a rising concern about the 
political reasons guiding equipment choices, such as the  willingness to 
reward European industries instead of a more technical evaluation. 
This reflects some truth if, as Sergio Coniglio points out, the engine 
                                                           
629 Sergio Coniglio, “The EPI TP 400-D6”, Military Technology,  2003. 
630 The United Kingdom Parliament, “Airlift Assets: A400M”, 2002. 
631 John D. Morrocco, “Europe Inches Toward A400M Transport Launch”, 2001,  
152. The author argues that Rolls Royce is the system integrator and that it  
would be in charge of the intermediate pressure compressor, combustor and 
power shaft. Germany MTU will be responsible for intermediate and low-
pressure turbines as well as for taking forward the final assembly of the engine 
in Berlin. Snecma will produce the core of the engine, the high-pressure 
compressor and high pressure turbine and the digital engine control unit with 
MTU. Spain will be in charge of the front frame, intermediate and face casings 
and engine dressings. Fiat Avio for the power gearbox and Belgium will 
furnish the lubrification system.  
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programme is very ambitious given that the design and development 
of turboprop engines has never been attempted by Europeans and the 
Western world in general.632 For sure, the choice to amalgamate all the 
European proposals gave the possibility to pool together all European 
power-plant houses. A turboprop to equip the A400M with, is an 
engine that guarantees the achievement of efficient economies in wide 
contexts. The A 400M will be equipped with four engines. 
As stated in the analysis of OCCAR’ s  structure and practices, an 
important element for the functioning and effectiveness of the 
organization is an early integration of the programme within OCCAR. 
This is so because states, by sharing their views and working together, 
become used to appreciate the positive economic outcomes coming out 
of a common definition of requirements, such as the prevention of  
redundancies and duplications in assembly lines. Moreover, this adds 
to the interoperability needed to face European challenges, security 
threats and uncertain scenarios. The A400M is without doubt the most 
important programme OCCAR is charged to manage both because of 
its ‘political and strategic’ relevance and because it has been integrated 
within the organization from the start of its development phase, 
enhancing the possibility to maximize the cost/performances trade-off.  
Moreover, knowing that more than 50% of the entire life-cycle of a 
programme is given by the In-Service-Support phase OCCAR has been 
entitled of managing this phase for the A400M at a very early date of 
the programme; the problem was therefore, “the search for an 
agreement amongst the participating states to perform support in 
common, thereby sharing resources and achieving increased efficiency 
as well as economies of scale”.633 The problem arose when states tried, 
                                                           
632 Sergio Coniglio, “A400M, AN-70, V-130J, C-17: How Do They Stand? A 
Comparative Report of Military Transport Aircraft Programmes”, Military 
Technology, 2003. 
633 Baudouin Heuninckx, « Availability Improvements in New Transport 
Aircraft, The Case of the A400M », NATO Paper, Unclassified, p. 11. The author 
underlines that analysis conducted have shown that the gains to be achieved by 
common maintenance, pooling of spare parts, common configuration 
management to share the non-recurring costs of modifications, common centres 
for performing  training are significant, and therefore managing this phase in a 
single way would be paramount. In particular he advances the example of 
cross maintenance as a fundamental tool as to the objectives this aircraft has 
been thought for: in this case the mechanics of  a participating state could 
maintain the aircraft of another state. Also, with spare parts lateral support 
aircraft can be more rapidly re-deployed than if the parts had to come from the 
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and still do, to agree upon a sound arrangement to manage the Support 
phase of the programme by reconciling all their positions and 
preferences and coordinating their actions. This process mirrors how 
cooperative solutions are never taken for granted within OCCAR but 
need to be searched from time to time whenever states pursue a 
coordination path: knowing that they will loose something in this 
pattern since their decision will at least in part be related to that of the 
other states and the final result dependent from each state’ 
collaboration, they crave to reach their preferred results that could 
enhance or at least preserve their prerogatives within the cooperative 
setting. For example, “the MoD needs to ensure that the arrangement 
identified provides the UK with operational sovereignty”.634 Also, 
France and Germany seem to be reticent to confer to OCCAR most of 
the ISS activities given they huge share in the Programme.  
The A400M’ s relevance is evident also because this is one of the 
OCCAR’ s  Programme in which non-Member States participate as 
export-nations; this is the case of South Africa, that late on December 
2004 expressed its intention to acquire the weapon system. The 
willingness expressed by South Africa has been of the greatest value for 
the project, first of all because it brought about new confidence to it and 
second because increased orders could boost the quantity of the 
products to be procured. South Africa has been granted the ‘observer 
status’ after the signature of contract with Airbus Military, “as the 
common standard aircraft is the same as for the launching nations,  
OCCAR Member States and A400M Participating States have agreed to 
grant South Africa observer status in order to allow it to get sufficient 
information necessary to manage their own contract with 
AMSL(Airbus Military Sociedad Limitada)”.635 On its side,  South Africa 
gained a work-share, (even if this is not the correct term given that it is 
not properly a participating nation) in the programme as well as 
technological transfers(worth 400 millions of euros), contributing to the 
improvement of airlift capabilities and to the increasing of occupation, 
“we believe this to be a win-win situations for all concerned. Airbus 
                                                                                                                               
state owner of the aircraft. Participation of a country such as South Africa, 
follows the author, is therefore paramount in European operations within 
central Africa. 
634 The United Kingdom Parliament, « A400M Transport Aircraft », NAO Major 
Projects Report, November 2006, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/462/46209.htm.   
635 General Nazzareno Cardinali, “Armament: Which technologies for which 
Defence?”, 2007b, p.  7. 
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Military will gain a valued partner and South Africa will benefit not 
only from a new and highly capable airlifter for the Defence Force but 
from the thousands of jobs that will be created during the life of the 
programme”.636 In 2005 was Malaysia to show interest in the 
Programme and to plan the purchase of four planes, that added to the 
eight ordered by South Africa, bringing the total production to 192 
aircrafts. The contract signed between Airbus Military and Malaysia’s 
Secretary General for Defence conferred to the country a work-share 
consisting on the design and the manufacture of airframe components 
for all the aircrafts to be produced plus a transfer of high technology 
(worth 200 millions euros). 
4.16 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to try to explain the reasons leading states 
to coordinate their actions in defence procurement through the 
presentation of OCCAR, an intergovernmental organization for the 
management of weapon systems in cooperation. 
European States have always cooperated in weapons procurement, but 
their aim was basically to make grown the own national industry. For 
this reason, duplications and fragmentation have characterized the 
European armament scenario and a soaring spiral of costs has 
overburdened yet limited defence budgets. As seen in the first sections 
of the research, OCCAR was inspired by pragmatic and political 
reasons: France and Germany were trying to carry forward their joint 
weapon systems and needed for that reason an efficient structure able 
to cut costs. Moreover, a restricted structure comprising the most 
important defence producers and consumers could have speeded up 
the process toward a common European Industrial Base and a 
European defence might difficultly reachable in the broader European 
context. Of course every state had different visions about the way in 
which the Agency had to be moulded, because different were the 
interest they wanted to achieve through it: for France the Agency was 
paramount in order to create a functional and truly European structure. 
The ‘European preference’ principle, for example, was not deemed 
paramount by all states; for the United Kingdom, instead, participation 
                                                           
636 Francisco Fernandez-Sainz, Managing Director of Airbus Military during the 
Ceremony for the Declaration of Intent signed from South Africa with Airbus 
Military for the participation in the A400M Programme, 15 December 2004, 
www.airbusmilitary.com/pressrelease.html.  
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in OCCAR mirrored a well-known path, that is, the willingness to be 
inside every structure in the European context to monitor its 
development, and preferably in those in which states still retain control 
over their actions. The transatlantic link counted much more for some 
nations than for others; of course, it did count for the UK but also for 
Italy and maybe in a more apparent way: Italy’s withdrawal from the 
A400M Programme was interpreted by some actors as a clear strategic 
choice. Germany, on its side, gave start to this project in tandem with 
France and in some occasions this locked tandem limited its choices, 
such as in the case of the A400M take-offs; nevertheless, their joint 
position has always constituted the bulk of European defence and 
economic stance. Even if different, states’ interests were not 
incompatible and instead there was the feeling among the actors that 
they could have been promoted by such an agency: this conviction, 
together with economic, industrial and strategic pressures did favour 
the creation of OCCAR. 
Notwithstanding its intergovernmental nature OCCAR is a structure 
with own rules, regulations, principles and procurement procedures, 
meaning that all the states have agreed upon a common and unique 
functioning system for the organization: this can of course be 
considered a great achievement on defence issues if compared to 
previous ad hoc agencies created for the procurement of military 
programmes. Also, states do renounce to national procurement 
procedures when conferring a programme to OCCAR. When states do 
integrate a programme in OCCAR they in fact accept OCCAR’ s modus 
operandi: of course, they can withdraw from a programme or defect 
from previous commitments but must pay all the adjustment costs and 
support all the negative consequences such a decision can bring about, 
as in the case of the UK withdrawal from the BOXER programme. 
OCCAR has improved and optimised its procurement practices and 
tried to attract the attention and trust of the Member states: in fact, in 
order to exploit at the maximum its potentialities it should work with a 
great amount of significant ‘European’ programmes, while state-of-the 
art shows that only one programme is considered for integration .  
Also, OCCAR has to mould a difficult and fluid relationship with EDA, 
the neonate European Defence Agency: within the European structure 
this broad agency aims at overtaking some of the functions previously 
thought for OCCAR, such as the ‘harmonization of requirements’ one. 
The years to come quest therefore for a clear and defined setting of the 
two agencies fields of activity, but the current situation seems to 
suggest that OCCAR is and will be devoted to pure management tasks. 
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The first programmes integrated in OCCAR were essentially existent 
ones, and helped the organization to start performing its functions and 
pool together states expertise and team-works. As seen in the research, 
to these programmes the classical juste-retour principle has been 
applied, meaning that states did have an industrial return on the basis 
of their financial contribution to the programme or to orders made. 
This principle has turned into the ‘global balance’ one  with the ‘new’ 
programmes: knowing that a more competitive framework would have 
pushed for better solutions while protecting Member States 
capabilities, these latter decided for an industrial return based on more 
programmes and calculated on more years. Here the consideration is 
twofold: for the ‘global balance’ principle to work appropriately more 
programmes should be integrated within OCCAR; also, an increased 
membership could render the industrial return calculus more arduous. 
OCCAR has been sometimes alleged of being an ‘exclusive club’: this 
statement is reinforced by the strict entry conditions imposed by 
Member States. Belgium’s entrance within the organization has 
somehow downplayed this sensation but it is clear that the 
organization is composed by the most powerful European states on 
defence might and that this has contributed significantly to its positive 
results. While a new system, ESSOR, is under consideration for 
integration, OCCAR is managing some fundamental programmes for 
the new challenges ahead: FREMM, BOXER, FSAF and A400M are 
outstanding examples of the contribution the organization can provide 
to a deepening of the European Defence Industrial Base and to an 
increased interoperability indispensable to face new security threats.  
In particular, the A400M aircraft stands as a demonstration of the 
willingness of seven European states to coordinate their actions and 
answer together to similar needs. This programme has a clear 
“European” relevance since, while performing tactic and strategic 
functions, it is aimed at filling a gap in European projection capabilities 
necessary to conduce out-of-area missions and be independent from 
the Atlantic Ally. As seen in the research, this programme has been 
plagued by delays, postponements, work-sharing controversies and 
withdrawals: within OCCAR Participating States are now facing the 
complicate issue of arranging the In-Service Support phase, trying to 
compose apparent divergences. 
All the ‘struggles’ occurred and occurring within OCCAR and within 
each programme characterize the nature of an organization  essentially 
created to pursue states’ interests; nevertheless, the awareness that 
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unilateral path are no longer pursuable or not rewarding has pushed 
states to search for  coordination and compromise solutions. 
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Conclusion 
The attempt at explaining cooperation on defence procurement among 
European states arises from the observation of real endeavours to 
harmonize and coordinate weapon systems acquisition and 
management procedures. The relevance of this topic is self-evident, as 
standardized or interoperable arms are to-date the preliminary 
condition for substantiating a European defence stance. 
The research has tried to consider all the facets of the cooperation 
observed, from the clarification of the concepts to be employed to the 
actual depiction of coordination on weapon systems. In fact, the first 
two chapters have been mainly theoretical with a high level of 
generality, while the last two chapters narrowed the scope of the 
research by presenting the cooperation arrangements agreed upon 
within the European landscape. 
‘Cooperation’ is one of the few subject-matter that all mainstream 
International Relations schools of thought have problems to deal with 
powerfully and convincingly. Cooperation out of pure alliance 
dynamics and characterized by common principles, norms rules and 
decision-making procedures on a given issue area is traditionally 
labelled as ‘regime’. While the ‘sociological’ approach has described the 
existence of regimes as a reflection of shared interests and identities 
springing out from common ideas, from communication, persuasion 
and discourse, the ‘rationalist’ approaches have always considered 
regimes as a collective action problem. This research does follow the 
assumptions of the rationalist approaches as most of the times regimes 
do not mirror social institutions but compromises and bargaining 
among different interests and among differently endowed states. 
Economic regimes have been broadly treated by the functionalist 
school of thought, which sustained how the Prisoner’s dilemma 
soundly exemplified the cooperation challenges to be faced by states: 
the fear of being double-crossed was the main determinant against 
cooperation, while regimes, with their institutionalized pattern of 
cooperation, the recipe to this problem. At a more careful glance, 
though, the challenges states’ may face when cooperating depend on 
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the structural situation in which they find to play: coordination games, 
for instance, seem to characterize a broad array of cooperative 
situations were states do agree to act jointly so as to avoid a particular 
outcome, but differ on the coordination point they hope to and strive 
for achieve. The precise arrangement is therefore strongly influenced 
by the power states do exhibit. 
If the neo-institutionalist school of thought is aware of the poor 
explanatory power of its theoretical approach to security issues, the 
realist one has a basic difficulty in explaining cooperation in security 
matters: the problem, for both of them, is to consider the ‘security 
dilemma’ as the basic conditions upon which states make their strategic 
choices. Contrary to that, security should be intended in broader terms 
as the possibility to pursue basic interests, such as prestige, 
independence and economic well-being: all these goals depend on and 
are influenced by the context in which actors do find themselves to 
play and by the relations they entertain with each others. 
Stating that cooperation on defence procurement can be classified as a 
security regime and as a coordination game does provide us with 
powerful insights for  assessing the reasons but also the limitations of 
cooperation: relative gains and ‘distributional’ issues are on the 
forefront from this point of view. Coordination, though, should be 
interpreted  as a strategy to pursue own interests when states agree on 
undesirable outcomes and therefore eschew unilateral paths. 
Chapter two has argued that, because of the relevance of defence 
procurement for the security of a state -intended this latter as the 
preservation of power, independence but also of internal jobs and 
markets-, states have tried to keep it within national borders or to drive 
it toward the preferred but not always efficient direction: both aims 
have depended on the structural power of a state and therefore on the 
strategic options at hands. A powerful state will strive to produce its 
own weapon systems, while a small one will buy them off-the shelf: 
middle level options are those at disposal of middle-sized states.  
The fundamental role a state can have on the defence procurement 
process has been explained by the peculiarities of the defence market: 
because of the very nature of the issue at hands, economic reasons have 
always been subject to security and strategic ones, especially in the 
past. In fact, cooperation on defence procurement has been employed 
as but another foreign policy tool according to the power and the 
strategic aims of the actors. 
While past cooperative efforts fell short of establishing permanent and 
functioning procurement arrangements, today soaring pressures are 
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pushing states towards strongly coordinated paths. The end of the Cold 
War has determined an overall shrinkage in European budgets just at 
the same moment when new and multi-faceted threats were coming 
about and when sophisticated technologies were raising weapon 
systems basic costs. On the industrial side, faced by the overwhelming 
American competition, by unit costs increases and by reduction in 
orders, European industries started processes of internal consolidations 
and transnational mergers, often helped in their attempts by national 
states. Big and powerful defence champions have emerged out of these 
practices, permitting European actors to compete on an almost equal 
footing with American competitors. Finally, Europe has said to aspire 
at playing a more powerful role and at gaining an higher influence on 
security matters. For this to happen it should be able to increase 
defence capabilities. This poses two challenges: to the relation with the 
Atlantic Ally and among European states. The poor attempts at 
cooperating in defence matters should be partly explained by the 
existence of the Atlantic Alliance as a guarantee of security and defence 
in the European context: this safe presence has rendered less stringent 
the necessity for a European security and defence might. If after the 
end of the Cold War Europe envisions itself as a more proactive and 
independent player, then it has to fix the transatlantic hurdles this 
posture may arise. On the other hand, a real European defence stance 
should be able to smooth  traditional reticence towards cooperation 
among European states, while favouring common operational 
requirements definition and coordinated procurement practices, so as 
to assure interoperability of their armies. 
All these economic, industrial and strategic pressures have significantly 
narrowed states’ margin of manoeuvre and made coordination the 
soundest alternative to choose; but ultimately, the real impact and 
effectiveness of cooperation has shown to be dependent on their 
political will and effective commitment to cooperate. 
Chapter three has explained that, if a general political will has been 
expressed by European states in favour of cooperation on defence 
procurement, an effective commitment has not yet be undertaken, 
rendering the arrangements agreed as minimal achievements without 
actual impact. This has been especially true within the institutional 
context of the European Union, where the regime on defence 
procurement is made up of Declarations of Intents and no binding 
provisions. Not directly able to impinge on states’ willingness to 
cooperate, the European Commission has searched, as much as 
possible, to create the conditions for a more competitive defence market 
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among European states and to favour rationalization, trying to 
encompass defence within the rules of the European internal market. 
Aside from that, the most important achievement has been the creation 
in 2004 of the European Defence Agency (EDA), committed to form a 
consistent and overwhelming defence framework within the European 
context.  
What has emerged, though, from these initiatives, is that a broad 
partnership and the presence of differently-sized states has prevented 
the realization of significant achievements, while a narrower but 
similar membership, combined with an intergovernmental approach, 
has brought about significant results, such as in the cases of LoI 
Framework agreement and especially of OCCAR (Organization 
Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement). Of course it is not 
possible to speak of an all encompassing European approach, because 
Europe of defence is still ‘Europe at six’ as some authors have pointed 
out, and cooperation seems to be strongly related to the structural 
power possessed. In particular, the bulk of defence production rests 
within four states: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. 
The decision by these states to give birth to a permanent agency 
(OCCAR) for the acquisition and management of weapon systems in 
cooperation should be interpreted as an outstanding step forward: the 
analysis of this organization has made up  the content of chapter four.  
The reasons behind these states’ decision to create OCCAR are different 
and pertains to each state’ s strategic aims: for France the creation of 
OCCAR was above all a way to maintain a leadership within the 
European defence process; for Germany to take forward some 
important weapon systems and confirm its reliability as paramount 
European partner; for the United Kingdom the participation was 
necessary so as to keep a double track on defence matters and try to 
have a say on the development of the European defence stance; finally, 
for Italy, cooperation was almost a compulsory step after all the other 
powerful states did decide in favour of the structure. All the states, 
though, were constrained by the same aforementioned pressures and 
found in their interest to coordinate their actions to avoid undesirable 
outcomes. As in the Concert of Europe, the strategic context did 
impinge on states’ eagerness in favour of cooperation, so that this latter 
was the best tool for the pursuit of different but not incompatible 
interests. As explained in the research, OCCAR does not constitute the 
regime on defence procurement but, because of its principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures, it is better equipped to provide 
insights not only for the reasons of cooperation, but also for the shape 
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coordination did and can assume in defence matters:  this will 
underline the limitations but also the threshold overcome by national 
states. 
As recalled, the first chapter presents a section called ‘ theoretical tool 
for the empirical analysis’ as an attempt at summing up the theoretical 
underpinnings developed and at applying and confronting them with 
the reality at hands: the ability to interpret and explain the situation, 
and therefore the relevance of this research also for future analyses, 
will be determined by the validity and the adherence to reality of the 
arguments made.  
As said, security matters do pose challenges to states’ willingness to 
cooperate because these latter are reluctant to bind themselves and to 
rely on common norms and practices limiting their freedom of action: 
this is of course the case in the defence procurement regime. 
Nevertheless, it has been emphasized that some collective actions do 
not require much more than a minimal agreement by states and low 
degrees of formalization: this perfectly matches with the looseness of 
our regime within the European framework and with the 
intergovernmental rule present in OCCAR, maintaining cooperation 
under strict political control. It has been argued that while states are 
reluctant to participate in structures that can potentially tie their hands, 
participation can be explained by a desire to control other states’ 
actions and limit their room of manoeuvre: this has been the case with 
the United Kingdom decision to participate in OCCAR (but also in 
EDA), explicable as a ‘defensive cooperation’, as underlined in Chapter 
four. Its participation and its huge power on defence matter have 
impinged significantly on the organization structure. 
The representation of defence procurement as a coordination game has 
highlighted the willingness to mutually avoid undesirable outcomes: 
non-interoperable weapon systems, costly procurement programmes, 
fragmented markets and industries and low capabilities with respect to 
the United States are among the undesirable outcomes states do share. 
Coordination is therefore necessary to eschew the likelihood of these 
events to occur or persist. However, and has foreseen in the theoretical 
part, states find themselves to face huge ‘distributional issues’ as each 
of them tries to reach the most preferred outcome: this has happened 
both within and outside of the European context. OCCAR’ s creation, 
as seen, was a kind of compromise solution among the four states, 
where each of them renounced to something. OCCAR’ s programmes, 
to a greater extent, have been and continue to be plagued by huge 
battles among states that inevitably delay or postpone them. Where a 
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compromise solution was not found among states, an example being 
the new decision-making procedure to be established within OCCAR, 
states did remain within old and inefficient arrangements.  
As introduced, defection in a coordination game should come about 
not because of the hope to achieve an higher reward: producing own 
weapon systems is today onerous even for powerful states, non-
participation may impinge on the long-term European strategy and on 
the relative competitiveness towards other European states. Instead, 
defection should be looked at as a dissatisfaction with the cooperative 
point agreed upon. This has been mirrored for example in France’ s 
withdrawal from the MRAV programme and Italy’s withdrawal from 
the A400M military transport aircraft. A powerful state is able to afford 
a going-it-alone strategy, but should pay the consequences of its 
actions, as appreciated in the United Kingdom withdrawal from the 
BOXER programme. It is fair to say, though, that the intergovernmental 
character of the organization and of the other arrangements agreed 
upon, together with the provision of opting-out and compensation 
tools render ‘defection’ in general a less attractive alternative and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game less relevant in explaining strategic 
situations. 
Similarly to past security regimes, OCCAR has been created by the 
most powerful actors within the European landscape as for defence 
resources: France knew that without the participation of the United 
Kingdom and of Italy a consistent and thorough European defence 
might would have been impossible. Together the four states defined 
the structure of the Organization, each providing an own significant 
contribution. Together they decided the rules for coordination so as to 
maintain a fair equilibrium and preserve the own power position 
within OCCAR: everything suggests this aim, from the votes conferred 
to Members and the same voting-procedures, from the staff, the 
headquarters, from the procurement procedures (global balance). This 
latter, in particular, is depicted as a form of ‘compensation’ foreseen by 
the organization both to ease cooperation and preserve a balanced 
work-share during time. Also, each state can decide whether to 
participate or not in a programme managed through OCCAR: this 
confers the degree of flexibility needed to deem the organization as a 
valuable cooperation tool. 
Considering the ‘neo-institutionalist’ tools favouring cooperation over 
time, it is possible to assess, observing OCCAR, that they do not have 
the same impact as envisioned in the functionalist theories. 
‘Reputation’, for example, while frequently invoked to compel states 
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compliance, is difficultly a tool fostering or stemming cooperation: 
while the United Kingdom is said to have ambiguous behaviours 
toward the European defence, European states do always search its 
cooperation, and this is so essentially because of its defence capabilities 
and power. Given that European defence producers are but a few, 
reputation assumes a clear lower role in favouring or hampering 
cooperation.  
While the regime may help discussion among members and make 
know each other position, it cannot prominently facilitate information 
sharing among states, as defence is strictly kept under national control: 
this has been apparent in the discussion about In-Service Support, 
where European allies find it difficult to coordinate their actions, and in 
all the procedures for the classification of information in OCCAR. 
Finally, ‘reiteration’ effect is ambiguous: while, for example, the global 
balance principle assures a fair return in the long-run and therefore 
incentives reiteration, the likelihood of future encounters may render 
more harsh the strive for today’s compromise, as the returns achieved 
within it could increase a state’ s bargaining power and then influence 
future coordination points. As a result, delays and postponements are 
likely to plague cooperative efforts. 
The relevance of the strongest states within a regime should be 
evaluated also in the relations entertained with weaker ones, and in 
particular in the willingness to accept them on the regime or in the 
conditions posed for their acceptance: in OCCAR we saw that while 
Founding Members accepted Belgium’s candidacy, they pretended that 
it was conferred less votes than they had. Spain pretended and 
obtained more votes than Belgium (8) considering itself a more 
powerful state than Belgium was. As a counterpart to this concession, 
the Founding Members required that Spain participated in two 
Programmes. Cooperation arises when it is rewarding, and it is 
rewarding when there is room for reciprocity or compensations 
bargaining among similarly powerful states. This may explain why, for 
example, Founding Members do not seem to pressure to accept new 
members. A small amount of Members is a sound number to work with 
both at the decision-making level and to make work some of the 
agreement reached within OCCAR: global balance, for example, is 
more easily applicable with a restricted number of actors.  
However, the entrance of a new Member State will have to be accepted 
by the Founding States, and these latter would set the conditions and 
ask for precise and sometimes hard requests. This practically indicates 
that Founding Members are able to state the rules of the game.  
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That said, it should be stressed that OCCAR stands as a paramount 
achievement: its lessons, therefore, should inform future cooperative 
proposals. While it is assessed that OCCAR is an intergovernmental 
structure reflecting its members positions, it is also clear that it is 
something more to that. First of all, OCCAR is structurally different 
from pure ad hoc agencies because it has a precise procurement model 
that mirrors none of the internal procurement procedures of its 
Member states and that is equally agreed upon by all states. Second, 
every national state has conceded something for the sake of OCCAR’ s 
creation because coordination always implies an accommodation 
among actors, and an institutionalized coordination among similarly 
powerful actors requires the delineation of common principles, 
missions, strategic aims. States’ decision to insert in OCCAR provisions 
for mitigating the shortfalls produced by an abrupt withdrawal or a 
likely event is another example of their willingness to go on with 
cooperation and punish detrimental behaviours. The same global 
balance principle was some years ago only a far remote whish for 
states. In the case of the A400M, states did decide to ‘bind’ their 
commitment through the organization in order to get some economic 
and strategic outcomes out of their cooperative actions, to agree on a 
precise schedule, to accept OCCAR procurement procedures. Given the 
number of participating states and the complexities involved in a 
programme such as this one, OCCAR has certainly eased the 
organizational procedures. This does not mean that once integrated in 
OCCAR states do not show different preferences regarding the 
programme development; to the contrary states do continue to support 
the preferred arrangements satisfying their own interests, but do this 
within an institutionalized framework which somehow poses some 
limitation on their actions. 
These achievements should nevertheless take account of a small and 
similar partnership which in no way find a replication within the 
European Union context: EDA, even if intergovernmentally shaped, 
pays the price of a broad membership where often incompatible 
interests do meet. OCCAR is an example of ‘exclusive’ but efficient 
procurement organization because it permits states to achieve their 
interests: states do want OCCAR to perform beneficial cooperative 
actions up to the point when their interests and position are not 
endangered. The coordination achieved for OCCAR’ s creation has to 
be constantly re-negotiated whenever a new step has to be undertaken, 
and this would be hugely painful with a broader and variegated 
membership. 
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Figures 
Figure 6 . MOD’s  top 10 direct suppliers in 2004/2005 showing location of 
corporate HQ Defence Industrial Strategy Source: Defence White Paper, 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, by Command of 
her Majesty, December 2005 http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F530ED6C-
F80C-4F24-8438-0B587CC4BF4D/0/def_industrial_strategy_wp_cm6697.pdf 
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Figure 9. OCCAR Headquarters. Source:  OCCAR Presentation to CNAD, 
NATO HQ, Richard Burley-Commercial Editor, October 2006- 
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Figure 10: Programme Contributions in Millions of 
Euros. Source: General Nazzareno Cardinali to the 
Defence Commission of the Italian Senate, Rome 29 May 
2007. 
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Figure 11: Staff Contribution. Source: General Nazzareno 
Cardinali to the Defence Commission of the Italian Senate, 
Rome 29 May 2007. 
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Figure 18. Work-share  of the A400M before Portugal withdrawal and Germany 
reduced orders. Source: Aviation News, www.aviation-
news.co.uk/a400m.html. Each of the sub-assemblies will be produced by the 
members nations in different parts of Europe and then delivered to the final 
assembly-line in Seville, Spain. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: A400M Strategic Workshare. Source:  http:// 
www.airbusmilitary.com/programme.html 
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